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1 



PHILOSOPHICAL 



PRACTICAL TREATISE 



ILL. 



BY THOMAS C. UPHAM, 

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN 
BOWDOIN COLLEGE. 



PORTLAND, 

PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM HYDE, 

FOR Z. HYDE. 

1834. 









Entered, according to act of Congress, in the year 1S34, by 
Thomas C. Upham, A. M. 
; u the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Maine. 



tirc-vr Thfeol. Stan, 

IN E l 
•AN 24 1808 

JOSEPH GRIFFIN, PRINTER, 
BRUNSWICK, ME. 



PREFACE. 



In offering to the public the following Treatise on the Will, 
I am obliged to presume', in no small degree, on its forbear- 
ance and candour. It is a subject, which, in some of its ap- 
plications, has been so long connected with Theological con- 
troversies, that it is almost impossible to write upon it, without 
exciting the suspicion, that the discussion will assume a party 
character. I hope the reader will do me the justice in the out- 
set to believe, that my object is not a party one, and that the 
ascertainment of truth is my only aim. If he will take the 
trouble carefully to read the Treatise through, as I hope he 
will before pronouncing an opinion upon it, I anticipate the 
pleasure of standing fair in his estimation, as a candid inquir- 
er after the truth, whether I have been successful in my efforts 
or not. 

I presume the reader, and the public generally, will agree 
with me in the admission, that the subject of the Will is one 
of great importance, both theoretically and practically. And 
yet there can be no hesitation in saying, that it has never re- 
ceived that attention from mental philosophers, which is due to 
it. In those various Schools of philosophy, which from time 
to time sprung up among the ancient Greeks and Romans, it 



IV PREFACE. 

seems almost wholly to have escaped notice ; their specula- 
tions, so far as they related to the nature of the mind, being 
principally taken up with inquiries into the origin of knowledge 
and the nature of virtue. From the earlier English writers on 
the mind, Hobbes, Cudworth, Butler, Baxter, and others, al- 
though it was not wholly passed by, it received no attention 
worthy of particular notice at the present time, and in the pres- 
ent advanced state of mental science. Mr. Locke, however, who 
has treated of this subject incidentally in his chapter on Pow- 
er, entered upon its investigation with his accustomed ability; 
and, as his views were given in the later editions of his Essay 
on the Human Understanding, they were greatly in advance 
of any thing, that had been written before. There are also 
some valuable remarks on the Will in Dr. Reid's writings; but 
he takes, on the whole, but a limited view of it. Mr. Stewart 
throws his observations, which are not numei-ous and which 
consist rather of criticisms on the opinions of others, than of a 
decided and systematic expression of his own, into an Ap- 
pendix. The learned and able Inquiry into the Will of President 
Edwards does not profess to go over the whole ground, and to 
exhaust the whole subject; but on the contrary, as appears 
from the very title page, is limited to a particular aspect or 
view of it, viz, that Freedom of the Will, which is supposed to 
be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and pun- 
ishment, praise and blame. 

But I would not be understood to make these remarks in 
the way of complaint. It could hardly be expected to be oth- 
erwise. An examination into the will naturally comes last in 
order in all inquiries into the mind. The questions relative to 
the origin of knowledge and the intellectual part of our consti- 
tution come first in order; and these are questions, which are 
not settled without much care and labour. The natural order 
of inquiry then brings us to the Sensibilities or sentient states 



PREFACE. v 

of the mind, in distinction from the intellectual, viz, the various 
forms of emotion and desire and feelings of moral obligation. 
These must be examined and understood also, as well as the 
intellectual part. Until mental philosophy is in some degree 
satisfactorily established in these great departments, the doc- 
trine of the will, although it maybe a matter of conjecture, 
cannot be fully and correctly ascertained. But this period has 
arrived ; and there is no longer any excuse for permitting this 
important inquiry to remain neglected. The subject is one of 
wide extent, perhaps more so than has sometimes been imagin- 
ed; and one too, which admits of various and important practi- 
cal applications. My examination of it may be imperfect, 
(and in truth, considering the variety of topics embraced in it, 
cannot well be otherwise,) and yet I cannot but indulge the 
hope, that some obscurities have been cleared up, that 
some leading principles have been established, and that the 
subject is placed in various respects in a satisfactory light. 
But of this the candid reader, who will take the trouble to ex- 
amine with suitable care what has been written, will be able to 
form a more accurate judgment for himself. 

THOMAS C. UPHAM. 
Bowdoin College, May, 1834. 



CONTENTS. 



PART FIRST. 

GENERAL NATURE OF THE 
WILL. 

Chap. I. — classification of the 

MENTAL POWERS. 

SECT. 

Of the method of inquiry proper 
to be pursued 1 

The will should be examined in 
connection with other parts of 
the mind 2 

The states of the mind may be re- 
garded in a threefold view 3 

Evidence of the general arrange- 
ment from consciousness 4 

Evidence of the same from terms 
found in different languages 5 

Evidence from incidental remarks 
in writers 6 

Consciousness alone not sufficient 
to give a full knowledge of the 
mind 7 

Further proof from various writers 
on the mind 8 

Of the consideration due to the 
opinions of able and professed 
inquirers into the mind 9 

A knowledge of the will implies a 
preliminary knowledge of the 
intellect 10 

Implies a preliminary knowledge 



also of the sensibilities 11 

II. RELATION OF THE INTEL- 
LECT TO THE WILL. 

A connection existing among all 
the parts and powers of the 
mind 12 

The intellectual part the founda- 
dation or basis of the others 13 

The connection of the understand- 
ing with the will shown from its 
connection with action 14 

Further proof from an observation 
of the conduct of men 15 

Of the nature of the connection be- 
tween the understanding and 
will 16 

Of the opinions of Mr. Locke on 
this point 17 

Opinions of Sir James Mackintosh 
on the same subject 18 

The understanding reaches the 
will through the sensibilities 19 

The acts of the intellect the direct 
antecedents to emotions 20 

Emotions change with changes of 
the intellectual perceptions 21 

The powers of the will not per- 
fectly correspondent to those of 
the intellect 22 

An energetic will sometimes found 

. in connection with limited pow- 
ers of intellect 23 

/ 

I 



CONTENTS. 



III. — RELATION OF THE SENSIBIL- 
ITIES TO THE WILL. 



General statement in explanation 
of the term sensibilities 

Of what are strictly included un- 
der the sensibilities 

Acts of the intellect in immediate 
proximity with emotions 

Emotions not in proximity with 
volitions 

Emotions followed by desires and 
feelings of obligation 

Further remarks on obligatory 
feelings 

Desires and obligatory feelings in 
contact with the will 

Opinions of metaphysical writers 
on the foregoing statements 

Of the strength of the desires 

Of the strength of feelings of obli- 
gation 

Of the influence of the sensibilities 
on the understanding 



24 



25 



2G 



27 



2S 



29 



30 



33 



34 



IV. VOLITIONS OR VOLUNTARY 

STATES OF MIND. 



The necessity of that controlling 

power which exists in the will 
The harmony of the mind secured 

by the superintendence of the 

will 
Remarks on the nature of the will 
Of the nature of the acts of the 

will or volitions 
Volition never exists without 

some object 
It exists only in reference to what 

we believe to be in our power 
Volition relates to our own action 

and to whatever else may be 

dependent upon us 
Volitions may exist with various 

degrees of strength 
Causes of the variation of the 

strength of the voluntary exer- 
cise 
Of preference or indifferency as 

applicable to the will 



33 



39 



40 



41 



42 



43 



44 



V. DISTINCTION BETWEEN DE- 
SIRES AND VOLITION'S. 

Of an objection sometimes made 
to the general arrangement 45 

Probable cause of desires and vo- 
litions being confounded 46 

The distinction of desires and vo- 
litions asserted by consciousness 47 

Desires differ from volitions in nx- 
edness and permanency 4S 

Further proof of this distinction 
from language 49 

Sentiments of esteem and honour 
often imply this distinction 50 

Of some strictures on the foregoing 
remarks of Reid 51 

Volitions may exist in Tespect to 
those complex acts which the 
mind can embrace as one 52 

If the distinction in question do 
not exist, the foundation of mor- 
als becomes unsettled 53 

Instances in illustration of the dis- 
tinction in question. 54 

Additional instances in illustration 
and proof 55 

The subject further illustrated by 
the voluntary death of the Sag- 
untines 56 

Of the chastisements of the Su- 
preme Being inflicted on those 
he loves 57 

Objected that these views lead to 
contradictions 58 

Opinions of Mr. Locke on this 
subject 5S 

•PART SECOND. 
LAWS OF THE WILL. 

CHAP I. UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 



The preceding chapters preparato- 
ry to what follows 

Of the importance of the topics 
now entered upon 

The inquiry, whether the will has 
its laws, preliminary to that of 



59 



60 



CONTENTS. 



its freedom 61 

Every thing throughout nature has 

its laws 62 

Reference to remarks of Cicero on 

the universality of law , 63 

Reference to remarks of Hooker 

on the universality of law 64 

The universality of law implied in 

the belief of a Divine exist- 

tence 65 

A presumption thus furnished in 

favour of the subjection of the 
will to law 66 

II. LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

Of certain laws or principles which 

extend to all classes of objects 67 
A belief in the law of causation 

founded in the peculiar structure 

of the human mind 68 

Of the universality of the law of 

causation 69 

Of the classification into Effective 

and Preparative causes 70 

Opinions of various philosophers 

on this subject 71 

Opinions of President Edwards on 

this subject 72 

Of the results of a denial of this 

proposition 73 

The truth of the proposition under . 

consideration implied in the fact 

of a Supreme existence or Deity 74 
Application of the views of this 

chapter to the will 75 

III. LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

Belief of men in the continued uni- 
formity of nature's operation's 76 

The belief exists in reference to 
mind as well as matter 77 

Circumstances under which this 
belief arises 78 

Of the true idea of chance, in dis- 
tinction from uniformity 79 

Grounds or foundation of this be- 
lief 80 



Reference to the opinions of Reid 
and Abercrombie 81 

Application of these views to the 
will S2 

Of an objection to these views 
drawn from the conduct of men 83 

IV. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 

Of the existence of a moral gov- 
ernment 84 
Laws of the will deducible from 
the first principles of moral gov- 
ernment 85 
Laws of the will inferred from 
that supremacy or paramount 
authority, which is implied in a 
moral government 86 
Laws of the will inferred from 
that accountability and depen- 
dence, which are implied in a 
moral government 87 
Inferred also from the fact, that 
the subject of a moral govern- 
ment must be endued with ade- 
quate powers of obedience 88 
Laws of the will inferred from 
that rationality which is essen- 
tial to the subjects of a moral 
government 89 
Laws of the will inferred from the 
fact that in the administration 
of a moral government motives 
are employed 90 
Inferred also from the application 

of rewards and punishments 91 

The same inferred from the fact, 
that the moral government of 
the present life is in its nature 
disciplinary 92 

That the will has laws implied in 
the existence of virtue and vice 93 

V. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED. 

IN THE PRESCIENCE OF THE 
DEITY. 

The notion which men naturally 



CONTENTS 



form of the Deity implies fore- 
knowledge 94 

The prescience of God involved 
and implied in his omniscience 95 

The prescience of God directly 
taught in the Scriptures 96 

The foreknowledge of events im- 
plies the foreknowledge of vo- 
litions 97 

Of the reasonableness of the fore- 
going views 98 

Application of these views to the 
will 99 

The views of this chapter in har- 
mony with the doctrine of the 
influences of the Holy Spirit 100 

VI. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORE- 
SIGHT OF MEN. 

Man as well as Deity susceptible 
of foresight 101 

Prescience or foresight of men in 
respect to their own situation 
and conduct 102 

Foresight of men in respect to 
the conduct of others 103 

Other familiar instances of this 

foresight 104 

Of sagacity in the estimate of in- 
dividual character ' 105 

Foresight of the conduct of mas- 
ses of men and nations 106 

Proof from the regularity obser- 
vable in the commission of 
crime 107 

VII. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

IN THE SCIENCES RELATING 
TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 

Of the object of sciences relating 
to human conduct 108 

Illustration of the subject from 
Political Philosophy 109 

Agreement among writers who 
in other respects differ 110 

Illustration of the subject from 
2 



History 111 

Illustration of the subject from 

Political Economy 112 

Reference to Municipal law 113 

Remarks of Beccaria on mildness 

of punishments 114 

Reference to the science of Edu- 
cation 115 
Illustration of the subject from 

Oratory 116 

Laws of the will implied in 

Christian Ethics 117 

Similar views applicable in other 

sciences 118 

VIII. OTHER PROOFS OF LAWS OF 

THE WILL. 

The subjection of the will to law 
confirmed by consciousness 119 

Confirmed by the fact of the 
will's not being a subject but 
an attribute 120 

The same confirmed by the na- 
ture of volition 121 

The analog)' of the other parts 
of the mind furnishes a pre- 
sumption that the will is sub- 
ject to law 122 

Proof from the facts developed 
in history 123 

Proof from instances of predomi- 
nant passion 124 

The subjection of the will to law 
evinced by cases of casual as- 
sociation 125 

Instances illustrative of the prece- 
ding section 126 

Remarks in conclusion of the ar- 
gument 127 

IX. NATURE AND KINDS OF MO- 
TIVES. 

Connection of this subject with 
the consideration of motives 128 

Of the divisions of motives into 
Internal and External 128> 

External motives derive their efS.- 



CONTENTS 



cacy from the mind 

The character of motives de- 
pends in part on the constitu- 
tional traits of the individual 

Their character depends in part 
on temporary influences 

Further division of motives into 
Personal and Moral 

On the use of the phrase person- 
al motives 

The appetites, propensities, and 
affections not in themselves of 
a moral nature 

Motives coextensive with voli- 
tions 

Nature of the influence of motives 

Of the will's being governed by 
the strongest motive 

Of the elements of the contest 
within 



130 



131 



132 



133 



134 



135 



136 
137 



138 



139 



PART THIRD. 

FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

Chap. I. — nature of mental 

FREEDOM. 

Of bodily in distinction from 
mental freedom 140 

Of unsuccessful attempts to ex- 
plain the nature of freedom 141 

Freedom the name of a simple 
abstract idea 142 

Occasions of the origin of the 
abstract idea of liberty 143 

Of the undefinableness of the 
term freedom 144 

Supposed definitions of freedom 
mere synonyms 145 

Distinction between the idea and 
reality of liberty 146 

Of the source of our knowledge 
of liberty itself in distinction 
from the abstract idea of liberty 147 

Of the precise import of the 
phrase moral liberty 14S 



II. MENTAL HARMONY THE BA- 
SIS OR OCCASION OF MENTAL 
FREEDOM. 



Statement of the inquiry in this 
chapter 

Occasions on which liberty exists 

Of the circumstances under 
which this mental harmony 
may be expected to exist 

Opinions of Bishop Butler on 
conscience 

Reference to the opinions of Dr. 
Price on this subject 

Objected that perfect harmony 
of the mind is not realized here 

Perfection of mental harmony 
and consequent mental liberty 
illustrated from the character 
of the Savior 

Objected that the foregoing views 
are necessarily and in then- 
very terms inconsistent with 
liberty 



149 
150 



151 



152 



153 



154 



155 



156 



III. FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

Remarks on the nature of the 
freedom of the will 157 

Of the relation of the freedom of 
the will to the fact of its sub- 
jection to law 158 

Circumstances or occasions un- 
der which freedom of the will 
exists 159 

Evidence of the freedom of will 
from consciousness 160 

Of an objection to the argument 
from consciousness 161 

Evidence of the will's freedom 
from the nature of motives 162 

Objected that the will is necessa- 
rily governed by the strongest 
motive 163 

IV. FREEDOM OF THE WILL IM- 
PLIED IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE. 

Remarks on the nature or mode 
of the argument 164 



CONTENTS. 



Of the elements of man's moral 
nature 165 

Evidence of freedom of the will 
from feelings of approval and 
disapproval 166 

Proof of freedom from feelings 
of remorse 167 

Without the possession of liber- 
ty of will man could never 
have framed the abstract no- 
tions of right and wrong 168 

Proof from feelings of moral ob- 
ligation 169 

Evidence from men's views of 
crimes and punishments 170 

Prevalent opinions of mankind 
on this subject 171 



V, 



-OTHER PROOFS OF FREEDOM 
OF THE WILL. 



Evidence of the freedom of the 
will from languages 172 

Evidence from the occasional 
suspension of the will's acts 173 

Evidence of the freedom of the 
will from the control which 
every man has over his own 
motives of action 174 

The freedom of the will further 
shown from the attempts of 
men to influence the conduct 
of their fellow-men 175 

Further evidence from the obser- 
vation of men's conduct 176 

Argued further from the view ta- 
ken in the Scriptures 177 

Practical importance of the doc- 
trine of liberty 178 

VI. CONSISTENCY OF LAW AND 

FREEDOM. 



Objected that the views maintain- 
ed are contradictory 

Answered that they result neces- 
sarily from the evidence 

Denial of the alledged contradic- 
tion 

Admission of inexplicableness or 



179 



180 



181 



mystery 182 

Of the limited powers of the hu- 
man mind 183 

We find things which cannot be 

explained every where 184 

Illustrated from the influence of 
one man over another 185 

The opposite supposition attend- 
ed with equal difficulty 186 

Both views are to be fully recei- 
ved 187 

The doctrine of the will's free- 
dom equally important with 
that of its subjection to law 188 

VII. ENTHRALMENT OR SLAVE- 
RY OF THE WILL. 



Of the occasions of mental en- 
thralment 189 

Inability to define enthralment or 
slavery 190 

The nature of mental enthral- 
ment illustrated by a reference 
to extorted promises 191 

Illustration of the same subject 
from cases of torture 192 

Historical illustrations of the sub- 
ject 193 

The will enthralled by the indul- 
gence of the appetites 194 

Enthralment of the will occasion- 
ed by predominant and over- 
ruling propensities 195 

The will enthralled by inordi- 
nate ambition 196 

The will enslaved by the indul- 
gence of the passions 197 

Inordinate intensity of the domes- 
tic affections 198 

Of the slavery of the will in con- 
nection with moral accounta- 
bility 199 



VIII. ALIENATION OR INSANITY 

OF THE WILL. 

Insanity predicable of all the 

powers of the mind 200 

Of alienation or insanity of the 



CONTENTS. 



will 201 

Another instance of this species 
of insanity 202 

Of insanity of the will in con- 
nection with cases of casual 
association 203 

Of alienation of the will as con- 
nected with a disordered state 
or alienation of belief 204 

Alienation of the will in connec- 
tion with melancholy 205 

Of alienation of the will termed 

INCONSTANTIA 206 

Of accountability iu connection 
with alienation or insanity of 
the will 207 



PART FOURTH. 
POWER OF THE WILL. 

Chap. I. — nature of mental 
power. 

Of the distinction between liber- 
ty and power 208 
Proof of the distinction between 

liberty and power 209 

The distinction of power and lib- 
erty involved in the fact of 
our being able to form the ab- 
stract ideas of power and lib- 
erty 210 

Distinction of power and liberty 
shown from language 211 

Further shown from the fact of 
our possessing a moral nature 212 

Origin of the idea of power hi 
Original Suggestion 213 

Occasions of the origin of the idea 
of power 214 

The idea of power involves the 
reality of power 215 

Things exist which are not made 

known by the senses 216 

Of power as an attribute of the 
iiuman mind 217 



Further shown by a reference to 
the Divine Mind 21S 

II. — power of the will. 

Proof of power in the will from 

the analogy of the mind 219 

The power of the will restricted 
and subordinate 220 

Proof of power in the will from 
internal experience 221 

Proved from the ability which 
we have to direct our attention 
to particular subjects 222 

Proof of power in the will from 
observation 223 

Of power of the will as exhibit- 
ed in patience under suffering 224 

Illustration of the subject from 
the command of temper 225 

Further illustrations of this sub- 
subject 226 

Proved from the concealment of 
the passions on sudden and 
trying occasions 227 

Further instances of concealment 
and repression of the passions 228 

Illustrated from the prosecution 
of some general plan 229 

The subject illustrated from the 
course of the first settlers of 
New England 230 

Illustrated by the fortitude ex- 
hibited by Savages 231 

III. — self-determining power 

OF THE WILL. 

General remarks on a self-deter- 
mining power 232 

Of a self-determining power of 
the mind 233 

Of a self-determining power of 
the will 234 

Of such a self-determining pow- 
er of the will as involves the 
dependence of the present vo- 
lition on a former one 235 

Opinions of President Edwards 
on this subject 236 



CONTENTS. 



IV. — DIFFERENCES OF VOLUNTA- 
RY POWER. 

Differences in voluntary power 
seldom noticed 237 

Remarks on constitutional weak- 
ness of the will 238 

Of comparative or relative weak- 
ness of the will 239 

Instances of want of energy of 
the will 240 

Remarks on great strength of the 
will 241 

Energy of the will as displayed 
under bodily suffering 242 

Energy of the will as shown in 
imminent danger 243 

Energy of the will as shown in 
martyrdoms 244 

Subject illustrated from two clas- 
ses of public speakers 245 

Power of the will requisite in the 
military and other arts 246 

Energy of the will requisite in 
the men of revolutions 247 

Practical application of these 
views 248 



V. — CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

Connection of the philosophy of 
the "will with consistency of 
character 249 

Illustrations of the inconsistent 
character 250 

Illustrations of the consistent 
character 251 

Of individuals remarkable for 
consistency of character 252 

Of the value of consistency in 
the religious character 253 

Of the foundation of basis of con- 
sistency and inconsistency of 
character 254 

Of inconsistency of belief in con- 
nection with inconsistency of 
conduct and character 255 



Self-possession an element of 
consistency of character 256 

Consistency implies persever- 
ance under changes of circum- 
stances 257 

Consistency implies a control 
over the passions 258 



VI. 



-DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 



Importance .'of a due discipline 
of the voluntary power 259 

A due balance of all the powers 
the most favourable state of 
things to the just exercise of 
the will 260 

Of the culture of the appetitites, 
propensities, and passions as 
auxiliary to the discipline of 
the will 261 

Some instances and proofs of the 
foregoing statements 262 

Importance of repressing the out- 
ward signs of the passions 263 

Of enlightening the intellect in con- 
nection with the discipline of 
the will 264 

Further remarks on the same sub- 
ject 265 

Of aiding the will by a reference 
to the regard of others 266 

Of aiding the will by a reference 
to conscience 267 

Of the aids furnished by the prin- 
ciple of imitation 268 

Of aiding the will by placing our- 

self in circumstances that do not 
admit of a retreat 269 

Of the effects of habit in giving 
strength to the will 270 

Of strengthening the will by reli- 
gious considerations 271 

NOTE (SECTION OMITTED.) 

The fact of laws of the will shown 
from the regularity of voluntary 
contributions and of depositesl05* 



CHAPTER FIRST. 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL POWERS. 



§. 1 . Of the method of inquiry proper to be pursued. 

In entering upon a discussion of the various questions, 
connected with the Will, it is perhaps proper to remark upon 
the course, which we deem it expedient to pursue. It will 
be our desire to rest mainly upon facts, and the obvious de- 
ductions from them ; and to avoid, as much as possible, mere 
speculation. The indulgence of speculation is often flatter- 
ing to pride of intellect, and is perhaps indicative of the con- 
sciousness of mental power ; but it is not on all subjects, 
unless controlled and mitigated by a frequent recurrence to 
facts, favorable to the ascertainment of truth. The inquiries 
before us, so far at least as the mode of conducting ^ / 

them is concerned, ought to be prosecuted in essen- 
tially the same manner as our inquiries into the physical 
world. What we wish to know are the simple facts that 
exist, and the general laws which they obviously develope 
and prove, in distinction from mere conjectures, however 
ingenious they may be. We apprehend, that this course, if 

we promise ourselves a favorable issue, is necessary in all 

3 „ 



18 CLASSIFICATION OF 

discussions in respect to the mind, to whatever powers they 
may relate. 

Especially is this true in respect to the Will, not only on 
account of the peculiar nature of its operations, but also for 
another obvious reason. There must be evidently some 
point in the mental constitution, which connects man with 
his Maker. Although men have liberty and power in their 
appropriate sphere of action, they are not in the strict sense 
of the term independent. All created beings, however great 
their powers may be, form but so many links in the immense 
chain of existence, that extends from the throne of God down 
to the humble forms of life,that approach nearest to inanimate 
matter. All, therefore, must, in some way, be connected with 
that great Source of existence,without whose emanations there 
could be existence no where. And accordingly it is in the 
voluntary part of our mental constitution that we find the 
point of union, the position of contact with the Divine Mind ; 
for the divine mind runs through and connects itself with the 
whole range of existences, making them all one in subordi- 
nation. Accordingly in the examination of the Will we 
must expect to meet with the apparently inconsistent attri- 
butes of freedom, dependence, and power, existing and uni- 
ting harmoniously in the same being. It is here of course, 
that we meet with much to perplex our judgment, to try our 
faith, and to solicit speculation. How necessary, then, to 
be on our guard, to proceed with caution, to test our powers 
of investigation exclusively within the legitimate limits of 
their action, and to be governed by those sentiments of 
modesty, which are suitable to fallible beings ! 

We are aware, that this proposed course is not altogether 
in accordance with what is termed the spirit of the age, 
which seems to call constantly for exaggeration ; for what 
is novel, strange, and unprecedented ; for something that 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 19 

"will arouse and astonish, rather than convince. But this 
diseased and inordinate appetite for novelty and excitement 
ought to be rebuked rather than encouraged ; and least of 
all should it be permitted to find nourishment and support in 
the calm regions of philosophy. Let us then proceed to this 
interesting inquiry with those chastened feelings of modera- 
tion and caution which have been recommended, and relying 
chiefly upon facts and the legitimate inferences which they 
furnish, and indulging as little as possible in speculation, be 
content with what we may be able to establish on a firm foun- 
dation, without complaining, that our limited and imperfect 
powers require some things to be left in obscurity. 

§. 2. The will should be examined in connection with other 
parts of the mind . 

It must constantly strike the observer, who carefully 
contemplates the facts, which the universe every where ex- 
hibits, that no object which exists is wholly disconnected 
from other objects. Accordingly in attempting to examine the 
nature of the Will, and in considering it in the various aspects 
in which it presents itself to our notice, it is obvious, that we 
must not regard it as standing alone, and apart from every 
thing else. It not only participates in the general nature of 
the mind, but has a close connection and sympathy with all 
its various modes of action. The general nature of the soul 
could not be altered, nor greatly affected in any way, with- 
out at the same time affecting the Will. Nor could a single 
susceptibility, even one of minor. importance, be either struck 
out from the list of its powers, or be greatly changed, with- 
out being attended with the same result. In the' present 
discussion, therefore, we are naturally and urgently led to 
take a concise view of the general structure of the- mind, for 
the purpose of more fully comprehending the relation, which 
the will sustains to the other parts. 



20 CLASSIFICATION OF 

§. 3. The states of the mind may be regarded in a threefold 

view. 

Although we properly ascribe to the human soul the attri- 
bute of oneness or indivisibility, there is abundant reason 
for sayiug, that its nature can never be fully understood by 
contemplating it solely and exclusively under one aspect. 
There are, accordingly, three prominent and well-defined 
points of view, in which the mind may be contemplated, viz, 
the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will 5 otherwise ex- 
pressed by the phrases, intellectual, sentient, and volun- 
tary states of the mind. Whatever truly and appropriately 
belongs to the intellect, has something peculiar and charac- 
teristic of it, which shuts it out from the domain of the sen- 
sibilities ; and whatever has the nature of a volition has a 
position apart both from the intellectual and the sentient. 
This is a fundamental arrangement, which, when properly 
and fully carried out and applied, includes the whole soul. 
To the one or the other of these general heads, every thing, 
involved in our mental existence, may be referred. In fully 
exhausting, therefore, these topics, we may justly count up- 
on having completed the exploration of the mental constitu- 
tion. When we have done this, nothing more remains to be 
said. The work is finished. The depths of the mind have 
been entered ; the heights have been ascended ; the boun- 
daries have been set up. 

§. 4. Evidence oj the general arrangement from consciousness. 

The general arrangement, which has been spoken of, viz, 
into the intellectual, sentient, and voluntary states of the 
mind, appears to be susceptible of abundant illustration and 
proof. It is not our intention, however, to enter into the 
discussion of its correctness at much length ; but merely to 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 21 

indicate, as briefly as possible, some of the grounds, on 
which it has been made ; premising at the same time, that the 
whole of this treatise, while it is based in a good degree on 
this fundamental division, will be found to furnish incidental 
evidence throughout of its truth. 

In proof of the propriety of the general arrangement in 
question, we may refer, in the first place, to Consciousness. 
In doing this we are of course obliged to presume, that the 
reader understands what is meant by the term consciousness ; 
and that he assents to the truth, so readily and generally ac- 
knowledged, that we have much of our knowledge of the 
mind by its aid. Mental philosophers assure us, that we are 
enabled, by means of consciousness, to ascertain what 
thought and feeling are in themselves, and to distinguish 
them from each other. And if we are not willing to depend 
upon the information thus given us, if we reject its authority 
in the hopes of finding something more certain,we shall only 
be involved in greater difficulty ; in the language of Con- 
dillac on this very subject, "we stray from a point, which 
we apprehend so clearly, that it can never lead us into er~ 
row."* But if it be true, that the existence and distinctive 
character of the mental acts is made known, in a good degree 
at least, by consciousness, and that we may justly and confi- 
dently rely on its testimony, we naturally inquire, what does 
it teach in the present case ? And in answering this question, 
we may safely appeal to any person's recollections, and ask, 
whether he has ever been in danger of confounding a mere 
perception, a mere thought, either with desires and emotions 
on the one hand, or with volitions on the other ? Does not 
his consciousness assure him, that the mental states, which 
we thus distinguish by these different terms, are not identi- 
cal, that the one class is not the other, that they as actually 

* Origin of Knowledge, Pt. I, ch, 1? 



22 CLASSIFICATION OF 

differ from each other, as association does from belief, or ira- 
agination from memory ? — It may be objected, however, that 
we find ourselves perplexed and at a loss to explain, by any 
statement in words, the precise difference in this case, 
whatever that difference may actually be. We readily admit 
the fact, implied in this objection, but without admitting 
that it has any weight as proof against the distinction in 
question. No simple notion or feeling whatever is suscep- 
tible of a definition, of an explanation by mere words alone. 
And it .cannot be expected of any thing, whose own nature 
we cannot explain by words, that we can fully explain, by 
a mere verbal statement, its difference from other things. 

It would seem, therefore, that we may rest in this inquiry 
upon men's consciousness ; not of one merely, but of any 
and all men. The understanding stands apart from the rest. 
The will also has its separate and appropriate position. We 
may at least assert with full confidence, that no one is in 
danger of confounding volitions with intellections ; that is 
to say, with the mere notions of the understanding. On this 
point there is certainly a general agreement. And yet our 
consciousness, if we will but attend to its intimations with 
proper care, will probably teach us, that the nature of a voli- 
tion more nearly approaches that of a purely intellectual act, 
than it does the distinctive nature of emotions and desires. It 
is undoubtedly true, that volitions may have aroused and 
excited antecedents, and may thus be very closely con- 
nected with the various affections ; but in themselves they 
are cold and unimpassioned ; they are purely executive or 
mandatory, and are as obviously free from any actual im- 
pregnation of appetite, sentiment, or desire, as the most ab- 
stract and callous exercises of the intellect. 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 23 

§. 5. Evidence of the same from terms found in different 
languages. 

We are enabled further to throw some light on this sub- 
ject from a consideration of the terms, which are found in va- 
rious languages. Every language is, in^ some important 
sense, a mirror of the mind. Something may be learnt of 
the tendency of the mental operations, not only from the 
form or structure of language in general, but even from the 
import of particular terms. There can be no hesitation in 
saving, that every language has its distinct terms, expressive 
'of the threefold view of the mind under consideration, and 
which are constantly used with a distinct and appropriate 
meaning, and without being interchanged with each other 
as if they were synonymous. In other words, there are 
terms in all languages, (meaning those of course which are 
spoken by nations somewhat advanced in mental culture,) 
which correspond to the English terms, intellect, sensi- 
bilities, will. If such terms are generally found in lan- 
guages, differing from each other in form and in meaning, it 
is certainly a strong circumstance in proof, that the distinc- 
tion, which we propose to establish, actually exists. On the 
supposition of its having no existence, it seems impossible to 
explain the fact, that men should so universally agree in 
making it. If on the other hand it does exist, it is reasona- 
ble to suppose, that it exists for some purpose ; and existing 
for some purpose, it must of course become known ; and be- 
ing .known, it is naturally expressed in language, the same 
as any other object of knowledge. And this is what we find 
to be the case. So that we may consider the expression to 
be an evidence of the fact ; the sign, an intimation and evi- 
dence of the reality of the thing signified. 



24 CLASSIFICATION OF 

§.6. Evidence from incidental remarks in writers. 

We now pass to other sources of evidence on this subject. 
No small amount of knowledge, bearing upon the capabilities 
and the character of the human mind, may be gathered from 
the incidental remarks of writers of careful observation and 
good sense. And accordingly if we find remarks expressive of 
mental distinctions, repeatedly made by such men, when 
they are not formally and professedly treating of the mind, 
it furnishes a strong presumption, that such distinctions ac- 
tually exist. Their testimony is given under circumstan- 
ces the most favorable to an unbiassed opinion ; and ought' 
to be received into the vast amount of evidence, drawn from 
a great variety of sources, which goes to illustrate the true 
nature of the soul. The popular author of Literary Hours 
has given in one of his Works an interesting biographical 
sketch of Sir Richard Steele. After remarking upon the in- 
consistencies of his life, his excellent resolutions and his 
feeble performances, his successive seasons of riot and of 
repentance, he refers the cause of these inconsistencies to the 
feebleness of the will ; and in doing it, he incidentally, but 
very clearly, makes the distinction under consideration. 
"His misfortune, the cause of all his errors, was, not to have 
clearly seen, where his deficiencies lay ; they were neither 
of the head, nor of the heart, but of the volition. He pos- 
sessed the wish, but not the power of volition to carry his 
purposes into execution."* As we are not at liberty to sup- 
pose, that so respectable a writer employs words without 
meaning, he must be regarded as intending to make the 
distinction, which has been asserted to exist. 

The reference, just made to the personal history of the 
distinguished English Essayist, leads us to remark inciden- 

* Drake's Essays illustrative of the Tatler, Spectator, and Guardian, 
Vol. 1. p. 50. 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 25 

tally upon biographical narratives in general. Biographers 
are supposed to study carefully the lives of those persons, of 
whose characters they give an account ; and if this supposi- 
tion be as correct as it is reasonable, they may justly be 
ranked amoug the valuable contributors to a true knowledge 
of mental history. A knowledge of a man's life and charac- 
ter of course implies a knowledge of his mind. And the 
character of any one man, whoever he may be and in what- 
ever situation he may be placed, of course throws light on 
the human mind in general. In Dr. Currie's well written 
Life of Burns, it is asserted, that the force of that remarka- 
ble poet lay in the powers of his understanding and the sen- 
sibilities of his heart. And the writer not only thus clearly 
indicates the distinction between the understanding or in- 
tellect and the heart ; but in another passage, which un- 
doubtedly discloses the key to the poet's character and con- 
duct, he distinguishes both of them from the voluntary pow- 
ers. The passage referred to is this. "He knew his own 
failings ; he predicted their consequences ; the melancholy 
foreboding was not long absent from his mind ; yet his pas- 
sions carried him down the stream of error, and swept him 
over the precipice he saw directly in his course. The fatal 
defect in his character lay in the comjoarative weakness of his 
volition, which, governing the conduct according to the dic- 
tates of the understanding, alone entitles it to be denomina- 
ted rational."* 

In looking into an Essay on Decision of Character,! (an 
interesting subject and treated with a vigor of thought and 
expression suited to its nature,) we find the following pas- 
sage, confused somewhat by the indulgence of figurative 
terms, but yet explicit enough for our present purpose. — "A 
strenuous ivill must accompany the conclusions of thought, 

* Currie's Life of Burns, Philadelphia Ed. p. 62. 
t Foster's Essays, II, Letter 3d. 
4 



26 CLASSIFICATION OF 

and constantly urge the utmost efforts for their practical ac- 
complishment. The intellect must be invested, if I may so des- 
cribe it, with a glowing atmosphere of passion, under the in- 
fluence of which the cold dictates of reason take fire, and spring 
into active poivers." 

A recently published Inquiry concerning the Indications 
of Insanity, in which are various sketches of personal history 
and character that illustrate certain traits of the mind, has the 
following statement — "Delinquents of this description are, 
perhaps, not unable to distinguish between what. is right and 
what is wrong ; but their will is not governed by their un- 
derstanding, and they want the power of restraining them- 
selves from that which, when committed, they are afraid to 
reflect upon. Their will remains ; but it springs from de- 
praved sensations and emotions, or from passions inordinate and 
unrestrained, and is not under the direction of sound mental 
faculties, "j" 

A celebrated writer, in giving directions to his son as to 
the manner of conducting negociations with foreign ministers, 
makes use of the following language. — "If you engage his 
heart, you have a fair chanccfor imposing upon his understand- 
ing, and determining his u'i/Z."* This writer, as well as many 
others , employs the more common term heart to express the 
sensibilities ; and he evidently uses language, as if there 
were a known and.admitted distinction between the intellec- 
tual, sentient, and voluntary parts of our nature, since he 
speaks of the control or regulation of the understanding, as 
being, in the case under consideration, subsequent to the pos- 
session of the heart, and the determination of the will as 
subsequent to both, or at least as not identical with them. 

tConolly's Inquiries concerning the Indications of Insanity, &.c. Lond. 
Ed. p. 454. * Chesterfield, Lond. Ed. Vol. Ill, p, 137. 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 27 

§.7. Consciousness alone not sufficient to gipe a full knowl- 
edge of the mind. 

Perhaps it is necessary to say something further in jus- 
tification of this mode of reference. Certain it is, that 
a reliance on our own consciousness, our own internal 
reflections alone is not enough. It is true, that all men 
have within themselves the elements of human nature, but 
they are not developed in all alike. And although our 
consciousness deserves preeminently to be consulted, and 
is always correct as far as it goes, the man, who studies 
consciousness alone, in other words' who relies exclusively 
on his own mental history, will necessarily have but an im- 
perfect knowledge of what really pertains to the mental con- 
stitution. There have not been wanting eminent philoso- 
phers, (Malebranche may be adduced as an instance,) who 
have pursued this course, but did not succeed. Locke on 
the contrary studied mankind in general, as well as himself; 
he summoned observation to the aid of consciousness, and 
with far more satisfactory results. 

Now if we look carefully at such writers as were refer- 
red to in the preceding section, what do we find to be the 
fact ? They give us an account of the insane man, of the 
literary man, the poet, the man of great decision of charac- 
ter, the politician, &c ; but in doing it, they are obliged to 
make the distinction in question ; they are compelled to re- 
cognize the separation of the understanding from the heart, 
and of both from the will ; and they could not complete their 
portraits without it. If they were not permitted to take this 
course, their sketches would but feebly tesemble the orig- 
inal ; they would be like those fragments of statuary, which 
have come down to us from ancient times, beautiful though 
absurdly mutilated, the head without the trunk, and limbs 
sundered from the body ; a subject of study and admiration 



28 CLASSIFICATION OF 

in themselves, but suggesting a very imperfect conception 
of that whole, to whose symmetry and perfection they had 
once contributed. But these writers do not find human na- 
ture thus mutilated, and they describe it as they find it. 
They do not describe it thus, because they are ambitious of 
novelty or of being reckoned among mental philosophers ; 
but because they cannot do otherwise, if they would faith- 
fully record what constantly presses itself on their notice. 
And hence it is, that their testimony on any question of this 
nature is of so much importance. 

§» S. Further proof from various writers on the mind . 

The distinction in question has been fully recognized by 
various distinguished writers on the mind. The following 
passage is to be found in Mr. Locke. "Thus by a due con- 
sideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our pow- 
er to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that 
good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work 
upon the %cill, and be pursued. For good, though appearing, 
and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our 
minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches 
not our wills."* Here the threefold division in question is 
distinctly recognized. The due consideration and examin- 
ing, which are spoken of, imply an act of the intellect ; the 
desires, which are subsequently raised, are appropriately as- 
cribed to the sensibilities ; and these last are followed by 
an act of the other part of our nature, viz, the will. 

Mr. Hume, in his Dissertation on the Passions, has the 
following passage, which is clear enough in its import with- 
out comment. — " It seems evident that reason, in a strict 
sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood, can 
never of itself be any motive to the ivill, and can have no in- 
* Essay on the Understanding. Bk. II. ch. xxi. §, 46. 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 29 

fluence but so far as it touches some passion or affection." 
In the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural 
Religion, ascribed to Lord Karnes, is a passage as follows. 
" He hath appetites and passions, which prompt him to their 
respective gratifications ; but he is under no necessity of 
blindly submitting to their impulse. For reason hath a pow- 
er of restraint. It suggests motives from the cool views of 
good and evil. He deliberates upon these. In consequence 
of his deliberation he chooseth ; and here, if any where, lies 
our liberty." 

Among writers more recent, who have insisted on this 
distinction with much earnestness and clearness, we may 
mention Sir James Mackintosh. In some strictures on Dr. 
Price's Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, he has 
occasion to make a remark, the substance of which had been 
given before and is repeated afterwards, "that no perception 
or judgment, or other unmixed act of the understanding, mere- 
ly as such and without the agency of some intermediate emo- 
tion, can affect the tuiK."* 

A writer of our own country, who, in the retirement of 
a country parish and in the faithful discharge of its multiplied 
duties, has found time to furnish his contributions to a knowl- 
edge of our mental structure, expresses himself thus* — 
"Why do not philosophers consider all the operations of the 
understanding, and the affections, as constituting but one gen- 
eral class of operations, and as belonging to one faculty ? 
The reason is, they see no similarity between intellectual 
perceptions and affections. A perception is not a feeling 
either of pleasure or pain, nor a desire. And pleasure and 
pain and desires, they clearly see,are not perceptions. Hence 
classing them together would be improper, and create con- 
fusion. It would be confounding things which differ, and. 
*General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 157. 



30 CLASSIFICATION OF 

destroying all those distinctions, which are necessary to the 
acquirement of scientific knowledge. For a person has no 
more than a confused notion^ of things, who does not make 
distinctions, where there are differences ; or point out the 
difference between one thing and another. As perceptions 
and affections generically differ, philosophers have distin- 
guished them, and formed them into distinct classes ; and 
so they have admitted the existence of two facul- 
ties. And for the same reason they admit two, they 
ought to grant there are three faculties. For when 
we attend to the affections and to volitions, it is evident 
there is a generic difference between them. It is evident 
that pain, pleasure, and desires, are not volitions; and have 
no similarity to those voluntary exertions, which produce 
effects on the body, and in other things around us. For 
these affections do not immediately produce any external 
effects; they are effects themselves produced by the heart, 
and are either virtuous or vicious. For it. has been shown, 
that vice and virtue belong to the heart only, and its opera- 
tions, or affections. There is, therefore, no more proprie- 
ty in classing the affections and volitions together, than in 
making but one class of the affections and perceptions. 
The affections and volitions so widely differ, that they nat- 
urally divide themselves into two distinct, general classes."* 
It would be easy to multiply passages of the same im- 
port from numerous other inquirers into the mind, if it were 
thought necessary. The view thus taken by English and 
American writers is sustained by judicious metaphysi- 
cians of other countries, of which our limits will permit 
us to give only a single passage as an instance. The wri- 
ter, after some remarks on the origin of the desires, hopes, 
and fears, proceeds as follows. — " Ces affections internes 
sont ce que nous nommons seniimens. lis different lies sensa- 
tions, en ce que les sensations ont leur source directement 
*Burton's Essays on Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology, p. 92. 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 31 

dans l'exterieur, tandis que les sentimens sont produits en 
nous seuleinent a l'occasion de l'exterieur, soit qu'il nous 
affecte actuellement, soit qu'il nous ait precedemment affec- 
tes. lis resemblent aux sensations, en ce que, comme elles, 
Us sont indepenclans de noire volonlc, et non susceptibles 
d'etre produits ou empeches par nous. Qui peut, en eftet, 
desirer, esperer, craindre a volonte ?"* 

§.9. Of the consideration due to the opinions of able and 
professed inquirers into the mind. 

In connection with the references, which have been made 
in the foregoing section and the extracts given, there re- 
mains a remark or two to be offered. It may be objected, 
that, in inquiries of this nature, we must not rest solely nor 
chiefly on mere authority ; and that, in respect to the pow- 
ers and the action of the mind , the testimony of one man is as 
good as that of another. The feeling of independence, im- 
plied in this objection, is so common and so much approved 
at the present day, and is often so misjudged in its applica- 
tion, that it deserves some notice: That the candid and con- 
siderate testimony of all men, in any matter where the ele- 
ments of human nature are concerned, is important, is very 
true. But that their testimony is, in all cases r of precisely 
equal value, is an assertion evidently hasty and unfounded. 
It may be the case, that the testimony of all men is equally 
good in respect to the more obvious facts ; but when we 
come to those, which are less so, and when we attempt to 
classify them and to trace the various relations existing 
among them, the testimony is the more valuable in propor- 
tion as it comes from men of greater ability and more tho- 
rough study of the mental operations. Do we not find such 
to be the case in the common transactions of life, and even 
in the matters of the least difficulty ? We prefer the opinion 

* De La Liberte et de ses Differens Modes, par Augustin-Frangois Thery. 



32 CLASSIFICATION OF 

of a skilful farmer on the qualities and value of a piece of 
land to that of any other man ; we adopt, in preference to all 
others, the opinion of one, who has long navigated the ocean, 
on the construction of a ship the most adapted to the purpo- 
ses of sailing and conveying merchandize ; and so of every 
trade and art and calling in life. And if it be thus in mat- 
ters comparatively so plain and obvious, it is certainly still 
more necessary in questions relating to our mental struc- 
ture. We cannot, therefore, bring ourselves to speak light- 
ly of the authority of those distinguished men, who have 
devoted themselves to mental and moral inquiries ; nor, 
while we admit the possibility of their sometimes commit- 
ting mistakes, withhold the great consideration, which is ob- 
viously due to their opinions. Nor can we permit ourselves 
to doubt,that the decisions of such philosophers as Mackintosh, 
Stewart, Butler, and Locke, in particular, will continue to 
be very generally quoted as of great account in discussions 
of this nature, at least till others of intellect as elevated and 
of feelings as pure, and aided by the precedents they have 
set, shall arise and occupy the place in the public estima- 
tion, which they now fill. 

<§. 10. A knowledge of the will implies a preliminary 
knowledge of the intellect. 

Illustrations and proofs might be carried to a much greater 
extent. But enough probably has been said to explain pre- 
cisely the views which we entertain on this subject, to inti- 
mate the various sources of proof, and to shield us from the 
imputation of asserting what cannot be maintained. Sup- 
ported by consciousness, the structure of languages, the in- 
cidental remarks of writers on a multitude of occasions, and 
by the deliberate opinions of many able metaphysicians, we 
are justified in going forward in our inquiries, with the dis- 
tinction in question as its basis. And now we have further 
to remark, if there be that threefold distinction in the mind 



THE MENTAL POWERS. 33 

which has heen contended for, then each of these prominent 
parts may he treated of separately; that is to say, the Will 
may be made a subject of examination in distinction from 
the Understanding, and both in distinction from the Affec- 
tions, or more properly from the Sensibilities; which is 
the more general and appropriate term. Eut in the order of 
inquiry the understanding naturally comes first, and then the 
sensibilities, and the will last. And hence we are led to ob- 
serve, that a thorough knowledge of the will necessarily im- 
plies a' knowledge of the understanding. 

We are compelled, therefore, to presume, that the reader 
is already acquainted with what has sometimes been termed 
the cognitive part of our nature ; that he knows something of 
the nature of sensation and perception ; that he has some 
acquaintance with the power of suggestion, with the judg- 
ment or relative suggestion, the memory, reasoning, imagin- 
ation and the like, which are properly included under the 
general head of the understanding or intellect. We indulge 
the hope, that this presumption will prove well-founded. 
Certain it is, that no man is entitled to pronounce with con- 
fidence on any discussion having relation to the will, with- 
out possessing the elements and outlines, at least, of such 
preliminary knowledge. 

§.11. Implies a preliminary knowledge also oj the sensibilities. 

It seems proper to observe further, that similar remarks 
will apply to the sensibilities; To a correct knowledge of the 
Will, a knowledge of the sentient states of the mind cannot 
be considered less necessary than of the intellectual. And 
who, that has given but even a slight attention to mental 
inquiries, can be supposed ignorant of that interesting part 
of our nature ? It is there we find the emotions, which invest 
the various forms of nature with beauty and grandeur. It is 



34 CLASSIFICATION &c. 

there we are to seek for a knowledge of the propensities and 
passions, which hind men together in society ; the sources 
at once of their activity, their joy, and their sorrow. And 
there also we discover the elements of accountability, the 
feelings that approve and disapprove, the signatures of the 
law written within, which no one either oheys or violates 
without the appropriate rew'ard or condemnation. With 
this preparatory knowledge, we are ready to advance with 
some hope of a successful issue. The natural course of in- 
quiry is through the understanding, and the heart or sensi- 
bilities, upwards to the will. The latter sustains the relation 
of a higher and more authoritative power ; a point of view 
in which we shall more fully consider it in some following 
chapters. Without this, all the rest would he comparatively 
useless. So that in considering the position it maintains we 
are naturally reminded of the passage, which Home Tooke 
has made so celebrated ; 

" 'Tis the last key-stone, 



"That makes the arch ; the rest, that there were put, 
" Are nothing, till that comes to bind and shut. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE WILL. 



§. 12. A connection existing among all the parts and powers 
oj the mind. 

In the preceding Chapter we have insisted on a threefold 
view of the mind as fundamental ; and we may add here 
our conviction, that the recognition of this distinction is not 
only fundamental in respect to a knoAvledge of the mind in 
general, but is particularly necessary to a full understanding 
and solution of the subject in hand. But to assert and even 
to prove the existence of this distinction is not enough. It 
seems proper to say something furf her in illustration of the 
precise relation of these prominent departments of the mind 
to eachother, beginning with the intellect. And as prelim- 
inary to this, we shall occupy a few moments in considering 
the connection, which seems to exist among all the various 
powers of the mind, both those of a more- general and those 
of a subordinate character. • 

A very slight observation, it is believed, will suffice to 
teach us the general fact, that there is some bond of union 



36 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

some principle of connection pervadiug every variety of the 
mental action. And the farther this observation is carried 
on, the more obvious and indispensable will this connection 
appear. If, for instance, Ave examine those subordinate 
powers, which are properly arranged together under the 
general head of the Intellect, we shall readily find this to be 
the case. There is no perception without the antecedent 
sensation ; there is no memory without attention ; no rea- 
soning without both memory and association; and neither rea- 
soning nor imagination without the power of perceiving re- 
lations or relative suggestion. But in all these cases and in 
others, they stand, if we may be allowed the expression, 
side by side, ready to -lend each other an assisting hand, and 
comparatively powerless and fruitless without this mutual 
aid. And if such be the state of things in the instances, 
which have been particularized, then analogy would lead us 
to suppose, that there is a like principle of union running 
through and connecting together the more general depart- 
ments of the mind ; and this too is abundantly obvious on 
even a slight examination, 

§. 13. The intellectual part the foundation or basis of the 
others. 

Of the Understanding in particular, it may be said with 
some appearance of reason, that we find in it the foundation, 
the basis of the existence and of the action both of the sen- 
tient and of the voluntary nature. Let us examine this point, 
in the first place, in reference to the Sensibilities. When 
that part of our nature is in action, we find ourselves, according 
to the circumstances of the case, pleased or displeased • we 
are filled with admiration or disgust ; Ave love or hate ; Ave 
approve or disapprove ; and exercise other emotions, de- 
sires, and passions. But the slightest examination Avill teach 
us, that this could not be the ease, that these states of mind 



TO THE WILL. 37 

could not exist, without the acquisition of knowledge, which 
of course implies the exercise of the intellect. If we approve 
or disapprove a thing, it is very evident that we must have 
a knowledge of some ohject of approval or disapproval, 
that there must he something, upon which these emotions can 
fasten. And again, if we exercise love or hatred, the intel- 
lect must have heen previously employed in making known 
the existence and qualities of those objects, towards which 
the passions of love and hatred are directed. 

And these views will be found equally applicable to the 
Will. There can no more be an act of the will without 
some object of knowledge before the mind, than there can 
be remembrance without a thing remembered, or association 
without an object, to which the principle of association at- 
taches itself. Hence, if we could find a man, in whom the 
intellect is entirely destroyed in fact, or is virtually des- 
troyed by being entirely dormant, we should find at the 
same time an extinction both of the passions and the will. 
Happily the history of the human race furnishes but a soli- 
tary instance of that extreme extinction of the intellect 
which we now have in view ; we refer to the case of the 
unfortunate Caspar Hauser. As the intellect cannot be 
brought into action and made to develope itself except by 
coming into contact with the material world, the result of 
his confinement from childhood 'in one place, and of his entire 
seclusion from every thing external to his horrid prison was 
the utter prostration of his understanding ; scarcely a ray of 
knowledge penetrated it ; the feeble perceptions of early 
infancy were -combined with a body, that had nearly expan- 
ded itself to the fulness of manhood. Such imbecility and 
vacuity of the intellect of course furnished no foundation 
for the developement of the sensibilities. If we may rely 
upon the accounts, that are given of him, there was in gen- 
eral an unruffled and placid surface, a great calm of the mind. 



38 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT v 

And as there was no excitement, no tossing to and fro of 
the sensibilities, but every thing there was wrapped up in 
slumber and inactivity ; so there was no determination, no 
resolve, no vigour and promptness of the voluntary power. 
The slightest impulse from the minds of others was followed 
by the consentaneous and unresisting movement of his own ; 
and his Will, so far from indicating any elements of decision 
and stability, could be likened only to the flexible reed of 
the desert, which, without knowing the power that presses 
it, is shaken and bent by every changing breeze. ' 

§. 14 The connection of the understanding with the will 
shown from its connection with action. 

But it is the object of this chapter to consider particular- 
ly the connection existing between the understanding and 
the will, and the relation they' sustain to each other. And 
we may accordingly remark further, that the connection of 
the intellectual with the voluntary constitution is apparent 
from the connection of the intellectual part or understanding 

with action. Whatever difference of opinion there may 

be in other respects, there is a general agreement in this, 
that the mind, both in its internal constitution and in its 
adaptation to outward objects, is evidently framed for 
movement. It was never meant to be essentially dormant, 
either in a state of unconsciousness or of mere •contemplation 
and emotion ; but was rather, when Ave consider its connec- 
tion with other states and modes of existence, designed to 
be an attendant and ministering angel to the great Being 
who made it, performing his errands of observation and 
mercy, in whatever sphere of activity He might see fit to 
designate. — And it seems to be further assented to, not on- 
ly that the various parts of man's nature conspire to action, 
but also that the ultimate seat and source of action is in the 



TO THE WILL. 30 

Will ; in other words, that the will emphatically sustains 
the part of the controlling and executive power of the mind. 
The will in particular leads to outward action. It must be 
obvious to every one. that there can be no bodily action, ex- ' 
cepting what is termed involuntary, without a concurrent 
act of the will ; and it is equally obvious that action, in its 
Various forms, embraces the multiplied duties, and is the 
foundation of the usefulness of man. 

Now if these views be correct, and if we wholly dissever 
the understanding from action, where is its utility ? If the 
highest exertions of the intellect can lead to no possible re- 
sults, except the mere accumulation of an inoperative and 
lifeless mass of knowledge, what are the benefits connected 
with it ? If we are assured on the highest authority, that 
knowledge without charity is no better than sounding brass 
and a tinkling cymbal, it iscertainly of no more worth with- 
out practical results, without correspondent action. But if 
we are not prepared to admit, that the intellect, which is so 
often and so justly pronounced the glory of man, is without 
worth, it seems to follow, that its value depends upon its con- 
nection with the will. Action, as we have seen, is uridoubt- 
cdlyethe great object, that was had in view, in the creation 
of the human mind ; but it is evident, that the understanding 
can have no connection with action, except in the direction 
and with the concurrent movement of the voluntary power. 
And on these grounds, among others, we may assert the rela- 
tionship and the alligation of the two. 

§ 15. Further proof from an observation of the conduct of men. 

In addition to the considerations, which have already 
been brought forward, we may find further proofs of the 
connection, which is alledged to exist, in our manner of ad- 
dressing men, when Ave wish them to pursue a certain course. 



40 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

We do not address the will directly and alone ; nor do we 
directly address ourselves to the emotions and passions of 
men ; but we commonly lay the basis of our efforts in a 
movement on the understanding. We. make this statement 
with a good degree of confidence ; and we appeal to every 
one's recollection, whether it be not true. A person wishes 
another to join with him in some enterprise, and perhaps it ' 
is one of an exciting nature. But where does he begin ? 
Does he immediately lay a requisition upon the will, com- 
manding and requiring the individual to enter upon the pro- 
posed course at once ? Every one must see, that this would 
certainly defeat his own purpose. If, therefore, he would 
indulge the hope of succeeding, he must act upon the will by 
taking advantage of the relations, which it sustains to other 
parts of our mental nature. Accordingly he commences his 
attempts, by an appeal to the understanding, endeavoring 
to show by plain and incontrovertible statements the practi- 
cability; propriety, and benefits of his propositions ; and 
he knows perfectly well, that, unless he succeeds in convinc- 
ing the understanding, he has no prospect of rousing the 
will to action, and that the probability of a movement on the 
part of the voluntary power will be in proportion, or near- 
ly so, to the favourable position of the intellect. 

On the death of Julius Caesar, Anthony is represented by 
Shakespeare, who well knew what process was requisite in 
effecting such an object, as endeavouring to stir up a " sud- 
den flood of mutiny.'' But he does not command the mul- 
titude,who are ready for almost any purpose whether good or 
evil, to go forth at once, and consummate his projects of fire 
and slaughter. He addresses neither the will, nor the pas- 
sions, till he had first made a lodgment in the understanding. 
After saying, in excuse of his coming to speak at Caesar's 
funeral, that Caesar was a just and faithful friend to him- 



TO THE WILL. 41 

self, he goes on to state what are the plain facts in the 
case, viz, that Caesar had brought to Rome many cap- 
tives, that by their ransom money he had filled the pub- 
lic coffers, that he had wept over the sufferings of the poor, 
that he had refused a kingly crown at the Lupereal, &c. 
These statements, which were mere facts addressed to the 
understanding, and some of them at least were incon- 
trovertible, of course laid the foundation for a change in 
the passions, as they were designed to do. And the people, 
who just before had called Caesar a tyrant, and were glad 
that Rome was rid of him, now began to admit, that there 
was much reason in Anthony's sayings, and that Caesar had 
suffered wrong. He then told them of the greatness of 
Caesar, of the power which he had once exercised, of his 
ability to stand against not one nation merely but the whole 
world, though now so low that none would do him reverence. 
And by such addresses, directed in the first instance to the 
understanding, he furnished appropriate fuel to the passions, 
which had already begun to quicken into life ; and when 
he further proceeded to show them the bloody mantle, and to 
speak of the testament which bequeathed to them his boun- 
tiful legacies, the passions were kindled to a flame. It was 
then that the object of the speaker was accomplished, as he 
foresaw it would be. There was no want of motives, no 
hesitancy of the will, and no slowness to action. The mul- 
titude, driven about as the billows are agitated by the wind, 
were no longer the friends of Brutus ; nor were they indif- 
ferent and idle spectators. But rushing from street to street, 
and seizing such weapons as their purposes required, they 
called for revenge, slaughters, and burnings. 

§.16. Of the nature of the connection between the understan- 
ding and loill. 

Presuming enough has been said, at least for the present, 
6 



42 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

in support of the actual existence of the connection we are 
inquiring into, we are now prepared to say something of 
its nature. Although the connection really exists, and is of 
very prominent importance, it is not meant to be said, that it 
is a direct one. In other words, the understanding, whatever 
opinions may have formerly prevailed on the subject, 
is, in no case, in direct contact with the will. When, there- 
fore, we speak of the operation of the intellect upon the 
will, we mean an indirect or circuitous operation ; that is 
to say, one which is carried on through the mediation of the 
sensibilities, under which term we include the various forms 
of emotion and desire, together with feelings of obligation. 
The appropriate and distinctive object of the understanding 
is knowledge. But we confidently venture the assertion, that 
knowledge alone has no tendency to control volition. It is 
possible for a person in the exercise of his intellectual pow- 
ers to possess unlimited knowledge, to explore and exhaust 
every field of inquiry, and yet if his knowledge be unat- 
tended with feeling, if it be followed by no form of emotion 
or desire or obligatory sentiment, it will leave the will per- 
fectly indifferent and motionless. Any other supposition is 
at variance with every day's experience. A certain person, 
for example, comes to the conclusion, after along train of 
reasoning., that the possession of a definite amount of prop- 
erty would be beneficial to himself and family. This con- 
clusion is of course the result of a purely intellectual process. 
But if it be utterly passionless, if it be unattended with a 
single emotion or desire, it will altogether fail to arouse the 
will to activity or to secure a single effort. In the constitution 
of the human mind, every where so fu.ll of wisdom and of 
mystery, the Sensibilities, which are as different from the 
will as from the understanding, are located between the two. 
They form the connecting link, which binds them together. 



TO THE WILL. 43 

Strike out the sensibilities, therefore, and you necessarily 
excavate a gulph of separation between the intellect and the 
will, which is forever impassible. There is from that moment 
no medium of communication, no bond of union, no recipro- 
cal action. • . 

* §. 17. Of the opinions of Mr. Locke on this point. 

• Here is one point, on which writers on the Will have 
sometimes fallen into errour, vjz, in placing the intellectual in 
juxta-position -with the voluntary power, and supposing the 
latter to be under the direct operation of the former. Mr. 
Locke himself seems to have been of this opinion at first, and 
.to have published to the world his belief, tha't the understand- 
ing,forming an estimate of what is the greatest good, was the 
direct means of controlling the will. But he afterwards, on 
more mature examination, announced, with the honesty and 
love of truth for which he is so celebrated, his' decided 
change of opinion. — "It seems, says he, so established and 
settled a maxim by the general consent of all mankind, that 
good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at 
all wonder, that, when I first published my thoughts on this 
subject, I took it for granted ; and I imagine that by a great 
many I shall be thought more excusable for having done so, 
than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an 
opinion. But yet upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to con- 
clude, that good, the greater good,though apprehended and ac^ 
knowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our 
desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the 
want of it. Convince a man ever so much, that plenty has its 
advantages over poverty 5 make him see and own, that the 
handsome conveniences of life are. better than nasty penury ; 
yet as long as he is content with the latter and finds no un- 
easiness in it, he moves not ; his will is never determined to 



44 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

any action, that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever 
so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as 
necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or 
hopes in the next, as food to life ; yet, .till he hungers and 
thirsts after righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the 
want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in 
pursuit of this greater good. "--"For good,he says in another 
passage, though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet till 
it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us unea- 
sy in its want, reaches not our xvills. v * 

He was satisfied on repeated examination and on the 
most mature reflection, which he could give to the subject, 
that the mere intellectual conviction of what might tend to 
the greatest good, has no effect upon the will, till it has first 
excited within us desires after that good. 

§. I8i Opinions of Sir James Mackintosh on- the same subject. 

The same view is taken by other profound metaphysicians, 
so that, independently of its own obvious reasonableness, 
there is no want of authority in its favour. The following 
expressions of Sir James Mackintosh show what were his 
own convictions on the subject. — "Through whatever length 
of reasoning the mind 'may pass in its advances towards 
action, there is placed at the end of any avenue, through 
which it can advance, some principle wholly unlike mere 
reason, some emotion or sentiment which must be touched, 
before the springs of will and action can be set in motion." 

And in another passage, a part of which follows, he main- 
tains the assertion here made at considerable length.— "We 
can easily imagine a percipient and thinking being without 
a capacity of receiving pleasure or pain. Such a being 
might perceive what we do ; if we could concei/e him to 

*Essay concerning the Human Understanding, Bk. II. Ch. xxi. §§. 35, 46, 



TO THE WILL. 45 

reason, he might reason justly ; and if he were to judge 
at all, there seems no reason why he should not judge 
truly.. But what could induce such a being to ivill or to 
act ? It seems evident that his existence could only be a state 
of passive contemplation. • Reason, as reason, can never be 
a motive to action. It is only when we superadd to such a 
being sensibility, or the capacity of emotion or sentiment, 
(or what in corporeal cases is called sensation,) of desire and 
aversion, that we introduce him into the world of. action. 
We then clearly discern, that, when the conclusion of a pro- 
cess of reasoning presents to his mind an object of desire, or 
the means of obtaining it, a motive of action begins to ope- 
rate ; and reason may then, but not till then, have a power- 
ful though indirect influence on conduct. Let any argument 
to dissuade a man from immorality be employed, and the 
issue of it will always appear to be an appeal to a feeling. 
You prove that drunkenness will probably ruin health. No 
position founded on experience is more certain. Most persons 
with whom you reason must be as much convinced of it as 
you are. But your hope of success depends on the drunk- 
ard's fear of ill health ; and he may always silence your 
argument by telling you that he loves wine more than he 
dreads sickness. You speak in vain of the infamy of an act 
to one who disregards the opinion of others ; or of its im- 
prudence to a man of little-feeling for his own future condi- 
tion. You may truly,. but vainly, tell of the pleasures of 
friendship to one who has little affection". If you display 
the delights of liberality to a miser, he may always shut 
your mouth by answering, "the spendthrift, may prefer 
such pleasure ; I love money more." If you even appeal to 
a man's conscience, he may answer you, that you have 
clearly proved the immorality of the act, and that he him- 
self knew it before ; but that now, when you had renewed 
and freshened his conviction, he was obliged to own, that 



40 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

his love of virtue, even aided by the fear of dishonour, 
remorse, and punishment, was not so powerful as the desire 
which hurried him into vice."* — He concludes with remark- 
ing, that it is thus apparent, that the influence of reason on the 
will is indirect ^nd arises only from its being one of the chan- 
nels, by which the objects of desire or aversion are brought 
near to these springs of voluntary action. 

§. 19. The understanding reaches the will through the sensibili- 
ties. 

While, therefore, we may be assured, that there is an 
established and fixed connection between the understanding 
and the will, and that they are by the constitution of our na- 
ture reciprocally indispensable to each other, this connection 
is not to be regarded as direct and immediate, but the under- 
standing affects the will through the medium- of the Sensi- 
bilities. The direct connection, therefore, of the understand- 
ing is with the sensibilities ;' and with that portion of them, 
which are appropriately, and by way of distinction from the 
other sentient states of the mind, termed 'the Emotions. It 
is true, there is no resemblance between an emotion and a 
mere perception or thought ; in their nature they are entirely 
different from each other. " An emotion of pleasure or pain, 
in the language of Mackintosh, differs much more from a 
mere perception, than the perceptions of one sense do from 
those of another. The perceptions, of all the senses have 
some qualities in common. But an emotion has not necessa- 
rily any thing in common with a perception, but that they 
are both states of the mind." 

But these two classes of mental states, although they dif- 
fer so entirely in their nature, are placed in juxta-position 
to each other ; by which we mean, that one is immediately 

*VieW of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Section V. 



TO THE WILL. 47 

successive to the other, or, in other words, that they 
hold the relation of antecedence and sequence. And it is 
here, that the understanding makes its approaches upon the 
voluntary power, and contributes to its being called into ac- 
tion, as will be seen more distinctly in som£ remarks of the 
following chapter. 

§. 20. The acts of the intellect the direct antecedents to 
emotions. 

Let us delay here a moment, and notice that marked and 
interesting fact in our mental economy, that knowledge is 
the foundation of emotion ; keeping in mind, that the knowl- 
edge of a particular subject is but the intellect itself brought 
into a new position in relation to that . subject. All the 
knowledge which men have relates either to matter or mind ; 
to the outward and external, or to the invisible and spiritual 
world. But in both its great forms, and under whatever 
possible aspect it may exist, we find it to be attended with 
emotion. * No man walks the earth, and contemplates its va- 
riegated features, its mingled yet harmonizing exhibitions 
of wood and water, of hill and vale, and tree and flower, and 
sun and cloud, without experiencing the origin of a feeling 
within him additional to the mere perception of these 
objects. There is a gush of pleasure, a flow of emotive sen- 
sibility, which is better known by the experience than by 
any description. The emotion, however, is not always of 
the same kind. There are times and places, where nature 
puts on her more awful and frowning aspects, where she 
appears in storm and power and gloom. And then the emo- 
tion ascends from the merely beautiful to the grand and 
sublime. 

.And there are also other objects of knowledge than mere 
natural objects ; all the various and wonderful attributes of 



48 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

mind ; the patience and the fortitude, and the joy and the 
sorrow, and the magnanimity and the crime and the justice, 
which diversify the history of the human race. The knowl- 
edge of these too, (for every thing is dormant until the intel- 
lect has put itself in exercise and has explored the objects 
which come within its sphere,) arouses the sensibility, and 
calls forth the strongest emotions ; not only emotions of 
the beautiful and sublime, of joy and sorrow, but of . appro- 
val and disapproval, according to the nature and character of 
the thing which is presented before us. 

§. 21. Emotions change with changes in the intellectual 

perceptions. . 

We may not only lay down the general truth, that emo- 
tions depend for their existence on the antecedent acts of 
the intellect, but also that the character of the emotion will 
vary as a general thing, with changes in the intellectual per- 
ceptions. All objects become more or less interesting to us, 
more or less radiant with glory or dark with degradation, as 
we know more or less about them. That scenery of nature, 
which seemed to us exceedingly beautiful at first, will at 
once appear less so, on the discovery of some new object, 
which is judged by us discordant. Avith its general character. 
That exquisite picture, which charms us at the first glance, 
will excite still stronger emotions of pleasure, whea we 
examine it carefully in all its parts. That man of riches, 
who beholds his granaries and coffers with so much joy, 
when he sits down to reason coolly upon the true value of 
the wealth he possesses ; when he considers that it will 
corrupt the morals and prove the destruction of his children, 
and that it will arouse the endless upbraidings of his own 
conscience for the means he employed in acquiring it, will 
be likely to find the feeling of joy withering within him, 
and those of sorrow and remorse taking its place. How 



TO THE WILL. 49 

many cases there are of moral conduct, which, on first being 
made known to us, have called forth the most decisive ap- 
probation ; but which, on a further examination of the 
motives of the actors, have changed their character, and lost 
all their moral glory ! How many friends have gladdened 
us by their countenance, which seemed to beam with a heav- 
enly excellence, but have afterwards filled us with loathing 
and abhorrence, when we have found, that their pretended 
friendship was merely assumed to cloak their private views, 
and to carry their selfish ends ! 

And thus it is with all objects of knowledge, as they 
become more fully explored either in themselves, or in their 
relations. According as they change their aspect under the 
inspection of the intellect, they are invested with a new 
character from the emotions. But if all emotion depends 
essentially upon intellect, and all change of emotion depends 
essentially upon change of intellect, we shall hereafter have 
occasion to see, even more fully than has yet been pointed 
out, how close and indispensable the bond is, which unites 
the intellectual to the voluntary power. 

• 
§. 22. The powers of the will not perfectly correspondent to 

those of the intellect. 

But, although the intellect thus lays the original founda- 
tion of the acts of the will, We are not necessarily to infer, 
that there. is an exact correspondence and proportion be- 
tween them. In other words we are not to infer,that the vigour 
of the will is always in exact proportion to the expansion 
and vigour of the intellect. It Avas'a sagacious remark of 
the distinguished painter Fuseli, which we venture to assert 
a careful observation will fully confirm, that nature does 
not always "proportion the will to our powers ; it sometimes as- 
signs a copious proportion of will to minds, whose faculties 



50 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT 

are very contracted, and frequently associates with the great- 
est faculties a will feeble and impotent."* — The will appears 
to require, as the basis of its action in any given case, only 
a certain sphere of knowledge ; and any amount of knowl- 
edge beyond that sphere will not necessarily affect the ener- 
gy of the voluntary action either one way or the other. 
Some instances will explain more clearly what we mean. 

In Dr. Goldsmith, so justly celebrated for his various 
literary productions, we may notice no inconsiderable grasp 
of intellect, combined with a will not fully proportioned to 
it. Distinguished as a poet, a comic writer, and a novelist, 
his conduct through life was marked with an exceeding in- 
firmity of purpose. With a perfect understanding of the 
impositions, of which he was made the subject, he still had 
not promptness and decision enough to counteract them. 
His biographer asserts, that he could not give a refusal ; and 
being thus cheated with his eyes open, no man could be a 
surer and easier dupe to the imposters, whose arts he could 
so well describe. f 

May we not also adduce the mental traits of a man still 
more distinguished ? The intellect of Sir Isaac Newton 
seemed capacious enough to embrace the whole circle of 
knowledge ; nothing among men could well exceed the 
grasp of his- understanding ; but, if we carefully compare 
the statements given by his biographers, we shall probably 
be convinced,that there was not a perfect correspondence and 
proportion between his intellectual and his voluntary power; 
that he often exhibited no small infirmity and indecision 
of purpose ; a gigantic strength of thought, united with a 
childlike uncertainty and flexibility of action. After he had 
completed his great work, the Principia, and had placed the 

*Cunn'mgham's Lives of Painters, Art. Fuseli. 
t Scott's Lives of the Novelists, Art. Goldsmith. 



TO THE WILL. 51 

the new philosophical creed on an immovable basis, we are 
told he was unwilling to give it to the world, probably- 
through fear of the controversies it might occasion ; and that 
he was induced to do so through the urgent importunity of 
some of his intimate friends* — In the case of 'Newton, how- 
ever, it may not be necessary to assert positively, as in that 
of Goldsmith and many others, that there- was a natural defi- 
ciency or weakness of the will, since we are at liberty to 
attempt another explanation. The will, like the other mental 
powers, strengthens by exercise, and grows languid and 
we'ak by disuse. But this great philosopher was almost 
constantly employed in inquiries beyond the ordinary sphere 
of the world's motives and actions ; and as he consequently 
had but little occasion for calling the voluntary power into 
exercise, we may well suppose that it lost in some degree 
its natural vigour. 

§. 23. Jin energetic will sometimes found in connection with 
limited powers of intellect. 

And if, on the one hand, a great grasp of intellect is not 
always attended with a voluntary energy corresponding to 
it, we find on the other, that inferiority of intellect, (we do 
not speak now of extreme cases, but of such as are of every 
day's occurrence,) is not necessarily accompanied with di- 
minished power of the will. The sphere of the will's action is 
of course diminished in such instances ; but it is possible 
for it to exhibit great vigour within that limited sphere. It 
has but a small field to work in, but it does its duty faith- 
fully and promptly in the restricted limits allotted it. It is 
not an uncommon thing to find men of great resolution and 
decision, whose want of intellectual ability must always 

¥ Brewster's Life of Newton, Chap. XI. — Cumberland's Memoirs, p. 9. — 
D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, Vol. 2d, p. 165. 



52 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT &c. 

confine them to the ordinary ranks of life. If the ener- 
gy of their intellect could be expanded so as to he in pro- 
portion to the energy of their will, they -would real- 
ize in their own persons the noble character of Cincinna- 
tus at the plough. And even among men in the more exalted 
stations, we sometimes find the combination of a restricted 
intellect with a fearfully imperative will. And if they are 
esteemed great men, it is not necessary to contest the title, 
but it is evidently the ascendency of the. will, and that alone, 
which gives them their high merit in the eyes of the public. 
It has been remarked of the renowned marshal Ney, that he 
was scarcely capable of putting two ideas together. Although 
this is an exaggeration, it is very certain, that his great celeb- 
rity does not rest upon- his comprehensive views and powers 
of reasoning, but almost solely on his surprising promptness 
and resolution in action ; in other words, on the promptness 
and force of the will. — But it will be necessary to resume this 
subject again. All that we wish to say now is, that, although 
there is a connection between the understanding and the will, 
and the one is the basis of the life and activity of the 
other, there is not a perfect correspondence between the 
two, and that the power and activity of the one does not fur- 
nish a perfect measure of the ability and promptness of the 
other. 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES TO THE 
WILL. 



§. 24. General statement in explanation of the term sensibilities. 

Having proceeded thus far, in considering the relation 
which the Understanding sustains to the will, we advance a 
step further into the interiour of the mental nature, and con- 
sider more particularly the relation which the Sensibilities sus- 
tain to it. We have already had occasion to remark, that the 
doctrine formerly prevalent of the will's being controlled by 
the last dictate of the understanding is untenable, and that 
the understanding is in no case indirect contact with the 
voluntary power. They are entirely removed from each 
other, and the space between them is occupied by another 
portion of the mind of the greatest interest and importance, 
viz, its sentient states, and which of course has a more direct 
connection with the will. But before attempting to illus- 
trate this connection, it is necessary to state, in a few words, 
what is properly included under the term Sensibilities. 

It may be said in general terms without professing 
to be specific and exact, that every thing is to be in- 
cluded under the word Sensibilities, which implies feel- 
ing. The expression may be regarded as meaning 



54 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES. 

the same as the word heart does, in those numerous pas- 
sages of English writers, where the heart is spoken of in 
distinction from the head or the understanding. "Loyalty, 
(says Junius in his First Letter,) in the heart and understand- 
ing of an Englishman, is a natural attachment to the guardian 
of the laws." Such expressions as these of this celehrated 
writer, implying a distinction hetween the" intellectual and 
sentient naturej are to be found without number ; so fre- 
quently at least as to authorize the presumption, that they 
are well understood. When we say of an individual, that he 
has a vigorous intellect but a perverted heart, or on the 
other hand characterize him as possessed of a just and 
generous heart in combination with a weak intellect, we 
rightly count on such expressions being easily and read- 
ily apprehended. We use the term Sensibilities, therefore, 
as meaning essentially the same with the heart, as it is em- 
ployed in such passages. But this statement, it must be ad- 
mitted, is so general and indefinite, that it seems necessary 
to designate more particularly what is included under the 
term. 

§. 25. Of what are strictly included under the sensibilities. 

The states of mind coming under the general head of the 
Sensibilities may be arranged under the three' subordinate 
classes of Emotions, Desires, and- feelings of Obligation ; 
including under the class of the Desires certain complex 
states of mind, of which desire makes a prominent part, 
such as the appetites, propensities, and affections. Of 
these three subordinate classes, the Emotions naturally pre- 
sent themselves first to our consideration. These feelings 
are very various in kind, such as the emotions of cheerful- 
ness and joy, of melancholy and sorrow^ of surprise, aston- 
ishment, and wonder ; the emotions of beauty, grandeur, and 



TO THE WILL. 55 

sublimity ; the emotions of the ludicrous, and the emotions 
of approval and disapproval. As the emotions are simple 
states of the mind, it would be of no avail to attempt to de- 
fine them ; but the knowledge of them must be {eft to the 
testimony of each one's consciousness. But it is to be pre- 
sumed, that no one is ignorant of what is meant when we 
speak of cheerfulness, of wonder, of melancholy, of beauty, 
grandeur, and the like. , 

Besides Emotions, we have the subordinate class of De- 
sires included under the general head of sentient states of 
the mind or sensibilities. The knowledge of these too must 
be had chiefly from consciousness. No mere form of words 
can illustrate their nature as' distinguished from that of emo- 
tions, independently of that internal experience which is im- 
plied in an act of consciousness, excepting in the single cir- 
cumstance, that emotions are instantaneous, while there is 
apparently a greater permanency in desires. These last 
continue the same as when they first arose, so long as the 
objects towards which they are directed are the same, while 

the emotions are in general more transitory. Under 

the class of. Desires may be included, as has already 
been stated, the appetites, such as hunger and thirst ; the 
propensities', such as curiosity or the desire of knowledge, 
the innate desire of esteem, the principle of imitation, socia- 
bility or the desire of society, ambition or the desire of 
power, and the like ; and the affections, both the malevo- 
lent, and those of a beneficent tendency. 

To these may also be added, as belonging to and as 
forming a distinct portion of the sentient constitution, the 
feelings of Obligation. It Avould be inconsistent with the 
plan, which we propose to pursue, to go very fully into the 
nature of Obligatory sentiments. The difference, existing 
between them and the Desires, will probably be obvious to 



ZQ RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

every one on even a slight internal examination. Nor is 
there, in "general, any danger of their being confounded 
with the Emotions, excepting those, which are also of a 
moral nature, viz, of approval and disapproval. But here 
also the distinction is not an imperfect or obscure one. The 
emotions of approval and disapproval, with some trifling ex- 
ceptions mote apparent than real, have reference entirely 
to the character of objects and actions, that are either past or 
present. The states of mind on the contrary, which involve 
obligation and duty, have reference to the future ; to some- 
thing, which is either to be performed or the performance of 
which is to be avoided.- They bind us entirely" to what is to 
come. — There is also this additional ground of distinction 
between the two, that the feelings of obligation are always 
subsequent in point of time to the approving or disappro- 
ving emotions ;' .and cannot possibly exist, unless prece- 
ded by them. The-statement, (to introduce here what we 
have already said on another occasion when more fully 
examining this subject,) is susceptible of illustration in this 
way. Some complicated state of things, involving moral 
considerations, is presented before us ; we inquire and exam- 
ine into it; emotions of approval and disapproval then arise. 
And this is all that takes place, if we ourselves have, in no 
way whatever, any direct and active concern, either present 
or future. But if it be otherwise, the moral emotions are 
immediately succeeded by a distinct and imperative feeling, 
viz, the sentiment of obligation, which binds us, as if it were 
the voice of God speaking in the soul, to act or not to act, to 
do or hot to do, to favour or to oppose. How common a 
thing it is for a person to say, that he feels no moral obliga- 
tion to do a thing, because he does not approve it, or on the 
contrary, that, approving any proposed course, he feels un- 
der obligation to pursue it ; language, which undoubtedly 



TO THE WILL. 57 

means something, and which implies a distinction between 
the mere moral emotion and the feeling of obligation ; and 
which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, 
that the feeling of obligation ii subsequent to, and depend- 
ent on that of approval or disapproval* These statements, 
though necessarily brief, "will help to show what are strictly 
included under the term sensibilities. 

§. 26. Acts of the intellect in immediate proximity with emo- 
tions. 

In considering those states of mind, which are termed 
sentient, in distinction from the intellectual, we have to 
remark further, that of the various classes of feeling named 
in the preceding section, the Emotions come first in order. 
That . is to say, in proceeding from the intellect to the 
will through the sensibilities, which is obviously the road 
that nature has laid out and established to the exclusion of 
every other, we find the intellections in contact, or more 
properly speaking, in immediate proximity with the emotions. 
The first step taken from the understanding to the heart is 
into the region of the emotions, and not into that of the 
desires, or of the feelings of obligation. And here it is 
proper again to observe, as we had occasion to notice in the 
preceding chapter, that the original and sole foundation of 
emotions is knowledge, which implies of course the action 
of the intellect. This is an ultimate fact in our constitution, 
which therefore we cannot resolve into any thing else. 
Whenever an object of knowledge is presented before us, of 
whatever kind, we are so constituted, that we necessarily 
have a correspondent emotion, either pleasing or displeas- 
ing ; though in many cases, it must be acknowledged, the 
emotion is so very slight as to give the object the appear- 
ance of being perfectly indifferent. And even if we should 

* Elements of Mental Philosophy, 3d. Abridged Ed. p. 586. 
8 



53 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

admit, that there may be some objects of knowledge, (or in 
other words some intellectual perceptions, which amounts to 
the same thing,) that are perfectly indifferent, being wholly 
unattended with emotions, it will still remain true, ou the 
other hand, that there can be no emotions without some ob- 
ject of knowledge, without some pfeceding intellectual act. 
The. natural progress Of the mind, therefore, in bringing the 
will into action, is from intellections to emotions. 

If we are asked, how a mere intellectual perception can 
excite an emotion,. which two are things entirely distinct 
from each other, all we can answer is, that such is the mind's 
constitution. The Creator of the mind has willed it to be 
so. He has ordained, by a wise and permament arrange- 
ment, that the landscape .should inspire within us senti- 
ments of beauty, that the vast cataract should inspire 
emotions of grandeur or sublimity, that the perception of 
wise and benevolent conduct in others should be attended 
with an instantaneous emotion of approval. — And, further- 
more, wherever there is a clear and just perception, the 
emotion will not only necessarily arise, but there will gen- 
erally be, though it may not always be the case, an entire 
correspondence between the two. That is to say, the emo- 
tion will be the true and precise measure of the natural and 
moral beauty of objects, and of their deformity ; and the 
true measure of all other qualities, which are fitted to excite 
emotions. We say, where there is a clear and just per- 
ception, for it is undeniable, that the perception is often 
perplexed and clouded by inexcusable carelessness, by in- 
ordinate passion, by strong casual associations, and for oth- 
er reasons ; and that, in consequence of this, the cor- 
respondence, which ought to exist between the emotion 
and the true nature of the object before the mind,'fre- 



TO THE WILL. 59 

quently fails. But in all those eases, where there is no erro- 
neous and unnatural influence operating on the understand- 
ing, we shall seldom fail to find a due adaptation and har- 
mony between these two parts of our nature. 

§. 27. Emotions not in proximity with volitions. 

Acts of the understanding or intellections are, by the 
constitution of our nature, antecedent to emotions. But 
while it is thus obvious, that emotions stand between intel- 
lections and volitions, we are not to suppose, that emotions, 
although they are one *step nearer the will than the mere 
acts of the understanding, are-in direct contact- with it, or 
have of themselves alone any power over it. It may be as- 
serted with perfect confidence, if we "had. these feelings 
alone, the will would never be brought into action. They 
have no more natural tendency to cause volition than mere 
thought, than the most unimpassioned and abstract specula- 
tions of the intellect. Let us take some illustration. A per- 
son contemplates some picture of excellent workmanship, 
which appears to him beautiful or sublime, and excites within 
him emotions of that character ; but the existence of these 
emotions merely never calls forth any act of volition. He 
stands, and gazes, and the tide of emotion swells in upon 
him, and he is overwhelmed with it. But while this portion 
of his Sensibilities alone is awakened and called into exer- 
cise, he will remain as inactive, as if he had been formed of 
intellect merely. He will take no measures to possess the 
painting or to do any thing else in respect to it, until he is 
under the influence of another portion of the Sensibilities 
entirely distinct from emotions. 

§. 28. Emotions followed by desires and feelings of obligation. 

We behold here the admirable economy of the mind, a 



6,0 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

decisive and striking proof of that wisdom, which pervades 
its wonderful structure. Intellectual perceptions lay the 
foundation of emotions, and if these last cannot reach and 
influence the higher and more authoritative power of the 
will, it is so ordered in tke mental constitution, that they lay 
the foundation of other mental states, which can. The 
classes of feelings, of which the emotions may be regarded 
as the basis, appear to be two in number, namely the Desires, 
founded on the various emotions which give pleasure or 
displeasure, and Feelings of obligation, founded on the emo- 
tions of approval and disapproval. 

And in the first place a word or two may be said on the 
Desires. It has been seen, that intellections are not in 
direct connection With the desires, but that emotions inter- 
vene. The acts of the understanding alone can never raise a 
single desire. In no case whatever does a man assert his 
desire of a thing, unless he is pleased with it either in itself, 
or in its relations and applications . But if there be no desire 
without the intervention of some emotion, then it is evident, 
that the mere knowledge of the thing, towards Avhich the de- 
sire is directed, is not sufficient to excite it ; but on the con- 
trary, without something more than the mere acts of the un- 
derstanding, it could never exist . The process of the mind,there- 
fore, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires. 
The intellectual perceptions lay the foundation for the vari- 
ous emotions both pleasant and painful ; and the desires are 
attendant upon these. We desire a hous"e and its furniture ; 
we desire a picture or a statue, or other objects of conven- 
ience, utility, and beauty ; ' because they excite emotions 
and give us pleasure, but not otherwise. 

And if we are here asked, Avhy the emotions should lay 
the foundation of desires, we can only say, as in respect to 
to the general fact that intellections lay the foundation of 



TO THE WILL. 61 

emotions, it is the constitution op our nature. The same 
creative power that requires emotions to follow the percep- 
tions of the understanding,has instituted the succession of the 
desires to emotions. And it is in Desires that we find the 
immediate antecedents to the acts of the Will. They pre- 
sent to it a powerful motive. They furnish to it one of 
its broadest grounds of action. 

§. 29. Further remarks on obligatory feelings. 

But the class of mental states, which are termed emo- 
tions, are followed not merely by Desires, but also by an- 
other class, distinct from Desires and yet sustaining the 
same relation of proximity to the will, which for want of a 
single term we have been obliged to denominate Feelings of 
obligation. Desires are founded on those emotions, which 
involve what is pleasurable or painful, while Obligatory 
feelings are exclusively based on emotions of a different 
kind, viz. those of approval and disapproval. These states 
of mind, although they are easily distinguished by our con- 
sciousness from desires, agree with the latter in being in di- 
rect contact with the voluntary power, and not unfrequently 
these two classes stand before the will in direct and fierce 
opposition to each other. 

We are aware, that the representation has sometimes 
been given by writers, that the emotions of approval and 
disapproval are in direct proximity with the will, and exert 
a direct control over it. But this is not true of any emo- 
tions whatever, those of approval and disapproval as well as 
others. They all stop short .of the will, and require the in- 
tervention of some other state of the mind. We put forth 
emotions in approval or disapproval of a certain action or a 
certain course of conduct, but they will never lead us to ex- 
ert any effort of our own, until^ they are followed by the 



62 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

distinct feelings of obligation. Hence the common re- 
mark, that we feel an obligation to pursue a certain 
course, because we approve it ; which implies, that, 
while the feeling of approval is the antecedent to that of 
obligation, the latter is the direct and effective antecedent to 
volition. A view of this portion of the mind, which, we are 
persuaded, will bear the strictest internal examination, and ' 
will not fail to be found true. 

§. 30. Desires and obligatory feelings in contact with the will. 

We are now able, looking at the mind* in its great out- 
lines, to understand the precise relation, which its prominent 
parts hold to the will. Volition is the great result, to which 
they all, in their appropriate position, contribute ; and .with 
which they all, therefore, sustain an established connection, 
though not with the same degree of nearness. And taken 
together, they furnish a basis for the operations of the will, 
sufficiently extensive not only for the purposes of action, 
but of accountability. We here see, that, in the exercise of 
volition, men are not shut up to one form of action ; but are 
enabled and required, in all cases where such a distinction 
actually exists, to discriminate between the utile and the 
honestum, between the desirable and the just, between what 
is merely profitable or prudential, and what is virtuous. And 
it is undoubtedly important, that these views should be borne 
in mind, for they have a direct and close bearing upon main's 
accountability, and also upon the question of his freedom. 
And a due degree of attention should be given to all consid- 
erations, which have a tendency to settle these interesting 
questions. 

§.31. Opinions of metaphysical loriters on the foregoing 
statements. 

The doctrines, thus far advanced in this chapter, find sup- 



TO THE WILL. ' Q$ 

port, in their essential and most important respects, in vari- 
ous writers. It is true that the distinction between desires 
and feelings of obligation has not been so clearly drawn 
and so much insisted on, as it should be, although almost all 
writers, either more formally or incidentally, seem to ac- 
knowledge, that the moral nature presents direct and power- 
ful motives to the will, as well as those parts of our consti- 
tution, which involve mere pleasure and desire. In respect 
to the relation, sustained by desires to the will, there is 
more explicitness. Mr. Locke, in particular, repeatedly and 
clearly asserts their proximity to volition. t He does indeed 
say, that uneasiness determines the will, (§. 31. of the Chap- 
ter on Power,) but we need not mistake how this is to be 
interpreted, when we remember he expressly adds, besides 
giving his reasons for the remark, "this uneasiness we may 
call, as it is, Desire." And in accordance with this, we find 
him remarking as follows, in a subsequent section of the 
same chapter. — "I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the un- 
easiness of desire, as that which determines the will, because 
that is the chief and most sensible, and the will seldom or- 
ders any action, nor is there any voluntary action perform- 
ed, without some desire accompanying it ; which I think is 
the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded. 
But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes 
up, or at least accompanies most of the other passions, as 
wholly excluded in the case. Aversion, fear, anger, envy, 
shame, &c. have each their uneasiness too, and thereby in- 
fluence the will. These passions are scarce any of them in 
life and practice simple and alone, and wholly unmixed with 
others ; though usually in discourse and contemplation, that 
carries the name which operates strongest, and appears most 
in the present, state of the mind: nay, there is, I think, 
scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined 



64 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

with it. I am sure, wherever, there, is uneasiness, there is 
desire ; for we constantly desire happiness ; and whatever 
we feeh'of uneasiness, so much it is certain we want of hap- 
piness, even in our own opinion, let our state and condition 
otherwise he what it will. Besides, the present moment 
not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment he, we look 
heyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight, and 
that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself, 
that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment de- 
pends, is the desire to continue it, and fear to lose it : and 
whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the 
mind, the will presently is by that determined to some new 
action, and the present delight neglected."* 

§. 32. Of the strength of the desires. 

While we are upon this part of the "general subject, we 
may properly remark, as it may he found to have some con- 
nection with what will he said hereafter, on the strength of 
the desires. The intensity of the desires, and also of the 
emotions on which they are founded, will not unfrequently 
vary in different individuals, even when they are acting 
together, in reference to the same object, and nearly "under 

the same circumstances. The cause of this variation may 

be found, in the first place, in the intellect or understanding. 
The relation existing between the understanding and the 
sensibilities has already been, in some measure, explained. 
And those explanations will throw a ready and clear light 
upon the present topic. We are so constituted, as it would 
seem from the remarks now referred to, that the emotions we 
have, whether pleasant or painful, will vary, as a general 
thing, with our knowledge. If we happen on some occasion 
to be pleased with any natural or artificial object, we shall 
find, that the pleasurable emotion will be increased or di- 
* Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk, II> Ch. XXI, §• 39. 



.: 



* 



TO THE WILL. 65 

minished by our further knowledge either of its excellencies 
or its defects. And as the natural progress of the mind is 
from the emotions to the desires, it will also happen, that 
the strength of the desires will vary in accordance with the 
variation in the intensity of the emotions. 

We will illustrate this by a- single instance. We may 
assume, (and indeed have abundant reason to believe it to 
be the fact,) that the venerable Thomas Clarkson, who has 
been the instrument of effecting so much for suffering Africa, 
is naturally a person of a kindly and amiable disposition, and 
easily moved by exhibitions of human woe: But how did 
it happen, that this individual felt and effected so much in op- 
position to the Slave Trade, while others of equal amiability 
neither felt nor acted ? The explanation is an easy one, 
and it throws light upon the operations of the human mind. 
In the year 1785, the vice-chancellor of the University of 
Cambridge, with which Mr Clarkson was connected, gave 
out as the subject of a prize essay, ll JLrme Uceat invitos in 
servitutem dare? Is it right to enslave others against 
their will?" He wrote upon this subject, and gained the 
prize. And it was the knowledge, which he acquired in 
writing this Essay, that affected his heart ; he became ac- 
quainted with facts, which were before unknown to him, and 
his sensibilities were moved ; he knew and then he felt ; he 
wept over the mass of human suffering that Was displayed be- 
fore him, not because he was actually of a more benevolent 
disposition than he was the year before, or of a more benev- 
olent temperament than a hundred others in Great Britain, 
but because he had become acquainted with it. And when 
he had known, and when he had felt new desires and new 
feelings of obligation enkindling within, him, he saw there 
was nothing remaining for him but to will and to do, to re- 
solve and to act. And from that time he has devoted his 
useful life to Africa. 

9 



66 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

(2) — But it is necessary to add, that the mere amount of 
knowledge does not seem sufficient of itself to explain fully 
the differences of sensibility, which we notice in different per- 
sons. Whatever may have sometimes been said to the contra- 
ry, there can hardly be a doubt, that the minds of men, though 
compacted of the same essential elements, differ from each 
other in the modification and exhibition of those elements, as 
much as the general form of their bodies and their looks dif- 
fers. And if we find, that there is a constitutional difference 
in the powers of perception, memory, reasoning and the like, 
we may expect to find that there is naturally and constitu- 
tionally a greater quickness and strength of emotions and 
of consequent desires in some than in others . And this is 
confirmed by constant observation. It would certainly be 
deemed a very reasonable assertion, and fully confirmed by 
the whole course of his life, that the benevolent Howard 
was possessed of greater quickness and power of sensibility 
than many others. We do not mean to say that all he did 
was owing solel y to the natural quickness of his sensibilities. 
It was undoubtedly the fact, that the food,which he furnished 
to the understanding, nourished the sensibilities also ; but it 
was equally true, that the sensibilites were naturally and 
strongly predisposed to receive such nourishment. 

If these views be correct, then in endeavouring to influ- 
ence a person to pursue a certain course of conduct, we 
must consider not only the character and value of the object 
which is presented before him, but the temperament of the 
man. The object, that will bring one promptly into action, 
may approach heavily and weakly the more sluggish and 
indurated heart of another. 

§. 33. Of the strength of feelings of obligation. 

Essentially the same views will apply to feelings of obli- 
gation. Like the desires, their degree of strength will vary, 



TO THE WILL. 67 

in the first place, with the amount of our knowledge. In 
other words, the more fully and completely we understand 
a moral action, in itself and in its relations, the stronger we 
may reasonably expect will be our feelings of approval or 
disapproval. But it has been seen, that the mere feelings 
of approval and disapproval never of themselves excite the 
will, and lead us to action. They must be followed by feel- 
ings of obligation ; and the strength of these last will cor- 
respond very nearly with that of the antecedent moral emo- 
tions. If the emotions be strong and there is an opening in 
the matter for any personal action, the feelings of obligation, 
which necessarily follow them, will be proportionately 
strong. 

But here also, as in the case of the desires, there may be 
a constitutional difference in individuals. As some persons 
appear to inherit from nature a quicker sensibility to the 
beauty or deformity of natural objects than others, so in re- 
gard to things of a moral character, the emotions of some 
persons are found to be faint, while those of others, though 
there is precisely the same amount of knowledge in both 
cases, are distinct and vivid. And if nature may thus lay a 
foundation for a difference in the emotions, it necessarily 
lays a foundation for a difference in those feelings of obli- 
gation, of which moral emotions are the basis. Did not na- 
ture do more for the moral constitution of Aristides than for 
that of Alcibiades ? And was Regulus, who sacrificed his 
life to preserve his honour, on an equality in this respect 
with Caesar, who sacrificed both his honour and his country 
to his ambition ? 

§. 34. Of the influence of the sensibilities on the understanding. 

Before quitting the subject of the relations sustained by 
the sensibilities, we have a remark further to make. The 
sensibilities have not only an influence onward, that is to 



68 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES 

say, upon the will ; but backward upon the understanding. 
The power of the heart over the intellect has been often no- 
ticed by theological writers ; nor can it have escaped the 
knowledge of any one, who has made the opinions and con- 
duct of men a subject of careful observation. It is not un- 
frequently the case, that we anticipate, with a great degree 
of confidence, the decisions of a person on a purely specula- 
tive subject, from a knowledge of his desires, prejudices, and 
predominant passions. But the fact is so obvious and so 
generally acknowledged, that we have nothing to do but to 
say something in explanation of it. 

In the first place a knowledge of the constitution of the 
human mind would lead us to expect, that the action of the 
intellect will not be free and unembarrassed, when the sen- 
sibilities are in a state of great excitement. It has been 
made sufficiently clear in this and the preceding chapters 
that the tendency of the mind, in its great departments of 
the cognitive, sentient, and voluntary, is towards conse- 
cutive rather than simultaneous action ; that its acts follow 
each other in a certain order in time ; that there is no feel- 
ing without antecedent cognition, and no voluntary action 
without the antecedent action of the sensibilities. A simul- 
taneous action, therefore, of the intellect and of the sensibil- 
ities, in an equal degree, seems to be inconsistent with those 
general principles of movement, which pervade the mental 
constitution. Accordingly When the intellect is at the high- 
est point of action, the passions will be subordinate; and 
when, on the other hand, the passions are highly excited, 
the operations of the intellect will be feeble and obscure. 
Hence it is, that every man, when he is about entering upon 
an investigation of an abstract and difficult nature, is desir- 
ous of freeing himself from the disturbing forces of the 
heartland of commencing his task with perfect coolness. 







TO THE WILL. 69 

(2) — But there is another point of view,in which this sub- 
ject may be contemplated. It is not merely of the occasion- 
al predominance of the passions that the intellect may com- 
plain ; there is often a secret influence of the sensibilities, 
which attracts less notice, but is hardly less powerful ; 
which does not absolutely interrupt the exercise of the un- 
derstanding, but perverts it. For instance, we often find it 
difficult to form a correct judgment, where our own person- 
al interests are concerned, or those of our family or political 
party. Our love has woven itself so closely around those 
partial interests, that even the keen eye of the understand- 
ing can scarcely penetrate its folds. And when it does, it 
beholds every thing under a false medium ; all that is ex- 
cellent, magnified and made prominent ; and all that is evil, 
diminished and kept out of .sight. And what love has done 
for our own interests, jealousy and ill will and hatred have 
done for interests adverse to our own. These last, as well 
as the more amiable passions, hinder the approach of the 
searchings of the intellect ; and when this is no longer pos- 
sible, they distort the objects of its examination. 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



VOLITIONS OR VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 



§. 35. The necessity oj that controlling power which exists 
in the will. 

In the remarks hitherto made, although enough has been 
said to evince clearly the distinct existence of the Will, 
very little has been said in illustration of its appropriate na- 
ture. This will now be made a distinct subject of consider- 
ation. But before entering directly upon its examination, 
we take this opportunity to say something of the great ne- 
cessity of that regulative and controlling power, of which 
the will is justly deemed to be the depository. 

Destitute of the power of willing, is it not evident, that 
man would be an inefficient and useless being ? He would 
indeed be possessed of the intellect and the sensibilities ; but 
it is well understood, and has already been remarked in res- 
pect to the intellect, that the value of these depends, in a 
great degree, upon action ; in other words, upon the practi- 
cal results, to which they lead. But the doctrine, that man 
can bring himself into action, without the power of willing, 
seems incomprehensible. And if we could suppose it to be 



VOLITIONS. 71 

otherwise, and if it were possible to try the experiment of 
basing human action directly upon the emotions and pas- 
sions instead of the will, it would soon show itself to be a 
species of action of the most perplexed and desultory kind. 
Like the passions themselves, it would be addicted to un- 
foreseen obliquities, and would every where be characteriz- 
ed by indications of violence and change. No language 
could fully express its unfixedness, its versatility, its move- 
ments hither and thither, in various and contradictory direc- 
tions. Unrestrained by any superintendant influence, the 
whole outward life and activity of man would be impelled 
blindly forward, like ships driven in storms without a rud- 
der, or the heavenly bodies, urged onward in all their rapid- 
ity of motion, without an observance of the principles of 
gravitation. 

It follows, therefore, necessarily, that there must be 
somewhere in the mind a power, which, amid the complica- 
ted variety of mental impulses, exerts a regulative and con- 
trolling sway. And without such a superintendent influence, 
we might justly pronounce the structure of the mind defec- 
tive. 

§. 3Q. The harmony of the mind secured by the superintend- 
ence oj the will. 

The intellect and the sensibilities, in their various forms 
of action, constitute the antecedents to volition. When 
called into exercise, they are to be regarded as the estab- 
lished prerequisites to any operation on the part of the will. 
And here we see occasion to notice, how much the beauty 
and utility of the various parts of the mind depend upon the 
concurrent action and support of the other parts ; and that 
the beauty and utility of the whole depend upon the harmo- 
ny of the whole. Without the enforcing power of the will, 



72 VOLITIONS OR 

every man would be " a house divided against itself," con- 
stant! y exhibiting a scene of internal hostility. 

Among the various elements, that are shut up in the hu- 
man bosom, there are some highly generous and virtuous, 
which tend to assimilate men to angels ; while there are 
others inordinately selfish and vicious, and which tend to de- 
press them both in character and in destiny ; and no one is 
ignorant, that frequently they are arrayed against each oth- 
er in direct and fierce conflict. And in this state of things 
the question naturally proposes itself, where is the arbiter ? 
Who shall determine this great contest, sometimes invol- 
ving consequences of everlasting import ? Who shall still 
these internal convulsions, and elicit order out of this 
mental chaos ? In answer to these inquiries, which demand 
to be fully and frankly met, it is an obvious remark, and is 
undeniably true, that we have the power within us. And 
that power, (and it would be difficult to designate any 
other,) is the authoritative voice of the will, which,* seeing 
the necessity of a decision, and calmly contemplating the 
conflicting claims of interest and passion on the one hand, 
and of conscience on the other, speaks and it is done, 
commands and it stands fast. 

The will, therefore, is the culminating point in man's 
spiritual nature. It sits the witness and the arbitress over 
all the rest. It is essential alike to action and accountabil- 
ity, to freedom and order, to intelligence and virtue. With- 
out this all else is nothing. It is in reference to this, that 
all other susceptibilities keep their station, and perform their 
functions. They revolve around it as a common centre, at- 
tracted by its power, and controlled by its ascendency. 

§. 37. Remarks on the nature of the will. 

Having seen that the mind is to be contemplated under ■ 
the threefold aspect of intellectual, SENTiENT,and volunta- 



VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 73 

ry, and having considered the relation which the intellect 
and the sensibilities hear to the will, we are now prepared 
to pass to the consideration of the precise nature of fhe last 
named power. And here let us interpose a word of caution. 
It is not to he inferred, when we speak of one part of the mind 
in distinction from another, and of passing from one part or 
power to another, that the mind is a congeries of distinct 
existences, or that it is, in any literal and proper sense of 
the terms, susceptible of division. Varieties of action do 
not necessarily imply a want of unity in the principle, from 
which they originate. The mental principle, therefore, is 
indivisible. In itself it is truly and essentially an unity, 
though multiplied, in a manner calculated to excite the 
greatest astonishment, in its modes of application. It is 
merely one of these modes of its application, or rather one 
of these modes of its exercise, which is indicated by the 
term Will. Accordingly the term Will is not meant to ex- 
press any thing separate from the mind ; but merely embod- 
ies and expresses the fact of the mind's operating in a par- 
ticular way. And hence the will may properly enough be 
defined the mental power or susceptibility, by which we 
put forth volitions. And in accordance with this definition, 
if we wish to understand more fully what the nature of the 
power is, we must look at its results, and examine the na- 
ture of those states of mind which it gives rise to. — "It is 
necessary, (says Mr. Stewart very justly,) to form a distinct 
notion of what is meant by the word volition, in order to un- 
derstand the import of the word iMl ; for this last word prop- 
erly expresses that power of the mind, of which volition is 
the ad, and it is only by attending to what we experience, 
while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand 
any thing concerning the nature of the power."* 

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix I. §. 1. 

10 



74 VOLITIONS OR 

§. 38. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions. 

Of volitions, which are the results of the existence and 
exercise of the voluntary power, we are unable to give any 
definition in words, which will of itself make them clearly 
understood. They are simple states of the mind, and that 
circumstance alone precludes the possibility of a definition, 
in any strict and proper sense of the term. It is true we 
may call them determinations or decisions of the mind, or 
resolutions of the mind, or acts of choice and the like, but 
this is only the substitution of other terms, which them- 
selves need explanation ; and of course it throws no light 
upon the subject, of inquiry. And hence we are thrown 
back upon our consciousness, as we are in all cases, where 
the nature of the simple states of mind is the matter of inves- 
tigation. And whenever we have made this appeal to the 
internal experience, and have received its testimony, we are 
then placed in the possession of all that knowledge, which 
the nature of the case seems to admit. of. And we must sup- 
pose, that every one has in some degree done this. It is 
not presumable, at least it is not at all probable, that men, 
who are constantly in action, pursuing one course and avoid- 
ing another, adopting one plan and rejecting another, ac- 
cepting and refusing, befriending and opposing, all which 
things and many others imply voluntary action, are still ig- 
norant of what an act of the will is. 

; §. 3d. Volition never exists without some object. 

Although we are obliged to depend chiefly upon con- 
sciousness for a knowledge of the nature of volitions, it is 
still true, that we can make some statements in respect to 
them, which may aid us in forming our opinions. Among 
other things, it is an obvious remark, that every act of the 



VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 75 

will must have an object. A very slight reflection on the 
subject will evince this. It is the same here as in respect to 
the act of thought, of memory, and of association, all of 
which imply some object, in reference to which the mental 
act is called forth. 

" Every act of the will, says Dr. Reid, must have an ob- 
ject. He that wills must will something ; and that which 
he wills is called the object of his- volition. As a man cannot 
think without thinking of something, nor remember without 
remembering something, so neither can he will without will- 
ing something. * Every act of will, therefore, must have 
an object ; and the person, who wills, must have some con- 
ception, more or less distinct, of what he wills."* 

§. 40. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be 
in our power. 

Another -circumstance may be pointed out in illustration 
of volitions, viz, that they never exist in respect to those things, 
which we believe to be wholly beyond our reach. As no man be- 
lieves, that it is in his power to fly in the air like a bird, so 
we never find a person putting forth a volition to do so. As 
no man believes, that he can originate what never had a be- 
ing before, in other words that he can create a new exist- 
ence out of nothing, so we never find a man determining, 
resolving, or willing to that effect. Indeed we are obvi- 
ously so constituted, that, whenever we believe an object to 
be wholly and absolutely beyond our power, volition does 
not and cannot exist in respect to it. The very nature of 
the mind interposes in such a case, and effectually obstructs 
the origination of the voluntary act. And this is so prompt- 
ly and decisively done, and done too in all cases without ex- 

*Reid's Essays on the Active Powers, Essay II, Chap. I. 



76 VOLITIONS OR 

ce'ption, that we find it very difficult even to conceive of any 
thing, which we are certain is wholly heyond our power, as 
being an object of the will's action. There may be a desire 
in such cases, but there is no volition. 

' And the usage of language will be found to throw light 
on this distinction, making the term desire applicable both 
to what is within, our reach and what is not ; and the term 
volition applicable only to'the former. In some cases we 
speak of willing or determining to do a thing, while in oth- 
ers we invariably limit ourselves to the mere expression of a 
wish or desire. Accordingly if would comport with and be 
required by the usage of language, if our thoughts and con- 
versation were directed to those matters, to say, that we 
determine or will to walk, but desire to fly ; that we will to 
build a house, but desire to create a world, As has already 
been intimated, the structure of the mind itself seems to re- 
quire the application of terms in this way. While nothing 
is more common than to speak of determining or Avilling to 
sail from New York, New Orleans, or some other mercantile 
place to London, no one is ever heard to speak of ivilling, 
but of only desiring or wishing to sail from those places to 
the peak of Chimborazo, or to some remote planet of our 
own or some other system. 

§. 41. Volition relates to our own action and to ichatever else 
may be dependent upon us. 

Although the statements thus far made tend to throw 
some light upon the nature of voluntary acts, something fur- 
ther remains to be remarked. It does, not seem definite 
enough merely to assert, that volitions relate solely to those 
things which are in our power, or are believed to be so. 
We may inquire further what is meant by being in our pow- ; 
er, and how far the import of the phrase may justly extend 



VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 77. 

itself. — And hence it is necessary to add, that volitions re- 
late, in the first place, to our own action, either some bodily- 
movement or some act of the mind. In saying this, however, 
we do not mean to say, that volition is necessarily limited 
to the present action. We may will to perfoftn something of 
the simplest kind, which will exact, in its execution, merely 
the present moment, or something.o^ a more complicated 
nature,which will require no inconsiderable time. Any series 
of actions intellectual or bodily, capable of being performed 
by us, which the understanding can embrace as one, and by 
means of any relations existing among them can consolidate 
into one, the will can resolve upon as one. So that the ac- 
tion, dependent upon volition, may be the mere movement 
of the foot or finger ; or it may be the continuous labours of 
a day, a- week, or a year, or some long and perilous expedi- 
tion by land or sea. It is just as proper to say, that a man 
wills to take a voyage to England, as to say that he wills to 
put one foot before the other, in stepping from his door to 
the street. 

Volition may exist, in the second place, in respect to any 
thing and every thing, which is truly dependent upon us, 
however circuitous and remote that dependence may be. It 
is proper to say, that a merchant has determined or will- 
ed to fit a vessel or a number of vessels for sea, and to 
send them to different parts of the' world, although his 
own direct and personal agency in the thing is hard- 
ly known. The effect of his volition, extending far be- 
yond his own direct and personal capabilities, controls the 
acts of a multitude of individuals who ' are dependent 
on him. Previous to the celebrated expedition of Napo- 
leon into Russia, undoubtedly that distinguished warriour 
had brought all the objects, relative to the intended ex- 
pedition, distinctly before his understanding ; the number 
and the kinds of troops, the arms and amunition with which 



78 VOLITIONS OR 

they were to be furnished, the means of subsistence in the 
various countries through which they were to pass, and the 
expenses incident to the arming and support of a body so 
numerous. The action of the intellect enabled him to assim- 
ilate and combine this vast complexity of objects into one. 
Although numberless in its parts and details, it assumed, as 
it passed before the rapid glances of his understanding, an 
identity and oneness, which, for all the purposes of volition 
and action, constituted it one thing. And accordingly it is 
altogether proper to say, that Napoleon purposed, deter- 
mined, or ivilled the expedition into Russia, although the 
agencies, requisite to carry it into effect, were not lodged 
directly in himself, but in millions of subordinate instru- 
ments, that were more or less remotely dependent upon him. 
— " It is not necessary, (says a recent writer in remarking 
upon this very subject,) to consider volition as directing 
merely our own physical powers. Any power, of which 
wealth, rank, or character gives us the command, is as truly 
the instrument of our will, as a hand or a foot. The despot, 
who leads forth his armies of obsequious slaves to overthro *v 
cities and desolate empires, as truly wills these events as to 
move a finger, or change an attitude."* 

§. 42. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength. 

There is one additional characteristic of volitions, worthy 
of some notice ; viz, that the volition does not always exist 
with the same degree of force. Undoubtedly every one 
must have been conscious, that the exercise of the voluntary 
power is more prompt and energetic at some times than oth- 
ers. We are aware, that it is liable to be objected to this 
statement, that if we will do a thing, there can be nothing 
less than the volition ; and that it is necessarily the same un- 

* Essay on Moral Freedom by Thomas T. Crybbace, Sect. II. 



VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 79 

der all circumstances. And it is undoubtedly true, that we 
never will to do an act with any thing less than a volition; and 
that, if there he any act of the Avill at all, it is one truly and 
fully so. That is to say, the act is in all cases the same, as 
far as its intrinsic nature is concerned. And yet we may 
confidently urge, there is no inconsistency in saying, that it 
may exist with different degrees of force. 

The existence of a mental state, which is always the 
same in its nature, in different degrees, is not peculiar to 
volition . The same trait is characteristic of the mental act 
in all cases where we yield our assent or belief. The state 
of mind, which we ■ denominate belief, is undoubtedly 
always the same in its nature, but admitting of various de- 
grees. We determine these differences of strength in the 
feeling by means of that same internal consciousness, which 
assures us of the existence of the mere feeling itself. In other 
words, we are conscious of, or feel our belief to be some- 
times weaker and at other times stronger, which we express 
by various terms, such as presumption, probability, high 
probability, and certainty. And by appealing in the same 
way to our consciousness of what takes place within, 
we shall probably come to the conclusion, that we put forth 
the act of volition with much greater strength at some times 
than others ; that at some times it is so feeble as hardly to 
be distinguished from a mere desire or wish, and is scarcely 
recognized as a volition, while at other times it is exceed- 
ingly marked and energetic. 

§. 43-. Causes of the variation of the strength of the voluntary 
exercise. 

It may tend to throw some light on the nature of the varie- 
ties or degrees in the energy of the voluntary act, if we make 
a remark or two in explanation of the causes of them. We do 



80 VOLITIONS OR 

not, however, intend to say any thing here of original or 
constitutional differences of the -voluntary power. We set 
that topic aside for the present, because we shall find here- 
after a more suitable opportunity, where we can pursue it at 
length. The degree of strength in the voluntary act, consid- 
ered independently of any constitutional differences which 
may perhaps exist, will be found to depend on various causes, 
two of which are particularly worthy of notice! — In the first 
place, as volitions cannot exist except in respect to those 
things which we believe to be in our power, the strength of 
the volition will naturally be in proportion to the strength of 
such belief. It has already been seen, that, where there is 
no belief of an object's being attainable, there can be no vo- 
lition ; and we should, therefore, conclude a priori, that the 
natural tendency of a diminution of belief would be to ope- 
erate a correspondent diminution of the voluntary energy. 
Accordingly we find it to be generally the fact, that, when- 
ever the possibility of securing any object in view is deci- 
dedly doubtful, the voluntary act, imbibing a sort of conta- 
gious hesitancy, becomes wavering and weak. We may ac- 
cordingly lay it down as a general truth, that the strength 
of volitions will depend, in part at least, on the probability 
of securing the object placed before us. We do not mean to 
say, that there is necessarily no energy of volition, where 
one's path is hedged up with doubts and difficulties, for it is 
not unfrequently otherwise ; but merely to assert, that the 
tendency of such doubts and difficulties is, all other things 
being equal, to infuse, into such energy a mixture of vacil- 
lancy and lassitude. And hence it is a common artifice, if a 
man wishes to shake another's resolution, to represent to him 
the difficulties in the way of his success, and to insist on the 
improbability of his securing the object before him. And if 
we notice carefully, we shall find it to be generally true, 



VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. QI 

although it may not always be the case, that a person's efforts 
will become enfeebled and less energetic, in proportion as he 
yields credence to such discouraging statements. And a dim- 
inution of active efforts of course implies a diminution of 
voluntary power. ? 

(2) The strength of the volition will depend, further- 
more, upon the state of the Sensibilities. If, for instance, 
our desires are strongly directed towards a particular object, 
and if there be no antagonist feeling arising up to obstruct 
and counteract them, it may be expected that the volition 
will be proportionably strong. And if it happen in any 
given case, that these strong desires are approved and aided 
by the feelings of obligation, the motive to action will thus 
be greatly increased, and the force of the voluntary deter- 
mination or resolve will be likely to be increased in propor- 
tion. And if it be the case, that there is not only a con- 
currence of the obligatory feelings .with the desires, but 
that the feelings of obligation as well as the desires are in- 
tense and energetic, it may reasonably be anticipated, that 
the energy of the voluntary act.will still further be aug- 
mented. 

In regard to the Sensibilities, it is enough briefly to add 
here,that the degree of their. intensity will vary from various 
circumstances. Those differences of vividness and strength, ■ 
which we notice from time to time, may be owing to some 
constitutional difference in persons, as we have already in 
the preceding chapter had occasion to see. Sometimes the 
acuteness and vigor of the sensibilities is found to vary also 
from accidental causes, which cannot be easily explained. 
And in particular, they will generally vary, in the intensity of 
their action, with the amount and character of our knowl- 
edge, conforming themselves in a great measure to the pre- 
cise position, whatever it may be, of the intellect. 
11 



82 VOLITIONS OR 

§. 44. Of preference or indifferency as applicable to the will. 

In some treatises on the Will, much is said of the will's 
being in a state of preference or of indifferency. But it is 
questionable, whether the terms preference and indifferency 
are properly applicable to the will at all. The prominent 
characteristic of the will is movement, determination, or ac- 
tion, and not feeling. There is no more of feeling, no more 
of sensibility in the Will than in the Intellect. But every 
one knows, that we do not apply the terms preference and 
indifference to the intellect ; to the acts of judgment and 
reasoning ; to the mere process of comparison and deduc- 
tion. So far as these acts are purely intellectual, and with- 
out any tincture from the sensibilities, they are perfectly 
cool and unimpassioned. And one is not more so than 
another ; but all are unimpassioned alike. The emotion, 
desire, and passion, which are sometimes plausibly ascribed 
to them, are not to be regarded as, in any case, the compo- 
nents or constituents of the intellectual acts, but merely the 
attendants. No man says, that he has a preference, or that 
he is indifferent, whether he shall believe the equality of the 
three angles of a triangle to two right ones. This is a mat- 
ter, where both preference and indifference, choice and refu- 
sal are alike inadmissible. He is impelled by the very con- 
stitution of his nature to believe, if there is evidence ; and 
on the other hand he is utterly unable to believe, if evidence 
is wanting ; and in all cases his belief necessarily corres- 
ponds with the evidence, being greater or less, in accord- 
ance with it. 

But indifferency and preference are equally inapplica- 
ble to the Will, although it may not be so obvious at first. 
A careful examination will hardly fail to convince one, 
that these terms are properly and emphatically applica- 



VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 38 

ble to the heart or sensibilities ; to that portion of our na- 
ture, which is the appropriate seat of the emotions and de- 
sires, of the various forms of delight and sorrow, of love and 
hatred. It would naturally be expected, therefore, since 
the intellect has nothing in its distinctive nature in common 
with the will, and neither of them have any thing in their 
distinctive nature in common with the sensibilities, if indif- 
ference and preference are properly and peculiarly applica- 
ble to the sensibilities, that they would not be properly and 
strictly applicable to the will and the intellect. It belongs 
to the heart to prefer, desire, or love ; or to be indifferent, 
to be averse from, t*o contemn, or hate: But the appropri- 
ate business of the will is merely to decide, to determine, to 
act ; expressions, which, together with many others, are ap- 
plied to the voluntary power,, but all with the same import. 

It ought perhaps to be added, that these statements are 
made in reference to the common and well understood mean- 
ing of the terms in question. If it could be shown, that in- 
difference implies merely a negation of action ; in other 
words if it merely expresses the fact of not acting in any 
given emergency, then indeed we might admit, that the term 
is applicable to the will. But it will probably be conceded 
that the term is not commonly, although it is sometimes used 
to express mere absence or want of action, but rather the 
absence or want of emotion and desire. And it is in this 
sense, and not in that of a mere negation of action, that we 
assert its inapplicability to an exercise of the will, 



CHAPTER FIFTH 



DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND 
VOLITIONS. 



§. 4"). Of an objection sometimes made to the general 
arrangement. 

In making the general classification of intellectual, senti- 
ent, and voluntary states of the mind, it is necessarily in- 
volved, that we separate volitions, which constitute the third 
class, from desires, which are in included in and make a 
part of the second. Of the correctness of this general ar- 
rangement, in its great features, we cannot permit ourselves 
to doubt, with the various proofs in its support, which pre- 
sent themselves from all sides. But it cannot be denied, that, 
in one respect, which we now proceed to notice, it has not 
been perfectly satisfactory. We refer to the objection 
sometimes made and urged with confidence, that, although 
volitions may clearly be distinguished from intellections and 
also from emotions, they are not so easily distinguished 
from that portion of the Sensibilities, which are denominated 
the desires* Indeed by some writers they have been con- 
sidered the same as desires ; and their claim to a distinct and 
independent nature has been wholly rejected. 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 85 

As the general arrangement, which has been proposed, is 
a fundamental one, and is absolutely essential and indispen- 
sable to a true knowledge of the will, it is proper to attempt, 
not only to establish it by direct proofs in its favour, but 
to meet and obviate any objections, which may have been 
made against it, whether those objections relate to the ar- 
rangement as a whole or to any of its parts. The objection, 
which has been referred to, is one of special importance ; 
and we shall proceed to bestow that notice upon it, which its 
prominence claims for it. We speak of it as important, be- 
cause it is undoubtedly true, that much of the obscurity, 
which has rested upon the whole subject of our voluntary 
nature, has been owing to a mistake here. And obscurity 
will exist, as long as the mistake continues. We may even 
assert with confidence, that the greatest minds will fail of 
bringing the important inquiries, involved in this discussion, 
to a satisfactory conclusion, without first fully and correctly 
settling this point, viz, that the state of mind, which we term 
volition, is entirely distinct from that, which we term desire. 

§. 40. Probable cause of desires and volitions being 
confounded. 

Before proceeding to propose our comments on the ob- 
jection before us, we may properly make the remark, that it 
is, on the whole, not extraordinary, that this tendency to 
confound volitions with the desires, should exist. We 
always find it difficult to separate . and discriminate those 
things, which have been long and strongly associated. Now 
it is well known that volitions and desires are in fact very 
closely united together, as antecedences and sequences. 
By the very constitution of our minds they go together, and 
are the sequents and precursors of each other. We do not 
mean to say or to intimate, that the acts of the voluntary 



8g DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

power are based upon the desires alone, exclusive of every 
other possible motive or ground of its exercise. But it is 
undoubtedly true, that the desires constitute the sole antece- 
dent causes of volition, (by which we mean the sole grounds 
or occasions of volition,) in a multitude and perhaps a ma- 
jority of cases. In the discharge of the common duties of 
life, in those every day matters which concern what we shall 
eat and with what we shall be clothed, it is undeniable, that 
we generally choose those things and pursue that course of 
conduct, which are most pleasing, and which most strongly 
excite our desires. In far the greater number of these cases 
the moral part of our nature furnishes no conflicting motive 
and presents no obstacle, because the course, which our daily 
necessities prompt us to take, is not necessarily of a char- 
acter to require the interposition of the moral power. There 
are appetites and propensities, which have their natural and 
appropriate objects, and which,in the pursuit of those objects 
in accordance "with the original intentions of nature, have 
no more of moral character, of merit or demerit, than the 
instincts, desires, and propensities of the lower animals. 
And still these appetites and propensities are very necessary 
parts of our mental constitution, and lay the foundation of a 
large portion of men's actions. And accordingly in all 
these ' cases desires and volitions are the antecedents and 
sequences of each other. Occupied, therefore, with various 
interesting and necessary objects of every day's occurrence, 
busied with the pressing cares of each returning hour, it 
could not well be expected, that men should delay upon and 
carefully discriminate the succession of mental acts. And 
as {his succession, in the case of desires and volitions, is 
not only exceedingly frequent, but, for the reasons just men- 
tioned, very rapid, (so much so in fact as hardly to furnish 
any basis for remembrance,) we gradually fall into the habit 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 87 

of confounding the two together, and at last come to be- 
lieve, that there is in truth no difference between them. 

§. 47. The distinction of desires and volitions asserted by 
consciousness. 

With the single further remark, that the tendency, men- 
tioned in the preceding section, to confound together these 
two states of mind, ought to be carefully guarded against, 
we proceed to the consideration of somethings, clearly evin- 
cing the distinction between them which we maintain to 
exist. And the inquiry naturally presents itself here, as in 
respect to every other mental state, How do we obtain a 
knowledge of either of them? If we consult our consciousness, 
which is an original and aufhoritative source of knowledge, we 
find it decisively ascribing to.the desires a distinct existence, 
and a distinct and specific character. If we consult it again, 
we find it returning an answer with equal decision and clear- 
ness, that volitions too have an existence and a character 
equally distinct and specific. But if consciousness asserts, 
in both cases, the reality of an existence stamped with a spe- 
cific and distinctive character, it does not and cannot in those 
same cases assert a oneness or identity. On the contrary, it 
must be considered as decisively pronouncing an entire 
separation of the two things, however nearly they may 
sometimes approach each other. 

And it seems proper, when we consider the difficulties 
that have attended these inquiries, to insist upon this testi- 
mony from within. It is. exceedingly desirable, that every 
one should reflect carefully and patiently upon the nature of 
desire and the nature of volition, as they present themselves 
to our internal notice in those various circumstances of en- 
ticement and temptation and action, in which we daily find 
ourselves placed. Those cases in particular deserve notice, 



88 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

which not unfrequently occur, where the volitions exist, and 
where we resolve to carry our plans into effect, in disregard 
of certain opposing desires, which have been overruled 
and baffled. Has not every man had this experience ? 
When under the influence of high moral sentiments, has he 
not sometimes determined to pursue a course to the disap- 
pointment, of many fond wishes, of many lingering and cher- 
ished desires ? Now let him recal the mental feelings and 
acts at such times, let him carefully reflect upon them, and 
will not consciousness not only clearly indicate a distinction, 
but even assert the impossibility of an identity in the case 
under consideration ? We cannot entertain a doubt, that it 
will. 

§. 48. Desires differ from volitions in fixedness and permanency. 

There is one particular, on which our consciousness gives 
its testimony, which it is thought may be easily and clearly 
pointed out. Every one must have felt, that our desires 
possess a considerable degree of fixedness or permanency •, 
and that they are distinguished and separated from volitions 
by this trait. We are able to change, our volitions with 
great rapidity 5 if we may so express it, in the twinkling of 
an eye." We may alter them a thousand times a day. W"ithin 
their allotted sphere of operation, there are no immutable 
lines, and angles, by which their action is restricted ; but on 
the contrary we find an astonishing quickness, flexibility, 
and variety in their movements. We make this as a general 
statement, without pretending that there are no exceptions. 
— But while this is obviously trUe of the volitions, there does 
not appear to be the same flexibility, the same facility of 
movement in our desires. We may indeed change them after 
a time, and ultimately secure a greater or less degree of 
conformity to what we conceive they ought to be. But 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 89 

they are so slow in movement, so heavy and refractory in 
the mutations they undergo, that they remind us rather of a 
burden to be borne, than of a living principle of elasticity 
and vigour. 

We believe, that this statement will be easily and clearly 
understood. Can the man, who is in prison, suppress in a 
moment and without an effort, his desires to see his beloved 
family ? Can he, who is an exile and a wanderer in a dis- 
tant land, easily cease to remember, and to long for the 
woods and the green fields and the mountain airs of his 
childhood ? Every one must know, when a desire is once 
deeply implanted in the heart, how long it lingers, how 
hard it is to be overcome . But a fixedness of the desires in a 
particular direction does not necessarily imply a fixedness of 
the volition in the same direction. The will may be active, 
when certain desires are immovable, because there may be 
other objects of desire, laying the foundation of its various de- 
cisions, or there may be objects of a moral nature, presenting 
a still higher and nobler motive. When the heart is sick and 
heavy and burdened, the purpose and high resolve may be elas- 
tic and full of energy. Except under certain marked and extra- 
ordinary circumstances, some of which will hereafter be point- 
ed out, we are never conscious of that immovableness of 
the voluntary power, and that want of elasticity, which 
often attend the desires. But these statements, which we 
presume to say are founded on the common experience, can- 
not be true, if desires and volitions are identical. 

§. 49. Further proof of this distinction from language. 

May it not also be said with a good degree of confidence, 
that, in the use of language, we have a further proof of the 
distinction between desire and volition ? It is certainly the 
fact, that men commonly speak, both in their ordinary con- 
versation and in writing, in such a manner as to imply their 
12 



90 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

conviction of a distinction between mere desires or wishes 
on the one hand, and purposes, resolves, or determinations 
on the other. As this distinction, so easily and frequently 
observed, may be found prevalent, not in one only but in 
all languages, it may well be regarded as a strong evidence 
of the universal consciousness on the subject. This fact has 
been noticed, and set in a strong light by Dr. Reid. — "De- 
sire and will agree in this, that both must have an object, 
of which we must have some conception ; and, therefore, 
both must be accompanied with some degree of understand- 
ing. But they differ in several things. The object of desire 
may be any thing, which appetite, passion, or affection leads 
us to pursue ; it may be any event, which we think good 
for us, or for those, to whom we are well affected. I may 
desire meat, or drink, or ease from pain ; but to say that 
I will meat, or will drink, or will ease from pain, is not Eng- 
lish. There is therefore a distinction in common language 
between desire and will." 

§. 50. Sentiments of esteem and honour often imply this 
distinction. 

It will further be seen on a little reflection, that the dis- 
tinction under consideration is implied in the sentiments of 
esteem and honour, which on various occasions we enter- 
tain in respect to others. It seems to be the fact, that we 
often bestow esteem and honour on a person, because he 
has resisted and withstood the obvious tendency of his own 
inclinations or desires. We will take a very common in- 
stance, that of the confirmed drunkard. The wine sparkles 
before him ; his tongue and throat are parched, and the 
strongest desires arise. But conscience at the same time 
urges upon him the claims of his family, his country, and 
his God. After enduring this inward conflict for a season, 



DESIRES AND| L VOLITIgONS. 91 

he resolves, he wills, he acts, and dashes the alluring bowl 
to the ground. Every one rejoices at, and honours the 
deed. But it cannot be because the desire has been grati- 
fied ; but because the person has willed and acted against 
desire ; because, in the opposing array and contest of the 
powers of his inferiour nature, desire has been beaten, and 
the sense of obligation and duty has triumphed by the award 
of the only possible umpire, viz, the will. We evidently 
make a distinction, in all such cases, between the cravings 
of a man's appetite which necessarily involve desire, and 
the act of volition, by which the tendency of such desire is 
counteracted. 

This illustration reminds us of an additional statement of 
Dr. Reid on this subject. — "With regard to our actions, he 
remarks, we may desire what we do not will, and will what 
we do not desire , nay what we have a great aversion to. A 
man a-thirst has a strong desire to drink, but, for some par- 
ticular reason, he determines not to gratify his desire. A 
judge, from a regard to justice and the duty of his office, 
dooms a criminal to die, while from humanity or particular 
affection, he desires that he should live. A man for health 
may take a nauseous draught, for which he has no desire, 
but a great aversion. Desire, therefore, even when its ob- 
ject is some action of our own, is only an excitement to the 
will, but is not volition. The determination of the mind may 
be not to do what we desire to."* 

§. 51. Of some stricturesj)n the foregoing remarks of Reid. 

We are not ignorant that this very passage of Dr. Reid 
has called forth some strictures, the object of which is to 

* Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay II, Chap. 1. 



92 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

show, that its statements are in some respects defective. It 
has hcen contended, that, in the instances ahovc adduced by 
Dr. Reid, the volition has reference to the muscular motion 
and to that alone. In respect to the judge, who pronounces 
the doom of his prisoner, it is maintained hy the objector, 
that the judicial announcement is the result of volition, so far 
and so far only as volition puts certain muscles in motion ; 
and that all such acts of volition are identical in their nature 
with desires. And a like view is maintained to hold good of 
all similar cascs,viz, That no volition exists except in respect 
to the muscular action which immediately follows, and that 
such volition is not different from desire. Upon views of 
this kind, we have two remarks to make. 

In the first place, if we were to admit the correctness of 
limiting the application of volition to the production of mere 
muscular motion, still it would not follow, that volition and 
desire arc identical. But ou the contrary in regard to mus- 
cular motion, as in all other cases, we may confidently assert, 
that they arc entirely distinct from each other, although we 
arc ready to admit they do not stand in opposition. It is 
undoubtedly true, that we are sometimes liable to confound 
with the desires those volitions, which have no higher office 
than the mere regulation of the muscles, in consequence of 
their being in the same direction, and the volition being in suc- 
cession to the desire, & both existing perhaps in a very slight 
degree. Still we may safely appeal to everyone's conscious- 
ness, whenever he bestows a suitable examination on the 
subject, whether he is not able, even in very slight instan- 
ces of muscular movement, to draw a distinction between 
the desire and the volition. The desire to move the muscles 
of the foot or hand or throat may have existed for minutes or 
hours, but till the volition came there was no motion ; nor 
had the desire the least possible tendency to secure the mo- 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 93 

tion, except through the medium of volition. A man goes 
from his house to his counting room ; and it is readily ad- 
mitted, that he puts forth various acts of volition, that he 
wills to arise from his chair, that he ivills to open the door of 
his house, to set one foot before another, and that all his 
muscular movements are preceded by volitions. And we 
may admit also, that he had a desire to put forth these suc- 
cessive acts ; but it does not at all follow, that the volitions 
were identical with the desires, any more than that they were 
identical with the various sensations and perceptions, which 
existed at the same time. On the contrary, in all instances 
whatever, the distinction between the two exists, although 
it may be less obvious at some times than others. The de- 
sire, (the same as in other analogous cases of a higher kind,) 
is merely the forerunner and preparative of whatever is to 
be done; the distinct act of volition is necessary to the exe- 
cution of it. 

§. 52. Volition may exist in respect to those complex acts which 
the mind can embrace as one. 

But we remark, in the second place, as we had occasion 
to show in the preceding chapter, that there may be volition 
in respect to combined action and plans of action, as well 
as in respect to single acts. He, who supposes that volition 
is exercised solely and exclusively in reference to the motion 
of the muscles, must have a very inadequate notion of the 
sphere, in which this part of the mind is called to operate. 
This view will seem the more admissible, when we consider, 
that we have it in our power to give a mental unity to ac- 
tions, which, as they are successively brought to their fulfil- 
ment, are many, and are distinct from each other. It is pre- 
sumed that the existence of this ability will not be denied. 
Dr. Brown himself, in whose writings the strictures on the 



V 



94 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

views of Dr. Reid are found, acknowledges, that we can 
give an unity in our conception to things which are com- 
plex. " In considering, (he remarks,) the physical changes, 
which come under our view, it is impossible for us, in many 
cases, not to give a sort of unity, in our conception, to phe- 
nomena, which are in their nature complex. We consider 
them, as in some measure one ; because, however complex 
they may truly be, they exhibit to us one great general 
character."* And we may add, that we are capable of giv- 
ing an Unity to moral objects of whatever kind, as well as to 
physical, if there be any possible relation of time or place or 
resemblance or effect or cause, which the mind can detect 
and employ as a ligament for this purpose. We repeat, that 
this capability of combining, by a mere mental act, many 
into one, of converting multiplicity into unity, is not less 
true of intellectual and moral changes than of physical ; and 
in many cases both are included. 

A man, for instance, contemplates going a journey ; he 
examines all the circumstances, which may have a bearing on 
his proposed expedition ; and combines, by the various ope- 
rations of the intellect, the whole into one view. This 
complex object is addressed, not in its parts, but as a whole, 
to the sensibilities. It excites the various forms of desire, 
and the feelings of obligation ; and these are followed by 
volition. In all cases of this kind the mind is capable of 
acting, and in point of fact it generally does act, in reference 
to the whole object. The volition may be in accordance with 
the desire or not ; it may be in accordance with the moral 
feelings, and wholly at variance with the desires ; but in 
both alike the desires and volitions are distinct. And these 
views hold good not only in the case just now remarked upon 
of the man, who dashes from him the intoxicating bowl; but 
* Relation of Cause and Effect, Part I, §. 3, Pt. II, §. 3. 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 95 

of the judge,, who is called, in the discharge of his duties, to 
pass sentence of death on an accused person. He undoubt- 
edly takes into view the action in its whole extent, in all its 
results. As it exists in the view of his intellect, it is one 
action, though made up of various subordinate parts; and the 
question, placed distinctly before him and subject to his own 
dispensation, is one of life and death. And we may assert 
with confidence, the true state of his mind in ordinary cases 
is, that he desires the accused person to live, but ivills him to 
die ; and that the desire and volition are not only distinct 
from each other, but are opposed to each other. The fact is, 
there are two conflicting principles within him, the desires 
on the one hand, and the feelings of moral obligation on 
the other. These both are in immediate contact with the 
will ; that is to say, have a direct influence upon it. In act- 
ing in conformity with the moral motive, he acts against the 
desire ; and an act which is against desire, whether that ac- 
tion be mental or bodily, cannot with any propriety of terras 
be said to be identical with it. 

§. 53. If the distinction in question do not exist, the founda- 
tion of morals becomes unsettled. 

There is another and important point of view, in which 
this subject may be considered. — It is a common, and certain- 
ly a just opinion, that conscience, as we have already inti- 
mated, sometimes controls our actions, in distinction from 
desires. We not unfrequently hear it said of this or that 
man, that he acts from the dictates of conscience ; and with- 
out any disposition to object to the justness of the remark. 
But if the volition is always coincident with the highest de- 
sire, this language is evidently founded on a mistake ; and 
the authority of conscience becomes a nullity. The two 
great sources of human actions, viz, the moral sentiments 



96 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

and feelings of obligation on the one hand, and the various 
forms of desire on the other, are, on this theory, reduced to 
one. Now when we consider, that not unfrequeufly the de- 
sires,existing in the hearts of men, are impregnated with in- 
ordinate selfishness or malignity and are morally evil, the 
assertion, that there is, and can be no volition, except what 
is identical with the highest desire, is certainly a hazardous 
one, and seems to undermine all moral distinctions. 

These remarks are made on the supposition, that we fully 
admit the existence of that department of our nature, which 
we variously denominate either the moral sense or the con- 
science. It is presumed, that no one will be disposed to 
deny either the existence or the practical utility of such a 
moral power. But if conscience is of any value, it is because 
the feelings of obligation resulting from it furnish a motive to 
volition, and become at times its antecedent and necessary, 
or rather its prerequisite condition ; and because the motive 
thus furnished is different from that presented by the appe- 
tites, propensities, and passions. But if volition is always 
and invariably identical with some form of desire, then noth- 
ing can be more unmeaning aud useless and delusory, than 
the apparatus of conscience and of feelings of obligation, 
which so evidently exists. They furnish,on that supposition, 
a mere show of authority without any actual good results. 
So that we have great reason to assert, that the doctrine, 
■which makes volition always and necessarily identical with 
the highest desire, tends to annihilate our moral nature. 
If we are not erroneous in our. construction of it, it places 
man, in a moral point of view, on the same footing with brute 
animals. We never condemn a brute, that yields to i'ts de- 
sires as guilty of a crime. And why not ? Because it has 
no conscience, no moral sense ; and of course there is no 
basis of its actions except in its desires ; and therefore in 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 97 

acting, in accordance with its desires, it acts in conformity 
with its nature, and fulfils the destiny allotted it. But it is not 
so with man. He has within him not only desires, but feel- 
ings of moral obligation ; and if ever in any assignable case 
he wills and acts in accordance with those moral feelings and 
in opposition to his desires, then his volitions and desires 
are not the same. 

§. 54. Instances in illustration of the distinction in question. 

We think we might bring many instances to illustrate 
the distinction under consideration, and which not only illus- 
trate, but tend to prove its existence. The parental relation 
will furnish to those at least, who have experienced the 
strength of affection incident to it, an illustration of the mat- 
ter before us. The tenderly beloved child commits some 
fault or crime under such circumstances as to render him in- 
excusable, and the father punishes him. Every father knows 
that the infliction of punishment in such cases is attended 
with a war in his own bosom ; the strong feeling of obliga- 
tion, which an enlightened conscience has laid the foundation 
of, drawing him one way, and the yearnings of parental af- 
fection enticing him another ; and it does not appear that 
any thing can still this commotion, and secure the suprema- 
cy of his moral nature, but the energetic and authoritative 
effort of the will. 

Let us apply these views to the case of the patriarch 

Abraham, when he was called, in the administration of the 

divine providence, to offer up his son Isaac amid the forests 

of Mount Moriah. Will any one presume to say, that, when 

the aged father stood with his knife extended over the bared 

bosom of his only son, there was no contest within him, no 

earnest and almost overpowering longing for his rescue ? Did 

not his affection kindle with tenfold ardour, when his dar- 
13 



93 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

ling boy asked him, with the simplicity of untaught and con- 
fiding childhood, where is the lamb for the burnt offering ? 
While desire for the child's safety existed at the highest 
point of intensity, there were other high and sacred princi- 
ples of action, and in view of them, the power of volition, 
collecting all its strength, smote through the torrents of 
affection, as the rod of Moses divided the troubled waters of 
the sea. 

If any should be disposed to object here, on the ground 
that Abraham was sustained by religious principles, which 
are not given to ordinary men, at least in an equal degree, 
it might be proper to reply, without conceding any special 
weight to the objection, that many similar instances can be 
brought forward. They abound in all parts of history. 
When the sons of Lucius Junius Brutus conspired against 
the Roman republic, they were justly condemned to die. It 
became the duty of the father to see the punishment enforc- 
ed. Can any one doubt that there was a contest, "a tug of 
war," in the soul of that noble Roman ? The historian in- 
forms us, that this struggle was visible in his countenance, 
(eminente animo palrio inter publicce pcence ministerium,) as he 
stood at the dreadful scene of the execution . But if desire 
and volition are the same thing, where was the foundation 
for such inward contest ? If the desire was coincident with 
the volition, if the latter was lost and absorbed in the for- 
mer, there must have been a calm within and without ; there 
could not possibly have been an agitation, dissidence, and 
rending asunder of the interiour nature. 

§. 55. Additional instances in illustration and proof . 

If it were thought necessary, Ave could easily bring for- 
ward, from the history of the same remarkable people, even 
stronger and more decisive instances, than that touching 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 99 

event which has just been adduced. One or two, at least, 
may repay a moment's attention. During the fatal period of 
the Roman, decemvirship, certain transactions took place, 
which', while they agitated the whole city of Rome with 
sentiments of grief and indignation, infused the deepest 
horror and despair into the heart of a worthy father. His 
affections were bound up in a beloved daughter, w"ho was 
insidiously assailed by one of the most powerful magistrates, 
in a manner which left no hope of deliverance. In this situ- 
ation, seeing his daughter exposed to unavoidable and un- 
speakable infamy, he seized the knife of a butcher, and 
plunged it into her bosom. And is it possible for us to say, 
with any propriety of language, that Virginus desired the 
death of his daughter ? The whole history of the transaction 
shows, that he doated upon her with all the depth and sac- 
redness of parental love. The assertion, therefore, is in- 
credible. He could not have desired it ; human nature spurns 
the thought as an impossibility ; and yet he too fatally willed 
it. He considered her life as but dust in the balance in 
comparison with the loathsome degradation, which was so 
cruelly threatened by one whom he had no power to resist ; 
and in putting her to death he willed and executed what at 
the same time he lamented and abhorred as in itself a most 
terrible and overwhelming calamity. 

§. 56. The subject further illustrated by the. voluntary death 
of the Saguntines, 

And when we read a little further in the same eloquent 
historian, who has given us the narrative of Brutus and of 
Virginius, we come to the deeply interesting story of the 
Iberus and Saguntum. Every thing depended upon one 
short sentence. "Pass not the Iberus !" The Romans in- 
sisted upon this as a boundary, which Carthage should not 



100 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

pass. Nevertheless the Carthaginian commander had his 
plans of aggrandizement ; the Iherus proved but a feeble 
barrier ; and Saguntum was fiercely attacked. After a des- 
perate conflict, the city was taken, and many of the inhabi- 
tants, rather than fall into the hands of their enemy, fired 
their houses over their own heads, and with their wives and 
children perished in the flames* 

But can we with propriety say, that these intolerable 
sufferings, the burning of their own bodies, and the burning 
of their children and dearest friends in the same horrid con- 
flagration, was a matter of desire ? It was far from this. They 
desired and loved life, and revolted at suffering, as much as 
other men. But they had formed the resolution to live 
free or die ; and had further resolved to undergo all the evils 
incident to that resolution, however intense, however dread- 
ful in the experience. They could not rise to glory but on 
flames of fire, but the greatness of the consummation re- 
conciled them to the dreadful nature of the terms. Their de- 
sires would have given them life and enjoyment at least, and 
perhaps even on the condition of slavery ; but the ascenden- 
cy of the will, which was secured by motives higher than 
any considerations of mere personal and immediate good, 
gave them burnings, liberty, and renown. 

And these are not insulated and solitary instances. They 
are to be found in all ages and- climes and nations, and 
among all classes of men. In the republic of Rome, there 
was probably not a day during five hundred years, when 
individuals could not have been found, who were willing, 
like Regulus and the celebrated Decii, to endure every form 
of suffering even to death itself for their honour and the 
good of their country. And only fitting circumstances are 
wanting in order to show, that it is the same in every other 
country, and under every form of government. Human na- 

*Livy, Lib. xxi, §. 13. 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 101 

ture is every where the same, both for good and evil. If any 
of its elements appear less decidedly in one country than in 
another, it is not because they are withheld in their origin, 
but are suppressed in their growth. But poor, indeed, would 
human nature be, neither honoured nor honourable in any sit- 
uation, if there were not in men some principles of action, 
not only distinct from the desires, but able on suitable occa- 
sions to bring them into subjection. Let it be remembered, 
that there is no foundation or characteristic of true greatness 
separable from a disposition to give up all private and per- 
sonal good in favour of the nobler objects of the general and 
moral good, whenever private and public good come de- 
cidedly in conflict ; and evidently this is a condition, which 
would seldom or rather never be realized, if the will could 
never act and decide in opposition to the desires. 

§. 57. Of the chastisements of the Supreme Being inflicted on 
those he loves. 

There is one consideration more. — May we not draw 
light down upon this subject from an observation of the 
course which our adorable Creator takes in his dealings with 
his creatures ? Throughout the Holy Scriptures we find 
expressions, which indicate the strongest love towards them, 
when, at the same time, he is compelled to inflict his chastise- 
ments. The Old Testament is full of expressions of kind- 
ness and tenderness towards his ancient people. " He nour- 
ished and brought them up as children ;" "he led them about, 
instructed them, and kept them as the apple of his eye." In 
their rebellions he calls after them with unspeakable affec- 
tion. " How shall I give thee up, Ephraim ? How shall I 
deliver thee, Israel ? How shall I make thee as Admah ? 
How shall I set thee as Zeboim ? Mine heart is turned 
within me, my repentings are kindled together !" But, al- 



103 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

though he loved them with all the intensity of a father's af- 
fection, still the eternal principles of his nature compelled 
him to exercise his benevolence in subordination to the sen- 
timents of justice. When his people rebelled, and did not 
listen to his warnings, he gave them over to dreadful pun- 
ishments. He poured upon Israel the fury of his anger, 
the strength of battle, and set him on fire round about. But, 
although he willed the wasting and desolation and sufferings 
of his people, (for he says, "who gave Jacob for a spoil, and 
Israel to the robbers ? Did not the Lord ?") we do not feel 
at liberty to say, that he desired it, for every thing in the 
Old Testament shows, that it greatly grieved him. 

And who does not recollect the affecting language of 
the Saviour, uttered over the Holy City ? "Oh Jerusalem, Je- 
rusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them 
which are sent unto thee !" And yet soon afterwards the 
sign of the Son of man appeared in heaven ; the sun and the 
moon were darkened ; the earth mourned ; there was fam- 
ine, pestilence, and earthquake ; of the beloved and beautiful 
Temple not one stone was left upon another ; and all Jeru- 
salem, that delight of the whole earth, was bathed in blood 
and wrapped in fire. — Not because the Saviour had ceased 
to love it, and to desire its good, but because the measure 
of its iniquity was full, and the dictates of eternal justice 
compelled him to will and to inflict a punishment, which a 
being so infinitely benevolent could never .have desired to 
see. — And does he not s£t this moment truly desire the re- 
turn and salvation of every sinner ? Does he not earnestly 
entreat them ? And when he shall inflict on these same sin- 
ners unutterable chastisements on account of their obduracy, 
will it be because he ceases to love, or because immutable 
justice requires it ? . • 

On this subject we cannot refrain from adding in un- 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 103 

feigned sincerity, that sound philosophy requires the Bible 
to he understood as it stands, in its ohvious import, and as 
it would he interpreted hy an unlettered reader. In the 
great outlines of his mental constitution, it is strictly and 
emphatically true,as Scripture informs us, that man is formed 
in the image of his Maker. And it is as true of God as of 
man, that there are elements in his nature, which lead him 
to determine or will that, which He does not desire. It nei- 
ther is nor can he true of God, that He ever desires the 
infliction of punishment, though the obduracy of transgres- 
sors often leads him to will it. To desire the infliction of 
misery in any way whatever, in the strict and original sense 
of the word desire, is the characteristic of an evil and not of a 
good being. It is the height of impiety to attempt to per- 
vert the often repeated and earnest expressions of the Su- 
preme Being on this subject. "As I live, saith the Lord God, 
I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the 
wicked turn from his ways and live." 

§. 58. Objected that these views lead to contradictions. 

If it were deemed of consequence enough, we might stop 
here to consider some objections chiefly of a verbal kind, of 
which it will perhaps answer all purpose to notice one,that 
may serve as a specimen of others. It being assumed, that 
every act of desire implies a preference or choice, and it 
being further said in way of definition, that volition is the 
act of choosing, we are then confronted with the obvious 
contradiction, that, if the volition is ever actually opposed 
to the desire, we choose what we do not choose, &c. This 
objection, perhaps a plausible one in the minds of some, will 
be found on examination to resolve itself into a verbal fal- 
lacy, and naturally vanishes as soon as that fallacy is de- 
tected. 



104 DISTINCTION BETWEEN 

It is well known, that owing to the imperfection of lan- 
guage we not unfrequently apply the same terms to things, 
which, both in their nature and relations, are different from 
each other. Now it is undoubtedly true, that the common 
usage of language authorizes us to apply the terms choice 
and choosing indiscriminately to either the desire or the vo- 
lition ; but it does not follow, and is not true, that we apply 
them to these different parts of our nature in precisely the 
same sense. We sometimes use the word choice, when it 
obviously implies and expresses desire ; and the desire in 
this. case differs from desire in other cases, not in its nature, 
but only in the circumstance, that it is a desire, which pre- 
dominates over other desires existing in reference to other 
conflicting objects brought before the mind at the same 
time. That is to say, when the word choice implies desire 
at all, it has reference to a number of desirable objects 
brought before the mind at once, and implies and expresses 
the ascendant or predominant desire. It is that particular 
desire, in distinction from others, which we denominate our 
choice . 

At other times we use the term choice or choosing in 
application to the will ; but when we do so use it, we are to 
regard it, as modified by the nature of the subject, to which 
it is applied. The choice of the will is the same as the de- 
cision of the will ; and the decision of the will is the same 
as the act of the will. The word in question then, when it 
is applied to that power, expresses the mere act of the will, 
and nothing more, with the exception, as in the other case, 
that more than one object of volition was present in the 
view of the mind, before the putting forth of the voluntary 
act. In fact, it is the circumstance, that two or more objects 
are present, which suggests the use of the word choice or 
choosing in both cases' ; but Ave are not at all to suppose, that 



DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 105 

the use of the word implies or involves a change in the na- 
ture, but only in the condition or circumstances of the men- 
tal act. The acts are entirely different in their nature, al- 
though under certain circumstances the same name is applied 
to them. When they are both called choice or acts of choice, 
they are indeed verbally, but not really identical. If these 
views are correct, (and we believe they be,) then the con- 
tradiction spoken of, whenever it takes place, is not a real, 
but merely a verbal one. If we ever choose against choos- 
ing, it will be found to be merely that choice, which is voli- 
tion, placed in opposition to that choice, which is desire ; a 
state of things, which, as we have already seen, not unfre- 
quently exists, and in which there is no incompatibility. 

§. 58. Opinions of Mr. Locke and others on this subject. 

We shall close this chapter with remarking, that the dis- 
tinction in question is more or less clearly recognized and 
sustained by a considerable number of writers, whose opin- 
ions, as they were given on mature deliberation, are entitled 
to great weight, particularly Sir James M'Intosh, Dr. Reid, 
Dr. Good, and Mr. Stewart. At an earlier period Mr. 
Locke also took the same ground in the following passage, 
which we commend to the careful consideration of the reader. 
— " I find the will often confounded with several of the affec- 
tions, especially desire, and one put for the other ; and that 
by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had 
very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very 
clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small oc- 
casion of obscurity and mistake in this matter ; and there- 
fore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he, that shall 
turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind 
when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is 

conversant about nothing but that particular determination 
14 



103 DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 

of the mind, whereby barely by a thought the mind endeav- 
ours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which 
it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly 
shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire ; 
which in the very same action may have a quite contrary 
tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, 
whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions 
to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may 
wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the 
will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends 
one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct 
contrary way. A man who by a violent fit of the gout in 
his limbs finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite 
in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain 
of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain there is a de- 
sire to be rid of it) though yet, whilst he apprehends that 
the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to 
a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one 
action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is ev- 
ident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the 
mind ; and consequently that the will, which is but the pow- 
er of volition, is much more distinct from desire."* 

*Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Chap. 21st. 



PAKT SECOND*. 



LAWS OF -THE WILL. 



CHAPTER FIRST, 



UNIVERSALITY OF LAW, 



§. 59. The preceding chapters preparatory to what follows. 

The remarks, that have been made in the Part First of 
this Work, relate to the general nature of the will. It seem- 
ed important to take this general view. It was obviously 
necessary, before entering into the examination of the long 
contested topics that are to follow, to settle the subject of 
the great outlines of the mind in its departments of the in- 
tellectual, sentient, and voluntary. And it seemed 
equally desirable, when we consider the mistakes that have 
prevailed upon that point, not only to assert and maintain 
the distinction existing between desire and volition, but to 
answer such objections as possessed any degree of plausibil- 
ity. Nor was this enough. It was further necessary to 
make some inquiry into those things, which not merely dis- 
tinguish the will from the other mental susceptibilities, but 
which are especially characteristic of it, and which contrib- 
ute to constitute its essential and distinctive nature . In 



110 UNIVERSALITY «OF LAW. 

looking back upon what has been brought forward, we in- 
dulge the hope, perhaps however without sufficient founda- 
tion, that some doubts have been cleared up, and some prin- 
ciples satisfactorily established. The remarks thus necessa- 
rily made may indeed appear to have been protracted to an 
inordinate length 5 and we can only say in reply, if such is 
thought to be the case, that they were rendered as concise 
as seemed consistent with any adequate notice of the num- 
erous topics, that have come under review . 

And it seems to come in place to add here, that, in every 
thing which has been said, there has been an object. Every 
part of this Treatise will be found to be more or less connec- 
ted with other parts ; and perhaps more closely than would 
at first seem probable. And accordingly the doctrines and 
principles, which have been brought forward and more or 
less elucidated and established, are introductory to three 
distinct series of views of great interest in themselves, as 
well as of great practical importance, having relation respec- 
tively to the Laws, the Freedom, and the Power of the Will. 
These leading topics will be successively considered. 

§. 60. Of the importance of the topics now entered upon. 

In examining the matters of inquiry which are to follow, 
particularly the Laws and the Freedom of the will, we pre- 
sume to say, that we have a claim on the strict and candid 
attention of the reader. While few questions present them- 
selves to one's notice of greater interest than these, a regard 
to historical truth requires it to be added, that on few has 
there been a greater difference of opinion. These inquiries, 
moreover, which lie so closely at the root of human accounta- 
bility, are as important as they are interesting, not only in a 
speculative point of view and as presenting complicated and 
difficult problems for solution, but also on account of their 



UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. JU 

practical results. If a man, for instance, adopts the opinion, 
that there is no such thing as freedom of the will, and that 
men are the subjects of an irresistible fatality, it will gener- 
ally follow, that his practice will be correspondent to such 
a belief. Placing an erroneous interpretation on the words 
of Solomon, that " time and chance happen to all men," such 
persons throw themselves upon the wave of their destiny, 
and are floated onward with an utter disregard of -the issue, 
whether it be good Or evil, shameful or glorious. No mat- 
ter what takes place, say they ; it is all from a higher pow- 
er ; and it would be wholly ineffectual and presumptuous in 
mere insects to prescribe plans for the Deity. The greatest 
circumspection, the most arduous labours, the most invinci- 
ble determination will effect nothing against the allotted and 
predestined course of events. Philosophers may speculate, 
and political cabinets may lay their plans, but after all the 
fate of Europe may depend, as it has once depended, upon a 
dispute about a pair of gloves, or some other trivial circum- 
stance, which happens to form a link in the unalterable chain 
of destiny.* 

On the other hand, if a person fully believes, that all 
things are in his own power, in the sense of excluding a 
wise and efficient superintendency, it leads to a presumptu- 
ous self-confidence altogether unsuitable and dangerous. 
Puffed up with an unwarrantable self-conceit, he does not 
feel the need of asking aid from on high ; he does not con- 
form his conduct to the indications of divine Providence ; 
but lays his plans, and attempts their execution wholly in 
his own strength. 

These respective systems, when adopted to the exclusion 
of other views which might control and modify them, may 

* See the Prince of Machiavel, Chap. 25th, and Examen du Prince. 



112 UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 

justly be pronounced false and dangerous ; as inconsistent 
with sound philosophy as they are with private duty and 
the general good ; although it is undoubtedly true, that in 
all ages of the world they have been made the governing 
principle of multitudes. We are authorized, therefore, in 
saying that the particular subjects, on which we now propose 
to enter, are very important in a practical point, of view. It 
will be our desire to examine them with that care and can- 
dour, which their practical importance demands ; and with- 
out any undue expression of confidence, we would indulge 
the hope of placing them in a light at once consistent with 
the claims of God, and the responsibilities of man. 

§. 61. The inquiry, whether the will has its laws, preliminary 
to that of its freedom. 

In order to approximate the true notion of the Freedom 
of the will, an inquiry which will receive particular attention 
in its place, it seems proper to attempt the settlement of a 
preliminary question, viz, tvhether the will is subject to. laws. 
If it be true, as we shall introduce some considerations to 
show, that the will has its laws, then the freedom of the 
will, whatever may be its nature, must accommodate itself 
to this preliminary fact. We will assume here, that the will 
is free ; we have no disposition to dispute the correctness of 
that view ; undoubtedly its freedom is' susceptible of ample 
demonstration ; but if there be other mental facts equally 
demonstrable, then it follows that the freedom of the will 
must exist in accommodation to such other facts, and can be 
such a freedom and such only as is consistent with them. 
This, it would seem, is a very obvious view ; and hence it 
is exceedingly important, that this point should be settled 
first. It will accordingly now be our object to propose 
certain considerations to show, that the will has its laws. 



UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 113 

§ . 62. Every thing throughout nature has its laws. 

In entering upon the question, whether the will has its 
laws, may we not reason, in the first place, from the general 
analogy of nature ? If the universe is every where legibly 
inscribed and written over with the great truth, that all 
things are' subject to law, are we not furnished with a strong 
presumption, that we shall not discover an exception in .any 
part of man's mental nature ? — As to the alledged fact, on 
which we base this presumption, there can be no doubt of 
it. Let us look in the first place at material things. The 
parts of the earth are kept in their relative position by 
the operation of some fixed law ; the various immense 
bodies, composing the system to which the earth belongs, 
are made to revolve in obedience to some unalterable princi- 
ple ; there is not even a plant or a stone or a falling leaf or 
a grain of sand, which can claim an exemption from regula- 
tion and control. And what is true in these few instances, 
is true in all. No certain and undoubted exception can be 
found. And this great truth holds good also of things, 
which have life and intelligence. Objects of a spiritual or 
mental nature, (if not in precisely the same sense in which 
the assertion is applicable to matter, yet in some true and 
important meaning of the expressions,) have their appropriate 
and determinate principles of being and action. There may, 
indeed, be some things, which are as yet unexplainable by 
man ; there may be some objects of knowledge, to the full 
understanding of whose nature limited human reason cannot 
as yet reach ; but still the vast majority of objects, coming 
within the ordinary range of our inspection, obviously tend 
to found and to foster the general conviction, that there are 
laws, wherever there are existences, whatever the kind or 
nature of the existence. There is, therefore, undoubted 
15 



114 UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 

truth in the remark of Montesquieu, with which he intro- 
duces his great work on the Spirit of Laws, where he says, 
after some suggestions, on the meaning of the term, " all be- 
ings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world 
its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the 
beasts their laws, man his laws." 

§. 63. Reference to remarks of Cicero on the universality of laic. 

The mention of Montesquieu, a name equally dear to let- 
ters and liberty, naturally suggests the recollection of some 
men of a kindred genius. The idea of the universality of law 
has ever been familiar to minds, that were particularly distin- 
guished for expansiveness of thought, and for philosophical 
sagaeity. They seem to have seized upon this great truth 
intuitively ; not by the sIoav deductions of reasoning, but 
by a sort of instinct of intellect. The illustrious orator 
of Rome among others asserts the existence of a law, 
which has its foundation in nature, and which is universal, 
uniform, and eternal. He declares God to be the author of 
it ; and adds, that no man can exempt himself from its con- 
trol, without fleeing from himself, and without putting off 
and alienating his own nature. It is of this law and in con- 
nection with these statements, that he employs those celebra- 
ted expressions, " nee erit alia lex Romas, alia Athenis, alia 
nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una 
lex etsempiterna et immortalis continebit,unusque erit commu- 
nis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus."* No person, 
who examines the whole of this remarkable passage with 
care, will fail to perceive, that its author had in his concep- 
tions the idea of a great central Power, possessed of perfect 
wisdom and justice, from whom emanates a paramount and 
controlling influence, which is binding upon nations as well 

*Cicero De Republica, Lib. III. 



UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. H5 

as individuals, which extends to all parts of his dominions, 
making one of many, and harmonizing them all by requiring 
them to act in subjection to himself. 

§.64. Reference to remarks of Hooker on the universality of law. 

We cannot forbear introducing here, as in accordance with 
the sentiments of this chapter, the memorable expressions of 
Hooker, although at the risk of repeating what may already 
be familiar. "Of law, no less can be said, than that her seat 
is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world ; 
all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least 
as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her 
power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition 
soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all 
with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their 
peace and joy."* 

We cannot agree with those, who are disposed to set 
down this sublime passage, as a species of rhetorical exag- 
geration, an instance of sounding language rather than well 
adjusted thought ; but would rather regard it as the expression 
of a reality, uttered on the most sober consideration; a reality 
perhaps not perfectly visible and obvious to minds of little 
expansion, but of which undoubtedly the learned and eloquent 
writer had a clear and impressive perception. The great idea, 
which pervades the passage, is identical with that of Cicero; 
and is simply this, that law originates in the bosom of the 
Deity and is co-substantial with his nature ; and going forth 
from that primitive and prolific centre in every possible direc- 
tion like rays from the sun, it embraces and harmonizes all 
things,whether intelligent or unintelligent. And how full of 
grandeur and of consolation is the thought ! If we could sup- 
pose, that even a single unintelligent atom had broken loose 

* Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, Bk. I. 



116 UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 

from the infinite ramifications of the great principle of 
unity, which is only another name for that law which hinds 
one existence to another and both to a third and all to 
the great central and superintendent Power, it would not 
fail to fill us with misgivings and anguish. The doctrine of 
the universality of law, which is the same as the universality 
of power under the guidance of fixed principles, recom- 
mends itself to the heart as well as the understanding, and 
dispenses happiness, while it controls conviction . Is any 
one prepared to say, that he is not rendered happy in the 
recollection, that God is around us and in us ? Is it not a 
source of consolation,that his paternal eye rests forever upon 
our path; that he knoweth our lying down and rising up, our 
going out and coming in ? And that while he superintends 
the minutest action's and events pertaining to ourselves, He 
extends ahroad, amid the numberless varieties of existence, 
the watchfulness of his pervading control, 

" And fills, and bounds, connects and equals all ?" 

§. 65. The universality of law implied in the belief of a 
Divine existence. 

The idea of a God necessarily embraces and implies the 
notion of the universality of law . Many of those nations, that 
have not been favoured with the light of Revelation, have 
maintained the doctrine of a Supreme Power. The human 
mind is so constituted, and is located under such a variety 
of influences favourable to such a result, that the idea of a 
God, though sometimes wholly obstructed by peculiarly un- 
toward circumstances, naturally deveiopes itself with a great- 
er or less degree of strength. The most savage nations, if it 
be too true that they are apt to forget Him in their prosperi- 
ty, seek to propitiate Him in the day of sorrow. They gener- 
ally have a conviction, indistinct indeed ; but not the less real, 



UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 117 

that a Deity is present, that there is some possible mode of 
communication between Him and men, that the virtuous are 
the objects of his favour and the vicious of his displeasure ; 
" pro se quisque, Deos tandem esse, etnon negligere humana, fre- 
munt. v * But with him, who enjoys the communications of 
the Divine Word, the conjectures, which are furnished by the 
light of nature, are exchanged for a cheering certainty, which 
can never be shaken . This high and inscrutable Being made 
all things ; he not only framed the world and all things 
therein, and ordained the moon and the stars, but he also 
holds in his hand the hearts of the children of men, and turns 
them whithersoever he will. He is not only unlimited in pow- 
er, but wholly unrestricted and boundless in knowledge, and 
supreme in the administration of his government. To deny 
either the one or the other, either his omniscience or his 
almightiness'or the supremacy of his administration, would 
be nothing less than to dethrone Him from his place in the 
universe, and virtually to deny his existence as Deity. As 
has been remarked, the idea of a God, possessed of such 
transcendent attributes, (an idea, which is not only proposed 
and fostered by Revelation, but is the natural and necessary- 
product of the human mind, except in those few cases where 
it is repressed and annulled by peculiar circumstances,) 
necessarily embraces and implies the notion of the universal- 
ity of law . The doctrine, that there is any thing whatever, 
which is truly and entirely exempt from every species of 
oversight and control, is altogether inconsistent with the 
recognition of the existence of a Supreme Being. If there 
is a God, there is an universal law . Can that power proper- 
ly be called omnipotent, within the sphere of whose opera- 
tions there are objects, which are entirely exempt from its 
supervision and control ? Can that wisdom properly be called 

*Livy, Lib. Ill, Cap. Lvr. 



118 UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 

ommiscient, which knows not what will be the determina- 
tions and acts of men in all assignable circumstances, in all 
time and place ? Can that government be with any propri- 
ety of language denominated a Supreme government, within 
whose limits there are agents, who are not reached and 
bound by any of those ties, even the feeblest of them, which 
operate to unite the circumference to the centre and to com- 
bine and assimilate the multiplied parts under one common 
head ? We must repeat it, therefore, if there is a God, there 
must be a law, which is, in the strict sense of the word, uni- 
versal. 

§ 66. A presumption thus furnished in favour of the sub- 
jection of the will to law . 

It is not necessary to pursue this subject, when contem- 
plated under this general form, at much length. What has 
been said will answer our present purpose. If the doctrine 
of the universality of law be tenable, what shall we say of 
the will ? Does not the position, that the will is not sub- 
ject to laws, imply an anomaly in the universe ? Whatever 
is not under some sort of control, but is entirely irregular, 
contingent, and exempt from all conditions, is necessarily 
irresponsible to the supervision of any thing, even God him- 
self. We have then an exceedingly strong presumption, 
when we look at the subject. in the most general light, in 
favour of the proposition, that the will has its laws. Espe- 
cially when we consider the relation, which the will sustains 
to the other powers ; that its action constitutes the great re- 
sult, to which the operation of the other parts of our nature 
tends ; in other words, that, in all cases of movement or ex- 
ertion, the volition is the consummation of all the other men- 
tal acts, and in effect represents the whole mind. If the 
will acts contingently^ then the man acts contingently ; and 



UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 119 

w hile he retains this alleged specific character of acting in 
this way, he is not only free from all law, thus destroying 
that peace and joy of which Hooker asserts her to be the 
mother, but he cannot be controlled even by the Deity. 
He has suffered a revulsion from the parent stock ; he has 
gone off and set up for himself ; he has established an empire 
of his own, where even the Most High must not enter ; a 
state of things, which certainly finds no parallel among the 
other existences, powers, and intelligences of the universe, 
and which is rebuked alike by the conclusions of reasoning, 
and by the suggestions of virtue. 



CHAPTER SECOND, 



LAW OF CAUSALITY, 



§. 67. Of certain laws or principles which extend to all 
classes of objects. 

In asserting the universality of law, with whatever depth 
of conviction on our own part, we are aware of the possibil- 
ity of meeting with some scepticism on the part of other's. 
But we would refer such persons to one or two principles, 
which are so universal in their application, and at the same 
time so deeply based in the elements of human belief, as 
fully to illustrate and confirm what has been said. The 
principles in themselves are abundantly worthy of considera- 
tion, independently of their bearing upon the question before 
us ; and we are the more encouraged, therefore, to give 
them a specific notice. 

It will be seen on the examination of these principles, 
that, when we assert the universality of law, we are not 
without witnesses. While each object has laws peculiar to 
itself, and while each class of objects has laws characteristic 
of it as a class, there are also laws, which are not so limited 



LAW OF CAUSALITY. 121 

in their application, but extend to all objects and classes of 
objects whatever. The first law of the latter description, 
which we propose to consider, may be denominated the law 
of causation or causality. Expressed in the more common 
form, the principle or law, which we now refer to, is simply 
this ; Every effect has a cause. But stated in language 
more explicit, and less liable as we apprehend to misconcep- 
tion, it may be given as follows ; There is no beginning 

OR CHANGE OF EXISTENCE WITHOUT A CAUSE. 

§. 68. A belief in the law of causation founded in the peculiar 
structure of the human mind. 

The principle, (or primary truth as it may well be 
denominated,) that there is no beginning or change of existence 
without a cause, is every way worthy of attention. The sub- 
ject, which it presents to notice, if it were examined in all its 
bearings and with a fullness of detail, would spread itself 
over the pages of a volume. Without proposing, however, 
to enter into it at much length, which would be inconsistent 
with our limits, we shall proceed to offer a few remarks, 
which may tend to its illustration. 

In explanation of the great law of causality,our first remark 
is, that the human mind is so constituted, that all events and 
all objects of knowledge whatever are made known to it in 
time. And in connection with this remark we may add, that 
there is no apprehension or knowledge of time, (we speak 
now of th*e human, and not of the divine intellect,) except 
by means of succession . It seems to be universally admitted 
by those who have given special attention to the inquiry, 
that the occasion, on which we have the idea of duration sug- 
gested or called forth within us, is succession ; particularly 
that succession of thought and feeling, of which we are con- 
scious as taking place internally. Hence the structure of 
16 



122 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

the human mind requires, (what indeed a constant experience 
also teaches us,) that all those objects of knowledge, which 
in the view of the mind have a distinct and separate exis- 
tence, should be contemplated as successive to each other; in 
other words,all the distinct objects of knowledge of whatever 
kind arrange themselves as antecedents and sequents. Hence 
it happens, that we are led, at a very early period, to frame 
the ideas of antecedence and sequence, since nature from 
the very first is necessarily, (that is to say, by virtue of our 
mental constitution,) presented to us and pressed upon our 
notice under this aspect. It is this necessity laid upon the 
human mind of contemplating objects of thought, which are 
brought before it distinct and separate from each other, not 
simultaneously but in sucession, which Kant seems to have in 
view, when he speaks of Time as a form or mode, that is, a 
fundamental law of the intellect. It is different with the in- 
tellectual perception, the mind of the Supreme Being, who 
is not necessitated to become acquainted with objects in this 
peculiar form or mode ; but perceives all events and all ob- 
jects of knowledge simultaneously, and spread out before Him 
as it were on a map. It seems obvious, therefore, that the 
basis of the belief, which is accorded to the great law of 
Causality, is deeply laid in the peculiar structure of the hu- 
man soul. The law not only exists ; (that is to say, it is 
not only a great principle in nature, that all facts and events 
arrange themselves as antecedences and sequences and sustain 
the relation of cause and effect;) but the structure of the mind 
itself is such, that it naturally, and as it were with its earliest 
breath, imbibes a knowledge of it. 

§. 69. Of the universality of the law of causation. 

Accordingly from the earliest period of our lives, we are 
naturally led, by the inherent and permanent tendencies of 



LAW O'JF CAUSALITY. . J23 

our mental constitution, to contemplate objects in this way. 
All objects, which are both distinct and separate in them- 
selves, and are contemplated separately from each other by 
the mind, necessarily pass before the intellectual view in 
succession. They appear and disappear one after another in 
a sort of perennial movement, arising in the course of the 
mind's action from darkness to light, and then again waning 
into evanescence, and wrapping themselves in clouds. 

It is in this way we are made acquainted with the general 
idea of succession. But this is not all. By a careful obser- 
vation of what takes place both within and around us, we are 
soon enabled to distinguish one succession from another ; 
that succession for instance, which is unfixed and variable, 
from that which is always the same. In other words, we 
soon ascertain from our experience, that certain facts and 
events are preceded by other fixed and invariable facts and 
events, and that the former never take place without the an- 
tecedent existence of the latter. This is the universal expe- 
rience in regard to a great number of facts and events, viz, 
that they are thus invariably connected together. And it is 
this form of our experience in particular, from which no one 
is exempt, which furnishes the occasion of the universal and 
unalterable belief, arising naturally and necessarily in the 
human mind, and existing in all ages and places of the world, 
that every effect, meaning by the term whatever takes place, 
has a cause. We say, existing in all ages and places of the 
world, for this undoubtedly is found to be the simple and 
real fact, so far as any inquiry has been made on the subject ; 
and which is ascertained so extensively as to warrant the'fur- 
ther extension of it by analogy to every human being. This 
proposition, which may be termed the lav/ of causality, is 
one of those transcendental or primary truths, which lay at 
the foundation of all knowledge. The belief, which is in- 



124 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

volved in it, is unprompted, spontaneous, and original ; it is 
the necessary growth of the mind's action, in the circum- 
stances in which we are placed ; and so far from being the 
result of reasoning, which is the foundation of so large a 
portion of our knowledge, it is entirely antecedent to it, and 
is to he regarded as one of those things, on which the reason- 
ing power itself essentially depends, as one of its primitive 
and indispensable bases. 

§. TO. Of the classification into Effective and Preparative causes. 

It is true, that men after a time learn to comment on this 
fundamental proposition, and to make distinctions. After 
their increased experience has enabled them to draw the line 
between the things animate and inanimate, material and im- 
material, and especially after they have learnt more fully the 
nature and appropriate residence of Power, they begin to 
make a distinction,which undoubtedly is a well founded one, 
between efficient or effective causes, which imply the exer- 
cise of power, and other causes, which furnish merely the 
preparation or occasion of what follows. — These two classes 
of causes, therefore, might not improperly be denominated 
and characterized, in order to aid in distinguishing them 
from each other, respectively as Effective and Preparative 
causes. Certain it is, that such a distinction is to be made ; . 
and that without it the fundamental principle of the univer- 
sality of causation does not hold true. Both of these classes 
of causes imply the notion of invariable antecedence ; but 
they differ in this. Preparative causes, (if for the want of a 
better term we may be permitted so to call them,) furnish 
merely the ground or occasion of what is to follow ; while 
Effective causes imply not only the ground or occasion of 
what follows, but the actual efficiency or power, which 
brings it to pass. Effective causes have power in them- 



XAW OF CAUSALITY. 125 

selves ; while Preparative causes only furnish the appropriate 
and necessary occasions, on which the power, that is lodged 
somewhere else, exercises itself. Both classes are invariably 
followed by their appropriate results or effects ; but the one 
class, having the whole efficiency in itself, is strictly opera- 
tive and actually makes or brings to pass the effect, what- 
ever it may be ; but the other class, which is destitute of 
efficiency in itself, is merely the preparatory circumstance, 
occasion, or condition, on which what is called the effect, 
either in virtue of its own power or some attendant power 
extraneous to itself, invariably takes place. 

It is important to remember this distinction. And it is 
with this distinction in view, and not otherwise, that we 
assert the universality of causation ; in other words that 
every effect has a cause. And accordingly it is the univer- 
sal belief of men, evinced alike by their words and their 
conduct, that without a cause there is neither any beginning 
nor any change of existence. 

§. 71. Opinions of various philosophers on this subject. 

Probably on no topic whatever can we find a greater 
agreement and a more decided concurrence of testimony, 
than in respect to the fundamental proposition now before 
us. We shall here introduce to the notice of the reader some 
passages, which will show, that this remark is not unadvis- 
edly made. 

Archbishop King. — In the celebrated Treatise of this 
learned and acute writer on the Origin of Evil, we find it 
maintained in a number of passages, that, although there is 
a great First Cause or original and uncreated Active Prin- 
ciple, all other things whatever, whether material or immate- 
rial, are dependent upon and are connected with that original 
Active Power, in the unbroken chain and succession of ef- 



126 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

fects and causes, however remote that dependence and con- 
nection ma"y he. "We are certain, he remarks in his inquiries 
concerning the First Cause or God, that all other things 
come from this Active Principle. For nothing else, as we 
have shown hefore, contains in itself necessary existence or 
active power, entirely independent of any other. As, there- 
fore, itself is from none, so all others are from it. For from 
hence we conclude that this Principle does exist, hecause, 
after considering the rest of the things which do exist, we 
perceive that they could neither be nor act, if that had not 
existed, and excited motion in them."* 

Dr. Clarke. — In the Demonstration of the Being and 
Attributes of God we find the subject under examination 
referred to by this distinguished writer in the following 
terms. — "It is absolutely and undeniably certain, that some- 
thing has existedfrom all eternity. This is so evident and un- 
deniable a proposition, that no atheist in any age has ever 
presumed to assert the contrary ; and therefore there is lit- 
tle need of being particular in the proof of it. For since 
something now is, it is evident, that something always was : 
Otherwise the things, that now are, must have been produced 
out of nothing, absolutely and without a cause ; which is a 
plain contradiction in terms. For to say a thing is produced, 
and yet that there is no cause at all of that production, is to 
say that something is effected, when it is effected by nothing; 
that is, at the same time when it is not effected at all. What- 
ever exists has a cause, a reason, a ground of its existence ; 
(a foundation, on which its existence relies ; a ground or 
reason why it doth exist, rather than not exist ;) either in the 
necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been qf 
itself eternal ; or in the will of some other being ; and then 

* Essay concerning the Origin of Evil, Chap. I, §. 3d. 



LAW OF CAUSALITY. 127 

that other being must, at least in the order of nature and 
causality, have existed before it."* 

Lord Kames. -'That nothing can happen without a 

cause, is a principle embraced by all men, the illiterate and 
ignorant as well as the learned. Nothing that happens is 
conceived as happening of itself, but as an effect produced by 
some other thing. However ignorant of the cause, we not- 
withstanding conclude, that every event must have a cause. 
We should perhaps be at a loss to deduce this principle from 
any premises by a chain of reasoning. But perception 
affords conviction, where reason leaves us in the dark. We' 
perceive the proposition to be true. And indeed a sentiment 
common to all must be founded on the common nature of «//.+" 

Mr Stewart. — "It may be safely pronounced to be im- 
possible for a person to bring himself for a moment to be- 
lieve, that any change may take place in the material universe 
without a cause. I can conceive very easily, that the voli- 
tion in my mind is not the efficient cause of the motions of 
my hand ; but can I conceive that my hand moves without 
any cause whatever? — In the case of every change around 
us, without exception, we have an irresistible conviction of 
the operation of some cause. "J 

Dr Dwight. — "The mind cannot realize the fact, that exis- 
tence, or change, can take place without a cause. This is, 
at least, true with respectto my own mind. I have very often 
made the attempt, and with no small pains-taking, but never 
been able to succeed at all. Supposing other minds to 
have the same general nature with my own, I conclude that 
all others will find the same want of success. If nothing 

* Demonstration of the Being and attributes of God, Prop. I. 
t Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, Lond. 2d. Ed. Essay in. 
% Stewart's Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Bk. III. Ch. 2d, §. 1. 



128 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

had originally existed, I cannot possibly realize, that any 
thing could ever have existed."* 

§.72. Opinions of President Edwards on this subject. 

In addition to these respectable testimonies, without 
referring to a multitude of others not less explicit, we may 
adduce that of President Edwards, as it is found in his able 
Inquiry into the Will. And thus having occasion to refer to 
that Work, we embrace this opportunity to render, with sin- 
cere pleasure, our acknowledgements to the metaphysical 
writings of that distinguished man, and to express our high 
sense of his services to the cause of letters and of religion 
in general. In the wide grasp of his views, in the ability of 
patient and persevering thought, in the power of perceiving 
and developing distinctions however intricate, in the desira- 
ble qualities of good temper and candour, he has perhaps 
never been excelled. If we take into view not only the 
mental ability, the creative vigour so characteristic of all his 
efforts, but the direction or tendency of the mind, (the intel- 
lectual taste if we may so express it,) he is entitled to be 
ranked, in either point of view, in the same exalted scale of 
intellect with those distinguished masters of mental science, 
bishop Butler and Mr Locke. Few have ever reached, by 
their own original efforts, the sublime height of his specu- 
lations , which are the more wonderful, as they are always 
based upon calm reason and sober good sense, and perhaps 
fewer still have attained to the radiant excellence of his vir- 
tue. He took his position with unfeigned humility at the 
feet of the Most High, and was pre-eminently wise himself, 
not only for being originally endowed with the quickening 
elements of wisdom, but because he sought the inspirations 
of knowledge from above. 

* Dwight's Theology, Ser. I. on the Existence of God. 



LAW OF CAUSALITY. 129 

On. the particular subject, which is before "us, Presi- 
dent Edwards expresses himself thus. "Having thus 

explained what I mean by cause, I assert, that nothing ever 
comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must 
be from eternity, and must be unchangeable . But as to all 
things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and there- 
fore must have some foundation of their existence without 

themselves . That whatsoever begins to be, which before 

was not, must have a cause why it begins to exist, seems to 
be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which 
God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the 
main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of 
things, past, present, or to come. 

And this dictate of common sense equally respects sub- 
stances and modes, or things and the manner and circum- 
stances of things. Thus, if we see a body, which has hith- 
erto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to 
move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is 
some cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as 
of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not 
existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in 
a certain direction, should suddenly change the direction of 
its motion ; or if it should put off its old figure, and take a new 
one ; or change its colour ; the beginning of these new 
modes is j a new event, and the mind of mankind necessarily 
supposes that there is some cause or reason of them."* 

* Edward's Inquiry into the Will, Part II, §. 3d. — A number of other 
American writers, of less celebrity undoubtedly than Presidents Edwards and 
Dwight but still of great weight, have maintained the principle under discus- 
sion. See among other works Dr Stephen West's Essay on Moral Agency, 
Part I, §. §. 5th, 6th ; and Dr Burton's Essays on some of the Fust Princi- 
ples of Metaphyics, &c, Essay XIII. — See also, in connection with this sub- 
ject, a recent English Work of Dr Abercrombie, entitled Inquiries concerning 
the Intellectual Powers, Pt. II, §. 2d. 
17 



130 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

§,73. Of the results of a denial of this proposition. 

One or two remarks remain to be made. Let it not be 
supposed, as may be likely to be the case, that thi3 proposi- 
tion or truth is of but small practical importance. It would 
be unnecessary, if it were possible at this time, to notice all 
its applications, and to show how constantly we make it 
the basis of our conclusions in the multiplied acts and duties 
of every day and hour. If this truth were not allowed us, 
it is not too much to say that we could not exist. It will in- 
dicate how extensively it applies, and of course how necessary 
it is even to our existence, when we remark, that even our 
belief in an external material world is, in some degree, 
founded upon it. We have the various sensations of taste, 
smell, sound, touch, and sight ; but in themselves considered 
they are purely internal ; they are as much attributes of 
the soul as the emotions of cheerfulness and joy and sorrow 
and wonder. We take cognizance of their mere existence, 
and of nothing more than their mere existence, till the great 
law of causality, which has established itself in our convic- 
tions from the first dawning of the intellect, and which con- 
stantly presses itself on our notice, leads us to inquire,whence 
come these sensations? What is it that fills us with harmony, 
and developes in the soul these visions of visible beauty ? 
The presence and pressure of the great truth of universal 
causation awakens the principle of curiosity, and we do not 
rest satisfied, till we are able to detect the grounds of these 
inward sensations in outward objects, and are thus led to 
recognize and to admit the existence of a world of matter. 
So that if men could be made to believe that there may be 
effects without causes, and could thus disconnect their in- 
ward sensations from all outward antecedents, they might 



LAW OF CAUSALITY. 131 

consistently regard all other existences as identified and 
embodied in their own, and pronounce every thing-, which 
seemed not to he in themselves, mere unsubstantial images, 

chimeras, & illusory appearances. Among other pernicious 

results. of the supposition, that there maybe effects without 
'•causes, is this, that we are unable to prove in that case the 
existence of the Supreme Being. The apostle assures us> 
that the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and 
godhead, are made known from the things which are created. 
And who does not assent to this great practical doctrine ? 
Who is able to cast his eye over the expanded face, of nature, 
decorated with countless forms of life and beauty, without 
every where reading the stamp and signatures of a higher 
Power ? We reason upwards from the things, which are 
made, to the maker. Nature's works are the foundation and 
support of a sort of Jacob's ladder, that reaches to heaven ; 
and by means of which even feeble men may climb upward 
and approach to the Most High, as did the angels of God in 
the bright and blessed visions of the Patriarch. But how is 
this done ? By what process shall we consummate this approx- 
imation to the Divine existence ? If it be said, it is clone by 
reasoning, and that reasoning is the ladder of ascent, then 
we may ask, where is its support ? What sustains it ? Where 
does it rest ? And all we can say is, that its basis is in this 
very proposition which we have made the subject of our con- 
sideration ; in the great and fundamental truth of causa- 
tion ; and without that truth it has not an inch of 
ground to rest upon. But if on the other hand it be true,that 
every effect has its cause, then may the universe of effects 
around us, bound together as it is by the evidences of a 
pervading unity as well as expansive and pervading wisdom, 
justly claim for itself in its creation the agency of a Su- 
preme Being, and thus lead our belief upward from the things 



132 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

that are made to the conception and belief of the great Au- 
thor of them. 

<j>. 74. The truth of the proposition under consideration implied 
in the fact of a Supreme existence or Deity. 

We may here without impropriety briefly revert to a train 1 
of thought, which has been already touched upon in the pre- 
ceding chapter. We there expressed ourselves to the effect, 
that, if there is no law, there is no Deity. We may go more 
into particulars in this connection, and may add further, that, 
if the law of universal causation in particular be not true, 
there is no Deity. In making this assertion, however, it is 
proper to remark, that we employ the term Deity in the 
sense commonly attached to it, viz, as including the ideas of 
omniscience and superintendence. But obviously if the pro- 
position of universal causation be not true, there is no basis 
whatever either for the one or the other of these attributes of 
the Supreme Being. If effects can take place without causes, 
if events can happen without being connected in any way 
with any thing antecedent, then there is evidently no tie, 
which can effectually unite them either with the Divine mind, 
or with any other mind. They stand insulated and apart 
from every thing else ; they come & go through the great & 
universal ordering and arrangement of things, like strangers 
from an unknown land, whose advent and departure are alike 
beyond all anticipation and knowledge. The vast and 
boundless empire, of which God stands at the head, would 
be flooded by events, in which He would have no a- 
gency, and of which he could have had no antecedent 
conception. Instead of the harmony and unity, which 
now every where exist and every where diffuse trans - 
cendant happiness, there would be the return of chaos, an 
universal breaking up of the established system of things, a 



LAW OF CAUSALITY. 133 

complete and utter embroilment, the reign "of [chance and 
tumult, of confusion and discord, like the jarring of the infer- 
nal doors, " grating harsh thunder." But the law of causal- 
ity hushes the confusion, arranges the discordant materials, 
and brings every thing into order. 

§. 75. Application of the views oj this chapter to the will. 

Our object in introducing these views must be obvious. 
They apply directly to the will ; and, if we do not misap- 
prehend their bearing, they decisively support the doctrine, 
that the voluntary power, whatever may be true in respect 
to its freedom, is still not exempt from law. If there be- 
any primary element of human reason whatever, any un- 
doubted and fundamental truth evolved from the very 
structure of the mind and exacting an universal assent, it is 
the one under consideration. But if the will is exempt from 
the superintendence of all law, if its acts have respect to no 
antecedent and are regulated by no conditions, then this 
fundamental proposition is not true, and has no existence. 
But if, on the other hand, in compliance with the dictates of 
our nature and the indispensable requirements of our situa- 
tion, we adhere to this truth in all that unlimited length and 
breadth, which constitutes its value, we shall of course as- 
sign to every act of the will a cause. 

Let it be noticed, however, that we do not specify here 
the precise nature of the cause. We use the term cause here, 
as we have done in all that has been' said, in its broadest 
sense, as meaning, according to the nature of the subject 
spoken of, either the mere antecedent occasion, or the an- 
tecedent combined with power ; as expressing either the 
Effective cause, which truly makes the sequence, or the Pre- 
parative cause, which is merely a condition of the existence 
of such sequence. In the language of President Edwards, 



134 LAW OF CAUSALITY. 

who endeavoured to prevent his being misunderstood, by 
taking particular precautions in respect to this term, we em- 
ploy it " to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, 
positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or 
the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is 
the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is, 
rather than not, or why it is as it is,rather than otherwise."* 
In this comprehensive sense of the term we hqld it to be un- 
deniably true, that there is no act of the will, no volition 
without a cause. And this being the case, it is of course im- 
plied, that the will itself, from which the act or volition 
originates, is subject to some principles of regulation ; in 
other words, has its' laws\ 

* Edward's Inquiry into the Will, Part II, §. 3d. 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 



§. 76. Belief of men in the continued uniformity of nature^ 
operations. 

Another principle or law of practically universal applica- 
tion, one -which, like the preceding is considered fundamental 
to the due exercise of the reasoning power in the ordinary 
occasions of its exercise, and the truth of which seems to be 
universally admitted, is this, — That there is a permanency and 
uniformity in the operations of nature. When we assert, as we 
cannot hesitate to do.that this principle is accordant with the 
common belief of mankind, and that it is universally admitted, 
we are not aware of asserting any thing more than what is 
obvious every hour in the orclirjiry conversation and con- 
duct of men. Is not such the case ? Does not the slightest 
observation show it ? All men believe, that the setting sun 
will arise again at the appointed hour ; that the rains will 
descend and the winds blow,and that the frosts and the snows 
will cover the earth, essentially the same as they have done 



136 LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

heretofore ; that the decaying plants of autumn will revive 
in the spring ; that the tides of the ocean will continue to 
heave as in times past ; and that there will be the return and 
the alternation of heat and cold ; and that the streams and 
rivers will continue to flow in their courses. Their conduct 
clearly proves, in all these cases, and in all instances anala- 
gous to them, the existence of a belief in the principle of 
uniformity above-mentioned, which seems deeply founded, 
constant, and unwavering in the very highest degree. If 
they doubted, they certainly would not live, and would not 
act, and would not feel, as they are now seen to do. It is 
with this belief, that that they lie down amid the evening 
shadows and sleep in quietness ; it is with this belief they 
arise in the light of the morning and till the reluctant- earth 
in the sweat of their brow ; it is with this belief that they 
store their minds with knowledge which without the belief 
they could never imagine to be at all available to them ; it 
is under the control of the same immovable conviction that 
they rear their habitations and provide in various ways for 
the good and the evil,the joys and the sufferings of the future. 
We are desirous of not being misunderstood in the state- 
ment of this great practical and fundamental principle. This 
principle, although it is an elementary and fundamental one, 
seems to be in some sense, subordinate to the law or princi- 
ple of causality. The latter partakes more of a transcend- 
ental nature. We not only fully believe it ; but it is impos- 
sible not to believe. It is as impossible for us to believe, 
that existences can be brought into being without a cause, 
or in other words that nothing can produce something, as to 
believe that the part is greater than the whole. But in 
respect to the other principle, although we are so constituted 
as fully to believe the affirmative, we do not necessarily be- 
lieve the absolute impossibility of the negative. In other 



LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 137 

words, while by our very constitution we believe in the uni- 
formity of nature in all its relations and bearings upon our- 
selves, we do not necessarily preclude the possible interpo- 
sition of that Being on whom all nature depends. Our be- 
lief is undoubtedly subject to that limitation. 

§. 77. This belief exists in reference to mind as well as matter. 

But while the statements now made are assented to, in 

relation to the material world and outward objects in general, 

it may be supposed, that they do not hold good in relation 

to the mind of man and spiritual or mental objects . But this 

is an erroneous supposition. There are no sufficient grounds 

for maintaining, that men intend to limit the application of 

the principle in question to mere material things ; but on the 

contrary they undoubtedly regard it as extending to mind, 

so far as comes within the reach of their observation, and 

bjr analogy to all minds in all parts of the universe. In other 

words, they believe, there is an uniformity in mental, as well 

as in material action. Certainly it must have come within 

the observation of every one, that men act precisely as if 

this were the case. It is admitted on all sides, that men plant 

their grounds in the spring, with the full expectation and 

confidence, that the operations of nature will be essentially 

the same as they have been, and that vernal labours will be 

enriched with autumnal rewards. But do they not exhibit 

the same confident expectation in their intercourse with 

each other ? Does not the. parent till the mind of his child 

in the full expectation of a mental harvest ? Do not men 

make promises, and form covenants, and incur responsibilities 

to an extent and with an assurance, which can be explained 

only on the ground, that they regard the law of uniformity 

as being applicable to mental as well as physical nature ? 

Without this belief no contracts between man and man 
18 



138 LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

would be formed ; no business transactions, involving future 
liabilities and duties, would be carried on ; no domestic 
relationships would be established ; but every thing would 
be thrown into utter confusion and perplexity ; and even the 
bonds of society, without which man can hardly exist and 
certainly cannot be happy, would be loosened and torn asun- 
der. So that the situation and conduct of men may, in this 
case, be regarded as proofs of what they believe. And being 
so regarded, they clearly indicate and prove the general and 
decided conviction among them, that there is an established 
and uniform order in the mental operations of mankind, 
which, if not perfectly analogous, is as much so, as the differ- 
ent natures of matter & mind will permit,to the regular course 
of things,which we constantly observe in the physical world. 

§. 78. Circumstances under which this belief arises. 

It ought perhaps to be added, in explanation of this belief 
in the permanency and uniformity both of material and men- 
tal nature, that it does not appear to arise and exist in its 
full strength at once. It seems to have its birth at first in 
some particular instance ; and then again is called into exis- 
tence in another instance; and then subsequently in another 
and another ; till ultimately we are led to regard that perma- 
nency and uniformity, to which .it relates, as of universal 
application with the single exception already referred to, 
viz, the possible interposition of that great Being, on whom 
all nature depends. As the belief arises in this gradual way, 
we may well suppose, that, in the early periods of its origin 
and growth, it is comparatively weak ; but it soon acquires 
great strength ; so much so that every day and hour we do 
not hesitate to make it the basis of our conduct. Even in 
our childhood and youth it had beeome in our minds a fixed 
principle, which in ordinary cases we no more thought of 



LAW OF UNIFORMITY. ]39 

questioning, than we did the facts of our personality and 
personal identity. We always looked upon .nature, even at 
that early period, as firm, unshaken, immoveable ; as going 
forth, in all the varieties of her action, to the undoubted at- 
tainment of certain definite ends, and as announcing in the 
facts of the past a most perfect pledge of what was to come. 

§. 79. Of the true idea of chance, in distinction from 
uniformity. 

We cannot hesitate to assert, that the belief in question 
is accordant with fact. The mind, in this respect as in 
others, corresponds with the operations and course of things 
around it. They are mutually adapted to each other. But 
if others have less confidence in these assertions, we would 
propose to them to consider a moment the opposite of the 
uniformity contended for, viz, contingency or chance. We 
must either take law, which implies an uniformity of opera- 
tions, or chance, which implies none. There is no other 
alternative. But what philosopher, what man of the' least 
depth of reflection is prepared to admit, that chance, as it is 
called, has any place at all in the constitution of things ? 

It is true, we not unfrequently use this term. But if we 
carefully consider the circumstances, under which it was 
originally introduced, we shall find that it necessarily ex- 
presses not any thing in nature, not any agency either neg- 
ative or positive, but merely a certain position of the hu- 
man mind. In other words, it expresses the fact, (and it 
does not necessarily express any thing more,) of the exis- 
tence of human ignorance. And hence it happens, that what 
is considered and called chance by one, is far from being so 
considered by another, who has a deeper insight into it. 
And in all cases whatever, the increase of knowledge will 
diminish what are considered the domains of chance by 



•+- 



t 



140 LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

those, who are incapable of fully exploring them. Some 
person says, for instance, it is a mere chance, whether the 
American Congress or the English Parliament will pass 
such or such an act in their coming session. But if this 
person could fully penetrate the hearts of all the members, 
their convictions, interests, prejudices, and moral sentiments, 
it would no longer he chance, hut become certainty. Ac- 
cordingly when men assert the occurrence of a thing by 
chance, it cannot be supposed, that they truly mean to as- 
sert, (for a voice within them, an original impulse of their 
own nature assures them of the contrary,) that the thing in 
question happens without any occasion, reason, or cause. Their 
notions will perhaps be indistinct, and it is possible they 
may entertain some such idea at first ; but if they will only 
analyze their thoughts, they will be convinced, they cannot, 
with any sort of propriety, intend to express by it any thing 
more than their own want of knowledge. In other words, 
when a thing happens by chance, it happens by chance in 
respect to them. That is to say, they are not able to com- 
prehend and explain how it happens ; it comes in a way 
they know not how ; and as they can attach to it no law, it 
has the appearance to them of being without law. And it is 
this appearance undoubtedly, rather than the reality of the 
absence of causation and of law, which they intend to ex- 
press, when they use the word in question. 

§. 80. Grounds or foundation of this belief . 

It will perhaps be inquired, what is the foundation of the 
deep belief, which so universally attaches itself to the great 
principle of a permanency and uniformity in nature? To 
what part of our constitution is it to be referred ? — It would 
perhaps be a natural explanation to suggest, that it is founded 
upon acts of reasoning. But on examination this does not ap- 



LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 141 

pear to "be the case. We do indeed sometimes speak in some 
such manner as follows ; The sun rose to-day, therefore it will 
do the same to-morrow ; Food nourished us to-day, therefore 
it will do the same to-morrow, &c ; a mode of expression, 
which seems to imply, that the uniformity of the future is 
inferred or deduced from the facts of the past by a train of 
reasoning. But certainly it is not difficult to see, that some- 
thing is here wanting ; that a link in the chain of reasoning 
must be supplied in order to make it cohere ; and that conse- 
quently there is merely the appearance or form of reasoning 
without the reality. The mere naked fact, that the sun rose 
to-day, without any thing else being connected with it, 
affords not the least ground for the inference, that it will 
rise again ; and the same may be said of all similar instan- 
ces. We cannot, therefore, prove the uniformity in ques- 
tion in this way. 

But if reasoning is not the basis on which it rests, and 
if we can give no other satisfactory explanation of its origin, 
(and it does not appear that we can,) all we can say is, that 
the belief, which men so universally have of such uniformity, 
is the gift of nature ; that it is neither taught to them by a 
deduction from other principles nor communicated by any 
other secondary process whatever ; but is produced or arises 
naturally within them ; the necessary and infallible growth 
and product of their mental constitution. In other words 
the very structure of our minds requires us to assume as a 
certainty and truth, that there will be, in time to come as in 
time past, this alledged permanency and uniformity in the 
operations, which are going on in the various departments of 
nature, both mental and material. Certain it is, no one 
appears to doubt, that such will be the case, although no one 
can bring proof of the fact, except such as is furnished by 
the irresistible suggestions of his own internal being. So 



142 LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

that the principle of uniformity, like that of causality, is 
something antecedent to reasoning and not subsequent to it; 
something beyond and above reasoning and not dependent 
on it ; one of those original and substantial columns, im- 
planted within us by the provident care of nature, which the 
reasoning power could never have placed there, but upon 
which that power, as it does upon the other great principle 
just referred to, subsequently erects its permanent and mag- 
nificent structures. 

§. 81. Reference to the opinions of Reid and Jlbercrombie. 

It is proper to remark that we do not by any means pro- 
pose these views as novel ; nor on the other hand do our 
limits permit us to introduce passages, at much length, for 
the purpose of showing, how often, and how ably they have 
been maintained by distinguished writers. We feel at liberty 
to make but one or two references out of a multitude of 
others not less explicit. " In the phenomena of nature, (says 
Dr. Reid,) what is to be, will probably be like to what has 
been in similar circumstances. We must have this convic- 
tion as soon as we are capable of learning any thing from 
experience ; for all experience is grounded upon a belief 
that the future will be like the past. Take away this princi- 
ple, and the experience of an hundred years makes us no 
wiser with regard to what is to come. 

"This is one of those principles, which, when we grow up 
and observe the course of nature, we can confirm by reason- 
ing. We perceive that nature is governed by fixed laws, 
and that if it were not so, there could be no such thing as 
prudence in human conduct ; there would be no fitness in 
any means to promote an end ; and what, on one occasion, 
promoted it, might as probably, on another occasion, ob- 
struct it. 



LAW OF UNIFORMITY. . 143 

" But the principle is necessary for us before we are able 
to discover it by reasoning, and therefore is made a part of 
our constitution, and produces its effects before the use of 
reason. 

" This principle remains in all its force when we come to 
the use of reason : but we learn to be more cautious in the 
application of it. We observe more carefully the circumstan- 
ces on which the past event depended, and learn to distin- 
guish them from those which were accidentally conjoined 
with it. 

"In order to this, a number of experiments, varied in their 
circumstances, is often necessary. Sometimes a single ex- 
periment is thought sufficient to establish a general conclu- 
sion. Thus, when it was once found, that, in a certain degree 
of cold, quicksilver became a hard malleable metal, there 
was good reason to think, that the same degree of cold will 
always produce this effect to the end of the world. 

" I need hardly mention, that the whole fabric of natural 
philosophy is built upon this principle, and, if it be taken 
away, must tumble down to the foundation. 

" Therefore the great Newton lays it down as an axiom, or 
as one of his laws of philosophising, in these words, Effec- 
tuum naturalium ejusdem .generis easdem esse causas. This is 
what every man assents to as soon as he understands it, and 
no man asks a reason for it. It has therefore the most genu- 
ine marks of a first principle, "f 

Dr. Abercrombie, in a recent philosophical work charac- 
terized by its sober and practical good sense, speaks of 
certain first truths, "which are not the result of any pro- 
cess of reasoning, but force themselves with a conviction of 
infallible certainty upon every sound understanding, without 
regard to its logical habits or powers of induction." Among 
tReid's Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay V. 



144 LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

these he expressly and particularly includes "a confidence 
in the uniformity of nature ; or that the same suhstance will 
always exhihit the 'same characters ; and that the same cause 
under the same circumstances will always he followed by 
the same effect. This, as a first truth, is a fundamental and 
instinctive conviction."* 

§. 82. Application of these views to the will. 

And now let us inquire, how the principle of uniformity 
will apply to the general subject under consideration. Does 
it not furnish an argument of much weight in respect to the 
regulation of the will ? The principle is understood to ap- 
ply, without exception, to every thing whatever, which has 
properties, attributes, or acts, whether its nature be mental 
or material ; and as thus stated and understood, it is received 
and maintained by writers of great discernment, among 
whom Mr. Stewart, who is not apt to commit himself in fa- 
vor of any position of doubtful strength, as well as Dr. Reid 
and Dr. Abercrombie, may be included. But if the will be 
not subject to any regulation, if it be above and beyond the 
control of law, then there can be no uniformity in its opera- 
tions 5 it is not only impossible for man, but for any 
being whatever to predict what those operations shall 
be, or eten to make any approximation to such pre- 
diction. But if the principle of uniformity do not hold 
good in respect to the will, it follows of course that it does 
not hold good in respect to the actions and general conduct 
of men, which depend upon the will. And if it fails, both in 
respect to the voluntary and outward action, constituting as 
they do so large a portion of the objects to which it is alledg- 
ed to apply,it certainly ought not to be laid down as a general 
principle. But then if the principle fails in respect to any 
*Abercroml>ie'3 Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, Pt. in. §. 4llu 



LAW OF UNIFOKMITY. 145 

part of those things which exist, and to which it has hither- 
to been supposed to apply, its authority is necessarily weak^ 
ened, if not totally undermined, in respect to all its other 
applications ; for, if exceptions to the general principle 
are once admitted, no man can tell where they are to be 
found, or in what number ; but every thing in respect to it 
is thrown into uncertainty. 

But those, who assert the universality of the principle, are 
not by any means disposed to admit, that it ever does or 
ever will fail any where. Not because such an admission 
would be fatal to their views ; but because they see no rea- 
son for the admission. If the planets are subject to laws ; 
if plants and trees and air and clouds and rivers and oceans 
have their uniform principles of action ; if the same principle 
extends to the mind, modified only by the different nature of the 
subject ; if sensation and perception and memory and reason- 
ing and imagination and belief and association act always 
under the condition of an uniformity of action in all future 
time when the circumstances are precisely the same ; if these 
are undeniable facts, as they obviously are ; then they find 
themselves compelled to believe, (and the belief existing 
under such circumstances is an original and imperative im- 
pulse of our nature,) that the will too, whenever the circum- ■ 
stances are the same, will be uniform in its operations ; that 

is, IT HAS ITS LAWS. 

And why should it not be so ? Will it not be gen- 
erally and readily conceded, that this is a pleasing and 
delightful thought ? This view, (and no other can do 
it,) makes man in all respects a part and parcel of that 
wonderful universe, of which the adorable Creator is the 
boundary and the centre. He exists in it, as in a delightful 
home. Wherever he turns his eyes, there are mansions pre- 
pared for him. Wherever he directs his footsteps, invisible 
ID 



146 LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 

beings, that know all his wants, watch over him. Even in 
solitude he is not alone ; he still finds indications of life, 
relationship, and love ; he still finds himself encircled in the 
arms of God. 

§ 83. Of an objection to these views drawn jrom the conduct 
of men. 

We think of no prominent objection to the views of this 
chapter excepting this, that the statements made are more 
agreeable to speculation, than accordant with fact ; in other 
words, that the conduct of men, as daily coming under our 
notice, does'not fully support them. In reply to this objec- 
tion, besides the obvious facts in human action already hinted 
at, we refer the reader to the more explicit and definite 
statements brought forward in a subsequent chapter on the 
Prescience or foresight of men, where he will see, that their 
conduct is abundantly conformed to the principle before us. 
We will however make one remark here, which of itself is 
but little short of decisive. — Men are constantly operating 
upon each other, endeavouring for some purpose or other to 
regulate, influence, and control the conduct of others. And 
what methods do they* employ ? It is evident, that they can- 
not possibly control the conduct of their fellow men, except 
by operating on the will. And the course, which, in accor- 
dance with this view, we find them taking , is that of apply- 
ing promises, threatenings, encouragements, and exhortations. 
They address these and other like considerations to those, 
whose conduct they desire to influence, as motives; expecting, 
as they think they have abundant reason to, that they will 
be received and have their influence as such. These are the 
means they employ ; and no one is ignorant, that in the 
employment of them they meet with ample success. But if 
the action of the will were regulated by no fixed principles, 



LAW OF UNIFORMITY. 147 

this could never happen. No addresses, made either to the 
interests or the sense of duty, no motives, of whatever kind, 
can furnish a ground of probability in respect to the acts of 
any being or power, whose acts are in their nature unavoid- 
ably contingent. Hence on the doctrine of contingency, 
which is the opposite of that law, there cannot possibly be 
any encouragement to the making of such addresses, or to the 
attempting of an} r efforts whatever, with the design of influ- 
encing and regulating the conduct of others, since there can 
on that doctrine be no possible foresight or even conjecture 
of the results. Only once establish the principle, that the 
will is liberated from all particular tendencies and law ; 
show that we are utterly unable to predict the nature of its 
acts under all circumstances whatever, and not a man will be 
found, who has any claims to an ordinary share of good 
judgment, that will use his efforts and apply means for the 
attainment of any object dependent upon the conduct of 
another, however desirable that object may be. As he can 
never tell nor even conjecture what is suitable to be address- 
ed to his felloAV-men, in order to induce them to pursue a 
certain course of conduct, it may be regarded as certain that 
he will never make the attempt. But as the facts, which 
constantly come under our notice, are directly the reverse of 
this, and as such attempts in relation to the actions of others 
are constantly made, we have, in this single view of men's 
conduct, a nearly decisive answer to the objection referred 
to. 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MORAL 
GOVERNMENT. 



§. 84. Of the existence of a moral government. 

But if we turn our attention from the fundamental laws, 
which are undeniably incorporated with the natural economy 
of the universe both in its mental and material forms, to the 
consideration of the predominant principles, which pervade 
its moral government, and examine these principles with a 
suitable degree of care, we shall find new and substantial 
evidence of the truth of the proposition before us. And accor- 
dingly it is our design in the present chapter to bring reasons 
to show, that the doctrine of the will's subjection to law is 
necessarily implied in the fact of a moral government; as- 
suming in the argument, of course, that we are reasoning 
with those who fully believe and admit, that such a moral 
-rovernment exists, and that men are subjects of it. Cer- 
tainly there is ample evidence that such is the case, inclepen- 



t 



LAWS OF THE WILL. 149 

dently of what is taught on the subject in Revelation. The 
light of nature clearly and strikingly indicates, that a moral 
government, extending its authority over the human race in 
particular, has an existence. Mankind, (says Bishop Butler, 
who has investigated this subject with his acknowledged 
ability and candour,) find themselves placed by God in such 
circumstances, as that they are unavoidably accountable for 
their behaviour, and are often punished, and sometimes re- 
warded under his government, in the view of their being 
mischievous or eminently beneficial to society."* Revela- 
tion, whatever may be the clearness or obscurity of the in- 
dications of unaided nature, places the existence of such a 
moral government beyond all doubt. We suppose, there- 
fore, the fact of such a government to be admitted. 

§. 85. Laws of the will deducible from'jhe first principles of 
moral government. 

If a moral government exists, as is assumed to be the fact 
and is known to be so, then it has its first principles or ele- 
ments. It must of course have its predominant traits, its 
distinctive characteristics , some admitted and essential truths. 
If these traits or principles are assented to, they must obvi- 
ously be assented to, with such consequences as may fairly 
attach to them, whatever those consequences may be. And 
hence the mode of our reasoning. 

In conducting the argument drawn from this source, we 
shall attempt to point out some of those things, which are 
universally understood to be implied in and to be essential 
to a moral government ; and as these elementary principles 
are successively pointed out, shall briefly examine their ap- 
plication to the subject under inquiry. And in thisfway we 

* Butler's Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature, 
Pt. I, Chap. 3d. 



150 LAWS OF THE WILL 

propose to make it appear, that the doctrine of the subjection 
of the voluntary power to laws is implied in the existence of 
moral government. And if such a government exists, which 
is conceded to be the fact,then the doctrine in question is true. 

§. 86. Laws of the will inferred jrom that supremacy or para- 
mount authority , which is implied in a moral government. 

Every moral government implies, in the first place, a ruler, 
a governor, some species of supreme authority. The term 
government itself, separate from any qualifying epithet, 
obviously expresses the fact, that there are some beings 
governed, which is inconceivable without the correlative of 
a higher and governing power. And what is true of all other 
government is certainly not less so of that species of gov- 
ernment, which is denominated moral. In all moral govern- 
ment, therefore, there must undoubtedly be some supreme 
authority, to which those, who are governed, are amenable. 

Now if men are under government, they are under law. 
To be governed is obviously to be regulated, guided, or 
controlled, in a greater or less degree. To say that men 
are governed and are at the same time exempt from law, is 
but little short of a verbal contradiction, and is certainly a 
real one. But when we speak of men as being under laws, 
we do not mean to assert a mere abstraction. We mean to 
express something actually existing ; in other words we 
intend to assert the fact, that the actions of men, whatever 
may be true of their freedom, are in some way or other 
reached by an effective supervision. But when we consider 
the undenied and undoubted dependence of the outward act 
on the inward volition, we very naturally and properly con- 
clude, that the supervision of the outward act is the result 
of the antecedent supervision of the inward principle of the 
will 5 in other words, the win. has its laws. 



IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 151 

§. 87. Laws of the will inferred from that accountability and 
dependence, which are implied in a moral government. 

Wherever there is a moral government, there is not only 
a higher or ruling power, hut an inferior one, which may he 
held accountable to it. If there is nothing, to which man is 
amenable, there certainly can be no accountability ; nor on 
the other hand can there be accountability, without some 
person or being, to whom such accountability attaches itself. 
Furthermore; accountability always implies the relation of 
dependence upon that higher Power or authority, whatever 
it may be, to which it must be rendered. Perhaps not 
dependence in every respect, but certainly a limited depen- 
dence. 

But it is evident, that man can never sustain the relation 
of dependence on a higher Power and of accountability to 
that power, without some medium of connection between 
the two. The proposition is wholly inadmissible and 'even 
inconceivable, that man can be dependent upon and accoun- 
table to the moral governor of the world, without any defi- 
nite channel of communication, and without any established 
and permanent methods of connection between himself and 
that moral governor. 

But if there be any connection between the accountable 
being and the being to whom the accountability is clue, that 
connection, under whatever form it may develope itself, 
must reach and affect the will. If there is no connection 
with the will, there is no connection with the man ; because, 
as we have already had occasion to remark, the act of the 
will is the result and consummation of all the other mental 
acts ; and accordingly it is that, which, in a very important 
-sense, constitutes the man. We are, therefore, necessarily 



52 LAWS OF THE WILL, 

brought to the conclusion, that, if man is under a moral gov- 
ernment, and if, as implied in the idea of his being under 
such a government, he is dependent and accountable, the 
fact of this accountability and dependence must attach itself 
to the will in particular as the controlling power of his men- 
tal nature ; and that consequently the will is not contingent 
in its action and beyond the reach of laws. — It will be no- 
ticed here as in other cases, we do not state, what the pre- 
cise nature or extent of these laws is ; but merely assert 
the general fact of their existence. 

§. 88. Inferred also from the fact, that the- subjects of amoral 
government must be endued with adequate poxoers of obedience. 

As all moral government must have the right of exacting 
obedience from its subjects, it follows necessarily, that the 
subjects of such government must possess the requisite pow - 
ers of obedience ; not a mere transitory obedience yielded 
for a moment, but one, which is accordant to a prescribed 
course, and yielded for a length of time. But if the will, 
which is the governing power over men's actions, be not 
subject to laws, it is self-evident, that such a continued or 
protracted course of obedience cannot be rendered, even 
with the most favourable dispositions on the part of those 
from whom it is due. Man is in this case not under the 
control of himself ; he can never tell at one moment what he 
may do or be the next ; and it is altogether inadmissible, 
therefore, to suppose, that he can by his own act conform 
himself to the control of another. There may indeed be an 
occasional and momentary coincidence between his actions 
and the requisitions laid upon him ; but whenever this is the 
case, it is merely a matter of accident, and neither in fact 
nor in spirit comes up to the idea of that obedience, which 
is due to a moral governor. In a word, if the acts of the 



IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. ] 53 

will are not based, as the occasions at least of their being 
called forth, upon any conditions whatever and are truly- 
contingent, man has no power to obey. And if he has no 
power of obedience, (using the term to mean a continued or 
protracted as well as momentary obedience,) tben he is un- 
der no obligation so to do. And moral government under 
such circumstances can never exist in respect to the human 
race. 

§. 89. Laws of the will inferred from that rationality which 
is essential to the subjects of a moral government. 

Again, if we look further into the elementary principles 
of moral government, we shall find, that this sort of adminis- 
tration differs from all natural or physical government in this 
respect, that its subjects are not only agents, but are neces- 
sarily rational agents. The attribute of rationality is abso- 
lutely essential to them, as accountable and moral beings. 
That is to say, their actions, so far as they are of a moral 
nature, are ultimately based upon the perceptions of our in- 
tellectual part or understanding. 

We can undoubtedly conceive of a purely sentient being, 
formed wholly of instincts, appetites, desires, and passions, 
without the intellectual endowments, (at least to any ex- 
tent worthy of notice,) of perceiving, comparing, abstract- 
ira^iand reasoning. Nor is the possibility of such a being 
left wholly to imagination, since we have abundant instan- 
ces in the brute creation around us. But such beings, 
wherever they may be found and whatever purposes more or 
less important they may answer in the arrangements of the 
universe, are not the subjects of moral emotions and of feel- 
ings of obligation, nor are they morally accountable. A 

sort of instinctive perception at once adjudges them incapa- 
20 



j 51 LAWS OF THE WILL 

ble of that higher destiny. Rationality, therefore, is an in- 
cident, or rather prerequisite of a moral nature. 

If man, therefore, is a rational being, which must be con- 
ceded as indispensable to the fact of his being in subjection 
to a moral government, then his actions, as has been stated, 
are ultimately based upon the perceptions of the under- 
standing. And if his actions are susceptible of being thus 
based and regulated, then the operations of the will may be 
regulated, (and must be regulated to the extent that the out- 
ward actions are,) in the same way, since the outward ac- 
tions have their origin in the decisions of the voluntary power. 
But if it be true, that the operations of the will are in this 
way connected, indirectly and ultimately at least, with the 
antecedent perceptions of the intellect, then they are subject 
to laws. There may indeed be, and there certainly are, 
emotions and desires and feelings of obligation intervening 
between the perceptions of the intellect and the acts of the 
will. But still the latter in all cases strike their roots through 
ihe intervening mental elements, and thrust themselves in- 
to the intellect as their original basis and support. Without 
this, man could not Avith propriety be denominated a rational 
being ; and with this he cannot with propriety be deemed a 
being, the acts of whose will are contingent. "One thing is 
clear and indisputable, says Mr. Stewart, that it is only in so 
far as a man acts from motives or intentions, that he is entitled 
to the character of a rational being. "*-In this passage it is in 
effect asserted as clear and indisputable, that man is a rational 
being, only so far as he acts from motives or intentions ; 
which of course implies, that the exercises of the will are put 
forth in connection with such motives or intentions, and are 
consequently subject to certain antecedent conditions or 
laws. The word intentions seems to express, not those acts 
of the sensibilities or heart which are in immediate contact 
with the will, but the antecedent perceptions of the intellect. 
♦Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, Append. I, §. 2d. 



IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 155 

§. 90. Laws of the will inferred from the fact that in the ad- 
ministration oj a moral government motives are employed. 

Let it further be remembered as a fixed principle in moral 
government, that it is sustained in its character of a moral 
government, not by the application of physical power, but by 
the presentation of motives. The fact, that men are influen- 
ced and directed by the motives set before them, is an en- 
couragement in the making of moral efforts, and in the use 
of such means, as are adapted to reclaim the vicious, or to 
strengthen habits of virtue. When men go astray, what can 
we do more in our attempts at reclaiming them, than apply 
promises, threatenings, and exhortations ? We address these 
to them as motives, expecting that they will be received, and 
have their influence as such. These are the means, which 
we employ, and we find that they meet with success. But 
liberate the will from all particular tendencies and law ; show 
that we are utterly unable to predict the nature of its acts 
under all circumstances whatever, and then there is no en- 
couragement to apply means for the attainment of moral 
ends ; there is no encouragement to moral efforts of any 
kind. When this is the case, we can never tell what is suita- 
ble to be addressed to men, in order to induce them to change 
their course of conduct. And moral government under such 
circumstances cannot exist. 

§. 91. Inferred also from the application of rewards and 
punishments. 

There is another point of view, in which the subject may 
be contemplated. Accountability, as has already been stat- 
ed, is essential to moral government. But accountability 
implies, that the person or persons, who are subject to it, 
may be called to an account ; and this of course implies, that 



150 LAWS OF THE WILL 

the being, who has the right of calling them to such account, 
may inflict punishment in case of delinquency. In other 
words, wherever there is accountability, there is the correl- 
ative right of enforcing it ; that is to say, of punishing if 
necessary. But if volitions are independent of motives and 
are entirely contingent, no man can tell, as has already been 
intimated, at one hour or one moment what he will do the 
next ; he cannot possibly have any foresight even of his 
own actions, and cannot take measures to prevent those 
which are evil. In the estimation of a right conscience, 
there would be no more propriety in punishing such a man's 
actions, than in punishing a stone or a billet of wood, which 
ma3 r have accidentally been the occasion of some injury to 
us. As his Avill is beyond the reach of all laws, there are no 
principles by means of which its exercises can be subjected, 
(we do not say to the power of others merely,) but even to 
his own power. He is the sport of an unfathomable fortui- 
ty, a sort of foot-ball, impelled in every possible contrarie- 
ty of direction, the ceaseless but imbecile plaything of inex- 
plicable chance. Such a man certainly is not the proper 
subject of punishment. And for like reasons he is not the 
proper subject of rewards. 

§', 92. The same inferred from the fad, that the moral govern- 
ment of the present life is in its nature disciplinary. 

And there is yet another and distinct view of that moral 
government under which men are placed, which is especially 
worthy of notice in connection with the subject under consid- 
eration, The moral administration, to which men are sub- 
ject in the present life, is in its nature disciplinary. As far 
as man is concerned, it is not to be denied, that the present 
state of being is incipient and preparatory to another and 
ampler field of existence. It is here, on the field of action 



IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 157 

where we are now placed in the present life, that it is pro- 
posed to train up men for glory, honour, and immortality. 

The present is a state of probation preparatory to this 
end. And it will be kept in mind, that it is proposed to se- 
cure this result by trial, exposure, exercise, training, disci- 
pline. But a moral regimen of this kind implies, that there are 
evils to be encountered ; that there are duties to be perform- 
ed ; that there are obstacles to be overcome ; that there are 
temptations to be resisted ; and that men are not only to 
sustain' their souls in patience, meekness, and fortitude, but 
to purify them in the prospect of an ultimate triumph. 

But if the will be not subject to laws, all this is words 
without meaning. It must be obvious, that there can be no 
moral trial or discipline of man without temptation. And it 
is no less clear, that temptations must be ultimately addressed 
to the will, or they are nothing. My understanding, for in- 
stance, tells me, that the attainment of a certain object will 
be promotive of my present good ; my desires are strongly 
enkindled in view of that object ; my conscience condemns 
it ; and here undoubtedly is the basis, the preparatory condi- 
tions of the temptation. But still there must be some internal 
object, upon which the temptation presses ; some principle 
of the mental nature, upon which it is brought to bear. And 
where is this principle or power to be discovered, around 
which the strength of the temptation thus gathers, and en- 
ters into contest, if it be not the will ? — But if moral disci- 
pline, (at least that of the present life,) implies temptation ; 
and if temptation, as it obviously does, implies a pressure 
upon the will, then the will must be subject to laws. For if 
it be not subject to laws, there seems to be no possible way, 
in which the temptation can approach it, or exert any influ- 
ence upon it. That, which is without law either in mind or 
matter, is necessarily unapproachable, except by mere ac- 
cident. 



158 LAWS OF THE WILL 

§. 93. That the will has laws implied in the existence of virtue 
and vice. 

Finally, if the will is truly contingent in its action and 
entirely without laws, it cannot fail to follow, that there is 
no tenable foundation of virtue and vice. — It is a common 
maxim, founded on the general experience and universally 
held to be true, that actions are reprehensible or otherwise, 
according to the designs, intentions, or motives, with which 
they originated. But if the acts of the will are perfectly 
contingent, (that is to say, are put forth without a regard to 
any thing else whatever,) then it is obvious, that designs 
or motives, considered in reference to such acts, are entirely 
excluded, and have no existence. It is evident that a man 
in that case can justly say of any action he performs, which 
is deemed by the community either virtuous or vicious, that 
it happened merely because it did happen ; that it came to 
pass without any forethought or intention or design on his 
part ; that he knows of no rational cause of its origin ; and 
in a word, that it is truly and wholly accidental. And is such 
a man, of whose actions these statements are undeniably 
true, to be either blamed or commended ? Where is the 
basis, in his actions or his character, of either morality or 
immorality ? Is he not beyond the reach, in every respect, 
of virtue and vice ? 

No one can be ignorant, that, when a man is arraigned on 
any accusation, one of the first inquiries is in respect to his 
designs or motives in perpetrating the alleged criminal act. 
By the law of the land, if a man has put another to death 
with malice aforethought, (that is, with an evil design or in- 
tention of so doing,) it is murder ; if the deed is committed in 
the violence of momentary passion, without any premeditated 
purpose, it becomes the diminished crime of manslaughter ; 
if it be what is called accidental, or in other words without 



' IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 159 

any hostile feeling and without in the least intending or ex- 
pecting the result which followed, then it is no crime at all. 
And so on the other hand, if a man perforins a highly bene- 
ficial action, with the view and the intention of doing good, 
all men agree in pronouncing it virtuous and praiseworthy ; 
but if they discover the action to be wholly accidental, they 
equally agree in denying to its author any claims to moral 
merit and commendation. In a word the circumstance of an 
action's being accidental is understood to destroy its moral 
character. But what is the true idea or characteristic of an 
accident ? It is evidently that, which has no cause, no reason, 
no reference to any fixed principle. And every volunta- 
ry act, on the supposition of the will's not being subjected to 
law, is precisely conformed to this view. Every such volition 
is truly an accident. And as such, the common consent of man- 
kind would deny to it, both in itself and its results, the pos- 
session of any moral character whatever. 

It would not be difficult to point out passages- in writers 
of acknowledged value, going to confirm the various views 
of this chapter. On the subject of the present section, 
President Edwards expresses himself in the following deci- 
ded language. — " If it should be allowed that there are some 
instances wherein the soul chooses without any motive ; 
what virtue can there be in such a choice ? I am sure there is 
no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no 
good end ; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any end, 
the view of the end would be the motive exciting to the act ; 
and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, 
then there is no good intention in it : and therefore, accord- 
ing to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in 
it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and 
fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, 
and which knows not whither, nor why and wherefore, it is 
moved."* 

*Edward's Inquiry into the Will, Part in, §. 7th. 



CHAPTER FIFTH 



LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE 
OF THE DEITY. 



§. 94. The notion which men naturally form of the Deity 
implies foreknowledge. 

In proof of the general proposition, that the Will has its 
Laws, we now enter upon a distinct train of thought. In 
the present chapter we propose to bring forward in its sup- 
port the Prescience of the Deity. And accordingly it will be 
necessary to say something in support of the fact, that there 
is such prescience, or in other words that God foreknows 
whatever comes to pass. We do not however propose to 
enter at much length into this specific topic ; for the general 
acquiescence in the proposition of God's foreknowledge ren- 
ders it unnecessary ; but merely to suggest in relation to it 
one or two considerations. 

And we naturally remark in the first place, that the idea, 
which all men agree in formiug of the Deity, implies fore- 
knowledge. We say nothing here of the light, which 
Revelation throws upon this subject ; but refer merely to 
the notion of the Deity, which men form of themselves. 
The basis of this paramount idea is abundantly laid in the 



PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 161 

human constitution. We do not undertake to say it is innate, 
in the sense in which that^feerra has been commonly under- 
stood ; but merely assort, that the human mind is so consti- 
tuted, and is operated upon by such influences, that the idea 
of God arises in it naturally and certainly, unless there are 
some peculiar circumstances counteracting this tendency. 
Hence we find, in all countries and among all classes of men, 
in the cheerless hut of the Esquhneaux, in the rude dwellings 
of the uncivilized tribes inhabiting the islands of the Pacific, 
in the tent of the vagrant Arab, as well as among those who 
are refined by the arts and enlightened by science, the no- 
tion of a God. The conception may indeed be a feeble and 
imperfect one, compared with that developed in the Scrip- 
tures ; but feeble as it is, it always includes the idea of pres- 
cience or foresight in a much higher degree than is posses- 
sed by men. The very heathen would scoff at the idea of a 
God, whose knowledge is limited to the present moment. 

§. 95. The prescience of God involved and implied 
in his omniscience. 

But we are not left, in the consideration of this subject, 
to the suggestions,which are furnished by an examination of 
the opinions of men, however naturally they may have aris- 
en, or however widely prevailed. God has seen fit, in the 
exercise of his great mercy, to speak by his Revealed Word, 
and to pour the light of inspiration on the dim and uncertain 
light of human reason. He has declared himself to possess 
all knowledge . He, who is familiar with the Bible, cannot 
fail to recollect many passages, where this great truth ap- 
pears. The hundred and thirty ninth Psalm, one of the most 
striking and beautiful in that exceedingly interesting collec- 
tion of sacred poetry, turns almost exclusively upon the 

great, and wonderful knowledge of God. " Thou knoyyest 

21 



162 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

ray down- sitting and mine up-rising ; thou understandest 
my thought afar off. . Thou compassest my path and my ly- 
ing down, and art acquainted with all my ways." The 
Psalmist in another place, after asserting the greatness of 
the Lord and of his power, immediately adds, that his under- 
standing is infinite." In another passage of the Psalms of 
great sublimity, God is introduced as saying, "I know all the 
fowls of the mountains, and the wild beasts of the field are 
mine ;" expressions which convey a sentiment parallel to 
that of the New Testament, in the passages where it is as- 
serted, that not a sparrow falls without the notice of God, 
and that the hairs of our head are numbered. "Neither is there 
any creature, says the Apostle, that is not manifest in His 
sight ; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of 
Him with whom we have to do." The beloved Disciple says, 
"God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."* 

But if God is omniscient, which is clearly implied or as- 
serted in these and many other passages, it follows of course, 
that he is able to foresee events, whatever they may be, 
which shall come to pass in future times. 

And let it be remembered here, that. God does not have a 
knowledge of things in precisely the same way as men have, 
viz, in success-ion, or as they arise before the mind's eye one 
after another; but on the contrary it seems rather to be the 
fact, that all the knowledge He possesses, whether more or 
less, exists in the perception of his mind simultaneously ; it 
is all taken in and contemplated at one view . With Him 
there is neither beginning of days nor end of years ; no 
present, past, nor future. And hence if we strike off from 
the great circle of his knowledge that part or section, which 
we denominate the future, his omniscience is at once shorn 
of the attribute of perfection, and is presented before us in a 

*Ps. 147, 5. 50, 10. Heb. 4, 13. First Epis. of John, 3d, 20. 



IN THE PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 163 

state of deformity and mutilation. And accordingly we as- 
sert, that the omniscience of God, a truth so obvious to rea- 
son and so abundantly taught in the Scriptures, implies the 
doctrine of prescience, and that he has a clear knowledge of 
all future events. 

§. 96. The prescience of God directly taught in the Scriptures. 

The divine prescience or foresight is not only implied in 
the omniscience of God, as that attribute is made known in 
the Scriptures, but is itself separately and distinctly made 
known in a multitude of passages. The Supreme Being 
himself, in the language ascribed to Him by the prophet 
Isaiah, asserts, " I am God and there is none like me, declar- 
ing the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the 
things that are not yet done." "Known unto God, says the 
Apostle James, are all his works, from the beginning of world. 1 ''* 

Nor does the doctrine of God's foreknowledge rest upon 
general statements alone ; but we have instances again and 
again of predictions, uttered long before the events came to 
pass, which were strictly fulfilled. The deluge was predic- 
ted one hundred and twenty years before it came on the 
face of the earth. It was foretold, that the children of Israel 
should be in bondage four hundred years. The cruel con- 
duct of the Syrian Hazael, and the deliverance wrought out 
by the hand of the Persian Cyrus, are matters of precise 
and specific prediction. The destruction of Babylon and of 
Nineveh, with many of the circumstances attending their 
overthrow, was predicted also. The coming and the preach- 
ing of Jesus Christ, and particularly his humiliation, trials, 
and death were foretold by the mouth of holy men, many 
years and even ages before the events themselves took 
place. The destruction of Jerusalem , (not to mention other 

* Isaiah 46 ch, 9, 10 v. Acts, ch. 15, 18 v, 



164 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

instances equally decisive in their bearing on this subject,) 
was depicted long before it happened, and with a wonderful 
particularity and vividness. — In view of these facts and 
others like them, we have only to make the remark, and v/e 
do it with full confidence in its correctness, that predictions 
so numerous and specific, and so exactly fulfilled, could not 
have been uttered without the possession of foreknowledge 
or prescience on the part of their author. 

.§. 97. The foreknowledge of events implies the foreknowledge of 
volitions. 

And it is further to be noticed in regard to many, if not 
all the events, which have taken place in accordance with 
such predictions as those referred to in the last section, that 
they were dependent on the volitions of men. The volun- 
tary actions of men necessarily imply the antecedent exer- 
cise of volitions; and it is impossible, that any being whatever 
should foresee the actions without a foresight at the same 
time of their volitions. As an illustration, it was foretold to 
Abraham, that his descendants should go into Egypt and 
should take up their residence there; but such a prediction 
evidently implies a knowledge of all the circumstances, under 
which this event should take place, including in particular 
every motive and every volition connected with it. Such a 
prediction implies a knowledge not only of the volitions and 
acts of the immediate agents in the events foretold, but of 
those persons also, who were concerned in them incidentally 
and collaterally. In the present case it implies a knowledge 
of the jealousies of Joseph's brethren, and of their perverse 
and wicked conduct in selling him to the Ishmaelites; it im- 
plies a knowledge of the wants, interests, and motives of 
the Ishmaelites themselves ; not to mention the situation and 
potives of other individuals and bodies of men, which were 



IN THE PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 165 

undoubtedly among the preparatory steps and means to the 
wonderful events which followed. 

Every one knows, that events of the greatest magnitude 
are dependent upon circumstances apparently the most triv- 
ial. It is a remark of Dr.Dvvight, that the "motions of a fly 
are capable of terminating the most important human life, 
or of changing all the future designs of a man, and altering 
the character, circumstances, and destiny of his descendants 
throughout time and eternity."* Now if these things are 
so, it cannot for a moment be conceded, that God fore- 
knows and predicts events, without a knowledge of all those 
circumstances even the most trivial, upon which those events 
may, by any possibility, be dependent. In particular, and 
above all, He must be minutely and fully acquainted with 
the voluntary acts, (meaning by the phrase the volitions,) of 
the immediate agents in them. In foreseeing events, in 
which men are concerned, He must of course foresee what 
men will do ; but it is inconceivable, that he should know 
this without knowing what volitions they will put forth. 

§. 98. Of the reasonableness of the foregoing views. 

These views in regard to the extent and particularity of 
God's foreknowledge commend themselves at once to the 
common sense and feelings of men. It would be of but little 
avail to extol God as the Creator of all worlds and all beings, 
if he could not foresee what would be the result of their 
creation ; if he could not tell whether their existence would 
be beneficial or injurious to themselves or others. Existence 
is known, not only from what it is in itself, but from its is- 
sues. And if God has no foresight of the results of his 
works, He creates He knows not what ; and if He is igno- 
rant of his own works, no other being can be supposed to, 
*Dwight's Theology, Serm. VI. 



166 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

have knowledge of them. Would such a God, supposing 
Him to be truly and fully the Creator of all things, be able 
to hold the reins of government over the things He had 
made ? Would He not be continually perplexed, and compell- 
ed at every turn in the affairs of the Universe to alter his 
plans ? Certain it is, that the doctrine, which denies the full 
and perfect prescience of the Deity, greatly degrades Him. 
It leaves Him at the mercy, as it were, of the most trifling 
circumstances. The movement of a single atom, as it is 
possible even for a matter so trivial as that to alter the des- 
tiny of a world, might perplex His wisest purposes, and de- 
feat his most benevolent plans. 

§. 99. Application of these views to the will. 

But if it satisfactorily appears, that God foreknows all 
things, particularly the volitions of men, then it clearly fol- 
lows, that the voluntary power has its laws. The opposite 
of a subjection to law, as has already been remarked, is per- 
fect contingency ; and the very idea of contingency or of 
contingent action, implies that it is something, which cannot 
possibly be foreknown. Whatever is foreknown must be 
foreknown to exist at a particular time or place or under 
some particular circumstances ; but that action or event, 
which it is ascertained and certain will exist at a particular 
time or place or under any particular and definite circumstan- 
ces, cannot with any propriety of language be deemed a 
contingent one. Since, therefore, nothing, which is fore- 
known, is contingent, and since the volitions of men are ob- 
viously the subjects of foreknowledge, it follows, that there 
must be some definite laws or principles, by Avhich the ac- 
tion of the voluntary power is regulated. 



IN THE PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 167 

§. 100. The views of this chapter in harmony with the 
doctrine of the influences of the Holy Spirit. 

As in some respects closely connected with the views of 
this chapter, we may here with propriety refer to the Scrip- 
ture doctrine, that God through the influences of the Holy 
Spirit has the power, and, when in his providence he sees 
fit, exerts the power, of enlightening, sanctifying, and guid- 
ing the minds of men. The reader of the Bible will natural- 
ly he reminded here of the Saviour's interesting expressions 
on this subject, which are found in the concluding chapters of 
the Gospel of John. — " I will pray the Father, and he shall 
give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for- 
ever." " And the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom 
the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all 
things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatso- 
ever I have said unto you." Johnxiv, 16,26. — " So they, 
being sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed unto Seleu- 
cia." — Then Saul, who is also called Paul, filled with the 
Holy Ghost, set his eyes upon him, and said, O full of all 
subtlety," &c— " And were forbidden of the Holy Ghost to 
preach the word in Asia." Acts xm, 4, 9, xvi, 6. — " Which 
things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom 
teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 1 Cor. n, 
13. — " Holy men of God spake, as they were moved by the 
Holy Ghost." 2 Pet. i, 21. 

All these passages and others like them necessarily and 
clearly imply, that there has not been an entire disruption 
and separation, at least in all respects, of man from his Ma- 
ker ; and that the human mind, however predisposed to re- 
bellion, is circumscribed and checked in its operations, and 
is held in subordination to the all-pervading and transcend- 
ent control of the Supreme Intelligence 



CHAPTER SIXTH. 



LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE 
OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 



§. 101 . Man as well as Deity susceptible of foresight. 

It may perhaps be objected by some, that the argument 
drawn from the prescience of the Deity is less satisfactory 
than it would otherwise be, in consequence of the unspeaka- 
ble elevation and incomprehensibleness of the Divine Mind. 
That the divine mind is in some respects incomprehensible 
by man is true ; but it does not follow, that an argument, 
founded upon what we know and can understand of the di- 
vine nature, is therefore incomprehensible or even obscure. 
But whatever weight, whether more or less, may be conced- 
ed to this objection, we come to another view of the subject, 
analogous indeed to that of the last chapter, but drawn from 
a different source, and level to every one's comprehension. 
Man himself, restricted and dimmed as his conceptions un- 
doubtedly are, has a prescience of the future, a foresight of 
what is to come to pass, as well as the adorable Being who 
made him. Not in an equal degree indeed, but still in some 
degree. And this fact also goes to confirm the position, 
which we are now examining in regard to the will. 



PRESCIENCE OF MEN. 169 

§. 102. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own 
situation and conduct. 

In the first place, man can foretell, (we do not say 
with perfect certainty, nor is that at all essential to our 
argument,) his own situation, actions, and success at some 
future time. 

Take a very simple illustration. A man proposes to go to 
Boston or New York, or to some place of common resort, 
no matter where it is^ for the purpose of transacting business 
there. The execution of a design of this nature, although it 
is difficult to mention one more common and simple, implies 
the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions. 
And it is undoubtedly the fact, that the object in view cannot 
be effected without this great number of volitions. And yet 
we perceive that this person goes forward with confidence, 
and that he makes his calculations without fear, and with a 
feeling of certainty that he will be able to execute them. 
He evidently proceeds upon the supposition, (although he 
may not be fully conscious of it at the time, and may never 
have made it a matter of distinct reflection,) that the opera- 
tions of the will exist in reference to some fixed principles; 
and particularly in connection with motives in their various 
kinds and degrees. And looking at his proposed underta-- 
king with care, and understanding well the claims both of 
interest and duty, which are involved in it, he determines or 
wills in reference to the general plan before him, whatever 
it may be, without even doubting that all the future acts of 
the voluntary power will be accordant with its requisite de- 
rails ; and that in due season it will be brought to a fulfil- 
ment in all its parts. But we may assert with confidence, 
that this could never be done, if volitions were entirely con- 
tingent, in other words if they were without laws. For if 
22 



170 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

this last were the case, he would be just as likely to go to 
Providence as Boston, to Albany as New York, or to any 
other place whatever, as to that where he first determined 
to go; and would be just as likely to do the direct opposite 
as that particular business, which he designed to accomplish 
at his first setting out. — And the views, applicable in this 
particular case, will apply to the multiplied occurrences and 
duties of every week and day. And they furnish of them- 
selves, and independently of every other argument which 
may be brought up, but little' short of a demonstration of 
what we are attempting to establish. 

§. 103. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others. 

In the second place men are able to foretell, with a con- 
siderable degree of certainty, the situation, actions, and suc- 
cess of others at some future time. This is so notorious as 
not unfrequently to have elicited the remark, that there is a 
certain regular order in the conduct of men, in some degree 
analogous to the regular course of things, which we never 
fail to observe in the physical world. Men may every 
where be found, who would no more hesitate to predict the 
precise conduct of their neighbours in certain assignable 
circumstances, than they would to predict, that trees of a cer- 
tain kind would grow in a given situation. 

Some instances will illustrate what we mean. — A poor man 
<roes to a rich man in the same neighbourhood, who is a con- 
firmed and inexorable miser, for the purpose of borrowing a 
sum of money, but without being willing to give the custo- 
mary interest of twenty per cent, and unable at the same 
time to furnish adequate security for the principal . Everv f 
bo<!y knows, that the miser will refuse his money at once. 
They expect and predict it with hardly less confidence than 
they predict, that a stone thrown into the air will immediate- 



IN THE PRESCIENCE OF MEN, 171 

ly fall to the earth's surface. — "A prisoner, says Mr. Hume, 
who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibil- 
ity of escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of his 
guards as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded ; 
and in all his attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to 
work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflex- 
ible nature of the other." This remark of Mr. Hume is an 
important one, and without question is essentially correct. 
Undoubtedly it is sometimes the case, that prisoners endeav- 
our to effect their escape by working upon the passions and 
will of their guards ; but in a vast majority of cases they 
consider their chance of escape much better by means of at- 
tempts made upon the stone and iron that enclose them. 
They understand so well the connection between motive and 
volition, between interest and duty on the one hand and the 
resolves of the will on the other, that, with the knowledge 
they possess of the characters .and situation of those who 
are appointed to act as their guards, they consider their es- 
cape by means of any collusion with them, or any assistance 
from that source, as an utter impossibility.* 

§. 104. Other familiar instances of this foresight. 

But we will now proceed to give some instances which 
are less remote from common observation. The reader may 
perhaps recollect some remarks of Dr. Paley, relative to our 
constant dependence on our fellow men. "Every hour of our 

* Expressions very similar to those of Mr. Hume, 'and certainly not less 
strong in their import, are found in a Treatise of Lord Kames, (Principles of 
Morality, Pt. I, Essay 3d ;) and also in the recent work of Dr.Abercrombie on 
the Moral Feelings, Part II. — "We can foretell, says the last mentioned writer, 
the respective effects,which a tale of distress will have upon a cold hearted mi- 
ser, and a man of active benevolence,with the same confidence, with which we 
can predict the different actions of an acid upon an alkali and upon a metal." 



17$ LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

lives we trust and depend upon others; and it is impossible 
to stjr a step, or, what is worse, to sit still a moment with- 
out such trust and dependence. I am now writing at my 
ease, not doubting, (or rather never distrusting, and there- 
fore never thinking about it,) but that the butcher will send 
in the joint of meat, which I ordered ; that his servant will 
bring it; that my cOok will dress it ; that my footman will 
serve it up ; and that I shall find it on the table at one 
o'clock."* — And this is a state of things, which is constantly 
occurring, not only in the matter of the daily food necessa- 
ry for the support of our lives, but in a thousand other in- 
stances. The merchant depends upon his clerks ; the man- 
ufacturer depends upon his numerous operatives of all clas- 
ses and conditions ; the farmer, who works upon a large 
scale, depends upon the hands of others as much as he does 
upon the labor of his own hands; the commander of a ves- 
sel constantly reckons upon. the efficient cooperation of his 
sailors; the leader of armies relies upon -the movements of 
vast bodies of men made with the utmost precision in the 
most trying circumstances. And it is the same in all situa- 
tions, and among all classes of men, as any one, who will in 
the least trouble himself to exercise his recollection, will be 
abundantly satisfied. Eut if all these persons operated by 
mere accident, and without regard to any fixed principles; 
if it were a matter of entire contingency whether they 
should perform their engagements or not, it is easy to see 
that all the sources of enjoyment and even of existence 
would be destroyed, and the foundations of society speedi- 
ly broken up. 

* Moral Philosophy, Book hi. Chap. 5th. 



IN THE PRESCIENCE OF MEN. 173 

§. 105. Of sagacity in the estimate of individual character. 

We will here introduce to the consideration of the reader 
another view of the subject of this chapter, which is interest- 
ing in itself, besides furnishing an argument deserving of 
some attention. — It is not uncommon to find men, who ex- 
hibit a sort of quickness or sagacity in the estimate of indi- 
vidual character, which is sometimes described by the phrase, 
a knmvhdge of the world, or of human nature. This knowl- 
edge is undoubtedly possessed by all persons to some extent; 
but not unfrequently individuals are found, who possess it in 
a remarkably high degree. In some men it may be said, 
not only to assume the appearance, but even to approximate 
the nature of a prophetic anticipation or foresight; and when 
this is the case, it is an acquisition, as no one can be igno- 
rant, of great power and value. The late Mr. Dumont of 
Geneva in his interesting Recollections of Mirabeau has no- 
ticed this ability in one of its more striking forms. -. " It 

was by the same instinctive penetration, that Mirabeau so 
easily detected the feelings of the assembly, and so often 
embarrassed his opponents by revealing their secret motives, 
and laying open that which they were most anxious to conceal. 
There seemed to exist no political enigma which he could 
not solve. He came at once to the most intimate secrets, 
and his sagacity alone was of more use to him than a multi- 
tude of spies in the enemy's camp. I used sometimes to at- 
tribute the severity of his judgments to hatred or jealousy ; 
but it has been justified by succeeding events, and there 
was not a man 'of any consequence in the assembly, the 
sum of whose conduct did not correspond with the opinion 
which Mirabeau had formed of him. 

"Independently of this natural gift, this intellect of pene- 



174 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

tration, his life had been so agitated, he had been so tossed 
upon the sea of human existence, as he used to say, that he 
had acquired vast experience of the world and of men. He 
detected, in a moment, every shade of character ; and to 
express the result of his observations, he had invented a 
language scarcely intelligible to any but himself ; had terms 
to indicate fractions of talents, qualities, virtues, or vices — 
halves and quarters — and, at a glance, he could perceive ev- 
ery real or apparent contradiction. No form of vanity, dis- 
guised ambition, or tortuous proceedings, could escape his 
penetration ; but he could also perceive good qualities, and 
no man had a higher esteem for energetic and virtuous char- 
acters."* 

It cannot be necessary to add any thing to show, how 
this instance and others like it, (for the political history of 
every age brings to light some men of this stamp,) connects 
itself with and illustrates our subject. 

§ 106. Foresight of the conduct of masses of men and nations. 

It is not too much to say, that we are able, not only to 
predict with a considerable degree of certainty, the conduct 
of individuals in any given circumstances, but we may do 
the same of whole classes of men, and even nations. The 
speculations in the public stocks are very frequently promp- 
ted by the opinions, which those, who are engaged in such 
speculations, are able to form of the course, which States and 
nations will take in some future time. The results of a pop- 
ular election, if certain data are ascertained, are often con- 
sidered as settled, even before the day of voting has arrived; 
although the conclusions thus formed are based in part upon 
opinions relative to whole classes of men, who differ from 
each other in their callings, interests, and prejudices. 
* Dumont's Recollections of Mirabeau, Chap. XIV. 



IN THE PRESCIENCE OF MEN. 175 

The amount of property, invested in commerce, with the 
annual returns of revenue to the government, is every year 
estimated in advance, and with very considerahle accuracy, 
by the treasury departments of all civilized nations. 

If a person will take the pains to examine the total re- 
ceipts of the Post Office Department of the U. S. in the suc- 
cessive years from 1790 to 1830, he will notice, with but 
few exceptions and those easily explained, a gradual and 
very regular increase in the amount ; the increase being 
such as would naturally be expected from the augmentation 
of the wealth and population of the country. We presume 
it will be found also on inquiry, that the number of letters, 
not taken from the subordinate offices and returned from time 
to time to the General Post Office, or dead letters so call- 
ed, is nearly the same from year to year, or varying so as to 
correspond to the variation in the number of letters received. 
% is stated by Laplace, that the number of dead letters re- 
maining at and returned from other offices to the Post Office 
at Paris is, in ordinary times, nearly the same from one 
year to another. The same thing has been stated of the 
Dead Letter Office, as it is called, in London.* All -these 
things conclusively evince, that the actions of men, whether 
considered individually or in masses, are not left to chance 
or mere accident. 

But a field of investigation opens itself here too wide to. 
be pursued. We shall, therefore, leave it to the reflections 
of the reader, with a mere additional reference to a recent 
French writer, who has taken a view of human nature, novel 
indeed and painful, but highly satisfactory in its connection 
with the matter before us. It is proper to observe that we 
are indebted for the statements of this writer to the public 
prints, having never been able to obtain sight of his work ; 
* Edin. Rev. Vol. xxiii. 



176 PRESCIENCE OF MEN. 

but with no reason to suppose that they are otherwise than 
correctly reported. He has made an estimate of the tenden- 
cy to crime in the human race at different periods of life. 

§. 107. Proof from the regularity observable in the commission of 

crime. 

" Such, says the writer referred to, is the certainty with 
which this tendency prevails, that in France under ordinary 
circumstances, one may predict at the beginning of the year, 
what will be the number of persons condemned to death, the 
number condemned to hard labour for life or for a term of 
years, the number condemned to solitary imprisonment, &c, 
with more certainty than the Treasury Department can make its 
annual estimate of the income and expenditures of the nation . 

" In France, for every 4,460 inhabitants, one is anriually 
arraigned at a criminal tribunal. Of the persons thus ar- 
raigned, one out of every four is accused of a crime against 
persons, the others of crimes against property. Out of a 
hundred accused, sixty-one are regularly found guilty. The 
number of criminal homicides Avould seem to admit of the 
greatest variation, as in many cases they are the conse- 
quence of quarrels arising from accidental causes. Yet the 
number of murders in France is nearly the same every year. 
In 1826, it was 241 ; in 1827, it was 234; in 1828, it amoun- 
ted to 227 ; and in 1829, to 231 . The instruments by which 
murders were effected, were, in all these years, nearly in the 
same proportion. About one fifth of these murders were 
committed with the musket, and about one sixth or seventh 
with the knife." 



CHAPTER SEVENTH. 



LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE SCIENCES 
RELATING TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 



§. 108. Of the object of sciences relating to human conduct. 

Perhaps enough has already been said on this branch of 
our subject. And we should certainly not be disposed to 
run the hazard of entirely wearying the reader, were it not, 
that no problem in respect to the human mind has been more 
perplexed with difficulties than the one under consideration; 
and there are but few and perhaps none, which directly or 
indirectly involve more important consequences. In the 
hope therefore of being still patiently borne with, we invite 
the reader's attention to another view of this great subject, 
which opens a wide field of illustration ; far too wide un 
doubtedly to be fully explored in the brief remarks, which 
we feel at liberty to make. All sciences, which relate to 
the conduct of men, (either what it is at present, what it has 
been, what it will be in future, or what it ought to be,) will 
be found on examination to involve, in a greater or less de- 
gree, and to proceed upon the great fundamental truth, 

that the voluntary power in man is regulated by some fixed 
23 



178 LAWS &c. IMPLIED IN SCIENCES 

principles. Of the class of sciences, which are now referred 
to, may be mentioned that of History, of Politics, of War, 
of Commerce, of Moral Philosophy, of Oratory, Municipal 
Law, the Law of Nations, Crimes and Punishments in- 
cluding Prison Discipline, Political Economy, Education, 
Christian Ethics, &c. All these sciences relate, not exclu- 
sively but in some degree more or less, to human conduct. 
They tell us, what men have done under certain circumstan- 
ces in times past, Avhat they are expected to do in time to 
come, and what it is their duty to do. But certainly noth- 
ing could be. imagined more unmeaning and nugatory than 
the various principles they lay down, relative to the acts of 
men both past and prospective, if those acts are contingent 
to the extent, (which they must be if they are contingent at 
all,) of being placed beyond the reach of probable calcula- 
tions. 

§. 109. Illustration of the subject jrom Political Philosophy. 

But as this topic may not be fully apprehended by means 
of abstract statements alone, we will now proceed to give 
facts and instances, which will indicate more clearly what 
we mean ; premising however, that we do' not intend, 
(nor is it at all necessary,) to extend these illustrations to 
every possible department of science where human action is 
involved. Our object is merely to make what has been 
said clear to be understood, and to place it beyond doubt. 
The statement, which has been made, is true, in the first 
place, of Political Philosophy. A single maxim in politics 
•will show that it is so. — It is a settled principle in that de- 
partment of science, so far as we have been able to notice, 
that there ought to be a separation, to a great extent at least, 
of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of 
government. And if we ask for the reason or the occasion 



RELATING TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 179 

of this principle, we find the writers on Politics essentially- 
agreeing in the answer, that the accumulation of these dif- 
ferent offices in the same person is found to be universally 
followed by a course of conduct, (it is perhaps not necessa- 
ry to our argument to specify what that course of conduct 
is,) injurious to the interests of the country. Now this 
statement obviously implies, that men, when they are placed 
in given situations, will exhibit almost without exception a 
given course of conduct, and that from a knowledge of their 
situation we can infer with a great degree of certainty what 
that course will be ; a state of things which is utterly un- 
true and inconceivable, except on the ground, that the ac- 
tions of men are regulated on some uniform and permanent 
principles. 

§. 1 10. Agreement among writers who in other respects differ. 

Political Philosophy has exhibited almost every possible va- 
riety of phasis, and asserted and maintained almost every pos- 
sible variety of sentiment, according as the writers have been 
the subjects of free or despotic states, or have been the advo- 
cates or opposers of a particular course, of policy. The read- 
er will at once call to mind the Republic and other political 
treatises of Plato, the De Republica of Cicero, the Prince of 
Machiavel, the Oceana of Harrington, the Leviathan of 
Hobbes,the Social Contract of Rousseau, the Spirit of Laws 
of Montesquieu, the Discourses of Sydney, the Federalist ; 
not to mention a multitude of other treatises of greater or 
less celebrity. It may be the case, that not one of these va- 
rious treatises fully agrees with another ; and it is very cer- 
tain, that in many things they are very variant and conflict- 
ing ; but still there is in all at the bottom this fundamental 
principle, that human conduct, in its almost endles variety of 
development, may be referred to principles, inherent in the 



180 LAWS &c. IMPLIED IN SCIENCES 

mental constitution and of universal application. In this par- 
ticular, and so far as has now been asserted, writers are in 
harmony, who in other things are infinitely apart ; the sla- 
vish Hohbes with the patriotic Sydnej?, and Machiavel and 
Necker with Montesquieu and Madison. 

It certainly cannot be necessary to bring instances in 
proof of what will not be likely to be controverted. But 
perhaps a single remark of the author of the Oceana may 
not be inappropriate here. The circumstance of that writer's 
being much in his stiuty and much retired from the world 
was attributed by his friends to melancholy or discontent. 
Harrington, however, convinced them of their mistake, and 
showed them how he had employed himself, by exhibiting a 
copy of his 'Oceana ; at the same time making a remark 
highly deserving of attention. "He observed, that ever 
since he began to examine things seriously, he had appli- 
ed himself chiefly to the study of civil government, as of the 
first importance to the peace and happiness of mankind ; 
that he had succeeded, at least to his own satisfaction ; be- 
ing convinced, that no government is of so accidental or arbi- 
trary an institution, as people are wont to imagine, there being in 
societies natural causes producing their necessary effects, as well 
as in the earth or in the air."* 

§. 111. Illustration of the subject from History. 

The statement, which has been made, is illustrated fur- 
ther by the science, (or aft, if one chooses so to call it,) of 
History. It is not only the business of the historian to col- 
lect and arrange facts, but also to trace them to their causes, 
and to explain how they happened. And this latter branch 
of his calling is generally considered to be more interesting 

* Toland's Life of Harrington, §.11, and Burnet's English Prose Wri- 
ters, Vol. Ill, p. 25, Art. Harrington. 



RELATING TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 181 

and important than the other. The human mind, (just as it 
was four thousand years ago aud just as it is now,) lies 
beneath the naked facts of history, and furnishes the only 
key to their satisfactory explanation. It is to history what 
the soul is to the body, quickening and vivifying what must 
otherwise be looked upon as an inert and lifeless mass. The 
historian accordingly, in endeavoring to make such explana- 
tions as his narration seems to demand, always takes it for 
granted, that every thing which takes place has its adequate 
cause ; that there are, in all cases of human action, impulses 
and springs of movement, which always exist, even if they 
are not always discoverable. It is chiefly in the develope- 
ment of these various, and often remote springs of move- 
ment, that he deeply interests the attention of the reader, 
and amply rewards him for his trouble in following his nar- 
ration. 

§. 112-. Illustration of the subject from Political Economy. 

The science of Political Economy also, which may justly 
be included among those departments of knowledge that have 
special relation to human conduct, bases its results as much 
upon the constitution of the human mind, as it does upon 
lands, machinery, rents, manufactures, capital, money, and 
whatever else comes within the range of its inquiries.. The 
constitution of the mind is sq important an element that, if 
it were stricken out from his calculations,it cannot be doubted 
that the truly learned speculations and conclusions of the po- 
litical economist would be wholly without avail. Having 
no foundation in the history of the past, and no application 
in the circumstances of the present, they would, in that case, 
be irretrievably unprofitable and futile. Some more def- 
inite and explicit statements will sustain this general view. 
— It is a general principle in this department of science, that 



182 LAWS &c. IMPLIED IN SCIENCES 

in every country the cultivation of the soil will, under the 
guidance of personal interest and enterprise, be carried to 
the extreme limit of its being profitable. But if we exam- 
ine this principle, we shall find it to be a mere statement, 
drawn from what has taken place in times past, of what 
men will be likely to do in given situations. It is in fact a 
statement relative to the will, or if it be preferred to the act 
of willing or volition in its connection with certain motives 
to action; and the whole value of the principle depends upon 
its being such. 

It is the same with many other principles of political 
economy, some of which are matters of every day's experi- 
ence and verification, such as the following. — The number 
of purchasers of articles of the same kind will depend in 
part upon the value of the articles to be sold as compared 
with each other ; and those articles, which are in the best 
condition and of the greatest comparative value, will com- 
mand, other things being equal, the earliest sale. What is 
this principle but a statement of what men, under the govern- 
ment of the original impulses of their nature, will infallibly 
do in certain circumstances, which are capable of being 
pointed out ? 

It is sometimes the case, that the principles of political 
economy are stated in such an abstract form as entirely to 
exclude even an allusion to any human agency ; and of 
course may sometimes leave the impression, that the alledged 
results take place without the intervention of such agency. 
When, for instance, it is said, that the opening for cultivation 
of large tracts of fertile wild lands will reduce in value soils 
of an inferior grade in the neighborhood of the before uncul- 
tivated tracts, nothing is said or expressly intimated of human 
agency and of the operations of the human mind ; and still 
it is that agency and those operations, which give its whole 



RELATING TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 183 

truth to the principle. So that we may; assert with undoubted 
confidence, that mental philosophy, so far as it relates to 
the principles and tendencies ot human action, is a promin- 
ent basis of Political Economy as well as of Politics ; and in 
particular that department of it, which is emhraced in the 
philosophy of the operations of the Will. In a word, the 
science of political economy every where recognizes the 
great truth, that the voluntary power in man will infallibly 
be hrought to certain results and issues under certain as- 
signable circumstances. 

§ 113. Reference to Municipal law. 

We may apply these views to Municipal law* ; using the 
phrase as a convenient designation in the present case for 
whatever is not included under the phrase International law ; 
in other words for those laws, which are intended to operate 
upon individuals rather than upon masses of men. The 
object of all these laws is either to secure action in individ- 
uals where action would be desirahle; or to prevent it, 
where it would be wrong. Now if we examine laws of this 
description with suitable attention, what do we find to he 
the fact ? We shall of course find them attended with a defi- 
nite penalty, differing in that respect from International 
law ; and we shall also find, that the penalty is adjusted in 
accordance with certain definite views of human character. 
That is to say; pains will be taken to frame the penalty more 
or less in accordance with an almost infallible foresight,which 
the law-makers have, of the effect which it will produce upon 
those to whom it is applicable. In some cases the penalty 
will be small and light ; in other cases it will be severe ; and 
in all it will he adjusted, (and in nine out of ten the result 
will show the wisdom of the arrangement,) in conformity 
with a sort of prophetic knowledge of the course of human 



184 LAWS &c. IMPLIED. IN SCIENCES 

action. In truth, it is the prescience or foresight of what' 
men will do in given situations, which perhaps more than 
any thing else renders one man a more practical and safe 
legislator than another. Certain it is, if there were not a 
course of human action, which is truly the suhject of knowl- 
edge and which can be made a matter 'of highly probable 
calculation, the business of a legislator would be a very 
nugatory one. 

§. 114. Remarks of Beccaria on mildness of punishments. 

As the various laws, which are made for the individuals 
of a community, are necessarily attended with a penalty, it 
of course follows, that the science of legislation involves the 
doctrine of Crimes and Punishments. And we accordingly 
introduce here in conformation of the remarks of the prece- 
ding section, a passage, remarkable for its philosophical sa- 
gacity ; at the same time taking the liberty to ask # what 
propriety, wisdom, or even common sense it would indicate, 
except, on the admission of the principle we are contending 
for. — " Crimes are more effectually prevented by the cer- 
tainly, than the severity of punishment. Hence, in a magis- 
trate, the necessity of vigilance, and in a judge, of implaca- 
bility, which, that it may become a useful virtue, should be 
joined to a mild legislation. The certainty of a small punish- 
ment will make a stronger impression, than the fear of one 
more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping ; for it 
is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of 
the smallest inevitable evil, whilst* hope, the best gift of 
heaven, hath the power of dispelling the apprehension of a 
greater ; especially if supported by examples of impunity, 
which weakness or avarice too frequently afford. 

"If punishments be very severe, men are naturally led to 
the perpetration of other crimes, to avoid the punishment 



RELATING TO HUMAN COIIDUCT. 185 

due to the first. The countries and times most notorious 
for severity of punishments, were always those in which 
the most hloody and inhuman actions, and the most 
atrocious crimes were committed ; for the hand of the 
legislator and the assassin were directed hy the same 
spirit of ferocity ; which, on the throne, dictated laws of 
iron to slaves and savages, and, in private, instigated the 
suhject to sacrifice one tyrant, to make room for another. 

"In proportion as punishments become more cruel, the 
minds of men, as a fluid rises to the same height as that 
which surrounds it, grow hardened and insensible; and the 
force of the passions still continuing, in the space of an hun- 
dred years, the wheel terrifies no more than formerly the pris- 
on. That a punishment may produce the effect required, it 
is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good 
expected from the crime; including in the calculation the 
certainty of the punishment, and the privation of the expec- 
ted advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and 
therefore tyrannical."* 

§. 115. Reference to the science of Education. 

Education too may be denominated a science. And per-* 
haps it would not be top much to say, that in importance it 
will rank with any other purely earthly science whatever ; 
although it must be admitted, it is a department of human 
.knowledge, which, having in all ages of the world failed of 
its due share of attention, has never been wrought into that 
symmetry of parts and fulness of developement, of which it 
is susceptible. Education, considered as a science having 
its appropriate principles and rules, receives and acknowl- 
edges the truth and is to a great extent based upon it, that 
the action of the voluntary power is not independent of law. 
It is true, that so far as education relates to the intellectual 
*Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments, Chap. xxvn.. 

24 



186 LAWS &c. IMPLIED IN SCIENCES 

part or understanding alone, it is possible this remark 
may not hold good. But we are sure, that no one who has 
any correct idea of this noble department of knowledge, would 
consent to see it subjected to such an inglorious limitation. 
If we rightly understand it, it is the object of education 
suitably to train up the affections and the will, as well as the 
intellect. "I imagine, (says Mr. Locke in his valuable 
Thoughts concerning Education,) you would think him a 
yery foolish fellow, that should not value a -virtuous or a 
wise man, infinitely before a great scholar." It is no small 
mistake to regard the soul as a mere storehouse, created for 
the sole purpose of taking in accumulated masses of learning. ' 
It is also a principle of feeling and activity; and we hazard 
little in saying, that man is even more interesting as a sen- 
tient and active being, as formed for emotion and conduct, 
than as a mere percipient. So far, therefore, as education 
relates to the government of the feelings, to correct and enno- 
bling sentiments of virtue, to propriety of manners, to the 
extirpation of bad habits and the formation of different ones, 
to all those numberless matters that involve the regulation 
either of feeling or action, we may confidently assert, that it 
proceeds upon the position which has been maintained, viz, 
that the action of the voluntary power is not independent of 
law. 

In these remarks we have had particular reference to the 
prospective bearing of education, its influence in forming 
the future character, without including in them those pre- 
cepts of education, numerous and important as they are, 
which relate to the immediate government of persons, who 
in youth are actually the subjects of a process of instruction. 
Youth are to be governed now, in order to be enabled to 
receive that instruction, which is necessary to aid them in 
the government of themselves hereafter. What has been 
said will apply peculiarly and emphatically to all precepts 



RELATING TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 187 

and rules of education, having that object in view. All 
such precepts are designed to restrict, impel, or otherwise 
regulate the action of the pupils; and so far as they are de- 
signed to regulate the action, they are of course designed 
to regulate the will; an object, which necessarily implies 
that the will is truly, in some way or other, suscepti- 
ble of being approached by an influence extraneous to 
itself. 

§. 116. Illustration of the subject from Oratory. 

The science or art of Oratory involves, as a fundamental 
principle, the truth under consideration. By universal con- 
sent, it is emphatically and appropriately the business of the 
orator to move masses of men. But large bodies or masses 
of men are never moved in a consentaneous course of action, 
except by means of a consentaneous volition. The produc- 
tion of such consent or unanimity, or even an approach to 
unanimity, in those daily and numberless cases, where it is 
necessary, is obviously impossible, except on the supposi- 
tion of the will's being subject to law. There must be some 
point of approach to the voluntary power ; some known and 
definite lines of communication ; some means, by which the 
wills of men, however diverse and conflicting, may be in- 
duced to operate in the same manner. Without, such meth- 
ods of producing unanimity, (which of course implies that 
the will has its laws,) it would be altogether in vain for 
one man to address another with the purpose of directing 
his action ; and all legislative and other assemblies, which 
propose to bring about action, as well as a conviction of the 
•understanding, would be useless. 

But these results, which would evidently follow from the 
exemption of the will from all law, are utterly at variance 
with what we constantly observe. Powers, consonant to 



1S8 LAWS &c. IMPLIED IN SCIENCES 

and operating in accordance with the nature of the mind, are 
made by the orator to bear upon the will, that great main- 
spring of human conduct ; and we constantly see masses of 
men, of every assignable dimension and under every assign- 
able circumstance, moving forward with harmonious action, 
and with harmonious issues. It is impossible satisfacto- 
rily to account for this congregated and unanimous move- 
ment of wills on the ground of a mere fortuitous concur- 
rence, a purely accidental concentration on a given object. 
Such an explanation is as unsatisfactory here as it is when 
brought forward in application to the origin and support of 
the material universe. It is not only at variance with the 
common sense of mankind, but violates the very elements 
and first principles of human belief and knowledge. 

§. 117. Laws of the will implied in Christian Ethics. 

Among other departments of science, susceptible of being 
adduced in illustration of the doctrine before us, is, that of 
Christian Ethics. This department of science, (for such 
we have no hesitancy in saying it may justly be term- 
ed,) which has its origin directly from heaven, and has been 
illustrated by the powerful pens of an Augustine, a Fene- 
lon, a Jeremy Taylor, and the author, whoever he may have 
been, of the justly celebrated Imitation of Christ, is undoubt- 
edly more important than any other, or all others put togeth- 
er. It inculcates the due subordination of the appetites, the 
regulation of the propensities, the developement of the kind- 
ly affections and the suppression of all others, supreme love 
to Jehovah, a love to our fellow-men coincident with that to 
ourselves, gratitude for mercies and entire resignation in* 
suffering, a sanctified understanding, a heart glowing with 
divine love, a will obedient to, and revolving, if we may be 
allowed the expression, in the will of Christ. As it con- 



RELATING TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 189 

templates effects far above those, embraced in the plan of 
any earthly system of mental renovation^ so it furnishes mo- 
tives, proportioned, both in their number and their transcen- 
dent nature, to the effects. It holds up before us, not only 
various supports and consolations connected with the pres- 
ent life, but presents to our view, what no other system of 
morals or religion is able, to do, the Son of God, persecuted 
and ignominously crucified. It also unveils the dark abyss of 
the future, and reveals the universe assembled and the judge 
enthroned ; even Him who was before, crucified, but now, 
risen and exalted, is clothed with majesty and surrounded 
with his mighty angels. But wonderful and transcendent as 
it is, compared with any other moral or religious system,, it 
goes throughout, in all the appeals it makes and all the mo- 
tives it presents, whether they are drawn from the day of 
final retribution, or the unclouded perfections of the God- 
head, or the mingled mercies and terrors of the Cross, it 
goes throughout on the supposition,that the operations of the 
mind of man are not left to a blind chance, but are suscepti- 
ble of being reached, influenced, renovated, and regulated ; 
and, in full consistency with their innate power and liberty, 
of being brought into subjection to the dominion of that Al- 
mighty Being, from whom all created minds have their ori- 
gin. So that we may confidently assert, that this science of 
sciences sets its seal of approbation upon the doctrine that 
the will has its laws; and that its own operations, searching 
and effective as they are and tending to the entire renova- 
tion of the inner man, are conducted in consistency with 
those laws. 

§. 118. Similar views applicable in other sciences. 

In this chapter as in some others we are under the neces- 
sity of leaving much to the reflections of the reader. Let 



190 LAWS See. IMPLIED IN SCIENCES. 

him apply the suggestions, which have been made, to the 
other departments of knowledge, mentioned in the first sec- 
tion of the chapter and even further, for they will apply to 
many of the forms of literature, such as tragedy, romance, 
&c. And he will be fully persuaded that the principle, for 
which we are contending, is a corner stone, which cannot he 
removed without undermining and endangering them all. 
And certainly it would he exceeding presumption to deny, 
that we find here decisive circumstances in proof of its be- 
ing a well-founded one. . 



CHAPTER EIGHTH. 



OTHER PROOFS OF LAWS OF THE WILL. 



§. 1 1 9. The subjection, of the will to law confirmed by 
consciousness. 

We propose in this chapter to bring together a number of 
miscellaneous proofs, which may add something to those, 

which have already been brought forward. Among other 

proofs, which have not hitherto been particularly adverted 
to, we may make the remark here, that the doctrine of the 
will's being subjeet to law is confirmed by our Conscious- 
ness. Certain it is, we all of us have the testimony of our 
inward experience, that there is a relation, whatever may be 
its nature and however difficult of explanation, between vo- 
lition and motives. As a general statement, (for we do not 
here speak of those actions, which in consequence of being 
frequently repeated have become almost mechanical, nor of 
those which are entirely trifling and insignificant,) no man 
is conscious of a volition, who is not also conscious of a 
knowledge of some antecedent, which constitutes the occa- 
sion, motive, or-cause of the subsequent volition. And if so, 



192 OTHER PROOFS OF, 

then the testimony of consciousness may properly be addu- 
ced in support of the general position, which we are endeav- 
ouring to maintain. 

§. 120. Confirmed by the fact of the wilVs not being a subject 
but an attribute. 

That the will has laws seems to be further indicated by 
the fact, that this faculty is not a distinct entity by itself, 
but rather an appurtenance of something else ; in other 
words, it is not the subject, which might more reasonably put 
forth claims of independence, but sustains the subordinate 
relation of an attribute. As the will is evidently only one of 
the many attributes of that distinct and organized existence, 
which we denominate the soul or mind, it is necessarily sub- 
jected to all the conditions implied in that relation. If the 
will, in its ordinary conditions', is not only free, (a truth 
which is readily conceded,) but is capable also of a perfectly 
contingent action; if it be not only independent of compul- 
sion but independent also of all regulative oversight and 
control ; if no principles whatever pervade its varieties of 
action and secure to them something like symmetry and or- 
der; then, so far as we have an understanding in the matter, 
it is obviously not merely an attribute or part of that whole, 
which we variously denominate the mind or soul, but must 
be regarded as a distinct existence by itself . But if it be 
otherwise and the will is truly an attribute, as it undoubted- 
ly is, then. like every other attribute it is necessarily subor- 
dinate to the fundamental conditions of that existence or en- 
tity, to which it belongs ; and from the nature of the case 
cannot sustain the claims, which have been set up for it, to 
a wholly irresponsible and independent action. 



LAWS OF THE WILL. 193 

§. 121. The same confirmed by the nature of volition. 

We may further argue the matter under consideration by 
a reference to the nature of volition. If we rightly under- 
stand the subject, the very idea of volition implies some an- 
tecedent object. It is perfectly obvious in any given case, 
that there can be no determining upon it, without something 
which is determined ; no resolving without something re- 
solved on ; but as these are only other names for willing or. 
volition, it is equally obvious, that there can be no volition, 
without an object towards which the act of the will is direc- 
ted. It is the same here, as it is with the memory, desire, 
association, and the like. . There can be no act of the mem- 
ory without something, which is remembered ; no act of the 
desire without something which is desired ; no act of asso- 
ciation, without some subject or object, to which the princi- 
ple of association attaches itself. But if by universal admis- 
sion it would be altogether absurd to speak of memory, de- 
sire, and association, without some object towards which 
they are directed or upon which they can operate, it would 
seem clearly to follow that volition without an object is no 
less an absurdity. It is something impossible ; something 
not admitted by the nature of the mind itself. 

But if volition has in. all cases an object, -it cannot well 
be denied, that its action is in all cases subjected to some 
law. This object, without which volition cannot exist, is of 
course a condition of its existence. And it is evident, that 
every thing, which is a condition of action, is in some sense, 
(and we may add in a true and very important sense,) a law 
to that being or power, which puts forth such action. The 
will, therefore, is in its very nature subject to law, 
25 



194 OTHER PROOFS OF 

§. 122^ The analogy oj the other parts of the mind furnishes a 
presumption that the will is subject to law. 

We are also furnished with an argument on this subject 
from the analogy, which is discoverable in the interiour of 
the mind itself. If we examine carefully, we shall not fail 
to see, that every prominent power is within the reach and 
the control of law. All men, for instance, possess the sus- 
ceptibility or power of believing ; hut it is obviously and un- 
deniably true, that men exercise belief in its various degrees 
and acquire knowledge in all cases whatever, under the 
promptings and guidance of some law. In other words they 
are so constituted, that the senses, consciousness, testimony, 
memory, and reasoning, in their various applications and 
modifications, necessarily occasion belief ; and on the con- 
trary, in the absence of these grounds of belief, the exercise 
of the susceptibility wholly fails, and the belief cannot, exist. 
The belief is the effect; the grounds of belief are the cause; 
and they are adapted to each other with as much precision 
and as much infallibility, if there are no disturbing and 
counteracting influences, as other instances of invariable an- 
tecedence and sequence. The belief, therefore, is properly 
said to be subject to law, since there are permanent condi- 
tions essential and indispensable to its exercise. 

But if we proceed from the power of belief to the power' 
of association, we shall find this last named principle also 
subjected to law. Although it is constantly at work, and 
every hour illustrates the multiplicity and the wonderful 
variety of its operations, every act is still referable to the 
influence of some general principle. — Without stopping to 
remark upon sensation, perception, and memory, in respect 
to all which the same statement will hold good, we may fur- 
ther add, that the reasoning power also has its laws, 



LAWS OF THE WILL. 195 

Writers agree in laying down what is prerequisite to the 
exercise of the reasoning power ; the methods in which 
it proceeds ; the limits which restrict it, and the "general 
conditions, which are the hasis of its success. The, kindred, 
though still higher pow.er of the imagination, which creates 
new worlds, and peoples them with new existences, and em- 
bellishes them with new forms of thought and feeling and 
situation, moves only in the precise manner, and within the 
precise limits which are prescribed by, the constitution of 
the human mind. 

And similar views hold good of the powers of the mind gen- 
erally. A careful observation of their modes of action will 
always lead to the same result. Not one of them acts at ran- 
dom ; not one of them is above, or beneath, or beyond the res- 
trictions and the guidance of fixed principles. And what then, 
in view of these facts, and reasoning by analogy from them, 
would be the natural conclusion in respect to the will? It 
would certainly appear strange and inexplicable, if the other 
powers of the mind have their fixed and appropriate princi- 
ples, to find the will alone destitute of them. 

§. 123. Proof from the jacts developed in history. 

Another important circumstance, which we have not hith- 
erto found a suitable opportunity to advert to, is the united 
testimony of all history in respect to the character and con- 
duct of mankind. If we carefully consult its pages, we 
shall find that history every where discloses and confirms 
the great truth of an uniformity or sameness of actions, in 
all cases where there is a sameness of circumstances. The 
lineaments of human nature as seen in one age correspond 
to the lineaments of the same nature as seen in another age, 
as unerringly as the face of man corresponds to its likeness 
in a mirror. The men of ancient Egypt and Judea, of an- 



li 



i 



196 OTHER PROOFS OF 

cient Attica and Italy were the same, in all the essential and 
leading elements of their character, with those who have at 
any time since inhahited those countries. The inhabitants 
of all countries and of all climes, in all periods of the world 
and in all the diversities 'of their situation, have been sus- 
ceptible alike of being influenced and controlled in their ac- 
tions by the various incitements of joy and sorrow, of rev- 
erence and contempt, of avarice and ambition, of fear and 
hope, of generosity and honour, of friendship and hatred. 
What has been true at one time has ever been essentially 
true at another. — " Would you know the sentiments, incli- 
nations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans ? 
Study well the temper and actions of the French and Eng- 
lish. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the 
former most of the observations, which you have made with 
regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all 
times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or 
strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover 
the constant and universal principles of human nature, by 
shewing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, 
and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form 
our observations, and become acquainted with the regular 
springs of human action and behaviour. These records of 
wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collec- 
tions of experiments, by which the politician or moral phi- 
losopher fixes the principles of his science ; in the same 
manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes .ac- 
quainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other ex- 
ternal objects, by the experiments which he forms concer- 
ning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, 
examined by Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like to those 
which at present lie under our observation, than the men, 
described by Polybitjs and Tacitus, are to those who now 
govern the world."* 

♦Hume's Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding, Essay ^th. 



LAWS OF THE WILL. 197 

§. 124. Proof from instances of predominant passion. 

Again, there is "a distinct source of illustration and proof, 
to be found in all instances of predominant passion. He, who 
has made human nature a study either in the past annals of 
the human race or within the range of his own personal ob- 
servation, must have frequently noticed individuals, in whom 
the passions have became so strong as to encroach upon the 
domain of the voluntary power, and to bring it into subjec- 
tion. No matter what the passion is, (whether attachment 
*to one's intimate friends, or attachment to one's country and 
the place of his birth, or the*Iove of pleasure, or the desire of 
acquiring property, or jealousy, or party zeal, or hatred, or 
ambition,) instances are every where found in society of the 
existence of .the particular passion, whatever it may be, in 
such overwhelming strength as to make the man a slave to 
it. We would here willingly bring forward instances, and the 
show more distinctly what we mean, were it not that they 
will find a more appropriate place in .another Chapter in a 
subsequent part of the work, where we shall endeavour to 
explain what we understand by enthralment or slavery of the 
will. But we may probably assume here, without "hes- 
itation, as a fact well known and,readily admitted, that such 
instances exist; that men, submitting to the influence of a 
predominant passion, lose in a great degree that voluntary 
power, which characterises and ennobles human nature. It 
is often the case that no lapse of time, no completeness of 
seclusion, no advice and consolation of friends can weaken 
the strength of this inordinate influence, and restore the parts 
of the mind to their, true and appropriate position. But it 
certainly seems obvious and undeniable, that, if the will is 
thus sometimes made captive to the passions, there must be a 
real and operative connection between the will and the pas- 



193 OTHER PROOFS OF 

sions, and that the will must be, in some effective sense, sub- 
ject to laws. 

§. 125. The subjection of the will to law evinced by cases 
of casual association. 

There is another and distinct view of the mind, though 
intimately related to that presented in the preceding section, 
which authorises and confirms the same conclusion in respect 
to the will. We refer to instances, which sometimes occur, 
and perhaps we may say not unfrecuiently, of strong and 
fixed casual association. Such cases decisively prove, that 
the will is not beyond control, which it would be, if it were 
altogether beyond the reach and influences of law. If the 
will were by its nature necessarily aud entirely indepen- 
dent, no* instances of casual association, however strong or 
however long-continued, could reach and destroy, or even 
perplex the action of the voluntary power. But a consider- 
able number of well-attested facts indicate directly the re- 
verse. 

§. 126. Instances illustrative of the preceding section. 

It would not be difficult to point out instances of individ- 
uals, otherwise not wanting in the full proportion and exer- 
cise of mental power, in whom the power of volition has 
been completely prostrated in respect to certain objects and 
occasions. ' In the history of the French Revolution we find 
mention made of a general, who in the sanguinary wars of 
La Veudee greatly distinguished himself by the attributes 
of skill, firmness, decision, aud bravery. He was perfect- 
ly calm and self-possessed, when contending in close and 
fatal opposition with hosts of armed men, bristling with the 
implements of death. But in consequence of a casual asso- 
ciation, the foundation of which he himself perhaps could 



LAWS OF THE WILL. 199 

not perfectly recollect, the distinguished commander to whom 
we refer could never look upon a squirrel, an animal suffi- 
ciently harmless and playful, without turning pale, and with- 
out a sensation of fear and shuddering.* — It will not he pre- 
tended, that Peter the Great of Russia was wanting in men- 
tal vigour on ordinary occasions: His whole history con- 
tradicts any such presumption. But it is related of him un- 
douhtedly with truth, that he was utterly unahle to b^ftr the 
sight of a certain black insect of the scarabeus or beetle kind, 
which is often found in houses that are not kept /dean. Thd 
sight of one would at once subdue his firmness and entirely 
overcome him, so much so as to drive him out of the apart- 
ment or even the house. j - — It is related of a distinguished 
Governor of one of the American States, that .when a boy 
he fell asleep under a tree, and was awakened by a serpent' 
crawling over him. He arose in great terror, ran towards 
the house, and fell down. in a convulsive fit. Afterwards 
through life be retained such an aversion for every thing of 
the serpent kind, that he could not see one, or even the pic- 
ture of one, without falling into convulsions.' There 

are other instances of a similar kind. Mr. Locke relates, 
(Essay, Book 11, Chapter 32,) the case of an individual, who 
was once perfectly cured of madness by a ve'ry harsh and 
offensive operation. During all his life after, he acknowl- 
edged with the most sincere gratitude, that he could- not have 
received a greater benefit ; and still he was utterly unable 
to bear the sight of the operator, it suggested so strongly 
the dreadful suffering which he underwent. 

In all cases' of this kind it is obvious, that individuals have 
in a great degree lost their voluntary power, in respect to 
particular occasions and objects. How it should thus have 

* See the interesting Memoirs of De La Rochejaquelin, 
t Staehlin's Original Anecdotes of Peter the Great. 



200 OTHER PROOFS OF 

happened it is not necessary for us to explain at the present 
time. The simple fact, that the will is susceptible of being 
placed in this peculiar situation, is enough for our present 
purpose ; since it does not at all appear how this could he 
the case, if the will were entirely independent, and could in 
no case whatever be subject to laws. For instance if we as- 
cribe the result in question to association, which is common- 
ly dofle, we must take into consideration, that association is 
a thing entirely distinct from the voluntary power ; that 
they are altogether separate from each other ; and that asso- 
ciation cannot possibly operate upon the will, except by 
means of some general principles or laws connecting them 
together. 

§. 127. Remarks in conclusion of the argument. 

We here close our review of those facts and circumstan- 
ces, which seem to us, whatever degree of weight they may 
have upon the minds of others-, decisively to indicate and to 
prove, that the will has its laws. It can hardly be necessary 
to add, after what has been said at various times, that, in pre- 
dicating laws of the willj we do not mean to assert, that the 
will has laws, in the same sense in which a piece of wood or 
a tree or a pendulum* or a clock or a watch or any other 
purely material object has laws. When we assert that the 
will is subject to law, the terms of the proposition must of 
course be modified by the nature of the subject, and be ex- 
plained in conformity with that nature. But numberless 
, propositions, having a relation to mind, are as well under- 
stood, as propositions relating to matter. If we can predi- 
cate law of spiritual existence, or spiritual attributes, or spir- 
itual action in any case whatever, we can do it equally well 
of the will of man. The proposition, therefore, has a distinct 
and substantive meaning. And as having such, it admits o 



LAWS OF THE WILL. 201 

the application of inquiry and argument, and is susceptible of 
being either affirmed or denied; and we leave it to the rea- 
der to determine whether the facts and circumstances, which 
have been brought up in reference to it, admit of any possi- 
ble explanation, except on the ground of its undoubted truth . 

And if its truth be satisfactorily established, then let it 
have its full practical effect. Let us remember, that in this 
simple .proposition we find the golden link, which binds us 
to the throne of God. If my will is not subject to law, 
then God is not my master. And what is more, he is not 
only not so in fact, but it is impossible that he should be so. 

But on the other hand, if my will is not independent, in 
the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand 
of the Almighty is upon me, and I cannot escape even if I 
would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things 
ever attends my path; and whether I love or hate, obey or 
rebel, I can never annul his authority, or evade his juris- 
diction. 



CHAPTER NINTH. 



NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 



§. 128, Connection of this subject with the consideration of 
motives. 

In what lias been said hitherto in this Part of our Work, 
our efforts have been directed to the single matter of endea- 
voring to show, that the will is subject to laivs. We are 
aware that we have given little more than the outlines of an 
argument, and that in its details it might have been prosecu- 
ted at much greater length; and yet we are utterly unable 
to renounce the conviction, that it conclusively establishes 
this important position,even in the imperfect form in which it 
has been presented. Certainly if we did not think so, we should 
not consider it worth while to attempt to advance any fur- 
ther in our investigations; for if we did not feel confident, 
that our own will is subject to laws, we could not for a mo- 
ment indulge the expectation of the accomplishment of any 
proposed purpose or plan whatever. 

But we are aware that something more may be expected. 
We may be required to indicate what these laws are, to 



NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 203 

point them out, to show how they operate. Without profes- 
sing to hold ourselves amenable to this requisition in its full 
extent, we nevertheless propose in this Chapter to indicate, 
in part at least, the conditions, to ^which the action of the 
will conforms itself. And as these conditions, so far as they 
are known and cognizable by us, appear to be found, if not 
exclusively, yet in a marked degree, in what are termed 
Motives, we shall accordingly proceed to remark briefly on 
this subject., 

§. 129 Of the division of motives into Internal and External. 

It is necessary, in order to have a thorough knowledge 
of Motives, to contemplate them in Various, points of view. 
Considered, in the first place, in reference to their origin, 
they are susceptible of being divided into the two classes 

of Internal and External. By the internal we mean 

motives, as they exist in the mind itself, the various forms of 
the appetites, those higher sentient principles,which may be 
denominated -the propensities, and the various kinds and de- 
grees of the affections, together with all motives within us 
of a moral nature. It is certain, that, in some important 
sense of the expressions, all motives, at least before they can 
reach and effect the will, must exist in the mind, although 
there are grounds for speaking of their antecedent and sep- 
arate existence in outward objects. (2) By external 

motives we mean all those, which are placed external to the 
mind, and are located, if the expression may be allowed, in 
outward things. All external objects, which excite within 
us either approbation or disgust, joy or sorrow; all such out- 
ward objects as are supposed to have a connection either 
with our worldly prosperity or our duty, operate upon us as 
motives. It is true they influence us through the medium of 
our mental nature, the emotions, passions, and moral pow- 
ers ; but as the influence exercised may be traced to them 



204 NATURE AND 

as the ultimate subjects, there is a degree of propriety in de- 
signating them as motives. Outward motives, in the sense 
of the term as just explained, are innumerable, presenting 
themselves to our notice on all sides, in all the various as- 
pects of creation, and in all the endless forms of human en- 
terprise. 

§. 130. External motives derive their efficacy from the mind. 

Although all objects without us, and all external actions 
may, under different circumstances, and in different degrees, 
exist as motives, still it is impossible for us to regard such 
external objects or actions as having a value to ourselves or 
a character of any kind, except it be in reference to those 
feelings which the contemplation of them excites in our own 
minds. Abstracted from the internal feelings, of which they 
are the antecedents arid cause, they are all equally indifferent. 
It is our own emotions and desires, therefore, reflected back 
upon all external objects and actions of whatever kind, which 
infuse into them their qualities of beauty or deformity, of un- 
worthiness or excellence, and give them their power, what- 
ever it may be, in relation to the will. 

• It would not be a difficult task, it is presumed, to adduce 
instances, illustrating and confirming these views. As an 
example, a war is announced in Europe, and the merchant 
winds up his accounts, and detains his vessels at home. The 
war' is his motive for so doing. Subsequently there is a 
false report of war in Europe, which he believes to be true, 
and he pursues the sarne course as before. In both these 
cases the internal belief, 'combined with his fears, gives to 
the motive, as the war would be considered, its whole effect. 
In the latter case it constitutes it entirely, as the reported 
war is only a fiction. 

Again, riches, whether in the form of lands or of gold 
and silver, or in any other form, constitute a powerful motive. 



KINDS OF- MOTIVES. 205 

But it is in vain to presume, that the common dust on which 
we tread, or even the brightest masses of ore it contains, in- 
herit and possess in themselves a power to keep men con- 
stantly in action, to carry them from land to land, and from 
sea to sea. It is the mind itself, which invests them with at- 
tributes, that render them so effective. Men see in them the 
means of the enjoyments they covet ; the means of influence 
among their fellows ; the source of honour and power. So that 
if riches are one of the most efficient motives that can be pre- 
sented to the human will, it is the heart,the soul, which makes 
them so. Since you have only to- place the man, who desir- 
ed them so much, on his death bed; you have only to show 
him that his gilded heaps can no longer purchase honour, in- 
fluence, enjoyment, not even an hour of life, not even ex- 
emption from a single pain, and then riches are no longer a 
motive; he turns from them with disgust; he regards them 
as" little as the chaff, which the wind scatters away. 

§. 131 The character of motives depends in part on the consti- 
tutional traits of the individual. 

Although all objects, which are presented to the mind in 
the shape and relation of External motives, undergo a modi- 
fication in their progress towards the region of the Will, it 
may not be unimportant to remark, that this modification 
will be very various in different individuals according to 
their predominant mental traits. We will suppose as an ex- 
ample, that the same object is presented to the notice of 
two individuals; the one possessed of dull and restricted, the 
other of quick' and comprehensive powers of reasoning. The 
'object may appear diminutive and unimportant to the former, 
and probably ivill appear so, because his powers of reasoning 
are not expansive enough to embrace it in all its relations 
and consequences; while the same object will appear, for an 



206 NATURE AND 

opposite reason, exceedingly magnified and important to the 
latter. 

And again, select two other persons, whose reasoning 
powers closely resemble each other, and are in fact entirely 
the same, hut whose sensibilities are constitutionally differ- 
ent; the one, a person intensely susceptible of vivid and 
strong emotions and desires; the other, on the contrary, pos- 
sessed of a sluggish and phlegmatic temperament. Now we 
will suppose that the exciting object or motive, whatever it 
is, comes from the reasoning or intellectual part of their con- 
stitution to the sentient or emotive part with the same di- 
mensions ; in other words as it exists in the understanding, 
and as it passes from the understanding to the heart, it ap- 
pears to both of these persons precisely alike; but in the 
former case, that of the man of vivid sensibilites, it at once 
becomes heated and expanded as if placed in the focus of .a 
powerful lens; while in the latter, it remains cold and with- 
ered and torpid as if under the blighting influences of a win- 
try frost. 

§, 132. Their character depends in part on temporary influences. 

And this is not all. Every one knows that we are sub- 
ject to temporary influences, sometimes not easily explicable. 
At one time we are animated by encouraging aspirations 
and joyous hopes, •and every thing is clothed in brightness ; 
and shortly after we are sad and depressed, and all objects 
appear to be invested with gloom. The motives, which call 
upon us to resolve and to act, appear very variously under 
such circumstances. In the season of our joyousness, the 
light of our minds attaches itself to the various outward ob- 
jects, that are presented before them, and they shine like illu- 
minated points, like guiding stars. In the season of our 
despondency and sorrow, they fall from the zenith with 



KINDS OF MOTIVES, 207 

dimmed or extinguished beams ; and we no longer heed 
them. 

And all these various circumstances, and the changes, 
which are consequent upon them, ought to be taken into con- 
sideration. Motives, as they exist outwardly and inde- 
pendently of the understanding, are as different from what 
they are subsequently, when they have passed under the no- 
tice and review Of the intellect, as the rich and diversified 
colors, when they are refracted and separated by the prism, 
are from the pale and uniform light, in which they were pre- 
viously patent. There is even a greater difference than is 
implied in this comparison; for they are not only, at their 
first appearance in the mind, subject to be altered by the in- 
tellect, as to their extent and relations ; but in their further 
progress they seem to be penetrated and inspired with an 
actual vitality, a principle of life derived from the actual in- 
fusion and mingling of the sensibilities. So that, if we may 
be permitted another illustration from material objects, mo- 
tives in their modification are as different from what they 
are in their primitive, outward, or objective state, as the col- 
ours of a skilful painter, when they are laid on the canvass 
in form and proportion, and are made instinct with life and 
intelligence, are from the same colours, when standing crude 
and massive in his paint vessels. — Such is the transformation, 
to which outward or External motives, as they are denomina- 
ted, are subject in their progress through the mind; but the 
amount and degree of this transformation will not only de- 
pend upon the general structure of the mind; but will be 
found to vary in different persons, and under different situa- 
tions. 

§. 133. Further division of motives into Personal and Moral. 
■ Motives may not only be divided into the two classes of 



208 NATURE AND 

External and Internal, but are susceptible of the yet further 
division into the classes of personal and moral, which is, in 
some respects, the more important arrangement of the two. — 
(1) By the phrase personal motives, we mean not only those 
which are of a prudential nature, and which relate to a man's 
own interests, as those interests are seen and estimated in 
a cautious foresight ; but we use it as including also vari- 
ous other motives, which are founded in the nature and cons- 
titution of the mind itself, such as the appetites, propensi- 
ties, and affections. These last are a part of ourselves in the 
strict sense of the terms. They are tendencies, which are not 
only a part of our nature, but which are evidently essential 
to our preservation, as beings existing in a state of want and 
dependence ourselves, and as closely connected in various 
ways with our fellow-men. And this being the case, there 
is certainly a propriety in applying the epithet personal to 
indicate all the motives, arising from these various sources. 

(2) By moral motives we understand those, which are 
connected with the intimations of conscience and wi'th feel- 
ings of obligation, or which are in any way based in our 
moral nature. In the occasions of their 1 origin, they do not 
appear to be so fixed and definite as those, which are pre- 
sented by the appetites, propensities, and affections, or by 
any other modifications of desire ; but are found to arise 
under a multitude of circumstances, of which it is impossi- 
ble to give any antecedent description. 

Personal motives operate within a limited sphere appro- 
priate to themselves, and in general easily ascertainable. 
Moral motives, on the contrary, acknowledge no limits, short 
of the universe, eternity, and the boundless range of duties 
from the finite to the infinite. Personal motives go no far- 
ther than to include whatever relates, either in its origin or 
its results, to ourselves, together with what relates to others, 



KINDS OF MOTIVES. 209 

• 
considered as the mere objects of our natural sympathy, affec- 
tion, or aversion. Moral motives extend themselves to all 
cases and occasions of action whatever, whether relating to 
ourselves or others, to the present or the future, to time or 
eternity ; in a word, to every variety aud possibility of 
human action, so far as the action is a voluntary one. Per- 
sonal motives, so far as they are natural or constitutional, 
which is the case with all the natural appetites, propensities, 
and affections, operate of themselves and originally, in a man- 
ner somewhat similar to the operation of the instincts. 
Moral motives, on the contrary, removed at the farthest pos- 
sible distance from any thing of an instinctive nature, are 
not capable of any operation or of any existence,indepenclent- 
ly of the reasoning power; but always exist and act in con- 
nection with that power. Personal motives, so far as they 
are not properly constitutional or instinctive, but are based 
upon the deductions of reasoning, always prompt us to act 
for certain things, simply and exclusively because those 
things appear desirable, either for ourselves or others. Mor- 
al motives, on the other hand, always prompt us to act for 
certain things, simply because they are right, whatever per- 
sonal bearing they may have either on ourselves or others. 
Personal motives, whether they are selfish or benevolent, 
whether they prompt us to act for the good of others or our 
own good, are obviously amenable to the higher authority 
and control of moral motives. The latter in their operation 
are in some sense analogous to the faith of the Christian in 
the promises of God; since they require men, with an au- 
thoritative voice, to go forward in the fulfilment of certain 
proposed actions, whatever distresses and darkness may be- 
set their path. Men, when called upon to act in view of mo- 
tives of this kind, are not permitted to enquire, whether it 

would be pleasing to their natural desires and affections, 

27 



210 NATURE AND 

I 
whether their love or hatred is concerned, whether the pro- 
posed course of conduct involves their henefit or their inju- 
ry; hut are presented with the simple and only alternative 
of acquiescence or resistance, of ohedience or disobedience, 
without regard to the consequences in any shape whatever. 

§. 134. On the use of the phrase personal motives. 

It may he proper to say something in vindication of the 
epithet, which we propose to apply to the class of motives, 
which are arranged as distinct from those of a moral kind. 
There are undouhtedly other terms, which will readily sug- 
gest themselves as more or less appropriate to he employed 
in the place of the one adopted, such as natural, prudential, 
psychological, selfish, self-interested, &c. But all of them, on 
careful examination, will he found to he attended with some 
ohjections. If, for instance, (for it is prohahly unnecessary 
to institute a distinct examination in respect to each of the 
terms just mentioned,) we propose to apply the epithet 
selfish to all motives, which are not of a moral kind, we must 
necessarily include many desires and affections, which, un- 
der certain circumstances at least, are not of that character. 
The epithet personal does not appear to he exposed to the 
same objection, and is therefore entitled to the preference. 
It undouhtedly in its applications implies, that the thing spo- 
ken of pertains to ourselves in some sense or other ; hut it 
does not necessarily imply what we express by the term 
selfishness, although on the other hand it does not exclude 
that idea. The term, it will he readily perceived, is a very 
general one, including the preparative influence or promp- 
tings of the appetites, desires, and affections in their various 
modifications, whether they are put forth within their due 
and innocent limits, or exist in that inordinate degree which 
indicates selfishness ; and accordingly seems to embrace ev- 



KINDS OF MOTIVES. 211 

ery possible motive, with the exception of those originating 
in our moral nature. And hence it appeared to be a very- 
proper term to be used, in order to express the distinction 
before us. • 

But it is not necessary to dwell upon this topic further 
than to add, that respectable authorities are not wanting in 
support of this application of the epithet in question. — "Rea- 
sonable men,(says Sir James Mackintosh, )apply arguments to 
the understanding, and blame, together with all other mo- 
tives, whether moral or personal, to the will alone."* 

§.. 135. The appetites, propensities, and affections not in them- 
■ 

selves of a moral nature. 

The classification of motives into Personal and Moral, 
which has been made, seems clearly to indicate, that the va- 
rious modifications of desire, which are included under the 
distinct heads of Appetites, Propensities, Affections, &c, and 
which go to constitute a large portion of personal in dis- 
tinction from what are denominated moral motives, have not 
of themselves a moral character. And this is true. — 'There 
can be no doubt, in the first place, in respect to the appe- 
tites. The truth in respect to all the appetites may be il- 
lustrated by a slight attention to those of hunger and thirst. 
These appetites are neither selfish nor benevolent; neither 
morally good nor evil, in themselves considered, and in their 
original and appropriate operation. Their object, in their 
original and uncorrupted state, is not pleasure, but food and 
drink. It cannot be doubted, that they are absolutely ne- 
cessary for our bodily support, and that without them we 
could not exist. They are implanted, therefore, although 

♦Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Sect. VI. Art. Hume. — See also a simi- 
lar application and use of the epithet personal in Dr.Abercrombie's Philosophy 
of the Moral Feelings, Part II. 



212 NATURE AND 

like all the other principles of our nature liable to perversion, 
for a definite purpose, and obviously an indispensable and 
good one. Being adapted to the exigencies of our present 
situation, and evidently good and important in their place, 
they cannot in their original state be vicious ; nor, on the 
other hand, as they are constitutional principles, not only 
operating of themselves but operating necessarily under cer- 
tain given circumstances, are they, by their own nature 
merety, virtuous. Nevertheless when they depart from their 
original object, and by excessive indulgence thrust them- 
selves beyond the sphere, in which Providence designed 
them to act, they may become a source of vice; and on the 
other hand endeavors to restrain them, when their action 
has become irregular and inordinate, may involve virtue. 

A like view will hold good in relation to what may prop- 
erly be .termed, in distinction from the appetites on the one 
hand and the affections on the other, the propensities of our 
nature, such as the principle of curiosity or desire of knowl- 
edge, the desire of esteem, the desire of society, the pro- 
pensity to imitate, &c. The following remarks of Mr. 

Stewart on the propensity of curiosity or desire of kuowledge 
will show clearly and satisfactorily, in what light these ten- 
dencies of our constitution are to be regarded. "Although, 
however, the desire of knowledge is not resolvable into self- 
love, it is not in itself an object of moral approbation. A 
person may indeed employ his intellectual powers with a 
view to his own moral improvement, or to the happiness of 
society, and so far he acts from a laudable principle. But 
to prosecute study merely from the desire of knowledge is 
neither virtuous nor vicious. When not suffered to interfere 
with our duties, it is morally innocent. The virtue or vice 
does not lie in the desire, but in the proper or improper reg- 
ulation of it. The ancient astronomer, who, when accused 



KINDS OP MOTIVES. 213 

of indifference in respect to public transactions, answered 
that his country was in the heavens, acted criminally, inas- 
much as he suffered his desire of knowledge to interfere with 
the duties, which he owed tomankjnd." 

Similar views are expressed by him, not only in regard 
to the other propensities, but also in respect to that higher 
class of sentient or active principles denominated the Affec- 
tions. And they are sustained by such considerations as 
will be likely to recommend them to the favourable recep- 
tion of every ^pe. We take the liberty to refer the reader 
to his statements with the single remark further, that what 
has been said is enough to show, that the classification of 
motives, which has just been made, is founded in nature. 

§. 136. Motives coextensive with volitions. 

In examining the subject of motives, it is one remark ob- 
vious to be made, that volitions never exist independently of 
motives. Whenever there is that act of the mind, which we 
term a volition,there is an antecedent state of the mind,consti- 
tuting the cause, (by which we mean the antecedent condi- 
tion, preparative,or occasion,) of the volition, which we term 
the motive. By the constitution of the mind itself they go 
together, and are inseparably connected. But we will not 
expend time on this point, upon which there will probably 
be found no difference of opinion. Mr. Stewart mentions this 
as one of the principles, on which the conflicting parties on 
the subject of the will are agreed. Some of his remarks are 

as follows, " Every action is performed with some view, 

or, in other words, is performed with some motive. Dr. 
Reid indeed denies this with zeal, but I am doubtful if he 
has strengthened his cause by doing so ; for he confesses, 
that the actions, which are performed without motives, are 
perfectly trifling and insignificant, and not such as lead to 



214 NATURE AND 

any general conclusion concerning the merit or demerit of 
moral agents. I should therefore rather be disposed to 
yield this point than to dispute a proposition not materially 
connected with the question at issue- One thing is clear 
and indisputable, that it is only in so far as a man acts from 
motives or intentions, that he is entitled to the character of a ra- 
tional being."* 

This view, that motives are coexistent with volitions, 
tends to confirm the general doctrine, that the will is subject 
to laws. If the existence of motives in sonj^ form or other, 
either personal or moral, either in the shape of our interest 
or our duty, is the indispensable condition of any action of 
the voluntary power, it certainly cannot be said with any 
degree of correctness, that the action of the will is wholly a 
contingent and unrestrained one. 

§. 137. Nature of the influence of motives. 

In consequence of this fixed connection between the vo- 
lition and the motive, involving the undeniable fact, that the 
volition is in some sense of the term dependent on the ante- 
cedent motive, we find in the use of language certain expres- 
sions and modes of expression, which are deserving of no- 
tice, such as, "motives influence the will," "motives govern 
the will," "volitions are caused by motives," "volitions are 
controlled by motives," &c. What we wish to observe in 
respect to these and other equivalent expressions is, that, 
although in common parlance they may often be convenient, 
they are to be received with some restriction in all inquiries 
into the will, aiming at philosophical accuracy . 

If, for instance, it be asserted, that motives cause voli- 
tions, as it not unfrequently is, we are undoubtedly required 
by all sound inquiry to exclude from the expression the idea 

♦Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Append. I, § 2d. 









KINDS OF MOTIVES. 215 

of direct efficiency. The causation spoken of is not, prop- 
erly speaking, efficient. The word cause in this case, (if we 
wish to announce the fact and the fact only,) can mean 
nothing more than the preparatory condition, circumstance, or 
occasion; a sort of antecedent incident to that, which takes 
place. It is the more important to keep this remark in mind, 
since, without the qualification implied in it, it may be diffi- 
cult to perceive, how man can be regarded as a free and ac- 
countable ag£nt. Accordingly,whenever we speak of motives 
as influencing, controlling, or causing volition, it is to be 
understood, that we mean merely to express the simple and 
unquestioned fact of their being conditions preparatory and 
prerequisite to the will's action. With this import of the 
terms, we obviously in such cases assert that, which is true, 
and which as a truth is important to be known and to be 
realized; and at the same time assert nothing, which is in- 
consistent with moral liberty and accountability. 

§. 138. Of the wiWs being governed by the strongest motive. 

It is sometimes said, that the will is governed by the 
strongest motive, and is necessarily so governed ; or stated 
in another manner perhaps less exceptionable, that the will 
acts in view of the strongest motive, and necessarily so acts. 
Although this proposition, which has the appearance of being 
a self-evident one and perhaps is. so, has sometimes been 
adduced with great confidence in support of the general doc- 
trine, that the will has its laws; it will be perceived, that 
we have not availed ourselves, in the discussion of that sub- 
ject, of the aid more or less, which it may be supposed to 
furnish. We fully believed, that there were arguments 
enough and more than enough without relying upon this 
proposition; saying nothing of the probability, that the pro- 
position itself would be found on examination liable to some 



216 NATURE AND 

strictures and exceptions. The views we entertain in re- 
gard to it are briefly these. 

(1) The epithet strong, and also its comparative forms 
stronger and strongest, imply something relative. They 
unquestionably indicate a comparison with something else, 
which is weak, or which is less strong. The proposition, 
therefore, that the will always and invariably acts in confor- 
mity with the strongest motive, acknowledges the idea, and 
is based upon it, that motives are truly susceptible of a com- 
parison with each other. And this is the fact. (2) Mo- 
tives may be compared together in two ways, and in only 
two ways; viz, either directly by themselves, or indirectly 
by means of their results. Accordingly all motives of the 
same kind, (for instance, all those which have been classed 
together and arranged under the one head of personal mo- 
tives,) are undoubtedly susceptible of a comparison with 
each other; not remotely merely, but directly and immediately. 
The same consciousness, which assures us of the existence 
of the motives themselves, indicates clearly the difference of 
their intensity or strength; and we can say with a degree 
of precision and with a full understanding of what is meant, 
that one motive is deeper or more intense or stronger than 
another, when such motives are the sole, exclusive, and di- 
rect subjects of comparison. -This is a matter of con- 
sciousness. And if all th,e motives, which exist and operate 
■in the human breast, were the same in kind, it would also be 
a matter of consciousness, and as such it would be a prima- 
ry and undeniable truth, that the acts of the will are always 
in conformity with the strongest motive. The proposition 
then would have meaning, and be unanswerable; and to the 
full extent implied in these remarks, such is the case at pres- 
ent. But still it is not an universal one, and it therefore 
seems to us to be defective, when brought as an argument in 
illustration of the absolute and universal nature of the will. 



., KINDS OF MOTIVES. 217 

-(3) Motives, which belong to different classes or kinds, 

(for instance personal and moral motives,) are not the sub- 
jects of direct comparison. They are radically and entirely 
distinct from each other; and there is no more possibility of 
their being brought into direct juxta-position and comparison, 
than there is of other things entirely distinct from each oth- 
er, such as association and belief, memory and perception, 
sympathy and hatred, or a circle and a square, red and white, 
&c. The way, then, and the only way, in which we can 
compare moral motives with personal motives, which are 
entirely distinct from each other in kind, is through the •'.'■■ 
medium of their bearing and results upon the will. If the 
will acts in conformity with the moral motive, we say 
that the moral motive is the strongest; if it acts in conformi- 
ty with the personal motive, we assert the reverse. But if 
the result, (that is to say, the volition,) is the measure of the 
intensity, when motives, differing in kind, are compared to- 
gether, then in all cases of this description, to say that the 
will is governed by the strongest motive is an identical prop- 
osition, and imports the same as to say, that the will is gov- 
ed by the motive by which it is governed! 

If we reflect carefully upon the foregoing statement, we 
shall undoubtedly find it to be so. When one motive is de- . 
signated as the strongest. in comparison with another differ- 
ing in kind, it is because the will acts in conformity with 
such motive. In all such cases, therefore, the strength of 
the motive is not a thing, which is ascertained and measured 
in itself through the medium of our consciousness, but is 
relative to the fact, of the will's being governed by the motive, 
as it is commonly expressed. But if the fact of the will's 
being governed by a particular motive, and that circum- 
stance alone, (which seems at least to be the case in respect 
to all motives differing in kind,) ascertains such motive to be 

28 



218 NATURE AND y 

the strongest, then certainly the declaration, that the will is 
governed by the strongest motive, is in effect the same thing 
as to say, that the will is governed by the motive by which 
it is governed. And it is self evident, that such a proposi- 
tion, which may be resolved into one of still greater celebri- 
ty, viz, whatever is, is, can prove nothing in respect to the 
true and universal nature of the will. 

§. 139. Of the elements of the contest within. 

What has been said in this chapter, opens, in various respects,, 
an impressive and fruitful view of man's character. We find 
in the two classes of motives, the natural or personal on the 
one hand, and the moral on the other,. the embryo of two 
conflicting principles, the fountain of sweet and of bitter 
waters, the basis of an internal hostility renewable every 
day and every hour. It is an indisputable position, and one 
which furnishes food for serious reflection, that every man's 
bosom, (whatever difficulties may attend the explanation of the 
origin of this state of things,) is a moral battle-field contin- 
ually set in array. Here is the theatre of that contest, 
which the Apostle so feelingly speaks of, a law in the members 
warring against the law of the mind; and which, in its dark 
and trying moments, compelled him to cry out in anguish, 
" Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the 
body of this death? " Here is the seat of virtues, which as- 
similate us to angels, and prepare us for glory; and of vices, 
which liken us to spirits of darkness, and are the forerunners 
of everlasting shame and contempt. Principles of eternal 
opposition, the Oromazes and Arimanius of the enigmatical 
philosophy of the Persians, are shut up together, destined to 
contend with a strife, which cannot cease, tilt the one or the 
other is destroyed. 

It will be noticed, that we state merely the fact of such 
an internal contest, without attempting to explain the man- 



KINDS OF MOTIVES. 219 

ner of its origin. Whether there be in men principles, 
which are naturally and originally evil ; or whether the evil 
exists, not so much in the nature, as it does in the unrepres- 
sed and inordinate tendencies of those principles, are ques- 
tions, upon which we do not feel required by the present 
discussion to offer any opinion. Indeed, in some of their 
aspects, they are questions, which belong to the deep things 
of God, and which may be expected, in. all ages to come as 
in all ages past, to set at nought the capabilities, and to con- 
found the pride of human reason. But whatever ground -may 
be taken on this matter, and however it may be explained, 
whatever may be satisfactorily explored and whatever may 
continue to be left in darkness, it still remains true, that 
there is an internal contest; that there are elements, which, 
in the present state of things, will always be found conflic- 
ting with each other; the calm effulgence of conscience 
struggling against the consuming fires of unholy passion; 
and a delight in the law of God striving against the aggres- 
sions of another antagonist principle spoken of by the Apos- 
tle, which brings men into captivity to the law of sin. The 
history of the human race sustains this view ; the philoso- 
phy of the mind concurs in it; and it is stamped more or 
less clearly on every part of the Bible, from the temptation 
and the sin of Eden to the histcrcy of the Seven Churches of 
the Apocalypse. It must be obvious even to the most casual 
observer, that men are every where represented in the 
Scriptures as endued with capacities of right and wrong, of 
moral good and evil ; as placed in a state of probation and trial, 
which is preparatory to another state of existence ; and as 
exhibiting in their hearts and lives, at one time., the predom- 
inance of vice, and at another, the ascendency of virtue. 
And it is an interesting consideration, that the eye of God, 
and the eye of angels, (to say nothing of the watchful solici- 
tude of the prince and the powers of darkness,) is intently 



220 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 

fixed on this belligerent attitude and concussion of the men- 
tal elements. And happy is he, who fully understands the 
nature and the consequences of this great contest; the duty 
and the rewards on the one hand, and the sin and the dan-, 
ger on the other! ' And thrice happy, if he carries on the 
contest, in all its vicissitudes and in all its length and 
breadth, with a humble reliance for wisdom and strength on 
that Brightness of the Father's glory, who made himself of 
no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and 
was- made in the likeness of men, and was tempted in all 
points as we are, and yet without sin. „ 



PART THIR 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 



NATURE OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 



§. 140. Of bodily in distinction from mental freedom. 

Having thus, in the second Part of this Work, assigned 
our reasons in support of the proposition, that the will has 
its laws, we next naturally proceed to consider the subject 
of its Freedom; a subject of perhaps equal importance and 
difficulty, and resting upon its own appropriate and specific 
grounds. — It has sometimes been the method of writers on 
the Freedom of the will to introduce the subject with remarks* 
in illustration of what may be termed bodily, in distinction 
from mental freedomi Although there is no such analogy, 
between mental and bodily freedom as to enable us to dif- 
fuse much light from one to "the other, it may not be lost 
time to ofifer a few remarks in explanation of what is meant 
by freedom of the latter kind. — Bodily freedom appears to 
consist in an exemption from any restraint on the corporeal 
action. So far as we are capable of putting forth any out- 
ward action at all, in accordance with some antecedent voli- 
tion, so far are we in the actual possession and enjoyment of 



224 • NATURE OF 

corporeal liberty. — And on the other hand inability of cor- 
poreal action, where the volition prompts us to make the at- 
tempt, may be regarded as a sort of slavery of the body. 
Accordingly he, who is shut up .within the massy walls and 
doors of a prison which he cannot possibly pass ; he, w r ho is 
the subject of a weakening and paralyzing disease which 
confines him to his chamber and his bed; he, who is thrown 
.from a precipice, and in his descent is obviously incapable of 
a contrary or upward motion ; and all others in a like situa- 
tion, whether it be from an abstraction of internal power or 
the presence of some outward impediment, may with propri- 
ety be described, to the extent of their inability to conform 
their outward actions to the requisitions of the will, as des- 
titute of freedom; or what is the same thing as the subjects 
of necessity or enthralment, in trte' bodily or corporeal sense 
of enthralment or freedom. 

And this is all we have to say on the subject, because ac- 
cording to the views we entertain in relation to it, bodily 
freedom or enthralment, which is a matter perfectly well un- 
derstood and beyond all reach of controversy, throws no 
light at all, or at least but a feeble ray, upon the nature of 
the enthralment or liberty of the mind. 

§. 141. Of unsuccessful attempts to explain the nature of 
freedom. ■ 

Accordingly for the reason above * intimated it will be 
understood, that in what we have to say of Freedom,we mean 
freedom or liberty of the mind. Mental freedom has a na- 
ture appropriate to itself; it possesses an identity and a char- 
acter of its own; and it is not only an entirely distinct thing, 
but undoubtedly is far more important than any mere liber- 
ty or enthralment of the body. 

In discussing the subject of the freedom of the mind, (a 
phrase which we use as entirely synonymous with liberty 



MENTAL FREEDOM. £25 

of the mind,) the inquiry first presenting itself is, what are 
we to understand hy the term freedom? This is a question, 
which seems to have been asked, and to have elicited more 
or less attention, in almost every age of the world. It is 
probably no exaggeration to say, that many volumes >have 
been written in illustration of the import of this single term. 
The prolific suggestions of the imagination and the ingen- 
ious speculations of the reasoning power have been put iu 
requisition for this purpose. And if to a considerable de- 
gree all these efforts have proved unsuccessful, may we not 
suppose, that it is owing, in part at least, to mistaken meth- 
ods of inquiry ? Or perhaps, if right methods have been 
pursued, the limits, which in the nature of things intercept 
and restrict their successful application, may not have been 
fully perceived. Certain it is, whatever flattering anticipa- 
tions may be entertained, and justly entertained too, of the 
progress of the human mind, there are some limits, which it 
cannot pass. And perhaps it is a charitable supposition, 
that many writers on this subject, in consequence of imper- 
fect apprehensions of the boundaries encircling and restric- 
ting the efforts of the intellect, have attempted too much,and 
have therefore failed in satisfactorily establishing any thing. 

§. 142. Freedom the name of a simple abstract idea. 

We have the authority of Mr. Locke for saying, (a posi- 
tion in which he is amply sustained by other writers on the 
Philosophy of the Mind,) that all our ideas may be divided 
into the two classes of Simple and Complex. Accordingly 
when we have fixed our attention upon any distinct subject 
of contemplation, and have resolved it into its parts, and 
have distinctly traced those parts to a position, where there 
is no longer a possibility of a separation of them, we have 

then reached a boundary of analysis, which it is not within 
29 



226 NATURE OF 

the capacity of the human mind to go beyond. The ele- 
ments of thought, which are disclosed in the issue of such a 
process, are entirely simple. Truly elementary and ulti- 
mate, they are deposited as deeply and strongly in the foun- 
dations of the edifice of intellectual perception, as it is pos- 
sible for them to be. They are to be regarded, therefore, 
as constituting knowledge, and that too of the highest kind, 
although it is equally true, that they are not susceptible of 
explanation, and that the person, who does not know them 
of himself and by virtue of his own mental action, can never 
know them from any other source. 

And in accordance with these views, our first remark in 
illustration of the nature of freedom or liberty is, that the 
term, when it is used abstractly, is the name of a simple 
thought or idea, the knowledge of which we cant derive from 
the mind itself alone. This remark we consider of no small 
importance, since it has a direct bearing on all attempts at a 
verbal explanation of freedom ; and indicates the possibility 

of such attempts being utterly futile. In taking this view, 

which we fully believe to be the only correct one, we are 
not wholly without the concurrence and authority of other 
writers. " La liberie, (says Thery in the Treatise referred 
to in the first Part of this work,) est indetermine meme. Comme 
lout ce qui est simple, elle nepeut se definer." 

§, 143. Occasions of the origin of the abstract idea of liberty. 

But in respect to all abstract notions or thoughts, (and 
the mere idea or conception of liberty is one of this kind,) 
there are two questions naturally presenting themselves ; 
the one just now remarked upon, whether the notion is sim- 
ple or complex ; the other, what is the occasion on which it 
arises. The occasion, on which the abstract idea of freedom 
is suggested to the intellect and becomes a part of our 
knowledge, is nothing else than the mind's action itself, in 



MENTAL FREEDOM. 221 

those favoured moments when its operations are in fact free. 
At such times we of course have a consciousness of what is 
in reality the fact, viz. of the mind's operating in the pre- 
scribed sphere of its action,without impediment or hindrance. 
And it is then, that the abstract idea or notion of freedom 
arises or is evolved, (if we may be allowed so to speak,) by 
what may appropriately be called the power of Original Sug- 
gestion, in the same manner as the abstract ideas of existence, 
identity, duration, space intelligence, power, right, wrong, 
and a considerable number of others. 

The fact and realization of our existence is the occasion, 
on which the abstract idea of existence or being in general 
is brought up, (or to employ what may be called the technical 
term in the case,) is suggested to the mind. The fact and the 
realization of power in ourselves is the occasion, on which 
the abstract notion of power, which every one distinctly 
possesses, is suggested. And in like manner, whenever 
there is liberty of the mind in fact and in actual realization, 
we are so constituted, that we are always, and without any 
effort on our own part put in distinct possession of the 
abstract idea of liberty. 

§. 144. Of the undejinableness of the term freedom. 

Now if such be the origin of the abstract notion of free- 
dom, and if it be the name of a simple and not a complex idea, 
(as certainly there is every reason to believe it to be so,) 
then every one, who speaks of freedom or enters into a dis- 
cussion upon it, must be supposed to know of himself what 
freedom is. Certain it is if he pleads ignorance of the import 
of the term, we shall find ourselves wholly unable to make it 
known to him by any statements in language. It being the 
name of a simple idea, if we attempt to define it we must 
necessarily employ synonymous terms, and which require au 
explanation no less than the one in question. Every definition 



228 NATURE OF 

of the name of a simple idea, which is not a synonym of 
the word itself or a synonymous phrase, is necessarily 
erroneous. And as a synonym or synonymous phrase 
cannot at all give us any new light in the matter, we are 
necessarily thrown hack upon our own experience for a 
knowledge of the thing under inquiry. 

§. 145. Supposed definitions of freedom mere synonyms. 

It may perhaps be useful to introduce one or two instances 
of definitions, which have been given by leading writers on 
the subject, in illustration and proof of our remark, that the 
term in question cannot be defined. Mr Hobbes defines it 
as follows. " Liberty is the absence of all impediments to ac- 
tion, that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic qual- 
ity of the agent." But the phrase absence of all impediments 
is obviously synonymous with liberty, and conveys no new 
idea. So that the definition, substituting other terms, 
amounts to this, and this merely ; that freedom is that liberty 
to action, which is contained in or permitted by the nature 
and intrinsic quality of the agent. Buffier gives the fol- 
lowing definition. "Liberty is the disposition a man feels 
within himself, of his capacity to act or not to act, to choose 
or not to choose a thing, at the same moment," Here the 
term capacity appears to be the synonymous expression. So 
that if we carefully reflect upon this definition, we shall 
probably find it amounting to merely this ; Liberty is the 
consciousness a man has of his freedom to act or not to act, 

to choose or not to choose. The definition, given by 

Dr. Reid, is this. " By the liberty of a moral agent, I un- 
derstand, a fower over the determinations of his own will." 
It is difficult to make any thing of this definition, because it 
seems to imply the existence of a will back of that,whose deci- 
sions are the immediate precur?ors of voluntary action. If 
it do not imply this, then all that is meant is, that the liberty 



MENTAL FREEDOM. 229 

of a moral agent is his power to put forth voluntary deter- 
minations or acts of the will. And in that case power is the 
synonymous expression ; and if it bs not so, the difficulty is 
not at all removed ; for, if we suppose it to have a distinct 
meaning from liberty, that idea or meaning, whatever it may 
be, is simple and undefinable. 

But it is unnecessary to remark further. According to 
the best reflections we have been able to bestow, it is alto- 
gether useless to give a definition of liberty, because it is 
in the nature of the case impossible to do it; and is unadvi- 
sable also, because every supposed definition, so far from 
settling the subject, has been generally found to leave it 
open to long controversies and disputes. 

§. 146. Distinction between the idea and reality of liberty. 

But a distinction is to be made, which has already been 
hinted at, between the mere notion, the abstract idea of 
freedom and freedom itself; between the conception of it as 
an object of thought, and the possession of it as a reality 
and a matter of personal experience. We may have the ab- 
stract idea of freedom, just as we have the abstract concep- 
tion of power; and we may reason upon the abstraction of 
freedom just as we reason upon the abstract idea or abstrac- 
tion of power, without possessing either freedom or power 
in ourselves. 

The idea of liberty in the abstract is the result, the sug- 
gestion, or the creature even, of what is sometimes called 
the pure intellect ; that is to say, it is the result or sugges- 
tion of intellectual operations, which appear to be the most 
disconnected and removed from external material impressions. 
And as such, it is truly an intellectual entity; a real "and 
distinct object of contemplation, of knowledge, of reasoning. 
But after all it is to be noticed, that this is merely the idea 
of the thing, and not the thing itself; it is the intellectual 

\ 



280 NATURE OF 

representative of liberty, but not the experience and the re- 
ality of liberty ; it is that which the veriest mental slave 
may conceive of and may speculate upon, as an object naked- 
ly and coldly suspended in the distance ; but which is very 
different from that, which the person, who actually possesses 
freedom, realizes as a thing near at hand, and enjoys as his 
own valued and personal possession. 

§. 147. Of the source of our knowledge of liberty itself in dis- 
tinction from the abstract idea of liberty. 

Of liberty in itself, in distinction from the abstract idea of 
liberty ; in other words, of freedom in the actual state of re- 
alization, we can have a knowledge by Consciousness, and 
by that alone. If a man, (we speak now of the mind of man 
and not of his body, and of the mind in a condition of men- 
tal soundness, and not in a state of either total or partial in- 
sanity,) truly feels himself to be free, we seem to have no 
alternative but to take it for granted that he is so. This is 
something ultimate; we cannot go beyond nor around it ; 
being based upon an original and ultimate feeling, it is of 
course founded in one of the deepest and surest sources of 
knowledge; and we are under a sort of necessity, therefore, 
of admitting, that the consciousness and the realization, the 
knowledge and the fact go together. 

And in connection with this view, we shall not hesitate 
to assume, that each one is] not only disposed to consult his 
consciousness, but to rely confidently on its intimations. 
We make this assumption, because we know of no other 
way in which it is possible for him, on a subject of this na- 
ture, to arrive at distinct and satisfactory conclusions for 
himself, or to understand the statements of others. If free- 
dom, in its essence and realization, is what it is known to be 
in our consciousness, and that too without the possibility of 
its being any thing else, then surely, however difficult it may 



MENTAL FREEDOM. 2B1 

be to give a definition of the abstract idea of freedom, we 
may enter on the examination of the subject-matter before 
us with entire confidence, since it is one, according to the 
view now given, which necessarily comes within the range 
of each one's personal knowledge. 

§. 143. Of the precise import of the phrase moral liberty. 

We close the suggestions of this chapter with a single 
remark more. — It is not uncommon to hear persons using the 
phrase moral liberty; and particularly in its applications to 
man. But the thought naturally arises, what is the distinc- 
tion between moral liberty and any other liberty ? To 
this inquiry it may be answered, that the phrase moral lib- 
erty indicates not a difference in the essence of liberty or in 
the liberty itself, which we have reason to believe is the 
same, so far as it exists at all, in all beings whatever from 
the highest to the lowest; but must be understood to express 
merely a difference in the capacity or sphere of the mind, of 
which it is predicable. The liberty of brutes is as perfect 
in its sphere, as that of men or angels. As they roam in for- 
ests and mountain wildernesses, or swim in the depths of the 
ocean, or fly and gaily sing in the radiant fields of the sum- 
mer's sky, they are free; they rejoice in their freedom ; and 
prize it as one of heaven's best gifts. But we never think 
of ascribing to them moral liberty, simply because, so far as 
we are able to learn, they have not a moral nature, as man 
has. The sphere of man's liberty is enlarged so as to em- 
brace moral considerations, those feelings of approval, disap- 
proval, and moral obligation, which are implied in moral 
accountability. Accordingly when we speak of man's moral 
liberty, or of man as morally free, we mean merely to ex- 
press the fact, that man is a free being, the sphere of whose 
liberty and action is so enlarged as to embrace moral con- 
siderations or moral principles of action. 



CHAPTER SECOND 



MENTAL HARMONY THE BASIS OR OCCASION 
OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 



§. 149. Statement of the inquiry in this chapter. 

What has been said so far on the general subject of Liberty 
relates to the abstract idea of liberty, the origin and nature 
of that idea, the realization or actual existence of liberty in 
ourselves in distinction from the mere abstract notion, and the 
manner in which we have a knowledge of liberty thus exis- 
ting in ourselves, viz, by Consciousness. It is a distinct 
inquiry, (and undoubtedly one worthy of some attention,) 
what that precise state of mind is, in connection with which 
liberty exists. In other words, what are the precise condi- 
tions or prerequisites of mind, essential to mental liberty ? 
If we are at liberty to suppose, as undoubtedly we are, 
that there are or may be certain circumstances or conditions 
of the mind, which are inconsistent with its freedom, it 
seems naturally to follow, that there are other circumstances 
or conditions, upon which its freedom, whenever it exists, is 
based, or which are essential to it. What are these precise 
circumstances ? What is this precise situation of the mind ? 



THE BASIS OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 233 

We are aware, that this is a question, which it is more 
easy to propose, than satisfactorily to resolve. At any rate 
it is probahle, that different persons would resolve it in dif- 
ferent ways. In giving an opinion therefore on this subject, 
which we cannot well avoid doing, we wish to be understood, 
as fully admitting, that the views of others may be found on 
examination to be equally satisfactory, and perhaps more so. 
With this remark we shall state explicitly what our opinion 
is; premising particularly, however, that we are now speak- 
ing of freedom as existing in the highest degree, or the 'perfec- 
tion of freedom. 

§. 150. Occasions on which liberty exists. 

If men will but carefully inquire and consider, they will 
not fail to perceive, that all things are in harmony, or were 
designed to be so. There is a harmony of the various parts 
of the external world ; there is a harmony of the parts of 
the human body ; there is also a harmony of the mind ; by 
which we mean there is a perfect symmetry and adaptation 
of the parts of the mind, each part being appointed to operate 
in its appropriate sphere; and, so far as it fulfils the inten- 
tions of nature, never infringing upon another part, whose 
sphere of operation is different. Now when each part oper- 
ates in this way; when there is truly a harmony of move- 
ment, every thing being equable, proportionate, and in its 
proper place ; when each power performs its functions with- 
out any unavoidable perplexity existing in itself or any in- 
fringement originating from some other source, we are then 
conscious of liberty in the highest sense of the term. He, 
who has no knowledge of liberty at such a time ? never will 
have; and it is wholly useless to reason with such a person 
on this subject. The consciousness of liberty, which natural- 
ly exists under such circumstances, is the only source of cue 
30 



234 MENTAL HARMONY 

knowledge in relation to it. A thousand mere speculations 
could never furnish the information which we have from that 
source ; nor could they ever have weight in opposition to 
the authority of that ultimate tribunal. 

§. 151. Of the circumstances under which this mental harmony 
may be expected to exist. 

But perhaps it may be objected, that these views, how- 
ever plausible they may be in theory, are useless and nuga- 
tory in their application, because there is no rule or measure, 
upon which the internal harmony depends and to which it 
may be referred. And certainly there would be something 
in such a suggestion, if it were well founded. But we think 
we may venture to say it is not so. It must, however, be admit- 
ted, if there is harmony in the mind, there must be more or 
less of subordination in the parts; and that if there is sub- 
ordination in some parts, there must be ascendancy and con- 
trol somewhere else. And this leads to the further remark, 
that it seems to be a proposition, satisfactorily established by 
writers on mental philosophy, that Conscience is, in some 
sense of the term, a governing and controlling power of the 
mind. Harmony, as it is capable of existing and is required 
to exist in the human mind, is by the appointment of God; 
and conscience, as the vicegerent of God in the human 
breast, indicates and rewards the fulfilment of this benevo- 
lent purpose. Conscience, however, is not so much a gov- 
erning power in the executive as in the legislative sense of 
the term; not so much in the capacity of actually carrying 
into effect, as in the office of guiding, prescribing, and reg- 
ulating. In the executive sense of the term the will is the 
presiding and controlling power, while the functions of con- 
science are more of an advisory and consultative kind. Ac- 
cordingly when all the appetites, propensities, and passions 



THE BASIS OF MENTAL FREEDOM 235 

are kept within their due bounds, we are reminded of this 
desirable state of things, and are encouraged to secure its 
permanency, by an internal approbation, and on the other 
hand, if they exceed those limits, we feel an internal reproof 
and condemnation. So that when we assert the harmony of 
the. mental acts to be the true and undoubted occasion, on 
which we are conscious of the existence of mental freedom 
in the highest degree, it is essentially the same as to say, 
that the occasion of this consciousness is to be found in a 
condition of the mental acts or operations, conformed to the 
requirements of conscience. And as conscience is a principle, 
instituted by God himself,and is designed to intimate his will, 
we may go further and say, that the occasion, on which we 
are conscious of mental freedom in the highest degree, is to 
be found in a condition of the mental acts, conformed to the 
requirements of the Supreme Being. 

It is conscience, (of course we mean an enlightened and 
right, and not a perverted conscience,) which, acting in the 
name of the great author of the mind, marks out their res- 
pective boundaries to its various powers and tendencies ; 
which says to this appetite and that desire, to this propensi- 
ty and that passion, thus far must thou go and no further; 
within these limits your operations are innocent, beyond 
them are criminal; within them there is freedom, beyond 
them there is enthralment, 

§. 152. Opinions of Bishop Butler on conscience. 

A number of English writers have proposed these views, 
or views essentially similar to them, in reference to con- 
science, particularly Bishop Butler. In his celebrated ser- 
mons on Human Nature he represents conscience as distin- 
guishing between the internal principles of man's heart, as 
wellas between his external actions ; as passing judgment 



236 MENTAL HARMONY 

both upon the one and the other; as pronouncing, by its 
own proper authority, some things to be in themselves right 

and good, and others to be evil and wrong. Some of his 

illustrations and statements are as follows. " Consider all 
the several parts of a tree without the natural respects they 
have to each other, and you have not at all the idea of a 
tree; but add these respects, and this gives you the idea. 
The body may be impaired by sickness, a tree may decay, a 
machine be out of order, and yet the system and constitu- 
tion of them not totally dissolved. There is plainly some- 
what which answers to all this in the moral constitution of 
man. Whoever will consider his own nature, will see that 
the several appetites, passions, and particular afFections,have 
different respects among themselves. They are restraints 
upon, and are in proportion to each other. This proportion 
is just and perfect, when all those under principles are 
perfectly coincident with conscience, so far as their nature 
permits, and in all cases under its absolute and entire direc- 
tion. The least excess or defect, the least alteration of 
the due proportions amongst themselves, or of their co-inci- 
dence with conscience, though not proceeding into action, 
is some degree of disorder in the moral constitution." * 

§, 153. Reference to the opinions of Dr. Price on this subject. 

As this view of the true occasion or basis of mental free- 
dom may be attended with difficulties in the minds of some, 
we must ask the patience of the reader, while we introduce 
to his notice some statements from the writings of Dr. Price. 
The object, for which the passage is introduced, will be kept 
in recollection, viz, in confirmation of the doctrine, that the 
mind is constituted on the principle of a subordination in its 
parts, and that there exists in the mind itself a power, which 

* See Butler's 2d and 3d Sermons on Human Nature and the Note. 



THE BASIS OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 237 

indicates, when this principle is conformed to, and when it 
is violated. In other words, that the original state of the 
mind is a state of harmony, and that there is in the mind a 
power, whose appropriate duty it is to indicate the devia- 
tions from that state of harmony. As to what that power is 
which has this authority, although we cannot doubt that the 
view of Butler is entirely the correct one, that is a matter, 
which is of subordinate consequence, so far as the subject 
now directly before us is concerned. 

" The conscience of a man is the man ; the reflecting 
principle is our supreme principle. It is what gives our dis- 
tinction as intelligent creatures; and whenever we act con- 
trary to it, we violate our natures, and are at variance with 
ourselves. There are biasses or determinations given us by 
the author of our beings which we might have wanted, and 
which are intended to be subordinate to reason. Now lib- 
erty being an exemption from all such force as takes away 
from us the capacity of acting as we think best, it is plain 
that whenever any passion becomes predominant within us, 
or causes us to contradict our sentiments of rectitude, we 
lose our liberty, and fall into a state of slavery. When any 
one of our instinctive desires assumes the direction of our 
conduct in opposition to our reason, then reason is overpow- 
ered and enslaved, and when reason is overpowered and 
enslaved, we are overpowered and enslaved. On the 
other hand, when our reason maintains its rights, and pos- 
sesses its proper seat of sovereignty within us; when it con- 
trols our desires and directs our actions so as never to yield 
to the force of passion, then are we masters of ourselves, 
and free in the truest possible sense. A person governed 
by his appetites is most properly a slave. To will (as St. 
Paul speaks) is present with him, but how to perfotfm that ivhich 
is good he knows not. What he would that he does not. But what he 



233 MENTAL HARMONY 

hates, that he does. He delights in the laiv of God after the in- 
ward man; but he has another law in his members warring 
against the law of his mind, and bringing him into captivity to the 
law of sin. Rom. vii. 22 and 23. 

There is but one just authority in the mind, and that is 
the authority of conscience. Whatever conquers this, puts 
us into a state of oppression." * 

§. 154. Objected that perfect harmony of the mind is not reali- 
zed here. 

It may be objected perhaps, that, in view of what has 
been said, there is no mental freedom at all in the present 
state of existence; at least that there is not the highest de- 
gree or perfection of mental freedom; since it is evident, and 
is universally admitted, that the harmony of the human mind 
is, in a great degree, destroyed. Take the most moral man 
in society, or even the man, who together with mere out- 
ward morality is the most deeply imbued with the spirit of 
the Gospel, and it is a fact too obvious, and too much to be 
lamented, that there is a want of harmony, that the soul 
sometimes sends forth jarring and discordant voices, and not 
always that sweet music, which breathes from minds in a 
purer state of existence. His love to God does not always 
possess that intensity and uniformity, which ought to be 
characteristic of it; his love to his fellow creatures, although 
he may be in the main anxious for their good, is subject to 
variations discreditable to the fervour of his benevolence 
and offensive to God; his evil passions are not always suita- 
bly rebuked and repressed,but sometimes reign for hours and 
even days & weeks. Such at his best estate is man in the pres- 
sent life. His bosom is not the placid lake, but rather the 
"torn ocean's roar." There are discordant voices, and con- 
testing movements, and more or less of internal jarring and 

* Price's Sermons. — See the Sermon on Spiritual or Inward Liberty. 



THE BASIS OP MENTAL FREEDOM. 229 

uproar and confusion, as when the fountains of the " great 
deep" were broken up, and the floods came, and the beauti- 
ful face of the world was overwhelmed with the inroads and 
the desolations of the waters. 

To the truth of this statement of man's condition we are 
obliged to assent. It is too obvious to admit of a denial. 
And it follows of course, that the perfection of liberty is 
but too seldom realized in the present life. If we wish, 
therefore, to contemplate liberty in its perfection, let us 
look at God. In that glorious Being all is harmony. In 
Him, wisdom, and benevolence, and justice, and voluntary 
power are all blended in due proportions ; are all active in 
their appropriate spheres without any interference, forming 
a constellation and inseparable cluster of light without any 
shades crossing their path, or any darkness at all. And in 
Him, more than in any other Being, there is perfect liberty. 
And let us look moreover at angels and seraphims, aud all the 
spotless companies and princely hosts that bow in his pres- 
ence and cast their crowns at his feet, and it is the same. 
Their souls, although infinitely removed from Him in point 
of capacity, are yet, in their moral nature and in their more 
limited sphere, the perfect mirror and reflex of His. And 
with them also, in that sphere, whatever it may be, which 
God has been pleased to assign them, there is undoubtedly 
the brightness and the perfection of liberty. 

§. 155. Perfection of mental harmony and consequent mental 
liberty illustrated from the character of the Savior. 

But is there not perfect liberty of the mind on earth ? 
Adam before he fell enjoyed this perfection of freedom. In 
the second Adam too, the man Christ Jesus, who was temp- 
ted in all points as we are and yet without sin, it existed in 
the highest possible degree. Follow him in the vicissitudes 



240 MENTAL HARMONY 

of his life; mark him in the various situations of temptation, 
trial, suffering. See him the son of a carpenter, and himself 
employed in the calling of his fathers ; see him at a little 
later period with his whip of thongs expelling with righteous 
indignation the money changers from the Temple; see him 
in the synagogue and the wilderness, in preaching and in 
prayer, smitten with the mid-day sun, and chilled with the 
drops of the night ; behold him with the sorrowful and the 
rejoicing, at the marriage feast of Cana, and at the tomb of 
Lazarus ; behold him mingling with all classes, and anxious 
for the good of all, seeking to benefit alike the high and the 
low, the priest in his robes, and the publican sitting at the 
receipt of customs, the young man of great possessions, as 
well as such as were halt and blind; behold him praying and 
agonizing in Gethsemane, and agonizing, and supplicating, 
and dying on the Cross. It is difficult to conceive of any 
one, who was placed in a greater diversity of situations, and 
exposed to a greater mixture and contrariety of influences. 
But in that mind there was entire and perfect harmony. 
The appetites, the propensities, the affections, (for he had 
them all, and not only that, he was tried or tempted in them 
all,) never violated their clue boundaries ; but always acted 
in complete conformity with the law of rectitude implanted 
in the soul. As there was perfect harmony, there was per- 
fect liberty; and as there was liberty there was peace; even 
that peace which passeth understanding. 

As Christ is set before us as an example, that we should 
follow him, we are certainly not to consider it as an impossi- 
bility for us to realize in our own souls the same complete- 
ness of mental harmony and the same perfection of inward 
liberty. It is the duty of all to strive to free themselves 
from the bondage under which they labour, and to secure, 
with the blessing of God, a restoration to that state from 
which they have fallen. And who will undertake to say, 



THE BASIS OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 241 

that there may not be a restoration to that state of inward 
harmony, purity, and peace in the present life ; if not through 
the whole course of a life or even a year, yet in some fa- 
vored moments, when the earnest strivings of the creature 
are blessed by the presence and the aids of the Creator ? 
" Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" ; not 
merely liberty in heaven but liberty on earth ; not merely 
an exemption from ceremonial thraldom, but from the great- 
er load of spiritual thraldom ; and we may add, as we are 
not authorized to limit the operations of that Spirit of the 
Lord, so we are not authorized or permitted to deny the pos- 
sibility, however seldom it may be the case in fact, of the 
completeness or perfection of liberty. If we are not wholly 
lovers of God, it is because we are still the lovers of some 
iniquity ; and if we are not wholly free, it is because we 
choose not to be so. 

§. 156. Objected that the foregoing views are necessarily and 
in their very terms inconsistent with liberty. 

But it may perhaps be objected, that the subordination 
of the various parts of the mind to the authority of con- 
science, which, inasmuch as it constitutes the true harmony 
of the mind, is the occasion and basis of the actual realiza- 
tion of perfect liberty, is even in its very terms a statement 
of restraint and enthralment. But can we with propriety, 
when we carefully examine the subject, concede any weight 
to such an objection ? Every thing, which exists, must have 
its appropriate nature, and consequently its prescribed sphere 
of action. Subordination, if there be indeed a Supreme 
Power to whom every thing else is amenable, must necessa- 
rily be the very condition of existence. It is a very errone- 
ous notion, which supposes, that mental liberty necessarily 
implies insubordination ; as much so as to suppose that there 

can be no civil freedom without popular licentiousness. 
31 



242 MENTAfc HARMONY. 

Without subordination, secured by some ascendant and per- 
manent principle, each inferiour principle and power of hu- 
man nature would leave its appropriate sphere, and com- 
mence an invasion on that of its neighbour. Such a state 
of things would necessarily be an infringement upon and a 
destruction of all liberty. 

We hold it to be self-evident, that no being, attribute, or 
faculty can be considered as free in the highest sense of that 
term, whenever there is a violation of the elements of its 
nature ; or what is the same thing, when there is an inter- 
ruption or hindrance from another source of the tendencies of 
those elements. Now the mind, though it is one and indivi- 
sible in its nature, is exceedingly multiplied and complex 
in its modes of operation. And each of these modes of opera- 
tion, (we speak not now of particular acts of the mind but 
of classes of acts,) has its definite limits and its specific and 
unalienable character, in other words a nature of its own ; 
so much so that there rs an entire propriety in speaking of 
the distinct faculties of the mind. But if these faculties or 
powers have a nature of theirown, they can be free and free 
only, at least in the highest and most ennobling sense of that 
term, when they are permitted to act in accordance with that 
nature. Now as every faculty of the mind exists and ope- 
rates in connection with other faculties, there must be in the 
mind some ascendant and authorized power, which can in- 
dicate to each its appropriate limits or sphere. And as these 
spheres of action are adapted to each other with perfect 
symmetry, there cannot be a transgression or passing over of 
one sphere, without an invasion of another ; there cannot 
be an excess of liberty in one, without a diminution of lib- 
erty in another. Hence we see, that, from the nature of 
the case, a due subordination in the powers of the mind is 
not inconsistent with the liberty of each power in itself, and 
is absolutely essential to the liberty of every other power. 
And this view seems to us fully to answer the objection above 
referred to. 



CHAPTER THIRD 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 



§. 157. Remarks on the nature of the freedom of the will. 

The remarks, which have been made in the two preceding 
chapters, are to some extent of a general nature, being ap- 
plicable to the mind as a whole, as well as in its parts ; and 
susceptible of an application not only to the human mind, 
but to all minds. The whole subject of the nature of free- 
dom is one of great importance, and it is also one of no in- 
considerable difficulty ; and it seemed, therefore, to require, 
those general illustrations. We hope from what has been 
said on the nature of freedom in general, that it will be ea- 
sy to understand what is meant by the freedom of the will. 
We do not suppose, (and we have already suggested reasons 
for the remark,) that the freedom of the will, when contem- 
plated directly and in itself, either is, or ever will be, a mat- 
ter of verbal explanation ; no mere form of words can of it- 
self fully explain what freedom is, either when predicated of 
the will, or of any other form or action of the mind. But 
still we trust, that, with the help of the general statements 
which have been made, it will be found a matter of clear in- 



244 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

tellectual perception ; and that if it should elude and baffle 
the powers of language to express it, it will still be found 
fully within the comprehension of thought. 

It does not follow, because the element of freedom is, in 
some respects, of too subtile a nature to be embodied in the 
massive forms of speech, that it is therefore too subtile and 
etherial to be approached and apprehended by the mind. 
There are many things, which are known and are under- 
stood, at least enough so for all practical purposes, but 
which cannot be explained by any statements in language, 
so as to make them clearer. It may be impossible for me 
to explain by a mere form of words what is meant by my 
existence ; but I fully know, as every body else does in res- 
pect to himself, what my existence is in experience and in 
fact. In like manner it is impossible for me to explain what 
the freedom of the will is in words, but I know what it is 
in experience and in fact ; and have never been destitute of 
that knowledge ; and it is impossible that I should be desti- 
tute of it. If the will were some material object, I could 
probably explain by words what is meant by its freedom; 
but as it is immaterial and mental, we are obliged to leave 
it to each one's internal examination and consciousness. 

§. 158. Of the relation of the freedom of the will to the fact of 
its subjection to law. 

But the inquiry may arise in the minds of some, how can 
it be possible that the will should be free, and at the same 
time subject to law ? No doubt some persons fully enter- 
tain the idea, that the doctrine of the will's subjection to 
law, which is clearly susceptible of accumulated and irresisti- 
ble proof, necessarily involves, that the voluntary faculty is 
destitute of liberty. But if we rightly understand the mat- 
ter, the fact is entirely the reverse of what is here supposed 
to be the case. The opinion, which for various reasons we 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 245 

deliberately and fully embrace, is, that, without laws of the 
mind, there is no liberty of the mind; neither liberty in fact, 
nor even a possibility of it. Law and liberty necessarily 
go together. In the order of their existence law precedes 
liberty; and it is in that order they are most naturally con- 
templated. Where there is perfect liberty, as we have al- 
ready had occasion to notice, there is perfect harmony; but 
there cannot be perfect harmony, nor harmony in any de- 
gree, without law. But the Creator has wisely and kindly 
taken this matter into his own hands. He has stamped upon 
the mind in letters of light, so that he who runs may read 
them, that the whole economy of the mind is subject to the 
oversight and regulation of fixed principles or laws. And 
in doing this, he has at the same moment, and by one single 
act, laid the broad and deep foundations of control and of 
subordination, of harmony and of freedom. 

But we may go further than this, and come more closely 
to the matter, which is directly before us. We may safely 
take the position, that the will could not enjoy freedom, 
either in a higher or less degree, if it were not in itself, and 
considered separately from all other powers, subject to law. 
If the acts of the will were guided by no principles whatev- 
er, if they were beyond the reach of all su perintendance and 
regulative control, they would necessarily be thrown into 
the arras of a blind and inflexible destiny. 

If it could be shown, that the will is not subject to law, 
it would of course follow, that it is the subject of mere con- 
tingency and accident, which entirely and fully comes up to 
the utmost idea of fatality. And it would be found to be a 
fatalism of the worst kind, an unintelligent fatalism. — But 
having proved, that the will, as well as the other mental 
powers, has its laws, we secure in that single fact the pos- 
sibility of liberty, which we could not have without it. 
We are accordingly in a situation, in which the liberty of 



£46 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

the will, that important and noble attribute of a morally ac- 
countable nature, is not necessarily excluded ; which would 
certainly be the case, if the will were driven about hither 
and thither, without any possible foresight of what is liable 
to take place,|and without any regularity of action. 

§. 159. Circumstances or occasions under which freedom of the 
will exists. 

Although, in entering into the subject of the freedom of 
the will in particular, in distinction from the general nature 
of freedom, we do not profess to go into verbal explanations 
and definitions, something may nevertheless be said in rela- 
tion to the occasions or circumstances, under which it exists. 
— In respect to the occasions, on which the freedom of the 
will exists, but little more remains to be done than apply 
the remarks made on the general subject of freedom in the 
preceding chapter. If there is perfect harmony in other 
parts of the mind, there will be perfect freedom in the will; 
if every appetite and propensity and passion is precisely 
what it should be, the voluntary power cannot possibly ex- 
perience any pressure, which will interrupt or diminish that 
degree of liberty, which is essential to or compatible with 
its nature. 

This topic may perhaps be susceptible of illustration by 
a reference to the Supreme Being. If freedom can, with 
propriety and justice, be predicated of any being whatever, 
it is certainly predicable of the Supreme Being; and predi- 
cable not only in general terms, but of the will in particular. 
We hazard nothing in saying, that liberty of the will is pos- 
sessed by Him in the highest possible degree. And we 
cannot conceive bow it should be otherwise, when we con- 
sider that the elements, both moral and intellectual, by which 
it is surrounded, are in perfect harmony with each other. — 
And if we turn our attention to any other high and holy be- 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 247 

ings, such as are nearest in glory to the Supreme Author of 
all things, it is the same. The will of angels and of arch- 
angels and of all other orders of holy beings, that encircle 
with their songs of praise the Divine Throne, possesses, 
within the appropriate sphere of its action, the highest de- 
gree of freedom. All the various elements, which go to 
constitute them intelligent and moral beings, are restricted 
to their proper place, and operate in their due proportion. 
Their perceptions, so far as they go, are in perfect accor- 
dance with the truth of things. Their emotions are such as 
God, who takes supreme delight in perfect rectitude, can 
entirely approve. Every desire, which they exercise is in 
its right place; their love to God is just such as it should 
be; their love to other holy beings corresponds precisely to 
the nature of the object towards which it is directed; their 
aversion to sin and sinful beings is just such, and fully and 
entirely such, as is appropriate and right ; and it is precisely 
the same in respect to every other emotion and desire. 
And the consequence is, there is no disturbing force in the 
neighborhood of the will; there is no possible motive to 
sway it from the line of perfect rectitude; and hence it is 
true, that their will, although it always operates in the direc- 
tion of the highest rectitude and good, is always at liberty; 
and this liberty exists too in the highest possible degree. 
And hence we assert, in respect to all minds, whether they 
are higher or lower in the scale of being, that perfect harmo- 
ny is the appropriate element of perfect freedom ; and that 
every diminution of harmony will be attended with a corres- 
ponding diminution of liberty. And this is as true of the 
separate parts or powers of the mind as of the whole; and is 
as true of the will as of any other part. 

<§. 160. Evidence of the freedom of the will from consciousness. 

Having made the foregoing remarks in explanation of the 



243 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

nature of the freedom of the will, and of the occasions on 
which it exists, we are now prepared to proceed to a consid- 
eration of the proofs in support of the position, that there is 
such a freedom. And we accordingly remark, that the 

doctrine of the freedom of the will is sustained, in the first 

• 
place, by consciousness. — When we assert that men have a 

knowledge of the freedom of the will by consciousness, we 
mean merely to declare, that such knowledge is the result of 
an inward conviction, an internal experience. In other 
words every man knows himself, in the exercise of volition, 
to be free. It is a knowledge which we possess, not by 
deduction, but by a species of intuitive conviction ; not by 
inference, but by an original perception. 

We do not propose to occupy time in expanding this 
view ; since it is a matter, which every one understands, 
and in respect to which it is presumed there is hardly a pos- 
sibility of mistake or of controversy. And the argument is 
as decisive, as it is plain and simple. Some writers, indeed, 
have even been disposed to rely upon this argument alone. 
They consider it, (and perhaps it may be admitted, with en- 
tire justice and correctness,) as conclusive against any con- 
siderations, which may be adduced adverse to it. " Our 
own free-will, says Mr. Stewart, we know by conscious- 
ness; and we can have no evidence of any truth so irresis- 
tible as this." 

§. 161. Of an objection to the argument from consciousness. 

It ought to be noticed, however, that from time to time 
a few individuals have been found, who have asserted the 
opposite, viz, a consciousness of internal compulsion or sla- 
very. Surprising as such a declaration is, we are bound in 
candour to receive it as truly indicating the internal experi- 
ence of those who make it, although it may be in opposition 
to the testimony of thousands and even hundreds of thou- 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 249 

sands to one. But these exceptions do not at all overthrow 
our argument. If there truly be such exceptions, they can 
undoubtedly be explained in entire consistency with the 
general truth, that the freedom of the will is ascertained and 
proved by the consciousness of mankind. Is it not true, 
is it not accordant with common experience and with the 
Scriptures even, that any man and every man may enslave 
himself ? And when that is the case, what could we expect 
but that consciousness, the true index of what takes place 
within, should bear its testimony to a state of thraldom ? 
If then these persons are not conscious of freedom of the 
will, may we not safely say, it is not the work of their Cre- 
ator, but their own ? Certain it is, if we permit any one 
of the appetites, propensities, or passions continually to ex- 
tend and strengthen itself by being continually repeated, it 
will eventually gain the ascendency over and subdue all the 
rest of the mind. If/or instance a man indulges, year af- 
ter year, the consuming propensity of ambition, it ultimate- 
ly so disorders the proper action of the mental powers, and 
acquires such immense strength, that he feels himself driven 
by a sort of compulsion; he undoubtedly recognizes in him- 
self, as he asserts to be the case, the impulse of a species of 
destiny, which however is of his own creation. By his own 
criminal improvidence and not by any inward and irresisti- 
ble fatality, he has lost control of the helm, and is driven 
forward amid billows and tempests to his destruction. 

Such cases undoubtedly exist, but they cannot with pro- 
priety be regarded in any other light than that of exceptions 
to the general rule, and which are susceptible of an expla- 
nation in consistency with the general experience of man- 
kind. That experience, (the inward testimony or conscious- 
ness, which the great mass of mankind has,) most decidedly 
testifies to the liberty of the will. 
32 



250 FREEDOM OF THE WILL: 

§. 162. Evidence of the wilVs freedom from the nature of 
motives. 

The nature of motives, among other things, appears to 
furnish an argument on the matter hefore us. It appeared 
in the Chapter on that subject, that motives are coexistent 
with volitions ; that the will acts in view of motives and 
never acts independently of them ; that, although its acts 
are its own and are to be regarded and spoken of as its oivn, 
yet motives furnish the condition or occasion, (and we may 
add the indispensable occasion,) on which its ability to put 
forth those acts is exerted. Here is at least one great law, to 
which the will is subject ; and it is one, which comes direct- 
ly and constantly under our observation. But it is worthy 
of notice, that we are obliged to rest satisfied with this law, 
as it comes to us in its general form and as it is stated in gen- 
eral terms, without the ability of going within the circle it 
draws around the will and seeing it carried into effect in 
particulars. Whether the influence of law draws itself more 
closely around the will or not, than is implied in the gener- 
al proposition of the will's action being restricted to the oc- 
casions furnished by motives ; and if it does, in what way 
this more intimate influence is carried into effect, is a mat- 
ter in both respects, which we venture to assert the mind of 
man has never yet penetrated, and probably never will pen- 
etrate. 

But, to come to the point which we had particularly in 
view, although motives are the condition or preparative or 
occasion of the will's action, yet when we consider that the 
motives placed before the will are oftentimes essentially dif- 
ferent from each other, being various in kind as well as de- 
gree, so much so as not to admit of a direct comparison, we 
are able distinctly to conceive, how the will may act in con- 



FREEDOM OP THE WILL- 25\ 

nection with motives and yet have a true and substantive 
power in itself; how it may be subject to law and yet be 
free. In other words, although motives are placed round 
about it, and enclose it on every side, it has the power of 
choosing, (or if other expressions be preferable,) of deci- 
ding, determining, or arbitrating among them. Although it 
is shut up within barriers, which God himself has instituted, 
it has a positive liberty and ability within those barriers. 
Although its operations are confined within a sphere of 
action, which is clearly and permanently marked out by its 
maker, yet within that sphere, (the proposition of the will's 
subjection to law still holding good,) its acts- emanate in 
itself. Although in some important sense the will is the 
creature of God, and is dependent upon God, and all its acts 
are God's acts ; yet at the same time, taking the facts just as 
they are presented and stand before us, it has a vitality of 
its own, a theatre of movement appropriate to itself, and all 
its acts are its own acts. This is the position undoubtedly, 
in which God has seen fit to place the subject before the hu- 
man mind, as if he would instruct us at the same moment, 
both in our weakness and strength, our power and depen- 
dence. 

But when we have stated this, we have stated all ; we 
have arrived at an unfathomable mystery, which, as we have 
already said, the limited mind of man will probably never 
penetrate. The facts are demonstrable, but the manner of 
them exceeds our comprehension. We see the evidencies 
of law, and we know beyond all doubt and question that 
laws of the will exist ; but at the same time, if the distinc- 
tion of motives into personal and moral be correct, we are 
not able to bind the ligatures of law so closely around the 
domains of the will, as to shut out the possibility either of 
its power or its freedom. That is to say, while the human 
mind can establish and prove to demonstration the proposi- 



252 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

tion, that the will is subject to law, it is obliged to rest in 
the general proposition that such is the fact; it can go no 
further ; it cannot, by any exercise of fair reasoning, so ap- 
ply the principle to the will as not to leave an ample sphere 
both for its liberty and its power. We are permitted, for 
wise purposes, to see, that God is our sovereign and our mas- 
ter, to see that not only the hairs of our head are numbered, 
but that even our inmost purposes are under his control, and 
to see it clearly, distinctty, and undeniably; but in such a 
way as to leave it both possible and demonstrable, that we 
possess in ourselves the elements, (and to an extent invol- 
ving the most solemn responsibility,) of power, of freedom, 
and of moral accountableness. 

§. 163. Objected that the will is necessarily governed by the 
strongest motive. 

But it will perhaps be said by way of objection, that the 
will is necessarily governed by the strongest motive, or at 
least that it necessarily acts in view of the strongest mo- 
tive, of whatever kind it may be. We are aware, that this 
has often been alledged; and not unfreauently by men,whose 
suggestions are entitled to the most respectful considera- 
tion. But the proposition, in order to have any weight as 
an argument, must be shown to be of universal application. 
If there were only one kind or class of motives, there would 
undoubtedly be some plausibility in the view proposed. 
Perhaps it would be a conclusive one. 

Motives of the same kind can be directly compared to- 
gether; and as our consciousness assures us of a difference 
in the strength of such motives even in themselves consider- 
ed, there is a propriety in speaking of them as more or less 
strong. But, as we have already had occasion to remark in 
speaking on this very subject, motives, which differ in kind, 
can be compared not in themselves, but only in their effects. 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 253 

In respect to all such, therefore, the proposition, that the 
will is governed hy the strongest motive, is an identical one. 
That is to say, the proposition can mean nothing more than 
simply, that the will is governed hy the motive, hy which it 
is governed. If we were to admit this, we should admit only 
an obvious truism, which could have no weight, either one 
way or the other, in resolving the matter under consideration. 
— (See the remarks on this subject in Chapter ninth of Part 
Second.) 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MAN'S 
MORAL NATURE. 



§. 164. Remarks on the nature or mode of the argument. 

There are various other considerations, connected with 
the general subject of the freedom of the will, all of which 
have weight, although they may not be closely connected 
with each other. Hence the argument on the subject of the 
freedom of the will, as well as on that of its subjection to 
laws, has a sort of miscellaneous appearance, which may be 
less pleasing, than it would otherwise be, to those, who 
have been accustomed to the invariable consecution of parts, 
and the strictness of mathematical demonstration. But it 
will be perceived, that the nature of the subject renders this 
in some degree unavoidable ; and it is to be hoped, that 
suitable allowance will be made for it, If the question be- 
fore us were, whether the Romans occupied the island of 
Great Britain at some period previous to the Saxon conquest, 
we probably should not rest the conclusion on one circum- 
stance or fact alone ; but employ all, which might have a 
bearing on the inquiry, however diverse they might be from 
each other in themselves. We should refer to the testimony 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL- 255 

of the Roman historians, to the remains of encampments and 
roads indicating a Roman origin, to the coins and urns 
which have been discovered ; and although each of these 
circumstances would be different from and independent of 
the others, they would all obviously bear upon the same 
conclusion ; and even if they were separately weak and 
somewhat unsatisfactory, might yet in their combination 
furnish an argument of irresistible strength. It is so with the 
subject now before us, as also and particularly so with that, 
which occupied our attention in the Second Part of this work. 
— We shall, therefore, go on to mention one view of the 
subject after another, in the expectation, that each distinct 
part of the argument will be kept in mind ; and that the 
influence of each will be so united with that of others as to 
render the conclusion not only satisfactory but unanswerable. 

§. 165. Of the elements of man's moral nature. 

Although the argument, taken as a whole, is emphatical- 
ly a miscellaneous one, yet the remarks of this chapter will 
be found to be connected together, in this respect at least, 
that they all have a relation to one topic, viz, man's moral 
nature. That man has a moral nature we cannot for a mo- 
ment suppose to be a matter of doubt.' Without such a 
nature he could not be the subject of a moral government ; 
and, although he might possess all knowledge, he would ne- 
cessarily be without virtue and vice ; and neither praise 
nor blame, neither rewards nor punishment could ever attach 
to his conduct. 

There is nothing inconceivable or inconsistent in the 
suppposition of a being so constituted as to be possessed of 
intellect, propensities, passions, and will, and yet to be inca- 
pable by his very constitution of framing those notions and 
of exercising those feelings, which are implied in a moral 
nature. But such is not the constitution of man. While he 



256 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

is endowed with intellect and appetites and propensities and 
passions and will, God has seen fit to elevate and ennoble 
him, by constituting him a moral and religious being. The 
elements of his moral nature, (in 'accordance with that stri- 
king wisdom ever manifested in God's works, which accom- 
plishes great results by simple means,) are few in number, 
and are to be found chiefly in his ability to frame the ab- 
stract notions of right and wrong, in the feelings of moral 
approval and disapproval, in those states of the mind which 
are known as feelings of remorse, and in feelings of 

moral obligation. All these states of mind, which 

taken together constitute man a moral being, and without 
which he could not sustain or possess that character, are 
based upon and imply the fact, as will more fully appear in 
the separate examination of them, of the freedom of the will. 

§. 166. Evidence of freedom of the will from feelings of ap- 
proval and disapproval. 

In stating the argument,which may be deduced on this sub- 
ject from our moral nature, we proceed to remark, in the first 
place, that the freedom of the will is implied in and is shown 
by the moral feelings of approval and disapproval. We are 
so constituted, that, whenever we behold a person perform- 
ing a virtuous action, demeaning himself with entire kind- 
ness, good faith, and justice, we at once feel a sentiment of 
approval. On the other hand if we see a person pursuing a 
different course, one which is obviously characterized by 
falsehood, ingratitude, and injustice, we at once feel an 
emotion of disapproval. But if it should be suddenly dis- 
closed to us, that the agent, whom we thus according to the 
circumstances of the case either approve or condemn, was 
not in the possession of freedom of will, it is undeniable, 
th at all such approval or disapproval would at once cease. 
We should no more think of approving an action, however 



IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE 357 

beneficial it might be, which was known to be performed 
without freedom of will, than of pronouncing a man worthy 
of moral approbation for a purely natural gift, such as sym- 
metry of form, a musical voice, or striking outlines of the 
countenance. More properly, we should think nothing 
about it. To approve under such circumstances would, by the 
very constitution of our nature, be an impossibility. The 
idea of liberty, therefore, is, in this respect and so far as 
these feelings are concerned, fundamental to our moral na- 
ture. 

§. 167. Proof of freedom from feelings of remorse. 

There is another class of mental states, constituting a 
part of man's moral nature, to which similar remarks will 
apply ; we refer to feelings of remorse. These feelings 
are entirely distinct from those of approval and disapproval. 
We are capable of approving or disapproving, when our at- 
tention is directed solely to the conduct of others; but we 
never feel remorse for what others do, and it is impossible 
that we should. Feelings of remorse have relation to our- 
selves alone. We experience them when bur own conduct, 
and not that of others, is the subject of moral disapproval. 
They are painful feelings, but the suffering is of a peculiar 
kind, altogether different from mere sadness or grief;, and 
hence they may be regarded as having a character of their 
own, and as separate in their nature from all other states of 
the mind. The existence of these states of mind implies, on 
the part of the person who is the subject of them, a convic- 
tion of the freedom of the will. 

It can hardly be thought necessary to adduce facts and 

arguments in support of what has been said. If a person 

feels an internal condemnation or remorse for what he has 

done, it certainly must be on the ground, that he was at lib- 

33 



258 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

erty to will and to do otherwise. It cannot be doubted, 
that this position is fully and universally admitted. — There 
may he fears and sorrows undoubtedly; there may be re- 
grets and sufferings, in cases which are not dependent on 
any determinations of our own; but there cannot possibly 
be remorse, which implies a sense of guilt as well as the 
experience of sorrow, without a conviction, deep as the ba- 
sis of the mind itself, that in doing the criminal action we 
willed and acted freely, and not by compulsion. If there- 
fore feelings of remorse exist, as they not unfrequently do, 
they furnish a strong proof in support of the liberty of the 
will. 

§. 1G8. Without the possession of liberty of will man could 
never have framed the abstract notions of right and wrong. 

Among other things having a relation to man's situation 
and character as a moral being, it is to be noticed that he is 
so constituted as to be able to form the abstract notions of 
right and wrong, or of virtue and vice, which are only oth- 
er and synonymous expressions for right and wrong. These 
conceptions, (which are thoughts and not emotions, the cre- 
ations of the Intellect, and not the exercises of the Sensibil- 
ities or heart,) are truly great and ennobling; audit may 
perhaps be said of them, more than of any other part of our 
moral nature, that they are the basis of moral reasoning, 
and the foundation of moral anticipation and hope. They 
disclose to the mind,like light coming from heaven and shin- 
ing vividly into its depths, the great fact, that there is a 
real, permanent, and immutable distinction between good 
and evil. Strike out and annihilate these primary concep- 
tions, and you at the same moment obscure and destroy the 
glory of man's mental nature, and blot out, at least as far as 
all human perception is concerned, the brightest feature in 
the character of all other mental existences. 



IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE. 259 

But these leading ideas, so fundamental to every thing of 
a moral and religious nature, could never have been formed, 
without a conviction of the liberty of the will. The occa- 
sions undoubtedly, on which they are suggested and exist 
in the mind, are instances of voluntary conduct, either our 
own or that of others, where we either approve or disap- 
prove. Without such occasions offered to our notice, and 
without such attendant emotions of moral approval or disap- 
proval, it may be asserted without any hesitation, that men 
would never have formed any conceptions in the abstract, 
of right and wrong, of rectitude and the opposite ; and con- 
sequently could never have beheld, as they now clearly do, 
as if inscribed by the radiant finger of God, a great line of 
demarcation, remaining always and immutably the same, 
"between good and evil, between holiness and sin. But as 
has already been stated, it is always implied in the feelings 
of approval and disapproval, that the person, whose conduct 
is either approved or disapproved, possessed liberty of the 
will. Without a firm conviction, that such was the case, 
the emotions could never have existed; and consequently 
there eould never have occurred, in the history of the human 
mind, that state of things, which is the basis of the origin 
of the abstract notions of right and wrong, of rectitude and 
want of rectitude, of virtue and vice, which are only differ- 
ent expressions for the same thing. We have, therefore, in 
this view of the subject a new proof, that the liberty of the 
will is positively and necessarily involved in the fact of our 
possessing a moral nature. 

§. 169. Proof from feelings of moral obligation. 

There is a distinct class of mental states, entitled in eve- 
ry point of view to an important place in man's moral con- 
stitution, which may be termed Obligatory feelings, or feel- 
ings of moral obligation. Of these states of mind we do 



260 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

not profess to give a definition. As they are elementary 
and simple, they are necessarily undefinable. But we can- 
not doubt, that every one must have more or less frequently 
experienced them, and that every one knows what their nature 
is. And this class of feelings also furnishes an argument 

on the subject before us, We deem the assertion within 

the bounds of truth and of the common opinion of mankind, 
when we say that no man ever does, or ever can experience 
in himself the feeling of moral obligation to do a thing, so 
long as he feels himself to be actually destitute of liberty to 
do it. And this is equally true, whether the destitution of 
liberty relates to the outward and bodily action or to the 
action of the will. Does a man feel himself morally ac- 
countable for the performance of an action, to which he is 
driven by some bodily compulsion? Or does he feel himself 
accountable for a failure to perform an action, from the per- 
formance of which he is kept by actual bodily restraint ? 
And if the mind is constrained and driven by a compression 
and violence, corresponding, as far as the different nature of 
the two things will permit, to such compulsion of the body, 
can there be anymore conviction of accountability, or of any 
form of moral obligation in the one case than in the other ? 
But if the existence of feelings of obligation be undeniable, 
and if the existence of such feelings be incompatible with the 
absence of freedom, and if both these truths are based on 
the consciousness and confirmed by the universal acknowl- 
edgements of mankind, then it follows of course, that men 
do in fact feel and recognize, and that they fully and assur- 
edly know their freedom. 

§. 170. Evidence from men's views of crimes and 'punishments. 

Again, the freedom of the will is clearly implied in the 
views, which we find to be generally adopted by men in re- 
spect, to crimes and punishments. This view of our sub- 



IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE. 261 

ject is closely connected with that, which has just heen giv- 
en; and essentially the same illustrations, as were introdu- 
ced in the last section, will apply here. 

If a man is laid under bodily constraint, and in that situ- 
ation is the agent or rather instrument in the performance of 
an action involving great loss and suffering to others, such 
action is never considered a crime and deserving of punish- 
ment, in whatever light it might be regarded under other 
circumstances. This is undeniable. And we always take 
the same view, when the mind is actually laid under con- 
straint as when the body is; with this difference merely, 
that constraint of the body is a matter easily ascertainable, 
while that of the mind can be learnt only with a greater or 
less degree of probability. The power of the will is a gift 
or trust, as much so as the power of perception, and is a 
definite thing; in some persons it is greater, in others less; 
but in all cases it has its limits. Whenever, therefore, there 
is an utter disproportion between the strength of the motive 
and the power of the will, (so much so perhaps as to render 
it essentially the same as if the will were wholly destitute 
of power,) the will is universally understood to be at such 
times under a greater or less degree of constraint. And if 
under such circumstances a crime be charged upon a person, 
we graduate the degree of it, (looking upon it as higher in 
some cases and lower in others,) in precise conformity with 
the degree of constraint, so far as we can judge what it is. 
" There are cases, says Dr. Reid, in which a man's vol- 
untary actions are thought to be very little, if at all in his 
power, on account of the violence of the motive that impels 
him. The magnanimity of a hero or a martyr is not expec- 
ted in every man and on all occasions. — If a man, trusted 
by the government with a secret, which it is high treason 
to disclose, be prevailed upon by a bribe, we have no mercy 
for him, and hardly allow the greatest bribe to be any alle- 



262 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED 

viation of his crime. Baton the other hand if the secret be 
extorted by the rack or the dread of present death, we pity 
him more than we blame him, and would think it severe and 
unequitable to condemn him as a traitor." And he after- 
wards gives the reason of these different judgments, viz, 
that, while the mere love of money leaves to a man the en- 
tire power over himself, the torment of the rack, or the dread 
of present death, are so violent motives, that men, who have 
not uncommon strength of mind, are not masters of them- 
selves in such a situation, and therefore what they do is not 
imputed to them as a crime at all , or is thought less criminal 
than it would otherwise be. 

§. 171. Prevalent opinions oj mankind on this subject. 

The argument under this general head, so far as it has 
now been gone into, has been stated in particulars; and it 
is probably more satisfactory, when stated in this way, than 
in any other. But something may be said on the subject of 
the freedom of the will as connected with our moral nature, 
when it is considered, as it were, in the mass. The body 
of mankind undoubtedly look upon this subject in its great 
outlines and as a whole, without attempting to penetrate 
and to seize its elements. And without unduly yielding to 
popular prejudices or abating from the dignity of philoso- 
phy, we may safely assert, that this is an inquiry, on which 
an appeal may with propriety be made to the common expe- 
rience, and the common convictions and expressions of the 
great body of men. And we no sooner make the appeal 
than we find, that the testimony from that source is unani- 
mous and unequivocal. 

There are some truths, which are so deeply based in the 
human constitution, that all men of all classes receive them, 
and act upon them. They are planted deeply and immuta- 
bly in the soul, and no reasoning, however plausible, can 



IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE. 263 

shake them. And if we are not mistaken, the doctrine of 
the freedom of the will, as a condition of even the possibili- 
ty of a moral nature, is one of these first truths. It seems 
to be regarded by all persons without any exception, as a 
dictate of common sense and as a first principle of our na- 
ture, that men are morally accountable and are the subjects 
of a moral responsibility in any respect whatever, only so 
far as they possess freedom, both of the outward action 
and of the will. They hold to this position as an elementa- 
ry truth, and would no sooner think of letting it go, than of 
abandoning the conviction of their personal existence and 
identity. They do not profess to go into particulars, but 
they assert it in the mass, that man is a moral being only so 
far as he is free. And such an unanimous and decided tes- 
timony, bearing as it obviously does the seal and superscrip- 
tion of nature herself, is entitled to serious consideration. 
In view of the various suggestions of this chapter, (and 
further illustrations to the same effect might be given if 
time would allow,) we are abundantly authorized in the as- 
sertion, that the liberty of the will is implied, and fully and 
clearly implied in the fact of man's possessing a moral na- 
ture; and that if he possesses such a nature, he possesses 
freedom. 



CHAPTER FIFTH, 



OTHER PROOFS OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 



§. 172. Evidence of the freedom of the will from languages. 

In bringing forward the various considerations,which, how- 
ever disconnected with each other in themselves, have yet a 
bearing on the subject before us, we proceed to remark fur- 
ther,that the existence of the freedom of the will may be ar- 
gued,with some degree of force, from the structure of all lan- 
guages. — We have already had occasion to make the remark, 
that every language is, in some important sense of the terms, 
a mirror of the mind ; and that something may be learnt of 
the tendencies of the mind, not only from the form or struc- 
ture of languages in general, but even from the import of 

particidar terms. Now it is undeniable, that the terms 

liberty and freedom and other terms of equivalent import 
are found in all languages ; and that they are not only found 
in application to nations, but to individuals ; and not only 
in application to outward actions, but to the acts of the will. 
But if men are in fact and by their very constitution desti- 
tute of liberty of the will, it seems impossible to give any 
explanation of this state of things. So that it is a natural 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 265 

and irresistible inference, if we can infer the convictions and 
belief of men at all from # the forms of speech, that they uni- 
versally have a conviction and belief of their liberty in that 
respect. And we can give no explanation of the existence 
of such conviction or belief, except on the ground of the 
actual existence of that freedom, to which the belief relates. • 

§.173. Evidence from the occasional suspension of the wilVs acts. 

, Another circumstance, which may be adduced as an in- 
dication and evidence of the freedom of the Will, is the fact 
of the occasional suspension or delay of its operations, when 
its action is solicited by the pressure of motives, which hap- 
pen to be various and conflicting in their kind, though all of 
them are alike powerful and urgent. Without attempting to 
explain, how this suspension takes place, it is enough for our 
present purpose simply to state the fact, as it constantly 
presents itself to observation and notice, viz, that at times, 
when motives are thronging around the will in various direc- 
tions, and are each and all of them clamorous for an action of 
the will favorable to themselves, the will nevertheless does 
not act. It is true some persons will say, and probably with 
correctness, that this negation or suspension of action is it- 
self to be regarded as a species of resolve or voluntary deter- 
mination ; that while the will reserves its.elf, so to speak, for 
a movement based upon more mature enquiry, this very re- 
servation of its action is itself an action. Without stopping 
to comment on this suggestion, it will be # perceived, that the 
essential idea still holds good and indisputable, viz, that the 
will not unfrequently, for some reason or other whatever it 
may be, witholds its decision in respect to claims that are 
urged by motives ^of no small efficacy. And this suspension 
of the wilPs action in respect to such claims, on whatever 
grounds it may happen and whatever other gourse may be 
34 



2'66 OTHER PROOFS OF 

taken by the will, is undoubtedly to be regarded, in a can- 
did view of the subject, as a characteristic and a proof of its ■ 
freedom. 

§. 174. Evidence of the freedom oj the will, from the control 
which every man has over his own motives of action. 

.There are various other considerations, which are enti- 
tled to more or less weight. — We have already seen, in the 
Second Part of this Work, that the will is subject to laws; 
and have further seen, that it never acts, and is not capable 
of acting, except in connection with antecedent motives. But 
it is a striking fact, and one worthy, of special notice in con- 
nection with the will's freedom, that we ourselves have no 
inconsiderable degree of control over these motives. • If the 
reader has in memory the remarks made in the First Part of 
this Work on the connection among all the great depart- 
ments of the mind, particular] y on the relation of the Intel- 
lect to the will and of the Sensibilities to the will, he will 
be prepared to understand and receive the truth of this 
remark. Those*motives, which come in immediate con- 
tact with the will and are most closely connected with 
its action, are deposited, not in the Understanding, but 
in the Sensibilities; are not mere perceptions of the in- 
tellect, but are impregnated with an infusion of desire and 
sentiment. Still they undoubtedly have, a close connection 
with the antecedent acts of the intellect. There must be 
something previously perceived, before there can be either 
desire or emotion. It is impossible, in the nature of things, • 
that we should have the feeling of desire or the feeling of 
obligation, without an antecedent act of the intellect or un- 
derstanding, making known and identifying to us the. partic- 
ular object of desire, and the particular object, to which the 
feeling of mor^l obligation relates. Hence as the sensibili- 
ties act upon the will, and the understanding acts upon the • 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL 



267 



sensibilities, we may in some degree control the will by en- 
lightening the understanding. But it is the will, which, more 
than any thing else, is the counterpart, or the synonym per- 
haps, of the personal pronoun, of the I and We, which. are 
so conspicuously introduced as agents; and it is the will, 
therefore, which, by adopting this. process controls itself. 
The voluntary power, operating through the intellect, may 
contract or expand the horizon of motives, by which it is 
surrounded, and in this way regulate by anticipation the pos- 
sibilities and probabilities, if not the absolute certainty, of 
its own ulterior action. We are presented, therefore, in 
this view of the subject with an instance of self-regulation 
obviously carried on under the control and within the limits 
oflaw, which is not only liberty in essence, but liberty in 
its most interesting and perfect form. 

§ . 175. The freedom of the will further shown from the attempts 
of men to influence, the conduct of their fellow-men. 

The freedom of the will seems to be evinced and proved 
furthermore, from the. manner, in which we address our fel- 
low men, when we wish them to pursue a certain course of 
conduct. When we request or 1 require them to do a certain 
thing,we certainly act on the supposition that they have both 
the power and the liberty to do it. It would evidently be a 
very fruitless thing to attempt by means of persuasion and 
argument to move them in a certain direction, if they were 
■the subjects of an inflexible destiny, and destitute of the power 
and liberty of acting in accordance with what is proposed. 
The view, which men obviously take of their fellow-men is, 
that they are rational beings; that the considerations addres- 
sed to them will have their due weight ; and that their ac- 
ting or not acting in conformity with those "considerations 
is a matter wholly within their own power, and in respect to 
which they are entirely and completely free. 



268 OTHER PROOFS OF 

§, 176. Further evidence from the observation of men's conduct. 

Among other sources of evidence in support of the prop- 
osition of the will's freedom, we may confidently appeal to 
the observation of what is constantly taking place among 
men, as we behold them engaged in the pursuits and duties 
of life'. Even a slight notice of their conduct fully justifies 
the assertion, that men act universally, as if they felt and 
knew themselves to be free. In making this statement how- 
ever, we may properly claim to be understood in the natu- 
ral import of the terms. We speak of men in general, as 
we see them in the discharge of the common duties of life 
and under the influence of ordinary motives; and not of those, 
whose liberty of outward action is restrained by chains and 
dungeons; nor of those, whose inward liberty has been 
perplexed and compromised by inordinate indulgences, which 
inevitably tend to bring the mjnd more or less within .the 
verge of insanity. Within the limitation implied in this re- 
mark, a very slight observation discovers to us, that meu are 
constantly in action; that the causes of- action exist in them- 
selves: and that in all the numberless varieties of their con- 
It 
duct they act freely. One is in pursuit of honor, another of 

pleasure, another of wealth ; one acts from motives of in- 
terest, and another from sentiments of duty; one has solely 
in view the promotion of his own personal welfare, another 
.that of mankind; but in each and all of these cases and in 
all others, there is no declaration and no evidence of com- 
pulsion. And we feel the force of this statement the more, 
when we further notice, that men are frequently changing 
those pursuits to which their attention was directed in the 
first instance ; transferring themselves from one neighbor- 
hood to another, from one sphere of life to another, and 
from one climate to another ; and adapting their feelings 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 269 

and conduct to situations never before experienced. Every- 
where there is life, activity, movement, energy; plans nev- 
er before started; new methods of executing them; the mo- 
tives and conduct of one individual conflicting with those of 
another, and varying constantly to meet conflicting exigen- 
cies. And does all this bear the impress of fatality? Are 
we not to receive these facts as decisive indications of lib- 
erty, even if it be true that we are unable to define what 
liberty is? Can we even conceive of a freedom, which shall 
result in opening a wider sphere, or in securing a greater 
variety of action? 

§. 177. Argued further from the view taken in the Scriptures. 

We conclude this enumeration of circumstances, which 
tend to illustrate and prove the existence of liberty of the 
will, with the single fact further, which no one can regard 
otherwise than as entitled to our serious consideration, that 
the Scriptures clearly recognize man as possessing' such lib- 
erty. If the Scriptures every where assert the omniscience 
and superintendence of God, and announce his superinten- 
dence as extending to the minutest things and events both 
material and immaterial, as seems to be abundantly evident 
and to be universally admitted; still it must be confessed at 
the same time, that they are no less explicit in the announce- 
ment, both expressly and by implication, that man has pow- 
er, freedom, and accountability. All those passages, which 
call upon men to consider of their ways, obviously imply, 
that there is no obstruction in the way of their considering; 
and that they are free either to do or . not to do it. All 
those passages, which exhort and require men to repent of 
their deeds, obviously imply that they are in the possession 
of liberty, and that there is no obstacle in the way of their 
repentance, which is inconsistent with liberty. All those 
passages, which enjoin upon men the performance of moral 



270 OTHER PROOFS OF 

and religious duties, go upon the supposition, that obedience 
and disobedience are alike within the sphere of their choice; 
according, as it is said in Job, " if they obey they shall 
spend their days in prosperity; if they obey not, they shall 
perish by the sword." Nothing could be more unmeaning 
and insincere, than a multitude of passages, which might 
be brought forward, if it were true that man is not in the 
possession of liberty of will; if it were true that all his vo- 
litions are put forth under the pressure of an irresistible 
compulsion ; that he is truly and unavoidably in all his ac- 
tions under a' mental constraint. " Turn ye, turn ye, from 
your evil ways ; for why will ye die, house of Israel ;" is 
the beautiful and affecting language, which God utters to 
his ancient covenant people and to all his impenitent chil- 
dren of all nations. But how ungenerous and taunting and 
hypocritical it must appear; how inconsistent with the spot- 
less holiness of God's character ;• how like giving tears. for 
drink and ashes for bread ; if we are to suppose, that men 
labour under a natural inability of turning, and that they are 
not truly possessed of freedom of the will! 

§. 178. Practical importance of the doctrine of liberty. 

. If we have not stated the argument on the side of free- 
dom so clearly and forcibly, and so much at length, as might 
have been done, the deficiency occasions the less solicitude, 
when we consider, that in all ages of the world the doctrine 
in question, with few exceptions, has been fully and univer- 
sally admitted. Still there have been found some persons 
from time to time, who have maintained and have believed 
the opposite; and have strenuously endeavored to give a 
currency to their opinions. And hence, in closing these re- 
marks on the subject of the freedom of the will, it seems a 
suitable opportunity to say something on its practical im- 
portance. If we are destitute of freedom, we certainly can- 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 211 

not feel moral jaccountability ; and whatever course we may 
take in life, even if it be entirely injurious and sinful, we 
shall yet feel, that we are not properly the subjects of blame. 
Before, therefore, we adopt the notion of man's destitution 
of liberty, (if indeed it be possible after a due consideration 
of what has been said on the subject,) we should carefully 
and seriously consider the consequences. 

For the purpose of showing, that these intimations are 
not based upon unfounded or exaggerated fears, and in or- 
der more clearly to illustrate the pernicious consequences, 
to which erroneous notions on this subject are apt to lead, 
we take the liberty to introduce here an extract, from the 
.writings of the celebrated M. Diderot. — " Examine it nar- 
rowly, says M. Diderot, and you will see, that the word 
liberty is a word devoid of meaning ; that there are not, and 
that there cannot be free beings ; that we are only what ac- 
cords with the general order, with our organization, our ed- 
ucation, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invin- 
cibly. We can no more conceive of a being acting without a 
motive than we can of one of the arms of a balance acting 
without a' weight. The motive is always exterior and for- 
eign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. 
What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, 
joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confoun- 
ding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often 
Braised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed 
others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing 
that we, and they toill and act freely. But if there is no 
liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; 
neither vice nor virtue ; nothing that ought either to be re- 
warded or punished. What then is the distinction among 
men? The doing of good and the doing of ill! The doer of 
ill is one who must be destroyed or punished. The doer of 
good is lucky, not virtuous. But though neither the doer of 



372 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

good or of ill be free, man is nevertheless a being to be mod- 
ified ; it is for this reason the doer of ill should be destroy- 
ed upon the scaffold. From thence the good effects of educa- 
tion, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of poverty, &c; 
from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly attached to 
the good, nor more angry with the wicked, than the whirl- 
wind which fills one's eyes with dust." 

It seems to be unnecessary to spend time in commenting 
on this passage, which does as little credit to the heart as 
the head of its author, and which is as much at variance with 
sound philosophy, as it is with good morals and the existence 
of society. Whereever such pernicious principles have gain- 
ed a footing, it is not surprising, that the intellect should be. 
obscured ; that the sensibilities should be blunted ; that- the 
ear should be closed to the names of truth and honour ;that 
the eye should be sealed to the effulgence of moral beauty ; 
that crimes, dreadfully revolting to human nature, should be 
multiplied ; that even whole kingdoms should be convulsed, 
and clothed in mourning and blood. 

Let us, then, take that true position, which is clearly 
pointed out both by reason and the Scriptures, of humble de- 
pendence on God on the one hand, and of solemn respon- 
sibility for our conduct on the other. It is impossible for us 
to form too high notions of the power, wisdom, and super- 
intendence of the Deity ; nothing is more favourable to 
virtue than the conviction of his constant presence and over- 
sight ; but at the same time we ought ever to remember, 
that he has seen fit to impart to us a moral nature, embracing 
the elements both of power and liberty ; and whether we 
account this gift as ten talents' or five or only one, he holds 
us responsible for its use, and will punish the slothful ser- 
vant, who hides it in the earth. " For ivlwsoever hath, to him 
shall be given, and he shall. have more abundance ; but whosoever 
hath not, from him shall be taken aivay even that he hath." 



CHAPTER SIXTH. 



CONSISTENCY OF LAW AND FREEDOM, 



§. 179, Objected that the views maintained are contradictory. 

We are now so far advanced in our inquiries as to find 
ourselves in a position, where we are met by the objection, 
expressed with some variety of phraseology but in all cases 
to this effect, that there is an utter inconsistency and contra- 
diction between the two doctrines of the freedom of the 
will and the subjection of the will to laws. If the will is 
free, it is said, it cannot be subject to laws ; and if it is sub- 
ject to laws, it cannot be free; and at any rate there is some- 
thing utterly incomprehensible in this state of things. — The 
consideration of this objection will occupy our attention in 
this Chapter ; and at the same time will incidentally furnish 
an opportunity for some remarks, which may not be unim- 
portant in their practical applications. 

§. 180. Answered that they result necessarily from the evidence. 

In remarking upon the objection, which has just been 

stated, and which undoubtedly exists in the minds of some 
35 



274 CONSISTENCY OF 

candid inquirers, we wish it to be noticed, in the first place, 
that each of these two propositions, viz, that the will is sub- 
ject to laws, and that the will is free, rests upon its appropri- 
ate evidence. We take it for granted, that they are propo- 
sitions, which have a meaning and which can be understood; 
and that as such they admit of the application of reasoning, 
and are susceptible either of affirmation or denial. In reas- 
oning upon them, they have been made separate sub- 
jects of contemplation. The arguments, by which they are 
respectively supported , are entirely distinct ; and are at the 
same time so appropriate to the nature of the subject to be 
proved, and, considered as a whole, bear upon it with sa 
much force, that it is difficult to conceive, how a well-balanc- 
ed mind, which is open to the reception of truth, can resist 
the conclusions, to which they lead. — And in making this'as- 
sertion, we do not wish to be understood as offering a re- 
mark, which is to be taken with some modification and dim- 
inution of its obvious import. The remark is based upon 
thexonstitution of the mind itself; particularly so far as the 
nature and laws of belief are concerned in and make a part 
of that constitution. Every one knows, that our belief is 
not a matter, which is under our control, in such a sense that 
we can believe or not believe, as we happen to choose. The 
mind is so constituted, that Ave exercise belief, not in accor- 
dance with a mere and direct act of volition, but in accord- 
ance with the nature and amount of the evidence, which 
happens to be before the mind at the precise moment of be- 
lief. 

And with this view of things in memory, we feel fully 
authorized in saying, that the evidence, which has been 
brought forward in support of the proposition of the will's 
subjection to laws, is such as in ordinary cases to remove 
all doubt. We look upon the proposition as proved ; not 
merely as probable, but as certain. It is not a matter, the 



LAW AND FREEDOM. 275 

reception and credence of which is left to our own choice ; 
but, on the contrary, such is the constitution of the human 
mfnd, we cannot possibly do otherwise than believe. — And 
these statements will apply equally well to both propositions. 
The proposition of the will's freedom is attended with such 
an amount of evidence, appropriate to the point to be es- 
tablished*, as to be equally beyond doubt, equally certain. 
We receive both with a full and unwavering conviction; and 
such are the nature and fundamental principles of belief, 
that we are unable to withhold such conviction. 

If then our belief involves what appears to us at present 
an inconsistency or even a contradiction, (we do not say, 
what we know to be a contradiction but what appears to be 
such,) it is a matter which we cannot help, and in respect to 
which, although we might wish it to be otherwise, we should 
give ourselves no unnecessary trouble. We are in the same 
situation, (certainly not a less favorable one,) as the sincere 
inquirer in other things. Does the natural philosopher, in 
pursuing the investigation of facts, stop to inquire what doc- 
trines formerly received it will either favor or conflict with, 
what system it will build up or put down, what new and in- 
explicable mysteries it will involve ? Is he not obliged to 
adhere to the testimony, that is fairly presented to him, 
wherever it may go; even if it should lead into a world not 
of pure light, but of mingled darkness and light? And in 
like manner, in respect to the question before us, let us go 
firmly and frankly wherever the evidence conducts ; even if 
it should be found to lead us, as no doubt it will, to a great 
mystery, where the human mind stops and starts back, appal- 
led on the one hand by its own feebleness, and on the other 
overwhelmed by the greatness of the divine wisdom. 

§. 181. Denial of the alledged contradiction. 

In answer, therefore, to the objection which has been re- 



276 CONSISTENCY OF 

ferred to, we say in the first place, that we are bound by 
the evidence, whatever difficulties may attend the relative 
adjustment of the results. If the objection were to some in- 
tent a valid and admissible one, (that is to say, if there 
were truly an appearance, a degree of probability, of incon- 
sistency arid contradiction,) this answer would be sufficient. 
But it is proper to say further,that there is no satisfactory 
evidence, either in a higher or lower degree, of the inconsis- 
tency and contradiction, Which has been alledged to exist. 
It has undoubtedly sometimes happened, either by design 
or from mere Carelessness, that men have so framed their 
speech, have so selected and constructed their formulary of 
words, as to make a contradiction, when there is none in the 
nature of things, and none in fact. If we define freedom to 
be an exemption from law, then no doubt the proposition of 
the will's subjection to law implies the exclusion of liberty. 
But, although bodily freedom can be defined, mental free- 
dom, as we have already had occasion to remark, is not sus- 
ceptible of definition; it is something indeed, which is a mat- 
ter of experience and is known by consciousness, but like 
the simple and elementary ideas of identity, duration, space, 
power, Unity, and the like, it cannot be described by words. 
And if it were otherwise, the definition of liberty above 
mentioned would be wholly inadmissible; for exemption 
from law is so far from constituting liberty, that it might be 
shown upon grounds entirely satisfactory, that there can be 
iio liberty, not even a possibility of it, where law has no 
place. So that we feel fully authorized in saying, although 
we are under the necessity of leaving the inquiry with these 
few words, that there is no evidence of contradiction in the 
case. 

§. 182. Admission of inexplicableneSs or mystery. 
But if it be merely said, that there is something inexpli- 



LAW AND FREEDOM. 277 

•cable or incomprehensible, something mysterious in the rela- 
tion of the two propositions, which have been considered, it 
is not easy to deny, that there is truth in the remark. We 
cannot imagine, that there is any undue humiliation, any 
thing discreditable in the acknowledgement, that such is the 
fact. Nothing is more certain than that there are many 
things, into the full measure of whose length and breadth 
and height and depth, the human mind, in the present state 
of existence and under the present economy of things, 
has never been able to penetrate. And it is undoubt- 
edly the mark of true wisdom, frankly to acknowledge 
our ignorance in those cases where it must infallibly 
exist, and not to indulge either in pretensions which 
are unfounded, or in complaints which are useless. Such 
advice indeed may not be entirely acceptable to men 
of a captious temper or of an intellect imperfectly dis- 
ciplined; but it is fully warranted by correct views of our 
own powers, and of the relations we sustain to other beings. 
"The most enlightened of men, says Robert Hall, have al- 
ways been the first to perceive and acknowledge the remain- 
ing obscurity which hung around them; just as, in the 
night, the further a light extends, the wider the surrounding 
sphere of darkness appears. Hence it has always been ob- 
served, that the most profound inquirers into nature have 
been the most modest and humble." These remarks of a 
writer, so distinguished, not only for refinement of taste and 
fervour of piety, but for philosophical acuteness, naturally 
remind us of some sayings of Mr. Locke, which indicate at 
the same time his characteristic modesty and candour, and 
his vie\Vs of the very difficulty which we are now examin- 
ing. " I own f/eely to you the weakness of my understan- 
ding, that, though it be unquestionable that there is omnip- 
otence and omniscience in God our Maker, and though I 
cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am 



278 CONSISTENCY OF 

free, yet I cannot make, [meaning undoubtedly that he could, 
not explain and clear up in all respects how it should be so,] 
freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omni- 
science in God, though 1 am as fully persuaded of both as of any 
truth Imost firmly assent to; and therefore I have long since 
given off the consideration of that question,resolving all into 
tluVshort conclusion, thafif it be possible for God to make a 
free agent, then man is free,though I see not the way of it," 

<§. 183. Of the limited powers of the human mind. 

In this connection, and as tending to support the views 
of this Chapter, we think it proper to make a few general 
suggestions in respect to the limited powers of the human 
mind. We may regard it as a well established principle, 
that the mind of man, although it may be indefinitely pro- 
gressive in some directions, is subject to the restriction of 
impassible barriers in others. How many objects of knowl- 
edge, in the sphere of material as well as mental nature, 
have altogether set at nought the inquiries of men! Be- 
yond the boundaries, whatever they may be, which God has 
assigned as the barriers of our faculties, is the land of dark- 
ness, the region of hieroglyphics, the habitation of myste- 
ries. We use these expressions not in lightness of spirit,but 
merely to convey the fact as it exists, and with profound ven- 
eration; for if those dark and mysterious places are not occu- 
pied by the human mind, it is certain that they are occupied 
and filled by another mind infinitely greater. The existence 
of mysteries, beyond its allotted sphere of action and inqui- 
ry, is necessarily an incident to every created mind; for the 
mere fact of being created necessarily implies inferiority ; 
and that too in perception as Avell as in power In one sense 
indeed, it may be admitted, that man is great, and the hon- 
ored possessor of great and wonderful faculties. Certainly 
this is the ease, when we compare him with the lower ani- 



LAW AND FREEDOM. 279 

mals, that have no moral nature, and seem destined soon to 
perish. But let' him never forget, that under other circum- 
stances the view presented is entirely the reverse, and that 
he is as blind in intellect as he is poor in power, in compari- 
son with God. He", who suitably realizes the relation 
which he sustains to the all-wise Jehovah, will not presume 
to compare his feeble intellect with the infinite Godhead; 
his understanding of yesterday just kindling into light and 
life, with the everlasting Sun of knowledge, ever effulgent 
and inexhaustible. Let this modesty of true, wisdom, so 
suitable on every subject, have its due place in the matter 
under examination . If we cannot see how the subjection 
of the will to law is consistent with its freedom, while irres- 
istible evidence compels us to believe both the liberty and 
the law, let us arraign our incapacity rather than the proof 
before us. 

§. 184. We find things which cannot be explained every where. 

If there were no other mysteries in the universe but the 
one in question, it might be thought less reasonable to sub- 
mit quietly to our inability to explain it. But they are found 
all around us ; they exist every where ; and every where 
baffle our curiosity. We generally suppose it to be other- 
wise, because it may happen that we are unable to point them 
out; but our inability to do this is owing to the fact of our 
not having given attention to the subject. We do indeed 
sometimes direct our attention to the mysteries, which are 
placed at a distance from us ; but it is seldom that we look 
at those, which are near at hand. In the time of the Apostle 
Paul, the opposers of Christianity objected particularly to 
the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead, on account of 
its being so mysterious, inexplicable, and wonderful ; but 
they did not consider, till the Apostle reminded them of the 
fact, that the conversion of the seed sown in the ground into 



280 CONSISTENCY OF 

the stalk or plant is no less wonderful, no less mysterious. 
Perhaps we might be justified in going so far as to say, 
there is nothing, however familiar it may be, which is not 
in some of its aspects replete with mystery. 

Can we explain how the seul and bt>dy exist and act to- 
gether ? Can we understand how God, who is a spirit, can 
fill all places with his presence ? Can we comprehend, how 
under any circumstances mind, which is so entirely distinct, 
can operate upon matter and put it in motion, as is the fact in 
our ordinary acts of volition ? Can we explain the opera- 
tions of matter itself, even the growth of a blade of grass ? 
Do not the most familiar appearances of nature, though easily 
explainable in some things, present in others insuperable dif- 
ficulties ? And why then should we account it particularly 
unbooked for and strange, that, in the two distinct doctrines 
of the will's freedom and the will's subjection to law, we 
should find something, Avhich withstands our penetration and 
baffles our sagacity ? 

§. 185. Illustrated from the influence of one man over another. 

We would furthermore propose to- such as are disposed 
to insist upon the difficulty under consideration, that the 
same difficulty, or at least one closely analogous, is constantly 
occurring in common life. We refer to the fact, which is too 
obvious to admit of any denial, that one man is capable of 
controlling, and does in fact control, the will of another. 
By his wealth, or personal address, or persuasive language, 
or powers of reasoning he bends his neighbour to his own 
purposes. This is seen particularly in the case of the orator, 
who addresses the public assembly ; and who sometimes 
not only sways the individuals composing it to his own pur- 
poses, but does it against the views and the determinations, 
which they had previously formed. Now here is a case,where, 
according to the common understanding of it, the will of one 



LAW AND FREEDOM. 2gJ 

man or of many men is under the control of another ; and 
yet it is not the common understanding or the common feel- 
ing, that the will of the former is not free. Here is a case, 
in which law and liberty are, by our own admission, united 
together; subjection and freedom are found in a state of com- 
bination. And why should we say, that what is possi- 
ble with men is impossible with God? 

§. 186. The opposite supposition attended with equal difficulty. 

But there is another consideration, which is worthy of 
the attention of the objector. — Before we arraign the views, 
which have been given, it seems proper to look at the results 
of the opposite scheme. If we exonerate the action of the 
will from the influence of all law, and leave it to the irregu- 
lar control of what may be variously termed accident, indif- 
erency,or contingency, we do not thereby secure its freedom. 
Can that mind be free,which knows not at one moment, nor 
can even conjecture, what may be its position, its acts, or its 
destiny at the next moment ? It is very much in the position 
of that people, who are under the direction of an irresponsi- 
ble despotism, compared with which, a despotism,which is in 
any degree subject to law, is quite tolerable. A will without 
law is necessarily subjected to the highest despotism. At one 
moment the volition may be in one direction; the next in a 
direction altogether opposite, without the ability to secure 
any fixed result. And it seems to be impossible in the na- 
ture of things, that man should be conscious, (and its exis- 
tence and nature are learnt from consciousness alone,) of 
freedom under such circumstances. It is wholly inconceiva- 
ble. So that, let the question be argued as it may, it will 
always be found in the human mind, as in civil government^ 
that law is the basis of liberty. 
36 



282 CONSISTENCY OF 

§. 187. Both views are to be fully received. 

In respect, then, to the two distinct doctrines of the will's 
freedom and its subjection to law, there remains nothing to 
be done, but the cheerful, ready, and complete reception of 
both. And with the views which we entertain, the outlines 
of which have been imperfectly laid before the reader, we 
are constrained earnestly to insist upon this, as the only cor- 
rect and satisfactory position. The doctrine, that the will 
has its laws, is very important, considered in connection 
with the relation, which men sustain to the Supreme Being. 
This view places the will in subordination to that higher and 
more glorious Intelligence, from whom the laws, to which 
it is amenable, proceed. By adopting this doctrine, we are 
enabled to understand, how his full and perfect superinten- 
dence can be maintained. He has himself assured us, that 
he is intimately acquainted with the outward actions of men, 
that he knoweth their down-sitting and up-rising; and it is 
a pleasing and consoling thought, that his care and exact 
scrutiny may be extended even to the mind itself. Who 
will not rejoice to be, in soul as well as in body, in the 
hands of God? Who will feel, that there could be any bet- 
ter provision for his security, than is thus furnished by the 
constancy and nearness of the Divine presence? Who will 
attach any value even to independence itself, when purcha- 
sed at the measureless expense of an exemption from the su- 
perintendence of the Deity ? 

§. 188. The doctrine of the will's freedom equally important 
with that of its subjection to law. 

On the other hand the doctrine, that the will is free, in 
any correct and intelligible sense of that term, is of equal 
practical importance, since it is obviously essential to man's 



LAW AND FREEDOM, 283 

moral character and accountableness. It is a great truth, 
which demands to be received with entire and unwavering 
confidence, that God has made man in his own image; and 
that in doing this he has seen fit to constitute him with the 
attributes of freedom and power, as well as with the other 
attributes, which are requisite to a rational and morally ac- 
countable nature. In the sphere which is given him, (a lim- 
ited one undoubtedly, but still actually existing, and always 
on the increase,) he has not only the ability, but is under the 
requisition of acting for himself. No plea of inability can 
ever be admitted as an excuse for negligence, still less for 
utter inaction. There are claims, therefore, binding upon 
every man, which he cannot resist. So that the truest and 
highest philosophy is to be found in that passage of Scrip- 
ture, " Work out your own salvation with fear and trem- 
bling, for it is God which worketh in you both to will and 
to do, of his own good pleasure." It expresses the great 
truth, and we may add, the great mystery, of the harmonious 
combination of power and dependence. And it is the same in 
other things as in religion, that, if we will act for ourselves 
under the impulse of right feelings, our Maker will take 
compassion upon us, and act in our behalf ; that, if we will 
faithfully do our duty, God will be as faithful to help us. 
Not an hour is spent in effort of any kind, in conformity 
with the directions of an enlightened conscience, and to use 
those famous expressions of Milton, 

As ever in our great Task-master's eye, 
which is not attended with a divine blessing. The doctrine 
of a combination of power on the part of men with complete 
superintendence on the part of God, brings God and men in- 
to harmony with each other; it fully makes men co-workers 
with God, and yet under the two fold condition, without 
which God can neither be a sovereign nor man a moral agent, 
of responsibility and dependence. 



CHAPTER SEVENTH. 



ENTHRALMENT OR SLAVERY OF THE WILL. 



§. 189. Of. the occasions of mental enthralment. 

It here seems to come in course to offer some explana- 
tions on what may be termed the Enthralment or slavery of 
the will. The explanation of this subject, however difficult 
it might prove when undertaken separate from and indepen- 
dent of other views of the will, seems to follow easily, and 
we may add, almost necessarily, from the views, which have 
been taken of the freedom of the voluntary power. It has 
appeared from various remarks made in preceding chapters, 
that a knowledge of freedom, as actually existing in the 
mind in general or in any part of the mind, can be possessed 
only by means of our own personal Consciousness. And it 
has furthermore appeared, that the circumstances or occasion, 
on which mental freedom actually exists in the highest de- 
gree, is to be found in the harmony of the mind's action. Jn 
other words, freedom exists in fact and exists in the highest 
degree, when all the mental powers are in the precise place, 
which their Creator designed for them, and when their oper- 
ations are conducted without their coming 1 into conflict with 



ENTHRALMENT OF THE WILL. 285 

each other. This is a position of the mental powers, which 
by the very nature of the mind is incidental and prerequisite 
to the highest degree of freedom; and every, deviation from 
it is attended with an interruption and diminution of that 
perfection of inward liberty, which men would otherwise 
possess. 

But if this view in respect to freedom be a correct one, 
then we are naturally led to suppose and to believe, that the 
precise opposite will be found to furnish the prerequisite cir- 
cumstance or the occasion of mental cnthralment. And such 
is undoubtedly the fact. In other words, whenever we find 
an internal jarring and conflict, whenever one power over- 
leaps its bounds and another is jostled from its place, we are 
conscious of want of freedom in a greater or less degree, or, 
what is the same thing, of enthralment or slavery. And es- 
pecially we have a sense of this internal enthralment, when- 
ever, in consequence of some inordinate appetite or some 
victorious propensity or passion, that presiding authority, 
which is lodged in the will, fails to execute what it obvious- 
ly ought to, and what the conscience pronounces to be right 
and requires to be done. 

§. 190. Inability to define enthralment or slavery. 

. But what is meant by enthralment or slavery ? What 
verbal definition can we give? — If the question related to 
the enthralment or slavery of the body, we could probably 
give a statement, or definition perhaps, that would fully and 
precisely meet the question. But we have already had oc- 
casion distinctly to intimate, that the nature of corporeal en- 
thralment and liberty throws no light, or at most but a fee- 
ble and doubtful ray, upon that of the mind. We are not 
more able, by any mere form of words, to explain what is 
meant by slavery, when that term is applied to the mind, 
than we are to define mental freedom. In both cases we 



286 ENTHRALMENT OE 

are obliged to refer each one to his own internal experience; 
but with a full conviction at the same time, that this refer- 
ence will fully answer the purpose, and cannot leave him in 
doubt. 

On the supposition, therefore, that each one as fully un- 
derstands what is meant by enthralment as by freedom, and 
that there is no mistake or doubt in either case, we repeat 
again, that, whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, 
there is always a greater or less degree of enthralment. 
This want of harmony, this internal jarring and conflict, this 
aggression and resistance of the mental powers will always 
exist, whenever any appetite, propensity, or passion of what- 
ever character swells over its allotted limits, and becomes un- 
duly and inordinately powerful. If we may be allowed to 
use such expressions, every part of the mind instinctively 
knows its appropriate place, and w ill not suffer itself to be 
thrust from it without much remonstrance and resistance. 
If such resistance is not successful, and if some one inward 
principle, without regard to the original constitution of the 
mind and the equitable admonitions of conscience, usurps an 
undue control over others, we are conscious of what we may 
properly term mental slavery; at least in respect to that 
particular part or faculty, which especially suffers under this 
usurpation. 

§. 191. The nature of mental enthralment illustrated by a ref- 
ference to extorted promises. 

It may possibly be found difficult for the reader at first 
to apprehend the view here given, (and the same may be said 
perhaps of various other topics which have come under our 
notice,) in consequence of such apprehension depending so 
much on his own internal reflection. That he must look 
within, and consult what takes place there, is true. And as 
it is undoubtedly desirable, that such internal reflection 



SLAVERY. OF THE WILL. 287 

should be called into exercise as much as possible, we will 
endeavour to aid it by some instances. — We will take the 
case of a man, who is travelling through an extensive forest, 
and unexpectedly meets with robbers. They suddenly pre- 
sent their pistols to him, and threaten him with immediate 
death, unless he promises to deposit a certain sum in a speci- 
fied place on a certain day. He promises that he will do it. 
And it is an obvious question here, what is the view, which 
men of plain common sense and the community generally 
take of such a transaction ? They evidently do not consid- 
er it on the same footing with a promise made under other 
circumstances; they do not regard it as a bona fide promise 
and morally binding, even when they judge it expedient, in 
view of some incidental circumstances, that it should be ful- 
filled. They always make a distinction,(and it is a distinction 
which is fully recognised in law both Municipal and Inter- 
national,) between an extorted promise and a free promise. 
And if an extorted promise is actually different from a free 
one, it must be because extortion implies a degree of enthral- 
ment. And this is the fact. 

When the question of life and death is placed before a 
man at once, and without giving him time for reflection and 
for strengthening his resolves, the fear becomes so exces- 
sive that there is no sort of proportion between the strength 
of the motive, and that of other principles within him, which 
might furnish the elements of resistance. Those supports,up- 
on which the will is wont to rely in seasons of trying assault 
and great emergency, are suddenly overthrown ; and it is 
prostrated and carried away captive almost without a conflict. 
The person himself, if the circumstances are of a nature so 
decisive as has been stated, experiences no convictions of 
guilt for subsequently violating a promise made under such 
a mental pressure, nor is he condemned by the moral sense 
of the community at large,' They perceive almost instinc- 



288 ENTHRALMENT OR 

tively, that by a sudden comjuncture of circumstances, for 
which the individual is not himself responsible, the due bal- 
ance and harmony of the powers of the mind has been de- 
stroyed ; and that it is unreasonable in such a state of things 
to expect results, which can properly be the subjects either 
of praise or blame. 

§. 192. Illustration of the same subject from cases oj torture. 

We may propose another illustration; "which will help to 
make the subject more fully and clearly understood. In for- 
mer ages it was no uncommon practice to put persons to the 
torture, in order to obtain their testimony. They were first 
subjected to the darkness and privations of a dungeon ; and 
after being worn down by this gradual form of suffering, 
their feet were applied to heated plates of iron ; their flesh 
was burnt and torn by pincers ; their limbs were wrenched 
and almost forced asunder ; and in these, and in various 
other ways they were compelled to endure almost every pos- 
sible degree of misery. And it was not unfrequently the 
case, that persons under this extremity of suffering uttered 
what was untrue. But no one thinks of condemning the 
moral delinquency, if it existed at all under such circumstan- 
ces, as equalling the aggravation of a falsehood uttered in ordi- 
nary cases. In all such cases every body perceives and feels, 
that the due balance and harmony of the mind is destroyed. 
Such an extreme pressure is brought to bear upon the mind 
in a particular direction, that its parts become, for the time 
being, dislocated, and utterly incapable of any just and ac- 
countable action. In other words there is an utter slavery 
of the voluntary power, and as the individual is not the 
cause of putting himself in this situation, we often only sym- 
pathize and pity, when we should otherwise condemn. It 
is indeed possible for as to condemn in some degree, when 
the suffering does not appear to be extreme; but the con- 



SLAVERY QF THE WILL 



289 



demnation is always mitigated, and in many cases does not 
exist at all. 

"The common sense of mankind, says Mr. Stewart, pro- 
nounces men to be accountable for their conduct, only in so 
far as they are understood to be morally free. Whence is 
it, that we consider the pain of the rack as an alleviation of 
the falsehoods extorted from the criminal? Plainly because 
the motives presented to him are supposed to be such as no 
ordinary degree of self-command is able to resist. And if 
we were only satisfied, that these motives are perfectly irres- 
istible, we would not ascribe to him any guilt at all."*— This 
is undoubtedly the true philosophy in this matter. 

§. 193. Historical illustrations of the subject. 

And here, with the permission of the reader, we will in- 
troduce a piece of literary history, which we find in D'lsra- 
eli, who, in his attempts to interest the curiosity and to give 
pleasure, has in various passages thrown much light upon 
the human mind. In the reign of Charles First of England, 
a man by the name of Felton, the assassinator of the Duke 
of Buckingham, was menaced with torture for the purpose 
and with the expectation of extracting from him the names 
of his accomplices. The communication, that it was the 
king's pleasure, that he should be put to the torture, was 
made to him by Lord Dorset, who accordingly gave him no- 
tice to prepare for the rack. Felton, after solemnly affirming 
that his purpose to commit the crime was not known to any 
man living, said; " but if it be his majesty's pleasure, I am 
ready to suffer whatever his majesty will have inflicted upon 
me. Yet this I must tell you by the way, that if I be put upon 
the rack J will accuse you,myLord Dorset,and none but yourself. "f 

♦Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix I. §. 3. 
t D' Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, Vol. Ill 
37 



2 o ENTHRALMENT OR 

Here is a text in ethical casuistry, affording abundant food 
for meditation. Felton foresaw, that it would probably 
be impossible for him to endure the suffering which would 
be inflicted ; that he would be under a mental necessity 
of accusing somebody; and he considered it of but little 
consequence whom he should name under such circumstan- 
ces, inasmuch as it could not rightfully be regarded either 
as a proof of falsehood in himself or of guilt in others. 
And was he not essentially right? Can a man be consider- 
ed as justly accountable for what is extracted from him under 
the pressure of the intense sufferings of the torture. 

In Fox's well known History of Christian Martyrdoms, 
a book where fiendish cruelty is arrayed side by side with 
transcendant virtue, there is an account of a Portuguese 
young lady resident in the city of Lisbon, who was taken 
up by the inquisitors and ordered to be put to the rack. Un- 
able to endure the torments that were inflicted, she confes- 
sed the charges brought against her. " The cords were then 
slackened, says the historian, and she was reconducted to 
her cell, where she remained till she had recovered the use 
of her limbs; she was then brought again before the tribu- 
nal, and ordered to ratify her confession. This she abso- 
lutely refused to do, telling them that what she had said was 
forced from her by the excessive pain she underwent. The 
inquisitors, incensed at this reply, ordered her again to be 
put to the rack, when the weakness of nature once more pre- 
vailed, and she repeated her former confession. She was 
immediately remanded to her cell: and being a third time 
brought before the inquisitors, they ordered her to sign her 
first and second confessions. She answered as before, but 
added, (( I have twice given way to the frailty of the flesh, 
and perhaps may, while on the rack, be weak enough to do 
so again; but depend upon it, if you torture me a hundred 



SLAVERY OF THE WILL. 291 

times, as soon as I am released from the rack I shall deny 
what was extorted, from me by pain."* 

Such illustrations and facts show clearly and decisively, 
that there is such a thing as mental enthralment ; that it is 
not a mere fiction, hut exists as truly and undeniably as en- 
thralment of the body. And such being the fact, it becomes 
an important subject both of philosophical and ethical in- 
quiry. 

§. 194. The will enthralled hy the indulgence of the appetites. 

With these general explanations before us on the nature 
of Mental Slavery, and in particular of the slavery of the 
will, we are the better prepared to contemplate the subject 

by going more into particulars. We have instances of the 

prostration and enslavement of the will, unhappily too often 
witnessed, in the undue indulgence of the appetites. Look 
at the man, who habitually indulges himself in the use of ar- 
dent spirits. Every time he carries the intoxicating potion 
to his lips, the sensation of taste, in accordance with the 
law of our nature that the various states of the mind become 
more prompt and vigorous in their exercise by repetition, 
acquires an increased degree of pleasantness. At the same 
time, the feeling of uneasiness, when the sensation is not 
indulged by drinking, is increased in a corresponding de- 
gree ; and of course the desire, which is necessarily atten- 
dant upon the uneasy feeling, becomes in like manner more 
and more importunate and imperative. During all this time 
the internal harmony of the mind is interrupted. The other 
parts of the mind revolt, if we may so speak, against the 
usurpations of this unholy and destructive desire. The rea- 
son points out the evil consequences ; the natural de- 
sire of esteem throws itself in front of the enemy; the 
conscience remonstrates and calls aloud; the will sum- 
* Universal History of Christian Martyrdom, Bk. V, § 2d. 



292 ENTHRALMENT OR 

mons up its strength and makes a serious resistance. But 
the desire, growing daily stronger and stronger, gains 
the victory over one opponent after another ; it tramples 
on the innate regard for the good opinion of others; it 
stops the hearing and puts out the eyes of conscience ; it 
pays no regard to the admonitions of reason ; like a strong 
man armed, it violently seizes the will, binds it hand and 
foot, and hurls it into the dust. What slavery can be more 
dreadful than this? The victim of this tremendous usurpa- 
pation, which he has fostered and brought about by his own 
wicked indulgences, is driven about in various directions, 
like the men of Scripture who were possessed with devils; 
and at, last forced over the precipice with his eyes open, he 
plunges down into the bottomless depths. 

§, 195. Enthralment of the will occasioned by predominant 
and overruling propensities. 

We. may apply these views to other active principles of a 
higher order than the appetites, such as the propensities and 
passions or affections. It is well understood, that our pro- 
pensities and passions of whatever kind, as well as the ap- 
petites, grow stronger and stronger by repetition. And 
there are not unfrequently cases, where they have become 
so intense after years of such repetition, as to control, or, in 
other words, enthral the voluntary power almost entirely. 
And we accordingly proceed to remark, that one of the most 
common and lamentable forms, in which mental slavery ex- 
ists, is the desire of wealth. We sometimes find men so en- 
tirely absorbed in this pursuit as to annihilate them, as it 
were, to every thing else. It so completely occupies every 
thought and feeling as to exclude all other objects, and to 
render them mentally debased and subjugated to the lowest 
degree. There have been men of great wealch, who were 
so entirely under the influence of avarice, that they could 



SLAVERY OP THE WILL. 293 

not be persuaded to expend enough for the common comforts 
of life, and who would even gather up the cast off clothes 
and sticks and nails, that are found in the street, to add 
something, even the merest trifle, to their heaps of treasure. 
We have some account of the characteristics of the insane 
Auri fames, as he terms it, in the medical writings of Dr. 
Good, an acute and laborious observer of nature, both in her 

material and immaterial forms. " The passion of Avarice 

has not a stirring property of any kind belonging to it, but 
benumbs and chills every energy of the body as well as of 
the soul, like the stream of Lethe: even the imagination is 
rendered cold and stagnant, and the only passions with 
which it forms a confederacy, are the miserable train of 
gloomy fear, suspicion, and anxiety. The body grows thin 
in the midst of wealth,the limbs totter though surrounded by 
cordial s,and the man voluntarily starves himself in the grana- 
ry of plenty, not from the want of appetite, but from a dread 
of giving way to it. The individual, who is in such a state 
of mind, must be estranged upon this point, howmuchsoever 
he may be at home upon others. Yet these are cases that are 
daily occurring, and have been in all ages: though perhaps 
one of the most curious is that related by Valerius Maximus 
of a miser, who took advantage of a famine to sell a mouse 
for two hundred pence, and then famished himself with the 
money in his pocket And hence the madness of the cove- 
tous man has been the subject of sarcasm and ridicule by 
moralists and dramatic writers of every period, of which we 
have sufficient examples in the writings of Aristophanes, 
Lucian, and Moliere."* 

§. 196. The will enthralled by inordinate ambition. 

The love of power, or ambition in any of its forms, if it 
gain an uncontrolled ascendency, will be found to cause such 

* Good's Study of Medicine, Vol. IV, p. 132. Cooper's Ed. 



294 ENTHRALMENT OR 

a degree of pressure upon the domains of the will, as great- 
ly to perplex and even enthral its action. It will not avail 
the individual, who is the subject of this inordinate ambition, 
that he is not wanting in energy of character ; that he is in 
ordinary cases a man of great promptness and decision. 
There is no efficiency or energy of the will so great, either 
originally or by culture, as not to be perplexed, weakened, 
and in some of the circumstances of its action entirely over- 
thrown by the inordinate increase of this passion. And we 
have reason to think, that we can make this position good, 
(saying nothing of the proofs which are almost daily and 
hourly presenting themselves to our notice,) by a remarka- 
ble instance. If any one will take the trouble to examine 
carefully and to estimate the life of the emperor Napoleon, 
he will be satisfied, that there is nothing more worthy of no- 
tice in the character of that remarkable man, than his ener- 
gy, his decision, his perfect control of all his powers. If we 
may judge with tolerable precision of a man's control over 
himself by his control over others, (which is at least one of 
the elements of a correct judgment in this matter,) we should 
certainly say, that but few men ever possessed greater self- 
command, both in respect to the understanding and the pas- 
sions. The action of his mind, both in planning what was 
to be done and in carrying it into execution, was always 
energetic in the highest degree, which can never be said of 
one whose will is weak. The movement of his volition, like 
some electric element of nature, instantaneously penetrated 
in all directions ; and all persons, who were in communica- 
tion with him, instinctively felt their own minds tremble and 
quail before it- But it cannot be too often remembered and 
repeated, that the will, like the other mental capabilities, is a 
price put into our hands to be employed by us in accordance 
with its nature; and however great its natural or acquired 
energy,that encroachments cannot be made upon it from any 



SLAVERY OF THE WILL. 295 

other source without great danger. Unfortunately the va- 
rious situations, in which the emperor of the French was 
placed, all tended to foster the love of power and domination. 
The acquisition of supreme dominion over the nations was 
the burden of his meditations, the constant object of his de- 
sires. In the end, the lust of power became so predominant, 
that, in all matters where it was concerned, there no longer 
remained any authority, any effective power of the mind, 
that seemed to be capable of checking and controlling it. 
That strong and impetuous will, which had subdued all oth- 
ers before it, was insidiously approached by this enemy from 
beneath, and before the danger was fully perceived, was ta- 
ken captive and bound with cords of iron. Napoleon him- 
self was conscious " of his situation, and feeling within him 
the demonstrations of this incontrollable impulse, usurping 
an authority to which nature never entitled it, and driving 
him hither and thither in a mad and measureless career, he 
began to talk about his horoscope, his star invisible to oth- 
ers, unalterable fate, and destiny. This is the common lan- 
guage of persons, who have lost the true balance of the 
mind, and have permitted unauthorized passions to gain the 
ascendency. 

§. 197. The will enslaved by the indulgence of the passions. 

One of the most common instances of an enslaved will is 
that of persons, who have long indulged in angry and violent 
passions. It is said of Frederic William of Prussia, the fa- 
ther of Frederic the Great, that he was "of a temper so vio- 
lent and ungovernable, that his passions almost amounted to 
madness."* And happy would it be, if such instances were 
found only here and there on the pages of history. But it 
is a melancholy fact, as every careful observer of human na- 
ture knows, that there is scarcely a neighbourhood without 

* Lord Dover's Life of Frederic Second, Chap. I. 



29(5 ENTHRALMENT OR 

them. These passions, which are so ungovernable at last, 
are perhaps feeble in the beginning; and the unhappy sub- 
jects of them may not be fully aware at first of what will as- 
suredly take place in the latter end. But for successive 
years they are repeated and indulged ; and each returning 
year and month and day adds to their intensity. So that 
the man in this situation, (to use an expression happily ap- 
plied by a Latin writer to Alexander in one of his fits of 
rage,) becomes in respect to any control over them, irrvpotens 
animi. He is a victim, sealed to destruction by his. own 
hand. When the occasion of the passion occurs, (and in the 
case of the persons whom we now have in view occasions are 
almost constantly occurring,) the feeble will trembles and 
bows before it, like the flexible reed in a tempest. 

§. 198. Inordinate intensity of the domestic affections. 

It will throw some light upon the nature of the enthral- 
ment or slavery of the will, if we consider the operations 
and results of some of the benevolent affections, when such 
affections exist in a high degree of intensity. It is proper 
to add, however, that we have not reference to temporary 
excitements, to sudden ebullitions and gusts of feeling, so 
much as to a fixed and permanent intensity. It might be 
naturally expected, that a sudden overflowing of the affec- 
tions would jar upon the harmony and interrupt the order of 
tlie mind's action; not only in respect to the will, but gen- 
erally. Such cases we have not now particularly in view ; 
but others of greater permanency, though perhaps sometimes 
of less violence. 

It is sometimes the case, that the domestic affections, the 
love of parents for their children, or of children for their pa- 
rents, or that complexity of deep and sacred feeling, which 
is embraced in the remembrance and the love of home, so 
pervades and fills the mind, as greatly, in certain situations, 



SLAVERY OF THE WILL. 297 

to embarrass the action of the will, and in fact to subject it 
to a greater or less degree of entbralment. If the individual, 
in whom the domestic affections exist in a very intense 
degree, is for some reason separated from the hills and woods 
of his childhood, from the hearth of his fathers, from the 
endearing company of those who sustain the most intimate 
relations, how greatly is his heart affected! What exquisite 
anguish fills his breast! Whatever plans he forms, whatev- 
er course of life he proposes to enter upon, he finds that the 
lovely and cherished image of the past constantly rises be- 
fore him, and by its contrast with the present renders him 
wretched. He makes various efforts to free himself from 
the pressure of this mental thraldom ; he calls up all the re- 
sources of his intellect; he reasons upon the perplexities and 
miseries of his situation, but all in vain. The fatal passion, 
so deeply rooted in his bosom, constantly besets him; it 
passes before and obscures the intellectual vision; it pros- 
trates and scatters to the wind the determinations, even the 
most deliberate and sacred resolves of the voluntary power. 
Neither the sunny skies and the blooming fields of nature, 
nor the beautiful works of art, nor the woody depths and 
the rugged rocks of an anchorite's abode, nor the wonders 
of the wide ocean, nor the massy walls of a prison, can 
change the direction of his thoughts, and expel the immuta- 
ble passion from his breast. If we may believe the state- 
ments of Rousseau and other writers, those inhabitants of 
the retired and solitary mountains and vales of Switzerland, 
who have been employed in foreign military service, have 
sometimes sickened and died, under the influence of this 
strong and incontrollable love of country and home, 

•' The intrepid Swiss, that guards a foreign shore, 
" Condemned to climb his mountain cliffs no more, 
'• If chance he hears the song so sweetly wild, 

38 



298 ENTHRALMENT OR 

" Which on those cliffs his infant hours beguiled, 
" Melts at the long-lost scenes that round him rise, 
" And sinks, a martyr to repentant sighs. 

§. 199. Of the slavery of the will in connection with moral ac- 
countability. 

In concluding the remarks of this chapter it is proper 
briefly to notice an interesting inquiry which naturally 
comes up here. The inquiry we refer to is, What bearing 

have these views on moral accountability ? And we may 

undoubtedly answer it by saying in general terms, that our 
moral accountability remains, in a greater or less degree', so 
long as the due proportion or balance between the various 
powers of the mind is not wholly destroyed. If we permit 
the undue aud unholy exercise of any appetite or passion, we 
are indeed enslaved, (in the sense in which slavery or en- 
thralment is predicable of the mind,) by such appetite or 
passion; but we are not therefore removed beyond the reach 
of accountability and guilt ; but on the contrary are both 
accountable and highly criminal, so long as there remain in 
our minds, either in the will or any where else, any powers 
of right' judgment and resistance. When such powers of 
judgment and resistance no longer remain, then our actions, 
of whatever kind they may be, are neither criminal nor mer- 
itorious; although we may be criminal for bringing ourselves 
into this situation. Mental slavery, when it becomes so in- 
tense as actually to disorganize the mind and to pass over 
into the regions of insanity destroys accountability, but not 
before. So long as it. does not pass within the limits of 
mental alienation and become merged in insanity, it is so 
far from rendering a person guiltless, that it might not be 
difficult to show that guilt or sin is identical with it. In 
other words, that there is no sin, where there is no slavery. 



SLAVERY Or THE WILL. 299 

The Scriptures themselves seem to recognize some such 
view. "Jesus answered them, Verily, verily I say unto 

you, Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin." . 

" But I see another law in my members, warring against the 
law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of 
sin." — " Because the creature itself also shall be delivered 
from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the 
children of God." — " For when ye were servants of sin, ye 
were free from righteousness." — "While they promise them 
liberty, they themselves are the servants of corruption ; for of 
whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bon- 
dage."— John 8, 34. Rom. 6, 20. 7, 23. 8, 21, 2d Peter 2, 19. 
It will be kept in mind, however, that we do not intend 
to apply these remarks to cases, where the will is brought 
into subjection by means extraneous to the person himself, 
and operating upon him without his concurrence or consent, 
as in the case just now referred to of extreme suffering by 
torture. In all such cases it is undeniable, that moral ac- 
countability, on the part of the person who is subjected to. 
such suffering, is either greatly diminished, or ceases to 
exist altogether. Under the pressure of a suffering so in- 
tense as wholly to prostrate the action of the voluntary 
power, he is no more accountable for what he does, than he 
would be for what he is compelled to do by actual bodily 
constraint. 



CHAPTER EIGHTH. 



ALIENATION OR INSANITY OF THE WILL. 



§. 200. Insanity predicable of all the powers of the mind. 

The view, which has been given of the freedom of the 
will, including those things, which are more or less at vari- 
ance with a state of perfect freedom, would certainly not he 
complete, and might perhaps be liable to misapprehension, 
if we were not to add something on the nature of Alienation 
or Insanity of the will. There are some grounds for the 
remark, (and perhaps we may go so far as to make the 
assertion without any qualification whatever,) that there may 
be an Alienation or Insanity of every part and power of the 
mind. The power of external perception, the memory, 
the judgment, the reasoning power, the power of asso- 
ciation, the imagination, the passions, may each of them 
separately, as well as in their combination with each other, 
suffer so great a degree of disorder and derangement as to 
constitute what may be termed insanity. — And this remark 
leads to another, which may properly be made in this con- 
nection, viz, that the whole subject of insanity, as there is 
reason $o believe, has been compressed within too narrow 



ALIENATION OF THE WILL. 301 

limits. We are sustained by the opinion of a valuable wri- 
ter on this subject,when we say, that this department of phi- 
losophical inquiry has suffered more than most others, from 
arbitrary or too restricted definitions* When we are told, 
on the authority of Cullen, that insanity is " an impairment 
of the judging faculty," or even on the authority of Locke 
that " it is putting wrong ideas together and so making 
wrong propositions, but arguing and reasoning right from 
them," we have, it is true,the announcement of some cases of 
mental alienation, but obviously to the exclusion of a multi- 
tude of others. Insanity, in its application to the mind, ex- 
presses, in its literal import, the simple fact of disorder, alien- 
ation, or unsoundness of mind ; and its true limits are co-ex- 
tensive with the opposite, viz, with a just, orderly, sound or 
sane state of the mind. We do not mean to say, that every 
variation of any and every mental power from a just and 
sane state, however slight it may be, constitutes insanity ; 
but wish to be understood as merely saying, that every such 
variation, when it is carried to a certain extent or degree, 
constitutes it. And consequently that the limits or sphere 
of insanity is no less extensive than that of the mind itself. 
And hence there may be, and is, a reasonableness and pro- 
priety in speaking of the alienation or insanity of the will. 

<§. 201. Of alienation or insanity of the will. 

There is a remark of M. Pinel in his Treatise on Insani- 
ty to this effect, that the active faculties, (under which phrase 
he includes those mental states, which are more immediately 
connected with action, such as the emotions, desires, and 
passions,) are as much subject to serious injuries and disor- 
ders, as the intellectual faculties; and that, although a disor- 
dered state of the active faculties is sometimes associated 

* Dr. Conolly. — Inquiry concerning the Indications of Insanity. 



$02 ALIENATION OE 

with a like disordered condition of the intellect, yet this is 
not always the case, and the former sometimes exists with- 
out the latter. He subsequently says expressly that the 
functions of the will, (a power which he undoubtedly embra- 
ces also under the general head of the Active faculties,) are 
absolutely distinct from those of the UNDERSTANDiNG,and that 
their seat, causes, and reciprocal dependencies are essential- 
ly different. This is said in a portion of his Work, the ti- 
tle of which is, the functions of the ivill exclusively diseased; and 
in the course of which he gives an instance of alienation of 
the will. The insanity of the individual, of whom he gives 
an account, was periodical; the paroxysms generally return- 
ing after an interval of several months. The shape of his 
insanity was that of an irresistible propensity to commit 
acts of barbarity and bloodshed. There was no disorder 
of the intellect; the memory, judgment, and imagination 
were perfectly sound; but his will, upon which men in ordi- 
nary cases rely for a resistance to inordinate passions, was 
entirely powerless, at least as compared with the intensity 
of his passion, and not even those persons, to whom at other 
times he appeared most attached, were safe in his presence. 
It is proper to remark here, that there seems to be, in the 
original constitution of the mind, a sort of correspondence 
or proportion between the desires and passions on the one 
hand, and the will on the other. That is to say ; the pow- 
er which the will possesses, whether more or less, bears a 
species of relation and proportion to the power of the de- 
sires and passions. Hence it happens, whatever may be 
the original power of the will, that an increase of the desires 
and passions to a certain degree of intensity is wholly incon- 
sistent with a due exercise of its authority; it is violently 
taken captive, and is virtually and to all useful purposes 
destitute of ability. A case of this kind, (and such is the 
instance narrated in the Treatise of M. Pinel,) is one, not of 



INSANITY OF THE WILL. 303 

mere enthralment or slavery, but truly a case of insanity. 
In consequence of the circumstance, that this alienation of 
the will is owing to a peculiar state of the desires and pas- 
sions, it is sometimes denominated alienation or insanity of 
the passions. 

§. 202. Another instance of this species of insanity. 

Some other instances, which might be adduced^ as illus- 
trating this form of insanity of the will, are given by M. Pi- 
ne], one of which we will repeat in his own words, as it fur- 
nishes an important practical lesson to those, who have the 
training of children and youth. — "An only son of a weak 
and indulgent mother was encouraged in the gratification of 
every caprice and passion, of which an untutored and vio- 
lent temper was susceptible. The impetuosity of his dis- 
position increased with his years. The money, with which 
he was lavishly supplied, removed every obstacle to his wild 
desires. Every instance of opposition or resistance roused 
him to acts of fury. He assaulted his adversary with the 
audacity of a savage; sought to reign by force ; and was 

perpetually embroiled in disputes and quarrels." "This 

wayward youth, however, when unmoved by passions, pos- 
sessed a perfectly sound judgment. When he came of age, 
he succeeded to the possession of an extensive domain. He 
proved himself fully competent to the management of his 
estate, as well as to the discharge of his relative duties ; 
and he even distinguished himself by acts of beneficence 
and compassion. Wounds, law -suits, and pecuniary compen- 
sations were generally the consequences of his unhappy 
propensity to quarrel. But an act of notoriety put an end to 
his career of violence. Enraged at a woman, who had used 
offensive language to him, he precipitated her into a well. 
Prosecution was commenced against him, and on the depo- 
sition of a great many witnesses, who gave evidence to his 



804 ALIENATION OR 

furious deportment, he was condemned to perpetual confine- 
ment at [the Insane Hospital of] Bicetre," 

§. 203. Of insanity of the will in connection with cases of casual 
association. 

Alienation or insanity of the will exists in many cases of 
strong casual association. Some persons, in consequence of 
such associations, are utterly unable to bear the sight of 
certain objects, however harmless they may be. Some 
instances were mentioned in the eighth chapter of Part 
Second, the particulars of which it is unnecessary here to 
repeat, and which will be found on referring to them fully 
to illustrate the subject. Peter the Great, in whom energy 
of the will was a conspicuous characteristic, was utterly una- 
able to bear the sight of a mere insect ; James I of England 
could not look on a sword unsheathed ; La Rochejaquelin, 
who on the field of battle bore the palm of chivalrous brave- 
ry from all others, still had not courage enough to encoun- 
ter a harmless squirrel. In these and a multitude *of other 
cases like them, we have instances of men, many of whom 
in general possessed great energy and decision, but who 
displayed in certain conjunctures, however trivial they 
might be, the greatest imbecility. And it does not appear, 
how we can give an explanation of them, except on the 
ground, that the disorder of mind, which is primarily seated 
in the power of association, ultimately diffused itself into 
the region of the will, and completely annihilated its energy 
within the sphere embraced by the particular association. 

Perhaps we have in the personal history of Dr Johnson 
an instance of alienation of will, based on a disordered casual 
association. " He had another particularity, says his biog- 
rapher, of which none of his friends ever ventured to ask an 

* See Good's Study of Medicine, Neurotica, Ord- IV, Gen. III. 



INSANITY OF THE WILL. 805 

explanation. It appeared to me some superstitious habit, 
which he had contracted early, and from which he had never 
called upon his reason to disentangle him. This was his 
anxious care to go out or in at a door or passage, by a cer- 
tain number of steps from a certain point, or at least so that as 
either his right or left foot, (I am not certain which,) should 
coBstantly make the first movement when he came close to 
the door or passage. Thus I conjecture: for I have, upon 
innumerable occasions, observed him suddenly stop, and then 
seem to count his steps with a deep earnestness; and when 
he had neglected or gone wrong in this sort of magical 
movement, I have seen him go back again, put himself into a 
proper posture to begin the ceremony, and having gone 
through it, break from his abstraction, walk briskly on, and 

join his company." With such clearness of perception, 

with such vast powers of understanding as Dr. Johnson pos- 
sessed-, we cannot suppose, that he would ever have submit- 
ted to the utter folly of such a practice, if his will had not 
entirely lost its power in that particular, in consequence of 
some early association, which had fastened itself in the mind 
too deeply for eradication. 

§. 204. Of alienation of the will as connected with a disordered 
state or alienation of belief 

Although each of the mental powers may become disor- 
dered and alienated in itself, yet this alienation depends not 
unfrequently upon the connection which such power has 
with others. And this is particularly true, (perhaps more so 
than in respect to any other faculty of the mind,) in relation 
to the will. It appeared in some remarks in the Part First 
of this treatise, that there is a close connection between vo- 
lition and that state of the mind, which is termed Belief; 

that the strength of the volition will become diminished more 
39 



,306 ALIENATION OR 

and more in conformity with the diminution of belief; and 
that by the original constitution of the mind itself there is 
not even a possibility of putting forth the exercise of voli- 
tion, when there is no belief that the thing to which it re- 
lates is in our power. Hence it follows as a general truth, 
that a disordered or alienated state of belief will be follow- 
ed by a corresponding alienation of the will. If a man, in 
the condition of insanity of belief, truly looks upon himself 
as made of glass, it is just as difficult for him to ivillto move 
himself about rapidly and to throw himself suddenly and vio- 
lently in contact with solid and hard bodies, as it is for a 
man in sane mind to will to thrust his hand or foot into the 
fire or boiling water, which with many persons would be 
found to be an utter impossibility His will is in such cases 
enslaved, (not in the more common and ordinary form of en- 
thralment, which is fully consistent with moral accountabili- 
ty,) but to the degree of insanity. We will suppose, that a 
man in the state of insanity of belief has a firm and unalter- 
able conviction, as much so as of his own existence, that.he 
has by amputation or in some way lost an arm or a leg; and 
it will be found, just so long as he remains the subject of this 
alienation of belief, impossible for him to put forth a single 
volition, having a relation to the action of those parts of the 
body. To that extent the power of willing is entirely lost. 
If his physician or any one else should require him to put 
forth such volition, it would appear to him, (and necessarily 
so from the constitution of the mind itself,) not only impos- 
sible, but as supremely ridiculous as for a man of sound 
mind to will to walk upon the ocean or to fly in the air. 

§. 205. Alienation of the will in connection with melancholy. 

Furthermore, the will is sometimes alienated, (that is to 
say, is in that state which is usually indicated by the term 
insanity,) in cases, where there is a deeply rooted and per- 



INSANITY OF THE WILL. 307 

manent melancholy. ' The mind of the person is fixed upon 
some gloomy subject ; it remains the object of contempla- 
tion day after day and hour after hour; a thick, impenetrable 
cloud seems to invest every prospect whether present or fu- 
ture. It seems to the spectator that there is nothing wan- 
ting but a mere act of the will, a resolution, a mere decision, 
in order to bring the person out ofthis state of gloomy inac- 
tivit} 1- and carry him once more into the discharge of the du- 
ties of life. And this is true, if the will could be made to 
act. But the gloom spreads itself from the understanding to 
the heart, and from the heart to the region of the voluntary 
power; and the will, invested on every side by the dark- 
ness of this dense and impenetrable atmosphere, remains 
closed up and fixed, as if imbedded in a mass of ice. 
"When the gloom is deepened to a certain degree, although 
the power of the will is not entirely gone, it is impossible 
for it to put forth any effective action. The English poet 
Collins is an instance of this unhappy state of mind. " He 
languished some years, says his biographer, under that de- 
pression of mind, which enchains the faculties without des- 
troying them, and leaves reason the knowledge of right 
wilhout the power of pursuing it. These clouds, which he per- 
ceived gathering upon his intellects, he endeavoured to dis- 
perse by travel, and passed into France; but found himself 
constrained to yield to his maladj^ and returned. He was 
for some time confined in a house of lunatics."* Well might 
this genuine poet have adopted the language, afterwards so 
feelingly applied to himself by his biographer, 

"Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased ? 
"Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow ? 

* Johnson's Lives of the English Poets, Art. Collins. 



30S ALIENATION OR 

§. 206. Of alienation of the will termed incgnstantia. 

There is another form of alienation of the will, distinct 
from those which have been mentioned, but perhaps of no 
less frequent occurrence. It is noticed more or less by wri- 
ters on insanity; and is classed by Dr. Good in the species 
of moria imbecillis, under the name of inconstantia. This 
mental disease is often connected with an irregular action of 
the power of association; and the cases, which illustrate it, 
might many times be arranged, according to the view which 
is taken of them, either as instances of alienated will or 
alienated association. The persons, who are subject to this 
form of insanity, (for when it exists in a very high degree, 
this state of mind may justly be regarded as one of insani- 
ty,) are designated by various epithets, such as fickle, 
flighty, lightheaded, hair-brained. The thoughts of these 
persons fly from one subject to another with great raprdity ; 
their bodies are almost always in motion ; and their volubili- 
ty of speech is excessive. M. Pinel mentions an instance, (a 
gentleman who had been educated in the prejudices of the 
ancient noblesse of France,) which illustrates this singular 
condition of mind. " He constantly bustled about the 
house, talking incessantly, shouting, and throwing himself 
into great passions for the most trifling causes. He teased 
his domestics by the most frivolous orders, and his neigh- 
bours by his fooleries and extravagances, of which he retain- 
ed not the least recollection for a single moment. He talk- 
ed with the greatest volatility of the court, of his periwig, 
of his horses, of his gardens, without waiting for an answer, 
or giving time to follow his incoherent jargon." 

In all these cases, whatever may be the cause of it, the 
will has obviously lost its power ; it has ceased, and appa- 
rently without the possibility of doing otherwise, to exer- 



INSANITY OF THE WILL. 309 

cise that authority over the other powers of the mind, to 
which it is entitled. It is ohviously the allotment and busi- 
ness of the will to stand at the helm, and resolutely and firm- 
ly to keep the vessel on her course, not only in ordinary oc- 
casions, but in those seasons of agitation and trial, when the 
billows heave from below and the tempests beat from above. 
But when it is under the influence of this disease, its arm 
becomes powerless; the helm is wrenched from its grasp; 
and the whole man is violently driven about, in each contra- 
riety of direction, by every wind of heaven and every surge 
of the ocean. 

§. 207. Of acco untability in connection with alienation 
or insanity of the will. 

It will be seen from what has been said, that the particu- 
lar form or aspect of insanity of the will is very various ; 
sometimes consisting of the entire or almost entire abstrac- 
tion of its own power ; sometimes in an immoveable fixed- 
ness, either occasioned by its own imbecility or the undue pre- 
ponderance of some other principle; sometimes in an action, 
powerful enough perhaps, but urged on and wholly shut up 
in one direction, and not in possession of an adequate degree 
of liberty; sometimes in a fickleness approaching to entire 
contingency, .occasioned by the suspension or violation of 
those general laws, by which the action of the will is ordi- 
narily restrained and regulated.- — In all cases of actual in- 
sanity, under whatever aspect or form it may appear, the 
person, who is the subject of it, is free from moral accounta- 
bility, to the degree or extent in which the insanity exists ; 
for it has now become a settled principle on the subject of 
mental alienation, and one which is perfectly well under- 
stood, that not unfrequently the insanity extends to a par- 
ticular power or a particular subject, and that beyond that 



310 ALIENATION OF THE WILL, 

particular power or subject the ordinary degree of percep- 
tion and action remains. 

But the question here presents itself to us, how can we 
ascertain the existence of insanity ? By what rule can it be 
discovered or known to exist in a particular case? How 
can the line of demarcation be detected between that pres- 
sure of the will, known as enthralment or slavery, which is 
consistent with moral accountability, and insanity of the will 

which wholly destroys it ? On this subject we do not feel 

called upon to lay down any general rule; nor, if we were, 
should we be able to do it. The Supreme Being alone can 
tell with entire certainty when the limit is passed, beyond 
which moral accountability ceases to exist. Men can do 
nothing more than approximate to such certainty of decision, 
determining according to the best of their judgment on the 
circumstances of individual cases. 



PART FOURTH. 



POWER OF THE WILL. 



CHAPTER, FIRST. 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 



§. 208. Of the distinction between liberty and power. 

We now enter again upon a distinct series of subjects, 
which present the will to our notice in a new aspect. They 
are subsequent in the order of examination, but they are not 
wanting either in importance or interest. In this last Part 
of our Work, we propose to examine the Power of the will 
and the various topics, that are naturally connected with it. 

But in making the power of the will a distinct subject 

of examination, it is proper to remark, that we deviate from 
the view of many writers, and some of them of no mean 
rank, who seem to have considered the power of the will and 
its liberty as one and the same thing. And this confusion 
of things which are entirely distinct, has been one cause of 
that obscurity, which has ever rested in too great a degree 
on the whole subject. 

It is not altogether surprising however, that an errour 

should have been committed here, when we consider how 

apt we are to confound together objects, whatever grounds 

there may be for a distinction between them, which are of- 
40 



314 NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 

ten united together in our thoughts. The material world is 
so constituted, that in our perceptions of extension and color 
we find them necessarily always accompanying each other; 
so that after a time we find it very difficult to exclude from 
our notion of the sensation of colour the idea of extension. 
And it is undoubtedly much the same in all similar cases ; 
and among others in that of freedom and power, which also 
are found to be closely associated together. It is obvious, 
that there is no freedom, where there is no power; it seems 
to be undeniable, that in the nature of things they go to- 
gether; and they are therefore so closely connected in our 
thoughts, that we ultimately find it difficult to make the 
proper distinction between them. 

§. 209. Proof of the distinction between liberty and power. 

We presume to anticipate, that, after the reader has gone 
through with what we have to say on this general subject of 
voluntary power, especially if he will take the pains to com- 
pare it with what has already been said on the nature of 
liberty, he will not be disposed to take exceptions to the 
distinction, which we assert to exist between liberty and 
power. And yet, although it is unnecessary, in this stage 
of our remarks, to spend much time on this particular topic, 
there is a propriety in briefly introducing a few circumstan- 
ces in support of the distinction before us. And accor- 
dingly we remark, in the first place, that there are sometimes 
diversities or different degrees in the amount of power, even 
to a marked and decided extent, while the amount of freedom 
is essentially the same, which could not well be the case, if 
liberty and power were identical. Take a single illustra- 
tion. There is as much freedom, in any true and proper 
sense of the term freedom, in the mind of a child, whose in- 
tellect, just beginning to open, cannot expand itself beyond 
the limits of his native village, as in that of a philosopher, 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 315 

whose thoughts embrace the world, and even systems of 
worlds. The sphere of the child's mind is indeed a very- 
limited one in comparison with that of the philosopher; but 
the degree of freedom enjoyed by it is essentially the same. 
But while there is undeniably in these two cases an equal 
or nearly equal degree of mental liberty, within the respec- 
tive spheres of the mind's operations, no one will undertake 
to say, that there is the same or nearly the same degree of 
mental power. The sphere of mental action is unquestiona- 
bly different, being more extended in the one case than the 
other ; the power or energy of mental action also is differ- 
ent, not slightly so but in the higest degree; but the free- 
dom of the mind in these two cases, which are so different 
in other respects, may be entirely the same. — If there should 
be a difference in the amount of liberty we should expect it 
to be in favor of the child or youth, rather than of the man ; 
because, at that early period of life, the relative position of 
the mental powers, (although those powers are very far at 
any period from having escaped the derangement resulting 
from the fallen condition of the human race,) is comparative- 
ly undisturbed. While, on the contrary, we too often find 
it to be the case, that advancement in age is attended by an 
increase of internal disorder exceedingly at variance with 
that regularity and harmony of mental action, which is the 
basis of the highest liberty. 

§. 210. The distinction of power and liberty involved in the 

fact of our being able to form the abstract ideas oj power 

and liberty. 

In the second place, our consciousness, (that internal re- 
flection which we are able to bestow upon what takes place 
in the mind itself,) assures us, that we are able to form the 
abstract idea of liberty, and also that we are able to form 
the abstract idea of power; and if ourjnternal mental ex-. 



316 NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. • 

perience thus assures us of the existence of the two, it of 
course assures us of a distinction between them. Every 
simple idea,as it is an unit and is inseparable into parts, must 
necessarily have a character of its own, which is definite and 
immutable. And if we are capable, therefore, of forming 
these two distinct ideas of power and liberty, (as the gener- 
al consciousness on the subject seems clearly to testify,) it 
will necessarily follow, that they are entirely distinct in 
their nature; and although they may be closely connected 
together by accidental circumstances or in any other way, so 
much so that we cannot conceive of the one without imply- 
ing the existence of the other, it is still true, that in them- 
selves considered they are entirely separate, each having an 
entity and a character of its own. And if the ideas of liberty 
and power are thus distinct from each other, then we are un- 
der the necessity of drawing the inference, that the things, 
for which they stand,or in other words that power and liberty, 
in their state of actual realization, are different from each other. 

§. 211. Distinction of power and liberty shown jrom language. 

That there exists a distinction between mental power 
and mental liberty, and that this distinction is to be fully 
recognized and received, seems to be evident, in the third 
place, from the structure of language. In the English lan- 
guage we have the two terms in question, which we con- 
stantly use, not as synonymous terms, but as truly expres- 
sive of things, which are different from each other. And as 
it is the same in all other languages, we may well regard 
this as a circumstance, which decisively indicates the gener- 
al conviction and belief on this subject. The existence of a 
belief so general and so deeply founded does not appear to 
admit of any satisfactory explanation, except on the ground 
of the actual existence of the distinction, to which the be- 
lief relates. 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 31? 

§. 212. Further shown from the fact of our possessing a moral 

nature. 

Furthermore, the possession of mental power, as well as 
of mental liberty, is involved in the fact, that man is a mor- 
al and accountable being. In all the leading questions, 
which have a relation to our moral nature, we are thrown 
back upon the elementary suggestions, upon the first and 
immutable principles of our mental constitution. Our Cre- 
ator has not left these questions to be settled by the ab- 
struse deductions of philosophers; but has written their solu- 
tion in letters of light on the tablet of the common heart of 
mankind. All classes and descriptions of men are alike ca- 
pable of understanding their import, and of rendering their 
interpretation. They all know, hardly less than they know 
their own identity, and far better than any human philosophy 
can teach them, that moral responsibleness implies the exis- 
tence of power, and that the defect of power necessarily in- 
volves the negation of accountability. 

" There is, says Dr. Reid, a perfect correspondence be- 
tween power on the one hand, and moral obligation and ac- 
countableness on the other. They not only correspond in 
general, as they respect voluntary actions only, but every 
limitation of the first produces a corresponding limitation of 
the two last. This indeed amounts to nothing more than 
that maxim of common sense, confirmed by Divine authority, 
that to whom much is given, of him much will be required." 

"A certain degree of active power is the talent which 

God has given to every rational accountable creature, and 
of which he will require an account. If man had no power, 
he would have nothing to account for. All wise and all 
foolish conduct, all virtue and vice, consist in the right use 
or in the abuse of that power which God has given us. If 



318 NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 

man had no power, he could neither he wise nor foolish, vir- 
tuous nor vicious."* 

§. 213. Origin of the idea of power in Original Suggestion. 

What has so far been said in this Chapter, at least when 
taken in connection with the illustrations of voluntary pow- 
er hereafter given, abundantly shows, that there is a distinc- 
tion between power and liberty, and that it is important not 
to confound them together. The subject of power, there- 
fore, is a subject by itself; and requiring a separate and 
careful consideration. — And in entering upon the examina- 
tion of this subject, it seems to be a proper place here, to 
say a few words in explanation of the origin of the idea of 
power. Power is obviously not any thing, which is direct- 
ly addressed to the outward senses. It is not addressed to 
the sense of sight as colors are; nor to the sense of hearing 
as sounds are ; nor to the taste ; nor to any other of the out- 
ward senses. We cannot see it, nor hear it, nor touch it 
nor taste, it, although it is every where actually diffused; 
for it is a first truth and undeniably certain, that, wherever 
there is existence, there is power, either actually in the thing 
itself or in some way connected with it. 

If the idea of power is not to be ascribed in its origin to 
external perception in any of its forms, we must look within 
for its rise. And in doing this we find ourselves unable to 
assert any thing more than this, that it is the result, (that is 
to say it is made known to us by means of it,) of that Origi- 
nal Suggestion, which has already been referred to as the 
true source of our idea of liberty. In other words we are 
so constituted, that, on certain occasions and under certain 
circumstances, the idea of power naturally and necessarily 
arises or is suggested within us. This is all, that can be 
said of its origin, as far as the mind is concerned. 

*Rejd's Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay IV= 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 319 

§. 214. Occasions of the origin oj the idea of power. 

But what are those occasions or circumstances just now 
spoken of, on which the faculty of Original Suggestion is 
brought into action, and in connection with which it gives 
existence and birth to the idea in question? 

Although on this point our views may perhaps be at va- 
riance with those of some other writers, the occasions, so 
far as we are able to judge, appear to be three fold. — (1) All 
cases of antecedence and sequence in the natural world. 
We are so constituted, that, in connection with such cases 
of antecedence and sequence, we are led at a very early pe- 
riod of life, to frame the proposition and to receive it as an 
undeniable truth, that there can be no beginning or change 
of existence without a cause. This proposition involves the 
idea of efficiency or power. — (2) The control of the will 
over the muscular action. We are so constituted, that, when- 
ever we will to put a part of the body in motion, and the 
motion follows the volition, we have the idea of power. — (3) 
The control of the will over the other mental powers. With- 
in certain limits and to a certain extent there seems to be 
ground for supposing, that the will is capable of exercising a 
directing control over the mental, as well as over the bodily 
powers. And whenever we are conscious of such control 
being exercised, whether it be greater or less, occasion is 
furnished for the origin of this idea. It is then called forth 
or suggested. 

It is proper to add here, that the idea of power, like that 
of freedom or liberty, is simple, and consequently is not 
susceptible of definition, although no one can be supposed 
to be ignorant of what is meant by the term. 

§. 215. The idea of power involves the reality of power. 

B ut because the idea of power is undefinable, we are not, 



320 NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 

therefore, to suppose, that it represents nothing; in other 
words that power is in itself is a chimsera and non-entity; 
a mere haseless fiction of the mind, like those shadowy and 
illusive pictures, which in times of ignorance and supersti- 
tion are seen written in the air. This would he a great mis- 
take. It is true that there may be complex ideas of things, 
as Mr. Locke has correctly maintained, which are chimeri- 
cal; that is to say, which have nothing corresponding to 
them in outward objects, or in any thing else, such as the 
ideas of a hypogriff, dragon, centaur, gold lighter than wa- 
ter, &c. But this want of correspondence between the idea 
and the object to which it relates or professes to relate, is 
never experienced in the case of simple ideas; and it is not 
at all surprising, that Ave should find this difference in these 
two classes of our notions. Complex ideas, so far as the 
combination and arrangement of the subordinate elements 
is concerned, is the work of man; and it may sometimes hap- 
pen, therefore, that they are expressive, or rather profess to 
be so, of what has no real existence. But simple ideas on 
the other hand, which result necessarily from the action of 
the mind under given circumstances, may be regarded as tru- 
ly the work of the great author of our mental nature ; and 
it would be inconsistent with our ideas of his perfections, 
particularly his truth, as well as with our own consciousness 
and experience, to suppose that they ever express any thing 
other than an unchangeable reality. 

§. 216. Things exist which are not made known by the senses. 

Can it be necessary to say, that there are existences, at 
least that there are realities, (whether they are existences in 
themselves, or the mere attributes of things, or relations,) 
which have no outward and visible representation ? We 
know, that the contrary supposition would not be inconsis- 
tent with the philosophy of Condillac and Helvetius ; but 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. $21 

present appearances, the result of patient and repeated inqui- 
ries, seem clearly to indicate ,that the philosophical systems 
of those writers, cannot, in this particular at least, be sustain- 
ed. It is undoubtedly true,that we do not have a knowledge 
of Power by means of any direct action on the outward sen- 
ses; that it has no form and outline, as if it were some material 
entity; that it is not the subject of any process of material 
admeasurement; that it is not an object of sight, hearing, or 
touch. But the leading writers on the mind agpee in assur- 
ing us, that there are inward sources of knowledge; that 
there are things and the attributes of things, which are not 
susceptible of any material or outward representation ; but 
are made known by an original developement exclusively 
taking place in the mind itself. And power, whether it be 
something in itself, or the attribute of something else, is one 
of this class. 

It would not be difficult to give instances in illustration, 
of these statements. Is there no such thing as design or 
foresight? Is there no such thing as identity, unity, or num- 
ber, as succession and time and space? Is there no such 
thing as intelligence or truth, as wrong or rectitude? And 
yet these are not made known by any direct action on the 
senses, but by the mind alone; by the creative energy of 
the spritual principle within us, called into action in the va- 
rious circumstances incident to its present situation. And it 
is certain that we have no more knowledge of these, than 
we have of Power. 

<§. 217. Of power as an attribute of the human mind. , 

Without saying any thing further on the existence and 

nature of power in general, and of the way in which we 

have a knowledge of it, we now proceed to remark upon 

power as existing in, and as an attribute of the human mind^ 

41 



322 NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 

There is power somewhere. Is it also in the mind of man ? 
Does it reside there as something substantive and positive, 
or is it merely an appearance ? 

In proof of the position, that power in the strict sense 
of the term is an attribute of the human mind, we may 
safely appeal, in the first place, to each one's consciousness. 
Every one is supposed to know what power is, although, as 
has been said, it is not susceptible of definition. And every 
man is conscious, that he possesses this power in himself ; 
not perhaps in so high a degree as it actually exists in some 
others, but yet in some degree. He is not conscious, that it 
exists in him in the form of a separate faculty, analogous to 
perception or memory ; but that it exists as an attribute of 
the whole mind, and is diffused, in a greater or less degree, 
through all its faculties. That is to say, having from the 
earliest period formed a distinct idea of power and already 
knowing what it is, he has an original feeling or conviction, 
that such is the case ; that in every exercise or operation of 
the mind there is, and must be power. It is a matter upon 
which, so far as it relates to himself, he does not profess to 
reason; for the conviction is an original one, approximating 
to the nature of an intuition; and it is therefore, in his view, 
neither assailable by argument, nor capable of being sus- 
tained in that way. 

Furthermore, the existence of power as an attribute of 
the human mind is proved by our observation of others. 
When we carefully consider the wonderful efforts of the hu- 
man intellect, with what rapidity and consummate skill it 
embraces and analyzes the most difficult subjects, have 
we not evidence of power? When we see men controlling 
their passions,sustaining themselves in meekness and fortitude 
amid the most cruel assaults, have we not additional evi- 
dence? When we read of the Republics of antiquity, of the 
eloquence that shook and swayed the fierce democracy of 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 323 

Athens, and controlled the proud hearts and intellects of 
Roman senators, and in later times has risen with no less 
ascendency in the stormy periods of the French and Eng- 
lish Parliaments, can we believe that these astonishing ef- 
fects are the results of minds constituted without any infusion 
of the element of power? Might we not as well turn our 
eyes to the sun in the heavens, when he throws his bright 
beams over the mountain tops and the green woods of sum- 
mer, and say there is no light ? 

§ 218. Further shown by a reference to the Divine Mind. 

On this subject, (the existence of power as truly an at- 
tribute of the human mind,) it may not be improper, although 
it is to be done with suitable humility and circumspection, to 
reason from the Supreme Being to the creatures he has 
made. We are informed in the pages of Holy Writ, that 
man was created in the image of his Maker ; and it cannot 
be doubted, that the similitude was mental, and not bodily. 
It was the mind, the spiritual part, that was honoured with 
bearing the glorious impress of the divine lineaments. 

It may indeed be said by way of objection, that the 
alledged similitude between man and his Maker is lim- 
ited to man's moral nature ; but it should be recollec- 
ted, that it is impossible entirely to separate man's moral 
from his intellectual part. As the moral nature is based upon 
the intellectual, (for there obviously can be no accounta- 
bility where there are no powers of perceiving and judg- 
ing,) the existence of the former of course involves and im- 
plies the existence of the latter. If there be a reality in the 
distinction between right and wrong, there must be not 
only feeling and volition, but intelligence ; and we cannot 
conceive of virtue or vice in connection with the absence of 
either of them. With these views of the connection exis- 
ting among all the parts of man's mental nature, the moral, 



[/ 



324 NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 

sentient, voluntary, and intellectual, we understand the 
statement of man's primitive creation in the image of God to 
mean, that there was really a likeness in kind, however di- 
verse in degree; and that this similitude extends to all parts 
of our mental nature, with the exception of what are purely 
instinctive, or are essentially connected, with our bodily and 
material organization. Now no one will deny, that power 
is an attribute of the Divine Mind; and hence, reasoning 
from the maker to that which is made, from the original and 
self-existent archetype to the derived and dependent simili- 
tude, we have good grounds to believe, that power exists 
positively and substantively in man, as well as the Being 
who formed him. "If it is granted, says an American wri- 
ter, that God is an efficient eause ; that in him is energy, 
activity, which constitutes Him an active agent ; why may 
not man be endued with the same principle, so as to make 
him an active agent? His being dependent, and his powers 
limited, are no objection of any weight against viewing him 
an active agent. If God can create a dependent, limited be- 
ing, why can he not endue him with an active, dependent, 
limited, principle of action ? I see no objection of weight, 
against this, and of course prefer viewing a moral agent 
as really having in his heart the same active, energetic prin- 
ciple, as we suppose God possesses. It is granted this active 
principle in man, which renders him an agent, is depen- 
dent and limited So is his being ; yet he is a real being, 
distinct from God."* 

This, then, is the view, which we think ourselves amply 
justified in taking, viz, that the Supreme Being has created 
men with power; that he has communicated of his own full 
ness to those, who would have been wanting, without this 
communication. As the planetary orbs revolve around the 

* Burton's Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology Essay XIII. 



NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. 325 

solar fountain of effulgence and attraction, and, although 
they are entirely distinct, are yet dependent upon it for mo- 
tion as well as light, in like manner all intellectual and sen- 
tient beings, in their various orders, from the archangel 
down to man, are set off from the great Source of all knowl- 
edge and efficiency; and, although they are created in the 
image of God and are constantly supported by Him, have 
yet a distinct existence, a distinct though dependent agency, 
and revolve in their own appropriate sphere. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



POWER OF THE WILL. 



§. 219 .Proof of power in the will from the analogy of the mind. 

But it is not enough to explain the nature of power, and 
to assert its existence as an -attribute of the mind in gener- 
al terms, we proceed now to consider its existence in that 
particular faculty or department of the mind, which is de- 
nominated the will. Power is not only predicable of the 
mind in a general way; hut it is predicable of its parts, and 
particularly and emphatically so of our voluntary nature. 
The analogy running through our mental constitution fur- 
nishes some grounds and authority for this remark. Men 
universally speak, (and they undoubtedly believe they have 
good reason so to do,) of the power of sensation, of the 
power of perception, of the power of memory, imagination, 
reasoning, &c. The structure of all languages, (for they 
appear to be all alike in this respect,) proves what they 
think; and we may add, proves what they know on this sub- 
ject. It is natural for the man who perceives, to say that he 
has the power of perception; the man,who remembers or rea- 
sons, asserts without hesitation, that he has the power of re- 



POWEE OF THE WILL. 3.27 

membering or reasoning ; and it is impossible to convince 
these men, either that these expressions are improperly ap- 
plied, or that they are nugatory and convey no distinct 
meaning. But if there is truly a foundation for such ex- 
pressions, and if there is a propriety and truth in the use of 
them, is there not equal propriety in speaking of the power 
of the will? If every other mental action clearly and con- 
vincingly indicates to us the existence of an innate energy 
corresponding to such action,it cannot be supposed, that the 
act of willing alone, which is a preeminent and leading ex- 
ercise of the mind, exists independently of any actual basis 
of voluntary energy. The analogy, therefore, of the men- 
tal constitution, (for we are undoubtedly at liberty to reason 
from analogy, in this case as well as others,) distinctly leads 
to the result, that power is appropriate to and is an attri- 
bute of the will. 

§. 220. The power of the will restricted and subordinate. 

But, although the will has power, it is not therefore in- 
dependent. We have already seen ample evidence of its 
subjection to law. And in this respect it is on the same 
footing with the other powers of the mind. There is no exer- 
cise of memory without something remembered ; no per- 
ception without an object perceived ; and there are not only 
objects, which the action of these faculties necessarily has 
relation to; but there are various other restrictions, (without 
any impropriety of language we might term them laws,) by 
which that action is governed. But are we to say on this 
account that the attribute of power does not belong to the 
perception, the memory, or the process of reasoning ? If 
so, we must for like reasons' exclude it from every other 
mental susceptibility, which is the same as to exclude it 
from the whole mind ; for the mental susceptibilities are 
nothing more than the mind itself acting in various ways. 



328 POWER OF THE WILL. 

And a mind without power is not an operative principle, 
but a principle^ rather an object operated upon ; and is of 
course destitute of all attractions and worth in itself,and of all 
moral accountability to anything else. There may be power, 
therefore, which power is, nevertheless, under direction and 
control. And accordingly, while we maintain the existence 
of power in the will,we must not forget its subjection to law ; 
nor suppose that the one is at all inconsistent with the other. 

§. 221. Proof oj power in the will from internal experience. 

That power is predicable of the will, as well as of any 
other faculty of the mind or of the mind as a whole, is evinced 
not only by the analogy running through the mental struc- 
ture, but by other considerations. Among other views to 
be taken of the subject now before us, may we not, in this 
inquiry as well as in others, make an appeal to our own in- 
ternal experience ? In other words, have we not beyond all 
doubt a testimony within us, a direct and decisive internal 
evidence of power in the acts of the will ? Do we not feel 
and know it to be so ? — Let us take a familiar instance as a 
test of these inquiries. When a person wills to go to a cer- 
tain place, or wills to do a certain thing, does the volition 
appear to have been wrought within himself by an extraneous 
cause ? Does it appear to have been created and placed there 
without any personal agency and effort ? Or does it rather 
distinctly and satisfactorily indicate to him an, energy of his 
own ? Few persona, it is believed, will hesitate as to what 
answer to give. 

Our conciousness, therefore, distinctly assures us, (al- 
though it is beyond all question that the will is circumscrib- 
and regulated by its appropriate laws,) that within the lim- 
its constituting its appropriate sphere, its action truly orig- 
inates in its own power. It wills, because it has the power 
to will. It acts, because it possesses that energy, which is 



POWER OF THE WILL. 329 

requisite to constitute the basis of action. In the language 
of one of the characters of the great English dramatist, when 
pressed for the reasons of a certain course of proceeding, 
" The cause is in my will ; I will not come." 

§. 222. Proved from the ability which we have to direct our 
attention to particular subjects. 

In one particular at least, our internal experience seems 
to be clear and decisive, viz. that we are able to direct our 
attention to some subjects of inquiry in preference to others. 
It is admitted that we cannot call up a thought or a train of 
thought by a mere and direct act of volition ; although we 
have an indirect power in this respect, which is not without 
its important results. But when various trains of thought 
are passing through the mind, we are enabled, as it is pre- 
sumed every one must be conscious, to direct our attention 
and to fix it firmly upon one thought or one train of thought 
in preference to another. It is undoubtedly the tendency 
of association to remove the thought or the train of thought, 
whatever it is, from the mind ; but the power of the will, 
where it is decisively exerted, can counteract this tendency, 
and keep the mind in essentially the same position for a 
greater or less length of time. And it does not appear what 
explanation can possibly be given of the fact, that we thus 
frequently delay upon subjects and revolve them in our con- 
templation, except on the ground of a real and effective en- 
ergy of the will. 

§. 223. Proof of power in the will from observation. 

Furthermore, the phenomena of human nature, as they 
come within our constant observation, cannot be explained, 
except on the supposition,that the will is not the subject of any 
extraneous operation or power,in such a sense as entirely to 

42 



330 POWEE OF THE WILL. 

exclude power or agency of its own. Do we not often see in- 
stances of persons, in whom vigor of the will is a characteris- 
tic and predominant trait; and whose character and conduct 
cannot he explained, except on the ground, that they possess 
a voluntary energy of their own, and that too in a high de- 
gree? Men have often been placed in the most trying cir- 
cumstances, called to endure the pains of imprisonment, and 
hunger and thirst, and torture and exile and death ; and they 
have undergone it all with a most astonishing fortitude and 
calmness, without shedding a tear or uttering a lamentation. 
Here is something difficult to he explained, unless we take 
into consideration that innate power, which we assert to he 
an attribute of the will. 

Whatever may be said of the fervid sincerity of his reli- 
gion, or the natural benevolence of his heart, are we able 
satisfactorily to explain the character and deeds of the illus- 
trious Howard, except by taking this vieAV? "The energy 
of his determination, says a judicious and valuable Avriter, 
was so great, that, if instead of being habitual, it had been 
shown only for a short time on particular occasions, it would 
have appeared a vehement impetuosity; but by being unin- 
termitted, it had an equability of manner, which scarcely ap- 
peared to exceed the tone of a calm constancy, it was so to- 
tally the reverse of any thing like turbulence or agitation. 
It was the calmness of an intensity, kept uniform by the na- 
ture of the human mind forbidding it to be more, and by the 
character of the individual forbidding it to be less."* 

The case of Howard, marked and extraordinary as it is, 
does not stand alone. Every age of the world and every 
class of society have their men of this stamp. Extraordina- 
ry endowments of the will are as necessary to support soci- 
ety and to meet the exigencies of our situation, as extraordi- 
nary endowments of intellect. But unfortunately, though 
*Foster's Essay on Decision of Character. 



POWER OF THE WILL. 331 

they are given in the discretion and wisdom of the great 
dispenser of all mental - gifts, they are not always wisely and 
righteously employed. A multitude of instances, of a char- 
acter both good and evil, will occur to every one; among 
others, Alexander, Cassar, Regulus, Charles Twelfth, Hanni- 
bal, Columbus, the Apostle Paul, Cromwell, Nelson, Led- 
yard, Mungo Park, John Knox, Luther, Whitefield, &c. 
The language of Ledyard will show the intensity of deter- 
mination existing in such men. "My distresses have been 
greater than I have ever owned, or ever ivill own to any 
man. I have known hunger and nakedness, to the utmost 
extremity of human suffering; I have known what it is to 
have food given me as charity to a madman; and I have 
at times been obliged to shelter myself under the miseries 
of that character to avoid a heavier calamity. Such evils 
are terrible to bear, but they never have yet had power to 
turn me from my purpose. ," 

§. 224. Of power of the will as exhibited in patience under 
suffering. 

We invite the particular attention of the reader to the 
view of the subject, which is now presented before him. 
If he will take the trouble to contemplate it steadily, we 
doubt not it Avill have its due weight. We wish to be un- 
derstood as distinctly and fully maintaining, on the ground 
of common observation, that the will has an actual and sub- 
stantive power; and that it is utterly impossible to explain 
the phenomena of human nature except by taking this view. 
Nor do we propose, in support of our positions, to introduce 
}nerely extraordinary instances of energy of the will; but 
on the contrary should not hesitate to rest the issue of the 
inquiry on an appeal to cases, which are of common occur- 
rence. We have an evidence, (an unobtrusive one perhaps 
but still worthy of our notice,) of the power of the will in 



332 POWER OF THE WLIL. 

that patience"and submissiveness, which we not unfrequent- 
]y witness in the ordinary trials of life. Persons, who have 
had their sensibilities wounded day after day and hour after 
hour, have been seen at the same time to wear the smile of 
cheerfulness ; and so far from uttering complaints and in- 
dulging a rebellious spirit, they have been uniformly kind to 
those, who were the causes of their suffering. Others, who 
have suffered under the approaches of a wasting and insidious 
disease, have completely succeeded in quieting the emotions 
within them, and permitted no murmur to arise ; they have 
even blessed these trying visitations of Providence, and 
have shed a loveliness, glorious for themselves and cheering 
to the heart of the spectator, over the chamber of sickness 
and death. It is not enough to say , that they may have 
possessed an enlightened understanding or a virtuous heart; 
nothing but the innate energy of the will, (however it may 
have been supported by correct views and virtuous princi- 
ples,) could have silenced and subdued the secret voice of 
anguish. 

§. 2£5. Illustration of the subject from the command of temper. 

The fact, that men are not governed by a fatality impres- 
sed upon them from an exterior cause, but have an efficien- 
cy in themselves, may be further illustrated from the control, 
which they are seen to exercise over their passions in what 
is called command of temper. Few sayings are more celebra- 
ted than that of Socrates on a certain occasion to his ser- 
vant, that he would beat him if he were not angry. Hume, 
who is entitled to the credit of being a careful observer of 
human nature, says of Henry IV of England, that "his com- 
mand of temper was remarkable;" and it is not uncommon to 
find this trait pointed out by historians and biographers, as 
one worthy of particular notice. The biographer of our il- 
lustrious countryman Mr. Jay, says, that" he sought not the 



POWER OF THE WILL. 333 

glory which cometh from man, and the only power of which 
he was covetous was the command of himself.'''* And this 
power, although he was obliged to contend with a natural 
irritability of temper, he exhibited in a very high degree. 
— But there is another name in American history of yet 
higher interest to our nation and to mankind. It was not 
among the least of the excellencies of Washington, great and 
various as they were, that he possessed a perfect self-control. 
With an intellect, which, though somewhat slow in its ac- 
tion, invariably came to a correct result; with a high moral 
sense, so prompt and pure in its decisions, as to secure the 
numerous and complicated acts of his life from all moral re- 
proach, it was nevertheless true, that his passions were 
naturally excitable and strong. But he fully succeeded 
in keeping them under admirable government. In the most 
trying situations, there was a calmness and dignity of coun- 
tenance and manner, which commanded the deepest respect. 
Such was the energy of his will, that it kept every thing in 
its place, and stamped a delightful harmony on his whole 
character; and being thus able to govern himself, he was ad- 
mirably fitted to govern this young and unsettled republic. 

§. 226. Further illustrations of this subject. 

It would not be difficult to specify other distinguished 
men both of our own and other countries, who knew how to 
conciliate the actings of a sensitive and enkindled heart with 
the coolest circumspection and the most perfect self-com- 
mand. But this is not necessary, since the trait in question 
is one daily coming within our notice. It is not uncommon, 
in almost every village and neighborhood, to observe per- 
sons of naturally quick feelings, and whose passions are ob- 
viously violent and are prone to foam and toss about like 
the waves of the sea, who nevertheless have those passions 
*Life of John Jay, Vol. I. Chap. 12th. 



331 POWER OP THE WILL. 

under complete control, even in the most trying circumstan- 
ces. 

And is it not a duty to exercise this control over the pas- 
sions ? "He, that ruleth his spirit, says Solomon, is hetter than 
he that taketh a city." And again, "He, that hath no rule over 
his own spirit, is like a city that is broken down, and with- 
out walls." " Be ye angry, says the Apostle, and sin not; 
let not the sun go down upon your wrath." Here, then is a 
great practical fact in the philosophy of the mind, and upon 
which important and solemn duties are based, viz, that the 
passions are under our control. But where is the power, 
that controls them? It is not enough to say, that this pow- 
er of regulation and control is deposited in the understan- 
ding. It is true that the understanding can suggest various 
and important reasons, Avhy this control should be exercised; 
but it cannot of itself render those reasons effective and 
available. The greatest light in the understanding, and 
even if it were carried into the region of the affections and 
the conscience, could never bring this great result to pass 
without the cooperation of the effective energies of the will. 

§. 227. Proved from the concealment of the passions on sudden 
and trying occasions. 

There are instances, av here the passions are repressed, or 
at least concealed, for the purpose of forwarding some ulteri- 
or end, which indicate the existence of power in the will. 
We might perhaps leave this statement just as it is, to be 
filled up by the private and personal recollections of the rea- 
der. But history, which furnishes so many valuable exposi- 
tions of the passions and the will, is not without its striking 
instances here. It is mentioned by those writers, who have 
given an account of Sylla the Roman dictator, as a marked 
trait in his character, that he was capable of acting the dis- 
sembler to perfection. He was engaged in forming and ex- 



POWER OF THE WILL. 3C5 

ecuting gigantic plans for the extension of the Roman em- 
pire, at the same time that he had formed other plans of an 
entirely different character, and based upon the most dread- 
ful passions, which he silently and calmly laid up to be exe- 
cuted at some distant day. One would have thought, that 
his whole soul, (such was his consummate ability in the 
management both of his present designs and of those pas- 
sions, which were afterwards to be indulged,) was exclu- 
sively taken up with his present business, and possessed no 
thought or feeling for any thing else. 

The conspirators against Julius Csesar, after they had ful- 
ly determined on his assassination, an event which involved 
either his death or their own and perhaps both, were in the 
almost daily habit of meeting and transacting business with 
him ; and yet that wonderful man was utterly unable to de- 
tect in the language, manner, or looks of the conspirators 
any evidence or intimations of their atrocious design. 
Does not this indicate on the part of the conspirators power 
of will ? Cicero seems to have been excluded from the con- 
spiracy, chiefly because he was supposed to be wanting in 
that decision and fortitude of purpose, which was requisite 
to the occasion. 

§. 228. Further instances of concealment and repression of the 

passions. 

We may go further and say, that people may not only 
avail themselves of the power of the will to subdue their 
passions or to conceal them, and that in so doing they prove 
the existence of power in the will ; but they not unfrequent- 
ly subdue them to a certain point, letting them run in certain 
directions and not in others ; or repressing them to a certain 
degree, and permitting them to rage below that degree. 

An instance will help to illustrate what we mean. The 
author of the Recollections of Mirabeau gives an account of 



336 POWER OF THE WILL.. 

a quarrel, which took place between Mirabeau and Claviere, 
two names, which must be familiar to all, avIio are acquainted 
with the events of the French Revolution. — "A singular 
circumstance, which struck me very forcibly, had called this 
quarrel to my recollection. Mirabeau and Claviere, 
although beside themselves with rage, maintained, with re- 
gard to each other's characters, a discretion which surprised 
me. I trembled every moment lest Claviere should utter 
some taunts regarding Mirabeau's private conduct, and tax 
him with meanness in pecuniary matters. But although he had 
frequently mentioned such things to me, he was too much 
master of himself to utter them now ; whilst Mirabeau on the 
other hand, foaming with pride and anger, had still the ad- 
dress to mingle with his invectives testimonies of esteem, 
and compliments upon Claviere's talents. Thus they scratch- 
ed and caressed each other with the same hand." The 

same writer makes another statement in regard to Mira- 
beau, which is applicable here. "In the tribune he was im- 
movable. They who have seen him well know that no agit- 
ation in the assembly had the least effect upon him, and that 
he remained master of his temper even under the severest 
personal attacks . I once recollect to have beard him make a 
report upon the city of Marseilles. Each sentence was in- 
terrupted from the cote droit with low abuse ; the words ca- 
lumniator, liar, assassin, and rascal, were very prodigally 
lavished upon him. On a sudden he stopped, and with a 
honeyed accent, as if what he had stated had been most fa- 
vorably received, "I am waiting, gentleman," said he, "until 
the fine compliments you are paying me, are exhausted." 

§. 229. Illustrated from the prosecution of some general plan. 

We find further illustration and proof of that energy 
which is appropriate to the will, in instances where individ- 
uals adopt and^pursue for a length of time some general plan. 



Power of the will. 337 

Not uufrequenfly they fix upon an object, which involves 
either their interest or their duty, and prosecute it with a 
perseverance and resolution, which is truly astonishing. 
Nor is this state of things limited to those who have been 
elevated by rank, or have had the advantages of learning. 
It is often the case, that we see this fixedness of purpose, 
this unalterable resolution, among those who have been 
greatly depressed by poverty, and who are ignorant as well 
as poor. An instance, furnished by this class of society, 

may not be wholly unacceptable to the reader. Not long 

since there was an account published in the Newspapers of 
a poor Irish girl, who came over to this country from 
Queen's County in Ireland for the purpose of making some 
provision, and obtaining a situation of greater comfort, for 
her depressed and suffering family. Alone and unprotected, 
she left the home of her father with only ten dollars in mon- 
ey; travelled on foot about fifty miles to the city of Dublin; 
succeeded in obtaining a passage on board a vessel bound 
for Quebec, and ultimately found her way into the United 
States. It is enough to add, although she had to encounter 
much trial and suffering, the smiles of a kind Providence re- 
warded her filial piety, and furnished the means which soon 
brought to her arms the beloved family she had left behind. 
Now here is a case in common life, without any artificial 
aids and excitement which can be supposed to have sustain- 
ed it; and if we could open and expose to the view of the 
world the records of the suffering and virtuous poor, we 
should undoubtedly find many like it. "In the obscurity 
of retirement, says the author of Lacon, amid the squalid 
povertj^ and revolting privations of a cottage, it has often 
been my lot to witness scenes of magnanimity and self-deni- 
al, as much beyond the belief, as the practice of the great; 
an heroism borrowing no support, either from the gaze of 



338 POWER OF THE WILL. 

the many or the admiration of the feWj yet flourishing amid 
ruins, and on the confines of the grave; a spectacle as stu- 
pendous in the moral world, as the falls of Niagara, in the 
natural ; and, like that mighty cataract, doomed to display 
its grandeur, only where there are no eyes to appreciate its 
magnificence." And can we explain this greatness of soul, 
this fixedness of purpose, this indomitable resolution, which 
is displayed in every condition of society, in humble as well 
as in elevated life, consistently with the supposition that the 
will has no power. 

But there are other facts of a higher character and a 
more general interest, as they involve the welfare not only 
of individuals and families, but of whole classes of men. 
They are too numerous to be mentioned here; but they are 
recorded, and will long continue to be so, in the faithful 
register of grateful hearts. Are there not many individuals, 
who, like the benevolent Clarkson, have fixed upon some 
plan of good-will to men, embracing a great variety and de- 
gree of effort, and have pursued it amid every form of trial 
and opposition for years and tens of years? The individual 
just referred to proposed the simple object of the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade. To this one object he consecrated his 
life and all his powers. He permitted no opposition to di- 
vert him from his purpose. But amid great apathy of the 
public mind and great opposition on the part of those who 
were personally interested in his defeat; amid the most ar- 
duous labors, attended with a thousand discouragements, and 
protracted for many years; in rebuke and sickness and sor- 
row, this one object was the star that guided him on, the 
light that sustained him, and which he followed without giv- 
ing way to his trials or relaxing in the least from his efforts, 
until it was secured. 



POWER OF THE WILL. 339 

§. 230. The subject illustrated from the course of the first 
settlers of New England. 

The course of the first settlers of New England is an in- 
stance favourable for the illustration of the subject before 
us. Their simple object was to find a residence somewhere, 
where they could live in the full and free exercise and en- 
joyment of their religion. And this was an object, which 
under the circumstances of the case was not to be carried 
into effect without great firmness and perseverance. They 
left behind them in their native country a thousand objects 
which the world holds most dear; despised and - out -cast, 
they came to these inhospitable shores, in sorrow and weak- 
ness and poverty ; they suffered from the want of provis- 
ions, from the prevalence of wasting sickness, from the 
storms and cold of winter, and from the watchful jealousy and 
hostility of the savage tribes. Though sincerely and ar- 
dently religious, it cannot be denied that they had their sea- 
sons of discouragement; and often feared, and often doubt- 
ed. But when the understanding was obscured and the 
heart was fainting, when all without was darkness and the 
lights within burnt dimly, when even religious faith, that 
principle of action more sacred as well as more powerful 
than all others, grew sickly and perplexed, the high pur- 
pose, which they had once deliberately and prayerfully for- 
med, remained unchanged and unshaken ; through succes- 
sive years of suffering and sorrow they never permitted 
themselves to cast a repentant and lingering look behind; 
with a countenance unmoved and a determination unalterable 
they stood as it were amid the billows, till the storm ceased, 
and the sun of their deliverance arose. 

<§. 231. Illustrated by the jortitude exhibited by Savages. 

We might go on multiplying illustrations of this sub- 



340 POWER Or THE WILL. 

ject almost without number; drawn too from every class of 
men, and from every condition of society, savage as well as 
civilized. It might perhaps be said with some appearance 
of plausibility, that the case of the first settlers of New Eng- 
land is an exempt one; that they were sustained, (at least 
such was the case with their leaders,) by the combined ad- 
vantages of civilization, education, and religion. But mul- 
titudes of other men, of whom this could not be said, have ex- 
hibited the same unshaken energy of the will. Look yon- 
der into that dark and boundless forest; behold, beneath the 
light of the uncertain and shuddering moon, the fire kindled, 
which is destined to consume the victim taken in war ; see 
him fastened to the stake, his flesh slowly consumed, and, 
as it is burning, torn piece-meal from his blackened bones. 
What inexpressible suffering! And yet this dark son of 
the forest, this poor ignorant child of nature betrays no 
weakness of purpose, sheds no tear, utters no exclamation 
of impatience, does not even move a muscle. His thoughts 
are upon his distant wigAvam, upon his wife and children, 
upon the glory of his forefathers, upon the good name of his 
tribe of the Jakes and the mountains, and upon that far land 
unseen, beyond the cloud-topt hill, 

"And thinks, admitted to that equal sky 
" His faithful dog shall bear him company. 

Here are the facts, which are presented before us ; not 
all indeed, which can be brought forward, and perhaps they 
are not those which are best adapted to our purpose. But 
such as they are, they are undeniable. They are inscribed, 
on every page of the history of the human race. And we 
may challenge philosophy or anything else, satisfactorily to 
explain them, except jon the ground of the innate energy, 
not merely of the mind as a whole, but of the voluntary fac- 
ulty in particular. 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



SELF-DETERMINING POWER OF THE WILL. 



§. 232. General remarks on a self-determining poicer. 

But admitting all that has been said, and freely granting 
that there is a true and substantive power in the will, the 
inquiry may still remain, what is the nature of this power ? 
On this particular topic Ave take the liberty to refer the rea- 
der to the remarks which have already been made on the 
nature of power, considered as applicable to and as an at- 
tribute of the mind in general. Those remarks are not less 
applicable to the parts of the mind, than they are to the 
mind considered as a whole. They do not appear, hoAvever,* 
to reach one question, Avhich has been the subject of much 
inquiry and interest, viz, the self-determining poiuer of the will, 
as it is termed. This question, therefore, is entitled to a 
brief notice. 

§. 233 . Of a self-determining power of the mind. 

In endeavouring to answer the inquiry, whether the will 
has a self-determining power, we remark, in the first place, 

that we must attend carefully to the import of the terms. 

If, for instance, by the self-determining power of the -will 



342 SELF-DETERMINING 

be meant the self determining power of the mind, consider- 
ed as a whole, we may grant that there is such a power un- 
der the circumstances, in which we actually exist. Under 
these circumstances it is unavoidable, that the understanding 
or intellect should be more or less developed. Thought is 
necessarily incident to the nature of the mind, when objects 
of thought are brought within its reach. And as in the cir- 
cumstances in which we are placed, such objects exist all 
around it, the intellect or understanding always expands 
and grasps them; and we may add that it expands and makes 
them the subject of knowledge by its own power. The mind 
is so constituted, that the developement of the intellect is 
always followed by the expansion and exercise, in a greater 
or less degree, of the sensibilities; that is to say, of the de- 
sires, emotions, and feelings of moral obligation. And in this 
state of things we have an adequate and ample basis for the 
action of the will. So that we may undoubtedly admit, and 
may assert with entire truth, that the mind, under the cir- 
cumstances in which we are placed, possesses what may be 
called, (although there is certainly no peculiar felicity in the 
expression,) a self- determining power. It perceives, and it 
feels, and it wills of itself . In each case there is power, sub- 
ject, however, as we should always keep in mind, to condi- 
tions. Having the power to will, it wills, because it feels ; 
having the power to feel, it feels,, because it perceives ; and 
having the power to perceive, it perceives, because objects of 
perception are involved in the circumstances in which it is 
placed. Under these circumstances, therefore, the mind acts 
of itself or has a self-determining power. 

The antecedence of feelings, or in other words of mo- 
tives, constitutes the condition of volitions; and the antece- 
dence of perceptions or intellections constitutes the condi- 
tion of feelings; and the antecedence, (that is to say, the ex- 
istence and presence,) of objects of perception constitutes 



POWER OF THE WILL. 313 

the condition of perceptions. But these conditions or inci- 
dents to the mind's action are not withholden, but are alrea- 
dy given; and the field is fully open for the exercise of all 
those powers it possesses. 

§. 234. Of a self-determining power of the will. 

In the second place, if, by the phrase self-determining 
power of the will, he merely meant that the will itself, that 
distinct susceptibility of the mind which we thus denomi- 
inate, has power, we grant that it is so. — We have already 
seen, that the mind, considered as a whole, has power. In 
this sense, as well as in others, the mind is created in the 
image of God. And wherever else that power may be lodg- 
ed, it has its residence peculiarly in the mental susceptibili- 
ty, which we denominate the will. That the will, therefore, 
has of itself to a certain extent, and within the limits and un- 
der the conditions which its Maker has assigned to it, the 
capability of movement or action; in other words, that it 
does of itself act, arbitrate, determine, or decide in the cir- 
cumstances appropriate to its action, we do not deny; but 
on the contrary admit and affirm it to be so. So far it is not 
necessary to contend. 

§. 235. Of such a self-determining power of the mil as involves 
the dependence of the present volition on a former one. 

But if, (as is sometimes understood by those expressions,) 
by the phrase self-determining power of the will, is meant a 
power, in virtue of which the will acts in order to determine 
its own action, then we may confidently assert, that the 
proposition, which alleges the existence of such self-deter- 
mining power, involves what is obviously contradictory and 
absurd. The reader is requested to notice the manner, in 
which the terms in question are understood by us in the re- 
marks, which are now to be made. We understand the on- 



344 SELF-DETERMINING 

]y remaining meaning of the phrase, self-determining pow- 
er of the will, to be this, viz. that in virtue of the will's 
power every volition is preceded by another well-defined 
act of the will, and in such a way that such volition could 
not have existed without the preceding act; in other words, 
that the will, in the exercise or by the action of its self-deter- 
mining power, causes or brings to pass the voluntary state 
of the mind or volition ; a form of expression, which evi- 
dently and necessarily implies an act of the will, antecedent to 
volition. — This doctrine, so far as we are able to form a judg- 
ment of it, seems to be in itself exceedingly absurd and even 
inconceivable. If every volition is based upon a preceding 
act of the will as the condition of its existence, may we not 
with propriety and with pertinence ask, what causes this 
preceding act? And we must be told again, (for we know 
of no other possible answer,) it is the will's self-determin- 
ing power ; an explanation which obviously implies an act 
existing anterior to the before-mentioned antecedent act. 
And thus on this system, we should be obliged to go on 
from one step to another, from the volition which is the im- 
mediate antecedent of the outward action to another voli- 
tion which is the antecedent and the cause of that, and then 
again to another still antecedent volition; and so on with- 
out end. A self-determining power, therefore, in the sense 
which we now suppose to be contended for, implies a per- 
petual going round and round, a movement in a circle with- 
out any end. So far from giving power to the will in any 
special and extraordinary sense, the doctrine in question 
deprives it of all power; it makes it a mere automaton, with 
a mechanism indeed, capable of generating a series of per- 
petual motions; but which motious have no perceptible, 
nor even conceivable beginning or termination. 



POWER OF THE WILL. 345 

§. 236. Opinions of President Edwards on this subject. 

Upon this particular view of the subject now before us,we 
take the liberty of appealing to the statements of President 
Edwards; and we do not know, that any thing can profitably 
be added to what he has said. We have already in the pre- 
ceding section given the substance of some of his remarks, 
but the reader is entitled to his own words. "If the will 
determines the will, then choice orders and determines the 
choice; and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and 
follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore 
if the will determines all its own free acts, then every free 
act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice 
choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will or 
choice be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act 
too, the will is self-determined: that is, this, in like manner, 
is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses ; or which is the 
same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act 
of the will, choosing that. And the like may again be obser- 
ved of the last mentioned act. Which brings us directly 
to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the will prece- 
ding the first act in the whole train, directing and determin- 
ing the rest; or a free act of the will, before the first free 
act ol the will."* 

♦Edward's Inquiry into the Will, Pt. n, §. 1. 



4^ 






44 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



DIFFERENCES OF VOLUNTARY POWER. 



§. 237. Differences in voluntary power seldom noticed. 

There is one aspect, iu which this subject remains to be 
contemplated, which may tend to throw some light on what 
has already been stated under the general head of Power of 
the Will; we refer to bifferences of voluntary power. 
This is a view of the human mind, which has seldom, owing 
perhaps to erroneous or indistinct views on the whole sub- 
ject of mental power, received that attention to which it ap- 
pears to be entitled. It is no uncommon thing to hear re- 
marks made upon differences of strength in the passions of 
men, or in their faculties of perception and reasoning, but it 
is exceedingly seldom, that we notice any thing said in ex- 
planation of differences in the capability of the will. But 
if there is truly a power, an original and substantive effi- 
ciency, lodged in the will, it is certainly a natural presump- 
tion, that we should find degrees and diversities in this 
power, not less than in any other ability of the mind. And 
facts, which are constantly presented to our notice^show 
this to be the case. 



Differences op voluntary power. 347 

§. 238. Remarks on constitutional weakness of the will. 

If we will take the trouble to examine the characters of 
men, as we find them developed more or less in the pursuits 
of life, we shall not fail to find some, who exhibit, not 
occasionally merely but as a general thing and as a perma- 
nent trait of mind, a feebleness of resolution, a sort of va- 
cillancy, a continual oscillation, if one may be allowed the 
expression, between one thing and another. No argu- 
ments, no motives, no considerations of interest, duty, or 
glory are able permanently to countervail and prop up this 
inherent weakness. They may indeed sustain it for a time; 
the imbecillity of purpose, which marks the history of these 
persons, may not always be discoverable in the ordinary 
circumstances of life, especially when the will is supported 
by considerations suitable to give it strength; but in the 
onset of perilous circumstances, in the close pressure of por- 
tentous danger, in sudden and fearful emergencies of any 
kind whatever, instead of standing erect and immoveable, 
they are overwhelmed and driven away, " like the heath in 
the desert." And if this statement is correct, it certainly 
presents an important aspect in the developements of human 
nature. 

We do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles; 
we do not expect the blind to see, the lame to walk erect, 
or the deaf to hear; we do not feel at liberty to require of 
a man, whose intellect is obviously incompetent to the task 
of combining more than half a dozen propositions, the pro- 
duction of a Spirit of Laws, a Principia,or Mecanique Celes- 
te; and it would be almost as unreasonable, however useful 
they may be in other situations more adapted to their pecu- 
liarities of mental organization, to expect from such persons 
p. course of perseverance, fortitude, and daring. If no one 



348 DIFFERENCES OF 

is answerable for a greater number of talents than are given 
him, and if in the case of particular individuals the Almighty 
dispenser of mental gifts has seen fit to assign those talents 
to the intellect rather than the will, the requisition should be 
made, not only in conformity with the amount which has 
been given, but with reference also to the place of deposit. 
We may impose upon such persons a heavy burden of 
thought; but must be less exorbitant in our requisitions on 
their resolves and action in those difficult and pressing emer- 
gencies, which obviously require the interposition of men of 
a different stamp. 

§. 239. Of comparative or relative weakness of the will. 

There is an apparent, and to all practical purposes, an ac- 
tual weakness of the will, which, when we fully consider its 
nature, may properly be termed comparative or relative. 
We may explain it thus. The individual is not wanting in 
voluntary decision and energy, if the will be considered in 
itself and disconnected from other parts of the mental 
constitution. So far from this, it may perhaps be said 
with truth, that voluntary energy is naturally a leading 
trait and characteristic of the persons now referred to. And 
yet the will does not fully perform the office of a controlling 
power; it does not act up to the standard of its own capa- 
bilities ; the individual is often vascillating in his conduct, 
even in those cases where he acts with vigor; so much so, 
that, even with great confidence in his good intentions, we 
do not place full reliance on his future conduct. And the 
cause is to be attributed not so much, as has been remarked, 
to any weakness in the will, in itself considered, as to the 
want of proportion between that and other parts of the mind. 
In other words, the passions have become predominant; an 
inflammatory violence has been infused into them by nature 
or by accidental circumstances; and the will, whatever may 



VOLUNTARY POWER. 349 

have been its original vigour, has become subordinate in its 

influence. -Have we not an illustration of these statements 

in the life of the Scottish poet Burns? It is undeniable, that 
he naturally possessed more vigour of purpose, more energy 
of resolve than many other persons; but such was the inor- 
dinate intensity of his passions, that the power of his will 
was relatively weak; it could not withstand and control those 
internal tempests, to which he was subject. 

§. 240. Instances of want of energy of the will. 

Having made these general statements concerning weak- 
ness or inefficiency of the will, (both that which is original 
or natural, and that which is relative and depends upon the 
inordinate strength of some parts of our sentient or emotive 
nature,) we now proceed to give some further instances of 
that want of voluntary energy which has been spoken of. 
Do we not often discover a defect of this kind in men in 
public life? How many instances are recorded in history, of 
men, who have been thrown upon the stormy ocean of poli- 
tics, fitted with every capability for such a situation with 
the exception of voluntary energy; but who, burdened with 
this single defect, have at last gone down, and been over- 
whelmed in the billows! Was not the preeminent mind of 
Tully, capable as it was of penetrating all the mazes of phi- 
losophy and of embracing all the heights and depths of civil 
and public law, greatly wanting in decision, in energy, in 
the firm and unshaken resolve? Although unspeakably in 
the advance in other respects, would it not in this particu- 
lar suffer in comparison with the energetic purpose of Bru- 
tus and the Caesars ? There is a name of no small note 

in English history, which is naturally brought to recollection 
in connection with these views, as an instance of versatility 
founded not so much upon incapacity of the understanding, 
as upon imbecility and changeableness of the will. We 



350 DIFFERENCES OF 

refer to the Duke of Buckingham, who figured so conspicu- 
ously in the reign of Charles II, and whom the pen of Dry- 
den has rendered so celebrated under the feigned name of 
Zimri. 

" Some of their chiefs were princes of the land, 
•' In the first rank of these did Zimri stand ; 
" A man so various that he seemed to be 
" Not one, but all mankind's epitome ; 
" Stiffin opinions, always in the wrong ; 
" Was every thing by starts, and nothing long ; 
" But, in the course of one revolving moon, 
"Was chemist, fiddler, statesman, and buffoon. 

Some of the prominent leaders in the French Revolution, 
that remarkable period of political tempest, showed them- 
selves unequal to the occasion, and were overwhelmed in 
the convulsions which they contributed to arouse, but were 
unable to control. Were not the ministers Necker and Ro- 
land, whose relations to that memorable event ar6 too well 
known to require a recital, instances and proofs of this re- 
mark? Of Claviere also, one of the associates of Roland, it 
was remarked by Mirabeau, who was intimately acquainted 
with him, that " he was a man in head, and a child in heart; 
that he always wanted a regulator; and that left to himself, 
he never ceased to vary." Of De Graves, the successor of 
Narbonne, and who was required, in consequence of his sit- 
uation and age, to furnish the list of the Roland ministry, it 
is said by a writer already repeatedly referred to, that " no 
man was less qualified to take a part in a stormy administration. 
He was an honest man, and his heart was good ; he was a stran- 
ger to all party feeling, but was weak both in body and mind; 
he was not deficient in acquirements and laboured hard ; but he 
wanted energy of character and a firm will of his own."* — The 
)mere possession of intellectual power is not enongh to fit a 

*Dumont's Recollections of Mirabeau, Chaps. 15, 19. 



VOLUNTARY POWER. 351 

person to take a leading part in the government of a nation; 
but it is necessary that he should add to distinguished pow- 
ers of perception and reasoning a corresponding energy of 
the will. How many, in consequence of not possessing 
powers of the will commensurate with those of the under- 
standing, have become giddj'- on the pinnacle of their eleva- 
tion, and have arisen only to fall! 

§. 241 . Remarks on great strength of the will. 

But there are instances of a different kind from those 
which have just been mentioned ; instances, so far from 
weakness, that we clearly discover in them remarkable pow- 
er of the will. It cannot be doubted, that, among the vari- 
ous elements, which constitute whatever is great and admi- 
rable in man, we find one here, viz, in marked decision and 
vigour of the will. If, in some cases, the will seems hardly 
to have an existence; in others it exhibits a transcendent de- 
gree of energy. There have been men, who, in danger and 
suffering, have shown a vigour, that was calculated to ex- 
cite the strongest emotions; who have been inflexible, while 
others have been changed with every varying breeze ; and 
have possessed themselves in stability and calmness, while 
many around them have been shaken in their resolutions, 
and disquieted with fears. Of this marked decision and en- 
ergy of the will, we now proceed to give some illustrations. 

§. 242. Energy of the will as displayed under bodily suffering. 

When occupied with the general subject of the power of 
the will, we had occasion to make the remark, that the pa- 
tience, which was not unfrequently exhibited in circumstan- 
ces of bodily suffering, indicated the existence of such pow- 
er in a greater or less degree. We might with propriety 
appeal to instances of the same kind in order to show, with 
what varieties of intensity the voluntary power is dispensed 



352 DIFFERENCES OF 

to different individuals. It is often said, however, when we 
refer to cases of this kind, that men will calmly endure al- 
most any thing when they cannot help it. But in answer to 
this suggestion it is enough to say, that there are cases 
where men suffer hy their own act, and their own choice ; 
and not merely in a slight manner, hut in the highest degree. 
— Plutarch relates an incident in the life of the celebrated 
Marius, which will tend to show what we mean. This extra- 
ordinary man had both his legs covered with wens, and being 
troubled with the deformity, he determined to put himself 
into the hands of a surgeon. Confident in his own energy 
of mind, he would not be bound, but stretched out one of his 
legs to the knife ; and without a motion or groan, bore the 
inexpressible pain of the operation in silence and with a 
settled countenance. The story of Mutius Scaevola also 
shows us what astonishing powers of will our Maker has 
seen fit to dispense to some persons. When required by 
Porsena to explain certain intimations . of danger which he 
had obscurely thrown out, and being threatened with ex- 
treme suffering in case of a refusal, he calmly thrust his 
right hand into a fire, which had been kindled for the pur- 
pose of a sacrifice, and steadily held it there burning in the 
flames, for' the sole purpose of giving Porsena to understand, 
that he was not a person to be influenced by fear, or intimi- 
dated by suffering. Is not this to be regarded as a deci- 
sive and remarkable instance of voluntary energy; showing 
most clearly, that, while power is truly and emphatically ap- 
propriate to the will, it does not exist in all persons in an 
equal degree, but is conferred more richly on some than on 
others ? 

There is a similar instance in the life of Archbishop 
Cranmer. In an unguarded and unhappy hour he had sub- 
scribed to doctrines which he did not believe; an act, which 
he afterwards deeply repented of as the greatest miscarriage 



VOLUNTAEY POWER. 353 

of his life. And when he was subsequently led to the stake, 
he stretched out the hand which had been the instrument in 
this false and discreditable subscription, and, without be- 
traying, either by his countenance or motions, the .least 
sign of weakness or even of feeling, (such are the very 
words of the historian,) he held it in the flames, till it was 
entirely consumed. 

§. 243. Energy oj the will as shown in imminent danger. 

Diversities in the strength and energy of the voluntary 
faculty are clearly seen in all cases of imminent danger, 
particularly danger of death. The fear of death is as natur- 
al to man as the love of life; and but few men can be sud- 
denly exposed to death, especially if it appear to be inevita- 
ble, without experiencing a shrinking back from it. We find 
some persons, however, who have such energy of purpose, 
such remarkable decision' and firmness, that they meet it, not 
merely as it comes in the milder arrangements of Providence, 
but in its most horrid and violent forms, with entire calm- 
ness, and even seek it as something desirable. The Roman 
Decii voluntarily devoted themselves to death for their 
country. Regulus, when he had been made a prisoner by the 
Carthaginians, of his own accord took a course, safe and 
honourable as he supposed for Rome ; but which he clearly 
foresaw, (and the result even more than realized his anticipa- 
tions,) would be attended with extreme cruelty & destruction 
to himself. In the dreadful wars of modern times, which have 
carried sorrow and desolation over Europe and America, how 
often have we heard of deeds and enterprises of valour, which 
have excited our admiration in view of the wonderful energy 
of purpose they have displayed, at the same time that we 
deeply lamented the occasions that called them forth. In 
the war of La Vendee the celebrated Kleber called an officer 
45 



354 DIFFERENCES OF 

to him, for whom he had a particular esteem and friendship. 
" Take, said he to his military friend, a company of grena- 
diers; stop the enemy before that ravine; you will be kil- 
led, but you will save your comrades." I shall do it, 
General, replied the officer, with as much calmness as if he 
had been required to perform a simple military evolution. 
He fulfilled his word, and arrested the enemy's progress; 
but perished in the achievement. 

But it is not the soldier alone, who has exhibited this en- 
ergy of purpose amid the imminent danger of death. Not 
unfrequently have the philanthropist and the Christian Mis- 
sionary placed themselves in situations, where extreme suf- 
fering and even death itself seemed to be inevitable. They 
have not only had the resolution to leave their country and 
home; but to plunge into dungeons, to walk on their errands 
of mercy amid pestilential atmospheres, to wander through 
pathless forests and over burning sands and precipitous 
mountains, to endure the privations of cold and hunger and na- 
kedness, and to encounter the ferocious Savage with his wea- 
pons of destruction extended against them. How many could 
say with the Apostle Paul,that first and most devoted of mis- 
sionaries, " in journeyings often, in perils of waters, in per- 
ils of robbers, in perils by the heathen, in perils in the city, 
in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea! " Unaltera- 
bly fixed in their purpose amid present suffering and the 
sure anticipation of future and greater woes, they have of- 
ten exhibited a wonderful heroism, not indeed in the cause 
of war and its attendant devastations, but for the sake of 
renovating the sensibilities, and soothing the countless mis- 
eries of their fellow-men. In the boundless forests of North 
and South America, on the shores of the Nile and the Gan- 
ges and on the banks of solitary streams unknown to civil- 
ized man, in frozen Greenland and the burning sands of Af- 
rica, in the distant islands of the sea, amid the wretched 



VOLUNTARY POWER. 355 

hamlets of the dreary Alps, wherever there is ignorance to 
be enlightened or sorrow to be soothed or souls to be saved, 
their astonishing labours of benevolence have been witnes- 
sed, and their names will be held in veneration down to the 
latest ages. 

§. 244. Energy of the will as shown in martyrdoms. 

Diversities in the power of the will are quickly discov- 
ered, not only in the situations just referred to, of exposure 
to imminent danger, but in all extraordinary and trying sit- 
uations whatever. Whenever we open a book of war, of 
famine, of pestilence, or of martyrdoms, and read in it the 
conduct of men under these terrible inflictions, we open and 
read a new and most interesting chapter in the philosophy 
of the human mind. We venture to say, that not only the 
history of civil convulsions and wars and revolutions, but 
also such a Book as Fox's History of Christian Martyrdom 
will afford matter of comment and reference to the mental 
philosopher. If, without such a work as the last mentioned, we 
should have known less of the depravity and dreadful cruelty 
of human nature, we should also have known less of its truth, 
its honour, its submission, and its immense resources of en- 
durance and energy. It is impossible for a person to read 
the history of Martyrdoms, without entertaining a deep re- 
gard and admiration for the sufferers, founded not rnerely 
upon considerations connected with the cause of their suffer- 
ings and death; but also upon the moral sublimity of their 
fixed and immutable resolve. On what principle can it be 
explained, that men and even delicate and feeble women, 
have endured the rack, the screw, the dungeon, and the fire 
without complaint and even with triumph? It may indeed 
be said, and said with truth, that they were supported by 
religious faith and hope. But can it be said with truth of 
fhose,who were not only thus supported but were thus suppor- 



356 DIFFERENCES OF 

ted in an equal degree, that they all died with equal calm- 
ness and fortitude? Although none of those holy sufferers 
doubted, that God would be their portion at last and would 
bestow upon them the crown and the mansions of the blest, 
yet could they all smile and. rejoice amid the flames ? They 
were all submissive and patient; but could they all as- 
sume the aspect of utter indifference to their tortures? 
We may rest assured, that the cases of marked and decisive 
triumph over bodily suffering were for the most part those 
of persons, who possessed an original and innate energy of 
the will. It is true that they were enabled to endure a 
great increase of suffering with the aids of religion; but 
they were, for the most part, persons, who could have firm- 
ly and triumphantly endured much suffering without it. It 
was this combination of original energy of character with 
the blessed aids of religion, that supported Jerome of Prague, 
who sung hymns as he went to the place of execution, em- 
braced the stake with cheerfulness, and when the execution- 
er went behind him to set fire to the faggots, exclaimed, 
"Come here and kindle it before my eyes; for had I been 
afraid of it, I had not come here, having had so many oppor- 
tunities to escape." 

§. 245. Subject illustrated from two classes of public speakers. 

In this connection we are naturally led to make the re- 
mark, that there are not only some situations, but some arts 
and callings in life, in which a high degree of decision and 
energy of the will is absolutely necessary to success. 
Among other arts, (we do not propose to mention all of 
them where this trait seems to be especially requisite,) a 
high degree of voluntary energy is exceedingly important 
to that of the orator. And we are here furnished with 
grounds of distinction and comparison between men of elo- 
quence. There are some public speakers, who greatly fail 



VOLUNTARY POWER. 357 

inefficiency of the will. Possessed of intellectual powers, 
that command the admiration of all, they are still acknowl- 
edged to have a weak point here. When they arise to speak 
in public, they have a clear perception of the subject of de- 
bate; and if there are any exciting elements in it, their 
passions are enkindled, and the texture of their argument is 
rendered heated and radiant with the flame. The strong 
workings of the sensibilities are seen in the agitated nerves, 
the violent gesticulation, and the contortions of the muscles. 
And we might expect great results, were it not that the 
presiding power of the will, upon which under such circum- 
stances every thing depends, is not equal to the occasion. 
The voluntary power staggers upon its throne. They lose 
the control of themselves; so that the mind, freighted as it 
is with thought and argument, is violently driven about, 
like a ship caught in a whirlwind. 

But there are other public speakers, who combine a high 
degree of intellectual ability with a no less signal energy of 
the will. On the occasions of public debate, however mo- 
mentous, they arise with perfect calmness. The class of 
persons, whom we now have in view, are not without pas- 
sion. On the contrary, the passions exist in a decided de- 
gree, and are capable of being aroused, and of being impreg- 
nated with tremendous energy. But under no circumstances 
do they permit the passions to be so aroused as to reject 
and annul the supervision and control of the higher power 
of the will. They at times permit them to operate, so far as 
may be necessary to infuse vitality and vigour into the intel- 
lect; but always hold them, even in their highest exercises, 
amenable to the effective superintendence of volition. Accord- 
ingly when they consider it as suiting their purpose, they let 
them loose, and at once their voice and all the other methods 
of oratorical communication become the indices and exposi- 



358 DIFFERENCES OF 

tors of the tempest that is raging within. If it suits their 
purpose better, they suddenly call to their aid the suprema- 
cy of the voluntary power; all outward agitation ceases ; 
a calm succeeds to the tempest; there is nothing perceptible 
but quiet dignity and unruffled self-possession; the passions, 
rebuked and quelled by a higher authority, retire into the 
secret recesses of the soul; 

" Imperio premit, ac vinclis et carcere frrenat." 

§. 246. Power of the willrequisite in the military and other arts. 

There are other situations and callings in life, in which 
power of the will is an essential requisite to success. This 
is particularly true of the military life, although it is painful 
even to speak of such an art or calling among men. There 
never was a great commander, who had not great energy of 
volition. It is not to be supposed, because a man stands 
unmoved and calm in the day of battle, even in its most ter- 
rible onsets, that he is naturally destitute either of fear, or 
of the love of life. If this is sometimes the case, it is cer- 
tainly not always so. And where such is undoubtedly the 
fact, it is not to be regarded as evidence of greatness, but 
rather of obtuseness and hebetude of character. That sort 
of courage, which consists in mere dullness and immo- 
bility of feeling, may answer well enough for a common 
soldier; but the trait of a great commander, in addition to 
great intellectual power, is energy of the will, or what we 
more commonly express by the term self-command. He keeps 
not only his fears, but his hopes also in subjection; and the 
imperturbable calmness he discovers is not to be regarded as 
a proof of the absence of fear or hope or joy or sorrow or 
anger, but merely as an indication, that he keeps those emo- 
tions and passions under complete control. 

Similar remarks will apply to those, who are exposed to 



VOLUNTARY POWER. 359 

the dangers and perplexities of a sea-faring life; particular- 
ly such as are sent out on voyages of exploration and dis- 
covery. If a high degree of energy of the will is essential 
to the character of men, who are required to fill leading mil- 
itary stations, it is not less essential to those who, like Co- 
lumbus and De Gama and Cooke and La Perouse are des- 
tined to discover and explore new worlds. And hence, when 
persons are to be selected for such expeditions, the inquiry 
with their employers always is, not merely is he a man of 
intellect and of education, but is he a man of decision and 
firmness? Can he stand unmoved and self-possessed in 
trying and unexpected situations? Is .he able with entire 
and manifest coolness, to meet danger, and pain, and t even 
death itself? 

§. 247. Energy of the will requisite in the men of revolutions. 

A higher degree of voluntary power, than is allotted to 
the great mass of mankind, seems to be requisite in those, 
who a-re destined to take a leading part in those great moral, 
religious, and political revolutions, which have from time 
to time agitated the face of the world. It is no easy task 
to change the opinions of men, to check and subdue vices 
which have become prevalent, or to give a new aspect and 
impulse to religion and liberty. The men, who take a lead 
in these movements, are in general men of decision and firm- 
ness ; no others would answer the purpose. If the gentle 
spirit of Melancthon had been placed in the precise position 
occupied by Luther, would the great event of the Protestant 
Reformation have been urged forward with the same impe- 
tus, and to the same issues? When society becomes great- 
ly unsettled either in its religious or political aspects, when 
there is a heaving and tossing to and fro, a removal of the old 
landmarks, and a breaking up of the old foundations, then 
it is, that men, not merely of intellect, but of decision and 



360 DIFFERENCES OF 

energy, (sagacious , cool, decided, persevering, resolute,) 
find their way upward to the summit of the conflicting ele- 
ments, and subject them to their guidance. Such is the nat- 
ural course of things; such men are needed and no others are 
capable of taking their place; and they become almost of 
necessity the advisers and leaders in the nascent order of so- 
ciety. The prominent leaders, therefore, in every great re- 
ligious or political revolution will be found to illustrate the 
fact, that there are original and marked differences in the 
degree of power, which is appropriate to the will. Look at 
the men who presided at the events of the great English 
Revolution of 1640, particularly the Puritans, men of the 
stamp of the Vanes, Hampdens, and Fleetwoods; who, in 
embarking in the convulsions of that stormy period, had a 
twofold object in view, the security of political liberty, and 
the attainment of religious freedom! Were they weak men? 
Were they men wanting in fortitude? Were they uncertain 
and flexible, vacillating and double-minded? History gives 
an emphatic answer to these questions. It informs us., that 
they entered into the contest for the great objects just now 
referred to, with a resolution which nothing could shake, 
with an immutability of purpose resembling the decrees of 
unalterable destiny. They struck for liberty and religion, 
and they struck not thrice merely, but as the prophet of old 
would have had them; smiting many times, and smiting fierce- 
ly, till Syria was consumed. They broke in pieces the 
throne of England; they trampled under foot her ancient 
and haughty aristocracy; they erected the standard of reli- 
gious liberty, which has waved ever since, and has scatter- 
ed its healing light over distant lands ; and by their wisdom 
and energy they not only overthrew the enemies of freedom 
at home, but made the name of their country honoured and 
terrible throughout the earth. They seem to have entirely 
subjected their passions to their purposes, and to have pres- 



VOLUNTARY POWER. $61 

sed all the exciting and inflammable elements of their 
nature into the service of their fixed and immutable wills. 
In the prosecution of their memorable achievements, 

"Of which all Europe talk'd from side to side," 
they acted under the the two-fold pressure of motives drawn 
from heaven and earth ; they felt as if they were con- 
tending for principles which were valuable to all mankind, 
and as if all mankind were witnesses of the coutest; at the 
same time that they beheld on every side, in the quickened 
eye of. their faith, the attendant angels eagerly bending 
over them, who were soon to transfer to the imperishable 
records on high the story of their victory and reward, or of 
their defeat and degradation. All these things imparted addi- 
tional fixedness and intensity to their purposes. " Death had 
lost its terrors, and pleasure its charms. They had their 
smiles and their tears, their raptures and their sorrows, but 
not for the things of this world. Enthusiasm had made them 
Stoics, had cleared their minds from every vulgar passion 
and prejudice, and raised them above the influence of danger 
and corruption. It sometimes might lead them to pursue 
unwise ends, but never to choose unwise means. They 
went through the world like Sir Artegale's man Talus with 
his flail, crushing and trampling down oppressors, mingling 
with human beings, but having neither part nor lot in hu- 
man infirmities; insensible to fatigue, to pleasure, and to 
pain; not to be pierced by any weapon, not to be withstood 
by any barrier."* 

§. 243. Practical application of these views. 

The statements and reasonings of this and the preceding 
chapters in this Part of the Treatise seem to us satisfactori- 
ly to show, that power, in the strict and real sense of the 

*Edinburgh Review, Aug. 1825, Art. Milton. 
46 



362 DIFFERENCES OF VOLUNTARY POWER. 

term, is an attribute of the mind as a whole; that it is truly 
an attribute of the will also; and that as an attribute of the 
will it exists in different degrees in different individuals. 
And it is proper to add here, th,at these views admit of a . 
practical application, from which no person whatever ought 
to consider himself exempt. We are too apt to estimate and 
limit the degree of our accountability by the amount of our 
intellectual powers. But it cannot he doubted, that this is 
a ground of estimate too restricted. We are to inquire also, 
whether our Maker has not seen fit to give us a large share 
of natural fortitude and decision ? Whether he has not en- 
dued us Avith powers of the will, which under a suitable 
direction might be available for our own good and that of 
others ? And if we find it to be so, we may be assured, 
that, somewhere within the sphere of our location and action 
in life, there are duties, which require this precise kind of 
talents, for the performance of which they were undoubted- 
ly given. Let us, then, study ourselves; and learn what our 
adorable Maker would have us to do. 



CHAPTER FIFTH. 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER, 



§. 249. Connection of the philosophy of the will with consisten- 
cy of character. 

The philosophical analysis of the Will, which we have 
now in a great degree completed, may contribute to various 
practical results, some of them of no small value. Among 
other things we may confidently assert, that we find in the 
nature and operations of the Will the basis of consistency 
of character, which is certainly one of the most interesting 
as well as important traits. There is a well written and 
and popular Essay of Mr. Foster upon Decision of Charac- 
ter ; a subject, although it is intimately connected with the 
doctrine of the will, on which we do not propose to touch 
except incidentally. We refer to that Essay, which ex- 
hausts in a great degree the subjectof Decision of Character, 
merely for the purpose of saying, if indeed it can be necessa- 
ry to suggest a caution of that kind, that it is important not 
to confound consistency with mere decision; for, although 
they approximate and resemble in some respects, they are 
obviously remote from each other and different in other res- 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

pects. Decision is more limited; consistency embraces a wi- 
der range of operations. Decision relates to one thing, or at 
least may be shown clearly and distinctly in one thing; consis- 
tency relates to many. The appropriate sphere of decision of 
character is found in some perplexing, but definite emergency, 
and of course it generally manifests itself in the performance 
of particular acts. Consistency, on the contrary, can never 
be shown from the course taken in a particular emergency, 
without taking into Consideration the conduct of the person in 
other situations; but developes and proves itself from the ten- 
our of his conduct in a long series of events. Decision im- 
plies a condensed and inspirited energy put forth in the crisis 
of a day or an hour; consistency implies a condensation, and, 
if we may be allowed the expression, a tension of purpose, kept 
firm and immoveable for years and even a whole life. 

There are some men, who may not altogether be wanting 
in decision, but who exhibit a species of mental restlesness, an 
uncertainty of regard and affection, an inequality of temper, 
and an inconstancy of conduct, which seems to be inconsis- 
tent with the just claims of a percipient and moral nature. If 
we do not err in our estimate of the capabilities of human na- 
ture, it is in the power of all, who are in the full possession of 
their faculties, to check this inordinate restlessness, to regu- 
late in a great degree this inequality, to establish and to ren- 
der certain this inconstancy and uncertainty; and it is certain- 
ly unnecessary to urge the importance of doing it. The man 
of naturally small intellect renders himself ridiculous, as well 
as unhappy by capriciousness and inconstancy; by such a 
course he hides or destroys the single talent that is given him ; 
while the man, who possesses originality and vigour of intellect, 
and who might make them of great account for the good of his 
fellow-men, loses for the same reason the confidence, which 
would be otherwise reposed in him, and becomes comparatively 
useless. 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 365 

§. 250. Illustrations of the inconsistent character. 

We shall perhaps obtain a more full and precise idea of 
consistency of character, if we look at the person who is with- 
out it. The inconsistent man projects a plan of operations to 
day; to-morrow he makes preparations to carry it into effect; 
and the next day he abandons it. He proclaims his friendship 
for this or that individual; eulogizes their merits without much 
discrimination on every opportunity suitable or unsuitable ; but 
suddenly he becomes suspicious, recals his eulogiums, and 
ends in hatred. He adopts the principles of some literary, po- 
litical, or religious sect; defends them with great zeal for a 
short time; and then rejects them with contempt. And it is 
impossible from any assertions he may make or any course he 
may pursue at the present moment to divine what doctrines he 
will maintain or what course he will take hereafter. In the 
language of Bruyere "a man unequal in his temper is several 
men in one; he multiplies himself as often as he changes his 
taste and manners : he is not this minute what he was the last, 
and will not be the next what he is now; he is his own succes- 
sor; ask not of what complexion he is, but what are his com- 
plexions; nor of what humor, but how many sorts of humors 
has he. Are you. not deceived? Is it Eulichrates whom you 
meet? How cold he is to day! Yesterday he sought you, 
caressed you, and made his friends jealous of you. Does he re- 
member you? Tell him your name." 

§. 251. Illustrations of the consistent character. 

The consistent man is directly the reverse. He may be 
less prompt and rapid in his movements, but he ordinarily ex- 
hibits more discretion. And when he has once come to a 
conclusion as to what course is best to be pursued, he goes 
forward to the accomplishment of his object with perseverance 
and success. He may be somewhat cautious in forming friend- 



866 CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

ships; but he is equally so in breaking them up and terminat- 
ing them. He endeavors to perform what he considers to be 
his duty after a full examination of a subject, and is not dis- 
couraged and angry and turbulent, if he happens to meet with 
disappointments. He looks calmly on the changes of life, 
neither much elated by prosperity, nor depressed by adversity. 
He does not make his principles bend to his circumstances; 
but conscientiously and firmly maintains them under all chan- 
ges of fortune. If he is poor in outward wealth, he is rich in 
inward consolation; if he is sometimes filled with sorrow, he is 
not harrassed with the ten-fold wretchedness of remorse ; and 
if he is destitute and unhonoured, he is never contemptible. 
Such is the consistent man, when guided by the senti- 
ments of virtue. Such, among other illustrious names abound- 
ing both in profane and sacred history, was Socrates. It was" 
his consistency of character, which shed such a lustre over the 
name and life of that wisest of the sons of Athens. 

Other men may have possessed equal talents and have beeli 
equally conspicuous; but they had not the same consistency; 
a consistency the more remarkable, as it was sustained not on- 
ly against outward pressures, but against no small share of in- 
ward evils. It is this trait in particular, which has rendered 
the ethical teacher of the ancients so preeminently entitled to 
the rank which he holds. In almost every possible situation, 
that could test his principles or try his patience, he was unal- 
tered. He retained the same high principles of virtue, the 
same meekness and kindness and cheerfulness, the same un- 
feigned disposition to promote the good of his country and o£ 
all mankind, amid great poverty, amid ingratitude and rebuke 
and calumny, in prison and in death itself. Had he decidedly 
failed in a single position, had he subjected his principles to 
•some temporary convenience even for one short hour, it would 
ifeave tarnished forever the glory of his good name. 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. g67 

§. B52. Of individuals remarkable for consistency of character. 

And if we come down to our own times and our own coun- 
try, is it not the same? What is it, that imparts its deathless 
splendour to the name of Washington ? It is the same consis- 
tency of character. In that well-balanced and noble mind, 
each desire and passion was compelled to keep its place. He 
never allowed them to usurp an undue dominion, and to drag 
his will hither and thither against the dictates of his conscience. 
He had but one ruie of conduct, that of an enlightened moral 
sense. Hence his life Avas not, at different periods, at vari- 
ance with and dissevered from itself; but was one throughout,, 
constituting from beginning to end, (at least as compared with 
that of the great mass of mankind,) a resplendent and unchan- 
geable unity of excellence. 

We could point to one man yet living with a ripe and hon^ 
our able old age, the associate and friend and pupil of Wash-, 
ington, whose glory is stamped as true and enduring by the 
consistency, which has pervaded his conduct in the various 
trying situations, in which he has been placed. Having seen 
in his youth the miseries of a government, which is not based 
on just fundamental laws,he naturally felt a sympathy for those, 
wherever they might be, who were struggling for liberty. It 
was not however the licentiousness of a mob, which had any 
charms for him; but freeedom controlled by law, the union of 
liberty and order. The promotion of these has been the great 
object of his life, steadily and openly pursued in almost every 
possible variety of trying situation. At one time the idol of 
the populace, at another doomed by them to the scaffold; at 
one time the prominent and leading man of his nation, and 
fcoon after a detested fugitive and exile; to-day the admired 
inmate of palaces, to-morrow the resident of a dungeon; in 
poverty and in wealth, in joy and in sorrow, in honour anclj 
in degradation, under the old monarchy, the republic, \he enK. 



£68 CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

pire and the constitutional monarchy, in the old world and the 
new, in the field of battle and amid the debates of the senate, 
when every thing around him has changed and every thing in 
his own personal situation, he still steadily and cheerfully pur- 
sues the same noble object; identified, more than any thing 
else, by the identity of his principles; and still grasping, as he 
bends over the grave, the standard, inscribed with liberty and 
order, which waved over him in the early contests of America. 

§. 253- Of the value of consistency in the religious character. 

If consistency gives nearly its whole beauty to the charac- 
ter of men in the political sphere and also in the ordinary trans- 
actions of life, it is certainly not less fitted to adorn and to 
honour in the discharge of the various duties of religion. 
Probably no directions in the Holy Scriptures, (not always 
given in express terms, but often indirectly and by implication,) 
are more frequent than those, which require us to possess and 
to exhibit consistency of religious character. This requisition 
is implied more or less, in all those passages which exhort us 
to labour and not to faint, to bear with patience, not to be soon 
shaken in mind, and to persevere unto the end. When we 
lack wisdom, we are directed by an Apostle, to "ask in faith, 
nothing wavering ; for he, that wavereth, is like a Avave of the 
sea, driven with the wind and tossed. For let not that man 
think, that he shall receive any thing of the Lord. Ji double- 
minded man is unstable in all ftipways." Again and again, 
christians are commanded to watch, to stand fast, to continue 
grounded and settled in the faith, not to be moved away from 
the hope of the Gospel, and to hold fast their profession with- 
out wavering. 

It is melancholy to see, how much the conduct of those, 
who would not be thought to be wanting in true Christian feel- 
ing, varies with circumstances. The performance of the most 
plain and obvious duty, (for instance that of prayer,) is un- 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. $69 

wisely and wickedly made to depend upon a thousand contin- 
gencies, as some transient doubt or fear, to which all men are 
subject, some trifling worldly disappointment, some slight af- 
fection of the nervous system, a keen and uncomfortable atmos- 
phere, the wind blowing in a particular direction, a bright and 
beaming sun, or a sky overcast with clouds. Many religious 
persons decline doing what it is obviously their duty to do, be- 
cause, as they alledge, they are not in the rightyVame; in other 
words, because their hearts are not sufficiently quickened and 
enlivened; not considering, that the laws of God and the requi- 
sitions of duty are as much binding upon the will and the mor- 
al powers, as upon the desires and the passions. When the de- 
sires and the passions are asleep, or are tending the wrong way, 
we may still find within us abundant elements of action in the 
will and the conscience. And just so long as the voluntary pow- 
er or faculty of the will remains to us, and the moral nature, by 
pointing out a certain course to be pursued, furnishes a basis 
or occasion for the action of the will, no excuse of dullness and 
worldliness of the affections can possibly avail. Men may al- 
ways be morally bound to do up to the limit of what they can do; 
and if their feelings, (we speak not of the moral feelings, but 
merely of the desires and affections in themselves considered,) 
do not come up to the standard of their actions, that may be 
their sin, as undoubtedly it is, but not their excuse. Not that 
we mean to approve, by any means, a cold and heartless perfor- 
mance of religious duties ; but merely to assert, that there are 
elements in our nature, which are sufficient to keep the conduct 
steady, and which ought to keep it steady, to the pursuit of the 
great objects of a religious life, amid the fluctuations of feeling, 
to which men are so exposed. A depressed and suffering con- 
dition of the physical system may for a time infuse a gloom and 
darkness into our religious affections, but so long as our percep- 
tions of truth remain clear, and our moral sensibilities are 
47 



370 CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

awake, and the faculty of the will is continued to us, we remain 
under an obligation, as binding and as urgent as ever, to hold 
on our way, to trust in God, to press forward towards the mark, 
to fulfil faithfully every obvious duty, "cast down but not des- 
troyed, faint yet pursuing." 

§. 254. Of the foundation or basis of consistency and inconsis- 
tency of character. 

The statements of this chapter thus far go to show what con- 
sistency of character is, of what importance it is, and what 
beauty and interest it throws over the whole life. Now if con- 
sistency of character is at once so full of beauty and utility, 
while the opposite trait of character is in an equal degree re- 
mote from both, being as deformed in its aspect as it is detrimen- 
tal in its results, it is important to inquire into the cause both 
of the one and the other. And we think it must be obvious on 
a very limited reflection, that they are both based upon one and 
the same mental power, viz, the Will. And it is in consequence 
of this, that we introduce this subject in connection with the ex- 
amination of the will. If the will be decisive and energetic, 

the conduct will be essentially consistent; if the will be vacilla- 
ting and weak, we may naturally expect that the vacillation of 
the mind will infuse itself into the outward life and stamp it with 
inconsistency. 

"When I look at the mind of Lord Bacon, says Cecil, it 
seems vast, original, penetrating, analogical, beyond all com- 
petition. When I look at his character, it is wavering, shuffling, 
mean.'** That the character, the outward life, of Lord Bacon 
was essentially what it is here represented to be, is true ; but 
the cause of this meanness and wavering and shuffling is not to 
be sought for in his intellectual powers, for in that respect he 
was undoubtedly vast and original, as Cecil represents him, and 
penetrating and analogical, beyond all competition. The se- 
cret is to be detected, not in the structure of his intellect or the 

♦Remains of Rev. Richard Cecil. Remarks on Authors. 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. $71 

mere percipient part of his nature ; but in the natural weakness 
of his will, as compared with the intensity of his desires and pas- 
sions. And so of other cases of marked inconsistency of life. 
There is probably not one, with the exception to be mentioned 
in the next section, which does not involve the fact of a consti- 
tutional, or a relative weakness of the will. 

§. 255. Of inconsistency of belief in connection with inconsis- 
tency of conduct and character. 

We are aware there is some ground for the remark here, 
that inconsistency of conduct is not to be ascribed wholly to a 
defect in the power or the regulation of the will; but is owing, in 
part at least, to inconsistencies in the power of belief. There 
are some men who are constantly undergoing changes in their 
speculative views; whose minds, in the strong language of Fos- 
ter, "are a caravansera of opinions, entertained a while, and 
then sent on pilgrimage." These frequent changes will of 
course be attended with correspondent changes and inconsisten- 
cies of conduct. So that undue versatility of conduct is not al- 
ways to be ascribed to a defect in the regulation of the will; but 
often to an inordinate facility and changeableness of belief. In 
connection with this aspect of human nature, which is undoubt- 
edly one of no small interest, a few remarks are to be made. 

In the first place we admit it to be true and undeniable, that 
there are some men, who have this strange facility of belief, 
which in its results attaches them successively to opinions and 
systems diametrically opposite in their import. And further- 
more, we may well suppose, that, in some of these cases, the 
cause of this peculiarity of mind is a constitutional and natural 
one. They labour under the difficulty of a constitutional weak- 
ness or defect of mind in this particular. Without checking 
their belief by the suggestions of the most ordinary degree of 
caution, without taking any note of dates, characters, and cir- 



372 CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

cumstances, they eagerly receive and digest the most glaring 
and ridiculous improbabilities. In respect to these persons we 
may admit that their inconsistency of conduct is not to be ulti- 
mately ascribed to a defect in the exercises of the will. 

But in the second place, we shall find in many and perhaps a 
majority of cases of great vacillancy and changes in the belief, 
that the ground or cause of such multiplied changes is not a 
constitutional imbecility of the belief itself, but is to be sought 
for in the will, and in that very trait or characteristic of the will, 
which is the basis of such inconsistencies in other respects. 
That is to say; the change in the position of the mind, which is 
undergone, commences in the will, and the belief is afterwards 
brought to correspond to the new direction, which has been ta- 
ken by the voluntary power. A man, for instance, who is wan- 
ting in firmness of purpose, is assailed by another person of a 
different party or creed. Placed in this situation, he feels the lit- 
tle voluntary strength which he possesses, beginning to break up 
or give way ; and very soon, as if he were a helpless victim 
wholly in the power of another, he is carried over to the new 
party and creed, and deserts both his old doctrines and his old 
friends. He is not convinced, nor satisfied ; on the contrary he 
feels himself greatly dishonoured; but as he soon finds he can- 
not retreat, but must remain in his new position, whether he is 
pleased with it or not, he sets about searching for arguments to 
justify him in the course he has taken. A thousand influences 
are now at work, which were dormant before; his reputation, 
his interests, his pride all throw their weight in favour of certain 
decisions of the understanding at variance with its former con- 
clusions ; and by this rapid and powerful process, so evidently 
unfavourable to a true view of a subject, his intellect is soon 
brought up into a line with the new position of his will; and 
he stands justified in his own estimation as a consistent person, 
though it may be in nobody's else. So that it still remains good, 
as a general statement, that the basis of consistency or the oppo- 



CONSISTENCY OP CHARACTER. 31$ 

site is to be sought for in the character and discipline of the will. 
§. 256. Self-possession an element of consistency of character. 

But it will be seen more distinctly and fully, that consisten- 
cy of character has its basis chiefly in the condition and disci- 
pline of the will', when we consider some of those things, which 
are more or less implied or embraced in such consistency. It 
is beyond all question, that one and a marked element in con- 
sistency of character is self-possession or self-government. A 
consistent person has of course some fixed principles, by which 
his conduct is regulated, and some great objects before him, 
(or at least what he considers such,) towards which his efforts 
tend. His consistency is chiefly exhibited by his acting upon 
these principles, and steadily pursuing these objects. But 
not unfrequently there are circumstances occurring, which come 
unexpectedly, and which, coming in this unexpected manner, 
greatly try the strength of his resolutions. If he has not an 
entire self-possession, if he cannot wholly control himself in 
such seasons of sudden temptation and trial, he is of course 
liable to be driven off from the ground of his principles, as well 
as diverted from the great object of his pursuit, and thus to 
forfeit his character for consistency. It is highly important, 
therefore, if we would possess the rich reward and the. high 
honour of a consistent course through life, that the business 
and events and trials of our present state, instead of driving us 
hither and thither, and exercising an arbitrary sway over us, 
should be made subject to ourselves; that our own minds 
should have the mastery, the preeminence, the control over 
events. But this ability of remaining firm and self-possessed 
in all such emergencies implies more or less of power and dis- 
cipline of the will. And if consistency of character is a truly 
valuable trait, which gives beauty while it increases the worth 
of all other traits and attainments, we have a reason here, and 
a powerful one too, why we should endeavour to understand 



374 CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

the nature of the will and the means of strengthening and reg- 
ulating it. 

§. 257. Consistency implies perseverance under changes of cir- 
cumstances. 

. As consistency of character involves the fact of a series of 
actions, extending over a greater or less length of time, there 
is Kiecessarily implied, as another element in such a character, 
a disposition to persevere in the course, which has been once 
adopted, under all those various changes of circumstances, 
which are found always to attend the progress of human affairs. 
But there is a great difference in this respect. When the tru- 
ly consistent man has once placed before him some object as 
decidedly worthy of his pursuit, he presses towards it with an 
inflexible and ever advancing step ; he is not frightened at eve- 
ry lion that stands or is supposed to stand in his path ; if diffi- 
culties suddenly come in his way, perhaps many in number and 
rising one above another in magnitude, his courage and reso- 
lution swell upward in proportion, and pass easily over their 

summit. But it is altogether different with the man, who 

does not possess this character for consistency. He does in- 
deed place before him some object to be obtained, and he en- 
ters upon the pursuit of it with ardour; but from the beginning 
he pursues a zigzag and irregular course, alternately advan- 
cing and retreating; the obstacles he meets with, whether 
from within or from without, perplex his resolutions, and final- 
ly turn him wholly from his purpose. 

But what is necessary to that perseverance, without which 
there can be no consistency of character ? Obviously strength 
of will; either a natural strength, or a vigour infused into it 
by a course of discipline. So that we see in this respect, 
as well as in others, how closely the important subject of 
consistency of character is connected with the doctrine of the 
will. 



CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 375 

§. 258. Consistency implies a control over the passions. 

Among other things, which are implied in consistency of 
character, is a control of the passions. Although this ability may, 
with some reason, appear to be involved in self-possession or 
self-government, yet it is worthy of a distinct notice by it- 
self. Frequent and violent ebullitions of passion will neces- 
sarily mar and destroy the order and harmony of one's life. 
It is obviously ordered in Providence, that we are placed in 
a world where trials constantly beset us, where griefs and 
joys and tears and smiles come mingled together, not mere- 
ly to render us either sad or happy, but to try, to purify, 
and to discipline the soul. How beautiful and even sublime 
it is to bear in patience the evils which are our allotment; 
while we learn in quietude and thankfulness the salutary les- 
sons they impart! It cannot be doubted, that a patient 
spirit, in the circumstances in which we are placed, is abso- 
lutely necessary to that propriety and evenness of deportment, 
which is implied in consistency of character. No one can 
pursue the regular and even tenour of his way on a path so 
beset with inequalities as that of human life, who is not 
able to guide and to subdue the storms, whether of anger or 
impatience, which at times arise in every one's bosom. 
When in the Providence of God, we are made the subjects of 
various sorrows, it is our duty to bear them without mur- 
muring. When we are injured by our enemies and are an- 
gry with them, it is still our duty to forgive and to bless 
them. But how can we possibly do this; in what way can 
we quell our impatience and subdue our anger ; if there be 
not, distinct from the passions and altogether above them, 
another and authoritative power, to which they can be com- 
pelled to render obedience! 

It may perhaps be said in all these cases, that we are 
not obliged to throw ourselves on the voluntary power, be- 



376 CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 

cause we have the power of the conscience, the ability im- 
planted within us to judge of the right and wrong. But it 
should be kept in mind, that the act of conscience is merely 
advisory or consultative; that it merely pronounces a thing 
to be just or unjust, merely approves or disapproves; and 
that, without some other power to carry its' decisions to their 
appropriate results, it would be wholly without effect. The 
whole topic, therefore, of consistency of character, (one of 
the most practical and interesting, that can be presented to 
our notice,) is closely, and even inseparably connected with 
the doctrine of the nature, powers, and laws of the will. 
This, however, is only one instance of the applications of 
this great subject; which will be found to weave itself into 
every variety and aspect of the philosophy of human conduct. 
So that we may say, in a single word, that it is impossible 
for us to have a correct understanding of the elements and 
operations and diversities of human nature, in its various, 
aspects both of feeling and action, without an acquaintance,, 
and a thorough acquaintance too, with the nature of the voir 
untary power. 



CHAPTER SIXTH. 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 



§. 259. Importance of a due discipline of the voluntary power. 

In all the various treatises having relation to mental dis- 
cipline, that have from time to time issued from the press, 
while much has been said of the discipline of the memory, 
the reasoning power, the imagination, &c, but little has been 
said of the discipline of the affections, and still less of that 
of the will. It seems even to have been imagined, that the 
voluntary power, in consequence perhaps of its acknowledg- 
ed preeminence and control over the other powers, is placed 
in a sphere so entirely distinct and remote, as not to be ap- 
proached in the way of discipline. And when we consider, 
what ignorance and misconception of this part of our na- 
ture has prevailed, it is not surprising on the whole, that 
such a notion, erroneous and prejudicial as it is, should have 
obtained currency. But if the views hitherto given in the, 
various parts of this treatise be correct, we shall see that 
the discipline of the will is not an unmeaning proposi- 
tion,. and that it is as important as it is practicable. Of the, 

importance of this discipline it will not be necessary tosa^. 

48 w? ' '- J " 



378 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

much, after what has just been remarked on the subject of 
consistency of character. If a man would sustain himself 
with any sort of credit amid the storms, which blow from 
every point of the compass; if he would covet the reputation 
of possessing any fixedness of belief or of acting on any 
fixedness of plan, it is certain that he must have within him- 
self a regulative power. And this regulative power, in or- 
der to meet and sustain the requisitions, that are made upon 
it, must be strengthened in every possible way. 

In these views of the importance of the discipline and 
culture of the will, we are happy to find ourselves sustained 
by the authority of an eminent writer, whose opinions would 
be entitled to great weight on a matter far less obvious. — 
" The faculty of the will requires not only to be directed 
aright in infant life, but to be fortified and strengthened by 
a course of exercise and discipline as much as any faculty 
whatever. This we may say as physiologists; but as moral- 
ists we may speak a bolder language and maintain, that it de- 
mands the spur and trammels of education even more than 
all the other faculties put together, since it is designed by 
nature to be the governing power, and to exercise an abso- 
lute sway over the rest, even over the desire itself, by 
which, however, it is moved on all ordinary occasions."* 

§. 260. A due balance of all the powers the most favourable 
state of things to the just exercise of the will. 

In this connection and as preparatory to what we have 
further to say in this chapter, we are led to make the remark, 
that the most favourable occasion for the action of any men- 
tal power is to be found in the exact adjustment and harmo- 
ny of the mental powers generally. When they are all in 
itheir natural place, when they are all properly and precisely 
?Goed's Medicine, Neurotica Ord. I. Gen. vi. 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 379 

adjusted in reference to each other, without any of that in- 
terference and jarring which always result from a transgres- 
sion of their natural limits, they may all be expected to act 
vigorously, because there is nothing in the way of their thus 
acting; all obstructions, at least all extrinsic obstructions, are 
removed; and we may reasonably anticipate, that whatever 
ability they possess will be„ put forth to the full extent of 
its existence, and in the most available and best manner. 
And accordingly we may lay it down as a general principle, 
that wherever there is perfect harmony in the mind, every 
thing will be right in its action; every exercise of the mind 
will be in accordance with the truth of things; that is to 
say, it will be just such as it ought to be. 

But every careful observer of human nature, (saying 
nothing of the obvious testimony of the Bible,) assuredly 
knows, that this is a state of things,which, as a general state- 
ment at least, does not exist among men. The perfect har- 
mony of mental operation, which exists in the Divine Mind, 
and which is beautifully reflected from the minds of all per- 
fectly holy beings, is not found in man. The parts of the 
human mind, however wonderfully they may have been ar- 
ranged in the first instance, and whatever realizations of 
harmony they are capable of attaining to in the future, ex- 
hibit at the present time but too mournful evidence of a dis- 
located and jarring movement. We do not undertake to ex- 
plain or to intimate in what way it has happened; but of 
the general fact there cannot be the least doubt, that the 
soul of man from his childhood upward, so far from always 
disclosing an exact and harmonious action as it should do^ 
is in its own self a scene of fierce and unremitting conflict; 
the flesh striving against the spirit, and the spirit against 
the flesh; the appetites and passions attempting to enforce 
their claims against the requisitions and authority of con- 
science; the love of the World, in its various forms of en- 



380 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

ticement and attraction, earnestly and fiercely contesting 
against the love of God and of heavenly things. And now 
it should he kept in mind, that all this terrible contest hears 
directly upon the will; and it is too often the case, that this 
higher and controlling power, this great arbiter of the inter- 
nal conflict, gives its decision in favour of the appetites and 
against the moral sentiments, in favour of the world and 
against Him, who made the world and all things therein. 
But this is a state of things which ought not to he. And it 
is truly a great practical question, in what way the energies 
of the will can he strengthened, and directed to their appro- 
priate and rightful issues. It is admitted that we know 
the right. And the question is, how shall we obtain strength 
to do it? How shall We redeem ourselves from our volun- 
tary thraldom, and walk forth in the light of our own con- 
science and in the smiles of an approving God, regenerated 
and free? The answer to these questions might be expanded 
over volumes, but such an extended examination is not a 
part of our plan, and we shall dismiss the subject, practical 
and interesting as it is, with some general views given in as 
few words as possible. 

5). 261. Of the culture of the appetites, propensities, and pas- 
sions as auxiliary to the discipline of the ivill. 

Keeping in view the general statement, that an entire 
harmony of the mental powers is a condition of things the 
most favourable for the perfect exercise of the will, we are 
the more fully prepared to enter into the examination of par- 
ticulars. We proceed, therefore, to remark, that it is highly 
important, in the discipline of the will, to keep the appetites, 
propensities, and passions in due subjection. While it is 
true, that the volitions are capable of operating upon these 
various desires, and that they can check and subdue them, 
nboth by a direct and indirect action, and particularly by a 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 381 

combination of both- it is likewise not the less true, that 
these appetitive and affective parts of our nature, if we may 
be allowed such expressions, are also capable in their turn 
of operating on the volitions, and that they do thus operate; 
although it is not necessary at the present time to enter in- 
to any explanation of the precise nature of this reciprocal 
influence. In other words there is in the economy of the 
mind a fixed relation between the two; between the volun- 
tary power or will on the one hand, and the appetites and 
affections or passions on the other. Each of them has its 
place; each in a perfect state of the mind has its appropriate 
limits; each has its nature, its object, and its relations. 
Hence, in order to illustrate the alleged importance of 
keeping the desires, in their various forms,, under suitable 
control, as a prerequisite to the proper exercise of the will, 
it seems to be necessary to present but one view. It is a 
fact, susceptible of as clear demonstration as subjects of this 
nature generally admit of, that any appetite or propensity 
whatever, whether it be the desire of mere sensual pleasures 
or of knowledge, wealth, or power, which is indulged for a 
long time without any restraint, (and the same may be said 
of any one of the passions or affections,) ultimately acquires 
the ascendency, and entirely prostrates, not only the will, 
but the whole mind at its feet. If, therefore, we duly esti- 
mate the great object of securing to the will a free, unper- 
plexed, and vigorous action, we shall seriously endeavour, 
by the use of all those means which have a relation to a 
result so desirable, to restrain every appetite, propensity, 
and passion within its due bounds. Whenever they exhibit 
a disposition to pass the limits, which a duly sensitive con- 
science has prescribed to them, let them be subjected to a 
rigid supervision and repression. If we permit them to 
take even one step beyond the sphere which nature has as- 
signed them, we give them a sort of claim on another step 



382 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

and another; and what is worse, we give them renewed pow- 
er to enforce it. It is in their very nature, when they have 
once transgressed, to insist on repeated and continued trans- 
gression; and it is impossible effectually to evade their 
clamorous and unjust demands, but by expelling them at 
once from their position, and bringing them back to the 
place where they belong. 

It remains only to be added, that in the culture of the vari- 
ous forms of desire is to be included, not only the repression 
of those which are evil ; but the bringing out and strength- 
ening of those which are good. The amiable and honorable 
propensities and passions, together with those of a purely 
religious kind, are entitled to a position in our sentient con- 
stitution of the first and highest rank ; but how frequently 
does it happen, that they are expelled from their appropriate 
place, and are Compressed into some obscure nook, by the 
spreading and strengthening of those of a different charac- 
ter. But it is certainly incumbent on every one, who is 
desirous of securing the great object of freeness, vigour, and 
rectitude in the mental operations, to make them the subject 
of special and long-continued attention, to allure them forth 
into the light, and in every suitable way to accelerate their 
expansion, and enhance their beauty. 

§. 262 Some instances and proofs of the foregoing statements. 

The subject of the inconsistency of the perfect exercise of 
the will with an undue and unnatural predominance of the 
appetites and passions has been particularly introduced to 
the reader's notice in the chapters on the Slavery and the 
Alienation of the will. In those chapters various illustra- 
trations and facts were brought forward; and of course it is 
not so necessary at the present time to enter into further il- 
lustrations and proofs at much length- A few additional re- 
marks will suffice. 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 383 

Every one must have observed, how destructive to every 
good resolve and noble effort is the inordinate indulgence of 
the bodily appetites. When they obtain the ascendency, 
as they not unfrequently do, they make the unhappy subject 
of them an entire slave; obscuring his intellect, blunting his 
conscience, perplexing and overthrowing all his serious and 
wise determinations, and debasing him to a level but little 
short of that of the brutes. The unhappy results of such in- 
dulgences are so frequently witnessed, that we feel at liber- 
ty to pass them by with this mere reference. But the evil 

does not rest with the undue indulgence of the appetites 
alone. Those active principles, which under the name of 
the propensities and passions, rank decidedly higher in the 
scale of our sentient nature, are hardly less hurtful, when in- 
dulged to excess, than excessive bodily appetites. This re- 
mark may perhaps be illustrated by a brief reference to the 
operations of a passion, which is obviously implanted for 
wise and beneficial purposes, and whose perversions are both 
less numerous and less injurious than those of some others; 
we refer to the passion of Fear. If all the various facts, 
which go to make up the history of this passion, could be 
presented before the reader, he would at once see, what an 
immense obstacle, an undue intensity of the passions pre- 
sents to the unencumbered and vigorous exercise of the will, 
when such exercise is put forth or is proposed to be put 
forth in any direction at variance with the precise line of the 
passion itself. If it be otherwise, how can it have happened 
that many persons of clear perception, and of undoubted 
powers of intellect in every respect, have nevertheless been 
the complete s]aves of the irresistible sway of the passion 
now referred to! 

There is one individual, whose mournful history is so 
familiar that a mere suggestion of it will answer our pur- 



384 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

pose; we refer to the English poet Cowper. The passion 
of fear in this amiable and interesting writer, (operating un- 
doubtedly on a constitution easily excited and nervous,) was 
so undue in its influence, that the will was often entirely 
overcome and prostrated; and he was often unable to perform 
what other persons, infinitely his inferiours in the length 
and breadth of intellectual perception, would have conceived 
a very easy thing to be done. While in some respects, (all 
those which go to constitute a man of literature and a poet,) 
but very few men could justly claim a superiority over him, 
he sunk in others to the grade of infantile weakness ; and 
so conscious was he of this, that his vivid imagination rep- 
resented him as the subject of ridicule and sport among 
those he met with in the streets. 

We recollect to have seen it represented in a German wri- 
ter of deserved celebrity, that the key to the character of the 
Apostle Peter, whose active and benevolent life was often 
strangely anomalous and inconsistent with itself, is to be 
found in the undue operation of the passion of fear. And 
there seems to be much truth in the remark. If one will 
carefully recal the incidents in the life of that devout and 
faithful follower of our Saviour, he will readily recognize, 
how applicable the remark is. When the disciple, with an 
undue confidence which is not unfrequently found associated 
with an undue susceptibility to fear, assured the Saviour he 
would not forsake him, though all others should; he undoubt- 
edly uttered what he felt, and what he felt too, when he 
made the asseveration,most deeply and sincerely. But when 
the Saviour's prospects were clouded, when the hour of the 
prince and of the powers of darkness came,wheu the shepherd 
was smitten and the smiters seemed to have all might in their 
hands, then it was that those intense misgivings and fears, to 
which this devoted follower of Christ had probably been al- 
ways subject, came rushing in, billow upon bi|low, till they 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 385 

overwhelmed all the landmarks of love and of duty, and 
bore him away captive into the camp of the enemy. 

We repeat it, therefore, that we should carefully study the 
nature of the appetites, propensities, and passions; we must 
make them the objects of a patient and assiduous culture ; 
we must in particular subject them to a strict supervision 
and control ; otherwise, in some unexpected hour, they will 
arise in their might, and, in defiance of the clamours of con- 
science and the struggles of the voluntary power, will bring 
the whole man under their dominion. True as it undoubt- 
edly is,that the will has a real and substantive power in itself, 
it is still true that this power has its limits, and cannot with- 
stand every thing; it is still true that every inordinate ex- 
ercise of the appetites and passions trenches upon the sphere 
of the voluntary faculty, and diminishes something from the 
freeness and vigour of its action. 

§. 263. Importance of repressing the outward signs of the pas- 
sions. 

But is it a fact, that the propensities and passions are ac- 
tually under our control in any degree? It cannot be doubt- 
ed. Instances have already been given which show it. 
There is a very striking remark of Mr. Locke on this subject, 
in his interesting chapter on Power. " Let not any one 
say, he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from 
breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can 
do before a prince, or a great man, he can do alone, or in the 
presence of God, if he will.''- — But granting the general fact,, 
the inquirj r still remains, what course shall be taken, what 
particular method shall be adopted in order to control them, 
and keep them in their place? Our limits will not permit us 
to undertake an answer to this question at length; and we 

shall accordingly leave the whole subject to the reflections 
49 



386 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

and good judgment of the reader with a few remarks upon a 
single topic, which is the more interesting as it has seldom 
attracted notice; certainly not that degree of notice to which 
it is justly entitled. There is a tendency in every emo- 
tion and passion to express itself outwardly by means of 
natural signs, such as the motions of the eye, the changes 
of colour in the countenance, the movements of the muscles, 
and the tones of the voice. As the tendency is a natural 
one, it may be difficult to control it entirely; but it is high- 
ly important to attempt to do so. And the reason is, (and 
a singular fact it is in the economy of the mind,) that the 
outward expression reacts upon the inward principle, and 
gives increased intensity to the internal feeling. "As every 
emotion of the mind, says Mr. Stewart, produces a sensible 
effect on the bodily appearance, so, upon the other hand, 
when we assume any strongly expressive look, and accom- 
pany it with appropriate gestures, some degree of the cor- 
respondent emotion is apt to arise within us. Mr. Burke 
informs us, that he has often been conscious of the passion 
of anger rising in his breast, in consequence of counterfeit- 
ing its external signs; and I have little doubt, that, with 
most individuals, the result of a similar experiment will 
be the same. Campanella, too, the celebrated philosopher 
and physiognomist, (as Mr. Burke farther observes,) when 
he wished to form a judgment of what was passing in the 
mind of another, is said to have mimicked, as accurately as 
possible, his appearance at the moment, and then to have 
directed his attention to the state of his own feelings."* 

Furthermore, as the tendency of the emotions and passions 
is to express themselves outwardly, every suppression of 
the outward signs operates,as a direct rebuke and curtailment 
of the passions themselves. The passions, when they are 

•Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. m. 
Chap. II. §. 2d. 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 387 

excited, are of such a violent nature, that they require an 
open field, a free, unencumbered circuit; and they cannot 
well exist in their higher degrees of intensity without this 
opportunity of expansion and of unencumbered action. 
Shut them up, therefore, in the bosom; enclose them amid 
the dim shades and the walls of the penetralia of the soul ; and 
they will necessarily wither and die. When they are thus 
enclosed, they will not be more likely to live and flourish, 
than the tree will, that is shut out from the light of the sun, 
and from the genial airs of heaven. 

This is a principle of great practical consequence in the 
government of the passions, and of course in the discipline 
of the will. Never give to the passions, (of course it will 
be understood that we have no reference to the mild and be- 
nevolent passions, but to the evil, and malignant, and angry 
passions,) an outward expression either verbal or physiog- 
nomical, with the exception of those cases, where the actu- 
al state of things does undoubtedly require it. We may 
suppose a case, where we may not only be angry with a 
person, but where also it is desirable that he should know 
it; but in a vast majority of cases, it is exceedingly better 
that they should be known only to the bosom where they 
originate. In one of the well known Resolutions of Presi- 
dent Edwards, which are worthy of the attention of the 
mere philosopher as well as of the Christian, after resolving 
against uneasiness and fretfulness in a certain case, he re- 
solves further, never to suffer the effects of such uneasiness 
or fretfulness, "so much as in the least alteration of speech, 
or motion of my eye." A strong intimation, to say the least, 
how unbecoming he considered the outward expression of 
the unamiable passions, and how injurious, in ordinary cases, 
he deemed such an expression to the subject of them. 



888 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

§. 264. Of enlightening the intellect in connection with the dis- 
cipline of the will. 

But in order to give the will a suitable opportunity of 
action by removing the obstructions in its way, and especial- 
ly in order to furnish an adequate and ample basis for its 
operations, we must go further back than the Sensibilities, 
which are in immediate proximity with it, and consider it 
in its connection with the Intellect. This is a prominent and 
leading view of the whole subject of the discipline of the 
will. It cannot be doubted that, among the most available 
and decisive methods of aiding and regulating the action of 
the will, we must include the illumination of the intellect. 
As a general thing the voluntary power will act the more 
decisively in reference to any given object, in proportion as 
such object is the more fully understood. We do not mean 
to say, that the perceptions of the intellect alone, and with- 
out any thing further, will furnish a basis for the action of the 
will. The intellect and the will are entirely separated from 
each other, as we have already seen in the First Part of this 
Work. But the intellect reaches and operates, and we may 
say poioerfidly operates, upon the will through the medium of 
the sensibilities. For instance, we are required to pursue a 
certain course, but it certainly cannot be expected, that we 
should have any feeling in the case, or that we should put 
forth any action in respect to it, until we understand what 
it is. Why is it that men are so inactive, so supine on sub- 
jects of the greatest moment to the welfare of the whole hu- 
man race? It is, because wholly taken up with their own 
private affairs, they do not give their attention to them; they 
do not investigate and understand them ; of course they do 
not feel, and being destitute of feeling, they do not act. 
Hundreds of millions of the human race are living and dy- 
ing without any of those aids and consolations, which a 



DISCITLINE OF THE WILL. 389 

knowledge of the religion of Jesus Christ is calculated to im- 
part. And yet it is universally admitted, both in consideration 
of the reasonableness of the thing and of the commands of Scrip- 
ture, that it is a duty incumbent on Christian nations, to see 
that blessed Gospel sent to them without delay. But why is 
it that so few feel in heart what they acknowledge speculative- 
ly, and that almost none are found to offer themselves as per- 
sonal labourers in this great and glorious work? It is because, 
(at least this is one great and prominent reason, if it be not 
the only one,) their inquiries have been too limited; they have 
not explored the length and breadth of that unspeakable wretch- 
edness incidental to a state of heathenism; they have been 
satisfied with generalities and abstract truisms, without care- 
fully and seriously estimating, even in a single instance, the 
extent of that degradation implied in bowing down to images 
of wood and stone; without sitting down and counting one by 
one the tears and the groans and the wailings, the crime and 
the hopelessness of the present life, and the weight of misery 
in the life to come. 

We would illustrate the prominent idea of this section by 
another topic. One of the greatest evils, which has ever 
afflicted the human race, is that of war. But still only a very 
few individuals appear to be fully awake to its dreadful atroci- 
ty, and are seriously, and with an earnestness proportioned to 
the importance of these movements, arraying their efforts and 
their influence against its continuance. The great mass of 
mankind arc indifferent and inert. And how can we account 
for it? In the same way we account for their indifference to 
the spread of the Gospel. It is owing, (we do not say wholly, 
but in a great degree certainly,) to inattention to the subject, 
and consequent ignorance of it. They dwell upon a few gen- 
eral and often erroneous conceptions of skill and heroism, as 
they are detailed in the pages of a government Gazette, but 
they do not bring distinctly and fixedly before their eyes the 



£90 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

burnings and the devastations and the famine, which overspread 
the country; they do not behold the wounds and the protracted 
suffering and the horrid forms of the battle field; they do not 
listen to the mourning and the lamentation of the bereaved fa- 
ther and mother, whose grey hairs go down with sorrow to the 
grave. If they would but once consider the subject in all its 
facts, and in all its bearings, they could not fail both to feel 
and to act; they would at once lift up a note of remonstrance, 
which should reach their rulers, and compel them to stop in 
their ministrations of blood. 

§. 265. Further remarks on the same subject. 

A multitude of similar illustrations might be brought for- 
ward. In almost any case whatever, if" we can induce a per- 
son to examine a subject with a view to action, the work is 
half done. And what is true of others, is true of ourselves. 
If we propose to act, we must think seriously upon that, what- 
ever it is, to which the proposed action relates. The proper, 
and we may add, the indispensable preliminary to action, is in- 
vestigation. We are so constituted, that it is impossible for us 
to put forth a volition, without a motive, without some antece- 
dent feeling, without some appetite, some desire, some moral 
feeling already existing in the mind. But it is equally impos- 
sible, as has already appeared in the chapter on the Relation 
of the Intellect to the Will, that the various emotions and de- 
sires should exist, without some specific object perceived by 
the understanding, to which such emotions and desires relate. 
It is a fundamental law of our nature, that there can be no ac- 
tion of the will without feeling ; and that there can be no feel- 
ing without intellection. There is, therefore, an indirect, but 
a very intimate and important connection between the intellect 
and the will. If we would will, we must feel ; and if we would 
feel, we must understand. As a general thing, (it will be no- 
ticed that we do not lay down the proposition as one admitting 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 391 

of no exception whatever,) the will corresponds to the intellect; 
the action of the will is in a line with the action of the intellect; 
and changes in the intellect will almost necessarily induce cor- 
responding changes in the sentient and voluntary parts of the 
mental constitution. And hence it happens, that what is de- 
sired at one time, will soon cease to be desired, when present- 
ed to the mind in some new light. What is warmly approved 
at one time will suddenly become, on further examination and 
knowledge of all the circumstances, an object of disapprobation. 
And on the other hand objects of disapprobation and aversion 
may soon become, on further inquiry, objects of approbation 
and desire. In this way, by exerting our powers of inquiry and 
reasoning, and by presenting new facts to the mind, we are 
continually presenting new motives, and are indirectly but very 
effectively operating changes in the action of the voluntary 
faculty ; and, (what is an important circumstance in this con- 
nection,) these inquiries are made, and these changes are 
brought about under the direction of the will itself. And thus in 
the wonderful constitution of the human mind there are wheels 
within wheels; effective springs of action operating upon each 
other; motives regulating the will, and the will taking a dif- 
ferent direction and regulating the motives; a reciprocal ac- 
tion and influence of each part without detriment to its appro- 
priate nature. 

§. 266. Of aiding the will by a reference to the regard oj others. 

We may sometimes give strength to the action of the will, 
in those numerous cases where we find ourselves vacillating, 
and uncertain what to do, by various aids external to ourselves. 
As our Creator never designed, that men should live isolated 
from each other and alone, so He has admirably fitted them up 
with those mental capacities and tendencies, which are pre- 
cisely adapted to a state of society. While he has implanted 
within them a strong desire for each other's company, which 



393 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

brings them together in communities, he has at the same time 
so constituted them, that they naturally exercise a regard and 
esteem for whatever is kind, honourable, and upright. And it 
is altogether suitable and just, that they should avail themselves 
of this arrangement of things, in whatever way it can be made 
subordinate to the discharge of their personal duties, and to the 
general perfection of their character. In a single word they 
are at liberty to sustain themselves in any proposed course of 
action by taking into view, and by receiving, as an encourage- 
ment to them, the favourable estimates of public opinion. 

We would not, however, be understood to say, that a re- 
gard to the good opinion of others should be the sole and para- 
mount rule of conduct; since our constitution developes a 
higher rule, that of the moral sense, to which every other one 
is not only subordinate, but responsible. Nevertheless' it is 
undoubtedly true, that a suitable regard, as has been remarked, 
may safely and justly be paid to the favourable opinions of 
our fellow men. The regard and approbation, which they not 
unfrequently bestow on those whose conduct they are called 
upon to witness, is one of those natural rewards, which the 
Creator has appointed as an attendant upon virtue. When, 
therefore, we are strongly tempted by the influence of preju- 
dice, passion, or self-interest, to pursue an erroneous though 
pleasing and favourite course, it is important to aid the will by 
presenting before it, as a counteracting motive, the judgment 
of enlightened public sentiment ; remembering that there is 
something in the heart of man, which is instinctively responsive 
to the just and true in human conduct, not only to condemn or 
approve such conduct as right or wrong, but to despise or to 
honour it as ennobling or as degrading. He, whose fixed and 
immoveable volition is always coincident with the requisitions of 
immutable rectitude, is cheered by the hearty and consentient 
voice of the wise and good. While he, who yields himself to 
an evil course, or even weakly vacillates between the right 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 393 

and the wrong, can expect nothing but their aversion and 
their frowns. 
§. 267. Of aiding the will by a reference to the conscience. 

But particularly, in those conflicts of life where we find 
the will halting between two opinions, we should refer, as 
has already been intimated, to the consolations and guidance 
of that higher power, within us, the Moral Sense. It is un- 
doubtedly true, that we may derive strength from an enlighten- 
ed public sentiment; but it cannot be denied, that public opin- 
ion is always changeable, and sometimes wrong. We may 
perhaps admit, that in a large majority of cases it is just in its 
decisions; but still it is obviously so imperfect as a rule of ac- 
tion, that we greatly need some other; not perhaps of a more 
amiable aspect, but certainly more lofty in its bearing, and 
more inflexible in its requisitions. He, who constantly sub- 
jects himself to the influence of the general rule, that con- 
science is never to be violated, who strictly observes it in small 
things as well as 1 in great, is a tower of strength to himself. 
Beginning to feel, as if he were in some degree acting up to 
the dignity of his nature, he finds within himself a fountain of 
joy springing up with spontaneous and everlasting freshness. 
While he builds, as it were, a mighty wall around the will to 
prevent its erring into forbidden paths, he at the same time 
gives it direct and positive strength to pursue its onward and 
allotted course. In all cases whatever, however we may ex- 
plain the fact, rectitude is strength. If it is true, that knowl- 
edge is power, it is still more so, that moral uprightness is 
power. It will always be found, that he, who faithfully walks 
within the magical circle of virtue, experiences an invisible 
protection; but when the limit is once passed over, he is left 
to himself, and rushes headlong. There is profound wisdom 
in the terse and emphatic expressions of a Roman writer, 

"UBI SEMEL RECTO DEERRATUM EST, IN PRAECEPS PERVENITUR." 

50 



S94 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

§. 268. Of the aids furnished by the principle of imitation. 

We here take the liberty of recalling to the reader's notice 
a remark already made to the effect, that the power of the will 
is a definite thing; that, although it may not be precisely the 
same in every individual, it has nevertheless, in every case, 
its fixed limits of capability and action; and that we cannot 
reasonably expect from it what is obviously beyond its ability. 
And hence the propriety of always keeping in mind its true 
nature, of carefully considering what it can do, and what it 
cannot do, in order to aid it in cases of doubt and trial in every 
possible way. 

Among other directions important to be kept in mind, we 
may make the further remark, that the operations of the will 
may be greatly aided by availing ourselves of the principle of 
Imitation. Of the nature of this principle we propose to say 
nothing further than to remark in a word, that it is an original 
one; and is very extensive and powerful in its influence; per- 
haps there is none more so. Hence in common life, and par- 
ticularly on extraordinary occasions, we find constant appeals 
to it. When soldiers are on the eve of a battle, the command- 
er instigates them to the great and decisive effort, not only by 
the consideration of what is due to their country, but by setting 
before them the example of others, who fell in the renowned 
fields of war. In the numerous and sanguinary battles of Na- 
poleon, he rarely permitted his soldiers to advance into the con- 
flict without reminding them of the great days and heroes of 
victory, and endeavouring to inflame their courage and to in- 
crease their energy by proposing for their imitation the soldiers 
of Lodi and Marengo, of Jena and Austerlitz. 

It will be naturally understood, that we introduce this in- 
stance merely as an example of the power of the principle, and 
of the use which has been made of it. It would be much to be 
lamented, if there were no other examples than those of a mili- 
tary kind to sustain in trial, and to encourage to endurance and 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 395 

effort in trying emergencies. In the ordinary trials of life, in 
those perplexities which assail us from every side, in those af- 
flictions both bodily and mental, which poor and corrupted hu- 
manity is heir to, we often feel our best resolutions breaking up 
and giving way, and we should wholly fall into despair, did we 
not draw encouragement and support from the faith and forti- 
tude of those, who have been in similar situations. Discoura- 
ged and fainting we rest our weary heads on the bosoms of 
those who have gone before us, and find ourselves refreshed. 
The Scriptures themselves fully recognize the propriety of this 
resource, and furnish us with some striking examples of an 
appeal to it. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in 
particular, seems to have availed himself of this principle of our 
nature. After mentioning Abel and Enoch and Abraham and 
Moses and a multitude of others, that great host of olden time, 
who subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, stopped the 
mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, had trial of 
mockings, scourgings, and imprisonment, and of whom, in a 
word, the world was not worthy, he adds, as if he would insti- 
gate those whom he addressed to follow an example so glori- 
ous, "wherefore, seeing we also are encompassed about by so 
great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and 
the sin, which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with pa- 
tience the race that is set before us." The sacred writers ev- 
ery where encourage and exhort us to follow in the path of our 
blessed Redeemer; "ioho suffered for us , leaving us an example, 
thative should follow his steps." And how many, in all ages of 
the world, have turned their weeping eyes to the Captain of 
their salvation; and beholding him firm and unmoved in temp- 
tation, constant and persevering in his labours, patient in suf- 
fering, benevolent and forgiving to his enemies, having but 
the one great object of doing his Father's will, have been 
transformed into the likeness of his glorious image, and like 
him have been made perfect through tribulation. 



398 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

§. 269. Of aiding the will by placing ourself in circum- 
stances which do not admit of a retreat. 

We may sometimes aid the action of the will by placing 
ourselves in a position, from which there is no retreat. We 
sometimes express it by saying, that we have taken, or are 
about to take, a decisive step; meaning a step, which is more 
or less an irretrievable one; a step, which fully and complete- 
ly pledges us to a certain course. We may suppose with some 
reason, that Julius Caesar, when he approached the banks of 
the Rubicon, felt some hesitation and vacillancy of purpose; 
he scarcely knew himself what he was going to do; his will 
stood balancing on a pivot; and it was uncertain in which di- 
rection it would throw itself; but when he had once passed the 
small stream, that constituted .the boundary of his province, 
when, by a [single movement onward, he had changed his po- 
sition in relation to the government of his country, then all 
was done; there was no possibility of retreat; his purpose at 
once became fixed, irrevocable, unchangeable. 

In many cases in common life, when the will is vacillating 
between various objects, we may establish it firmly and forever 
by a step onward, by placing ourselves in a new position, by 
appealing to a Higher Power for the uprightness of our inten- 
tions and making an irretrievable movement. And we have 
here an effective principle of action; one, upon the application 
of which the most important issues have sometimes depended. 
The true course of action, in all cases where the path of duty 
is unquestionably plain, and when at the same time the world 
and its allurements interposes to hinder us from entering into 
that path, is, not to sit down sluggishly and hold^an inglorious 
parley with the suggestions of indolence and vice, but to move 
forward, to commit ourselves at once, to take a decided step, 
to throw ourselveslnto the breach, and let the consequences 
take care of themselves. 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 397 

§. 270. Of the effects of habit in giving strength to the will. 

In illustrating that course, which is to be taken in order to 
give strength to the will, it is proper and important to bring in- 
to account the great principle or law of habit. Of the nature 
and tendencies of this law it is enough to say in this con- 
nection, that no other law of our mental constitution is capa- 
ble of so entirely modifying the mental action as this. We 
often see its results in the case of the viscious man, whose 
unholy propensities go on strengthening and strengthening un- 
der its influence, till they assume the stubbornness and inflexi- 
bility of iron. But the principle in question is as powerful 
for good as for evil; and we do not fully understand the secret 
of our own strength, till we have learnt its power, and how to 
apply it. When we set out upon a course of virtue, our reso- 
lution may be feeble; not unfrequently we shall find ourselves 
faltering in our purpose; and it seems to be with great difficul- 
ty that the voluntary power is brought fully up into a line with 
that course, which we deem it important to pursue. But it is 
the result of the principle of habit, that every act of the will in 
this right direction gives vivacity and strength to the succeed- 
ing act. So that, if a man once enters upon a virtuous 
course, if he once sets his foot into the strait and narrow way; 
then every step which he takes will greatly increase the elas- 
ticity and the ease, the rapidity and firmness of his movement. 

§. 271 . Of strengthening the will by religious considerations. 

Finally, we may give great strength and energy to the ac- 
tion of the Will byjneans of religious considerations. Let it 
ever be our serious desire and determination, in the numerous 
perplexities and temptations of life, to look constantly to that 
benificent Power, who presides over the destiny of men and 
of worlds, and without whom, (whatever human pride may as- 



898 DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 

sert to the contrary,) there is no race to the swift, and no bat- 
tle to the strong. Every thing of a religious nature, the good- 
ness of God, the astonishing condescension and love of the 
Savior, the completeness and mercy of the great plan of sal- 
vation, the shortness and rapidity of time, the solemnities of 
death, the dread realities and pomp of the judgment day, a 
boundless eternity, the inconceivable joys of heaven, and the 
inconceivable wretchedness of a rejection from God's favour; 
all these things may operate upon the mind,either singly or with 
various forms and degrees of combination; and as they cluster 
around the great principles of action, they will be found infu- 
sing into them an element of vitality, and imparting a strength, 
which can be derived from no other source. The world is full 
of instances. In all periods of the history of the human 
race, men have witnessed the power of religious considera- 
tions in imparting patience, endurance, and vigour of pur- 
pose. They have seen it in the chamber of sickness, in the 
solitary dungeon, on the iron bed of torture, in the flaming fur- 
nace, in the voluntary exile among barbarous tribes, in hun- 
ger and cold and nakedness, in dens and caves of the earth, in 
desert islands and wildernesses. Other considerations may 
undoubtedly give strength, but those of religion give more; 
mere worldly motives may impart a considerable degree of 
vigour, but the ennobling incentives, drawn from the character 
and government of God, inspire an energy far more intense, as 
well as more elevated and pure. How many have been able 
to say with Pellico in the miseries of his ten years imprison- 
ment, "religion taught me to experience a sort of pleasure in 
my troubles, to resist and to vanquish in the battle appointed 
me by heaven! " How many in a yet higher strain have been 
able to say with the three pious friends of the prophet Daniel, 
" We are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be 



DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 399 

so, our God, whom we serve, is able to deliver us from the 
burning fiery furnace." How many in all ages of the world, have 
been. sustained by such unspeakable energy, extracted from the 
quickening elements of religion, that they could truly exclaim 
with the poor and suffering Waldenses, when encircled with 
fire and sword in their Alpine fastnesses, and hurled "mother 
ivith infant down the rocks," 

" Yet better were this mountain wilderness 
" And this wild life of danger and distress, 
" Watchings by night and perilous flight by day, 
" And meetings in the depths of earth to pray, 
" Better, far better, than to kneel with them, 
" And pay the impious rite thy laws condemn, 

END. 



400 NOTE. (SECTION OMITTED;.) 

§. 105 2 . The fact of laws of the will shown from the regularity 
of voluntary contributions and of deposites. 

We request the attention of the reader to another fact, which 
has a bearing on the great subject of the laws of the will. It 
cannot have escaped the notice of any one as a peculiarity of 
modern times, that there are a multitude of benevolent associ- 
ations, whose receipts depend wholly upon voluntary contribu- 
tions. But notwithstanding the fact of their income being 
wholly voluntary, which, if experience had not shown to the 
contrary, would be exceedingly discouraging, they proceed in 
their affairs with nearly or quite the same confidence, as if they 
had a fixed capital to operate with. They send out missiona- 
ries, establish schools, translate the Scriptures, explore un- 
known and barbarous countries, plant colonies, erect churches, 
and engage in other important and expensive undertakings, 
without a cent of money except what comes from voluntary 
gifts. They make their calculations beforehand as to what 
they can accomplish in a given time; and not unfrequently in- 
cur heavy expenses in anticipation of their receipts. Their true 
capital is a knowledge of the operations of the human mind un- 
der certain assignable circumstances. These circumstances 
they are in a good degree acquainted with; and hence are en- 
abled to anticipate the amount of their receipts for a given time 
with almost as much accuracy, as the merchant or farmer, who 
has an actual capital already in his possession to operate with. 
Does not this circumstance go with others to show, that the 
will has its laws ? 

We will not enlarge upon the subject, but merely observe, 
that it reminds us of another interesting fact somewhat analo- 
gous to this. It is, that banks issue bills and lend money upon 
their deposites, and often to a great amount. They take this 
course as they believe, and as they have undoubted reason to 
believe, with almost entire safety. By observation they ascer- 
tain that their customers, (although the ability of their custo- 
mers to do it evidently depends on a thousand apparent contin- 
gencies,) deposite a certain amount or nearly so, within a giv- 
en time. They find as a general thing, that the variation in 
the amount received in specified times, is not greater than the 
variation of the receipts of an individual, who is largely engag- 
ed in business. And they consider this state of things basis 
enough for very extended transactions. But could this possibly 
be, if the will were wholly exempt from fixed principles of action? 



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